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FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA

COMPILED IN THE
INTELLIGENCE BRANCH
DIVISION OF THE CHIEF OF THE STAFF
ARMY HEAD QUARTERS
INDIA

IN SIX VOLUMES

VOL. VI
EXPEDITIONS OVERSEAS

CALCUTTA
SUPERINTENDENT GOVERNMENT PRINTING, INDIA.
1911

26
CALCUTTA

SUPERINTENDENT GOVERNMENT PRINTING, INDIA
8. HASTINGS STREET

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


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PART I.

AFRICA AND THE MEDITERRANEAN.

E G Y P T



AFRICA AND THE MEDITERRANEAN.

CHAPTER I.

EGYPT AND THE SUDAN. THE COUNTRY AND PEOPLE.

EGYPT* is bounded on the north by the Mediterranean, on the west by the Great Desert, and on the east by a line drawn from Rafa to Akaba, the gulf of Akaba, and the Red Sea. The 22nd parallel of north latitude is the southern boundary of Egypt proper, but to the south of this the provinces of the Sudan extend almost to the equator.

The great area of desert, mountain, and plateau of which Egypt is mainly composed is intersected throughout its entire length from south to north by the valley of the Nile. Dealing with this valley first, the southern portion of it, from Wadi Halfa to Assuan, is known as Nubia, and is an inhospitable and rugged country through which the Nile flows in a rocky and narrow channel. North of this, between Assuan and Cairo, the Nile valley is known as Upper Egypt. Here it varies from 5 to 30 miles in width, and is enclosed to the east and west by the cliffs of the desert plateau. The soil of the valley is a deep alluvial deposit, and is highly cultivated. Near Cairo the river bifurcates into the Rosetta and Damietta branches, each about 140 miles in length. The district between these two arms is called the Delta, and is a rich alluvial plain, studded with towns and villages, and intersected by innumerable canals and watercourses. During flood season this plain is inundated, and communication is only possible by the railways and paths which run along the banks of the canals.

Turning to the deserts, to the west of the Nile lies the Lybian desert, a monotonous waste of sand and limestone, devoid of vegetation, and possessing water at only a few widely distant points; while to the east another desert, mountainous, and much cut up by dry watercourses, lies between the Nile and the Red Sea.

* See map facing page 66.

Egypt may be said to have two distinct climates. On the Mediterranean coast, and for 50 miles inland, the temperature throughout the year is usually mild, the air is damp, and in the winter months a certain amount of rain falls. South of this zone the climate is characterised by great dryness, with a wide range between the maximum and minimum temperatures. Upper Egypt is hotter than Lower Egypt, and at Assuan the summer heat is intense. After sundown, however, the temperature falls considerably, and the nights are usually cool and pleasant. At Cairo the annual rainfall averages only about $\cdot 1$ of an inch, while south of Assuan the country is practically rainless. The climate is, on the whole, a very healthy one, but fever and dysentery are liable to be brought on by chills, especially at sundown. The principal diseases of the country are ophthalmia and small-pox, and in the hot weather there are occasional outbreaks of cholera.

The native population of Egypt is composed mainly of Fellahin, Copts, and Bedouin. Of these the Fellahin, or peasantry, who form the bulk of the population, are Muhammadans, and are usually men of fine physique. The Copts (Christians) are the direct descendants of the ancient Egyptians, and are chiefly resident in the large towns. They number about 600,000, and most of them are engaged in the trades of goldsmiths and clothworkers, while a large percentage of the clerks in Government offices are drawn from this community. The Bedouin, or Arabs of the desert, are of two different classes. First, the Arabic-speaking tribes, who have probably immigrated from Syria and Arabia, and who occupy the deserts as far south as latitude 26° N.; secondly, the tribes who dwell in the desert between Kosseir, Suakin, and the Nile, namely the Haddowa, Bisharin, and Ababda, who speak a language of their own, and are probably descendants of aboriginal races. Further south, in the Sudan, are wild tribes, including the Baggara, who formed the backbone of the Khalifa's army. All these tribes are nomadic. Some of them are strict Muhammadans, and those from the south were famous for their fanatical support of the Mahdi, but the majority are little affected by their nominal religious beliefs. The typical Bedouin is of slender build, with thin neck and limbs, and a dark-brown complexion.

The common language of the country north of Khartum is Arabic.

It is unnecessary within the scope of this work to trace the history of Egypt further back than the year 1798. At that period the country

Outline of history.

formed a portion of the Ottoman Empire, but the Mameluke Beys, from whom it had been wrested by the Turks some three centuries previously, were beginning to get the reins of government once more into their own hands. It was in these circumstances that

Napoleon's invasion.

Napoleon, who had always realised the strategical value of the country, landed in Egypt on the 1st July, 1798, with the avowed intention of chastising the Mameluke Beys and restoring the country to the Turks. Hardly, however, had he entered Cairo in triumph, when his fleet was destroyed by Nelson at Aboukir Bay, and his communications with France severed. The Porte meanwhile entered into an alliance with England and Russia, and declared war against the French. Two Turkish armies were at the same time collected; one to march through Syria on Cairo, the other to embark at Rhodes for Damietta. Napoleon, with his usual promptitude, at once seized the initiative, and marched with a force of 13,000 men to capture Acre and defeat the Turks in Syria. His siege of Acre was, however, unsuccessful, and he accordingly withdrew to Egypt. Thence, having defeated the Turkish army which had landed at Aboukir Bay, he embarked for France on the 22nd August, 1799, leaving a large force behind him in possession of the country, under the command of General Kleber. During the following year Kleber succeeded in defeating two Turkish forces sent against him, but on June 1800 he was assassinated by a fanatic, and the command of the French army of occupation now devolved on a man of weak and vacillating character named Menou.

In 1801 the British Government decided to drive the French from Egypt, and with this object in view

British Expedition, 1801.

Sir Ralph Abercrombie was despatched with a force of 12,000 men to Aburkir Bay. Abercrombie, opposed by only 1,500 men, made a successful landing at Abukir on the 8th March, but from that date the fighting was heavy, and between the 8th and 13th March the British lost 1,700 men killed and wounded.

Menou now joined the French at Axandria with large reinforcements from Cairo, and attacked the British on the 19th; but after a severe action, in which the English lost 1,500 men, including Sir R. Abercrombie, the French were defeated and driven into Alexandria. The arrival of a Turkish army to reinforce the British now enabled Sir John Hutchinson, who had assumed command of the expedition, to take the offensive. Leaving 6,000 men under General Coote to watch Menou, he marched on Cairo with 5,000 British and 4,000 Turkish troops, and on 26th May was reinforced by a second Turkish Army under the command of the Grand Wazir. Meanwhile it was decided to send an Indian contingent to co-operate from the Red Sea, and this force landed at Kosseir on the 8th June, whence they proceeded to Kena on the Nile. Cairo capitulated on the 27th June, the French garrison being allowed to march out with all the honours of war, and to embark for France at Rosetta. Alexandria was surrendered on the same terms as Cairo on the 2nd September, and General Menou embarked for France with all his troops on the 14th. In 1803 the English evacuated Egypt, and a reign of anarchy now ensued in the country, while Turk,

Rise of Mehemet Ali. Mameluke, and Albanian struggled for supremacy and ravaged the land. Finally

the populace, oppressed beyond measure, rose against the Turkish Governor, and elected Mehemet Ali, chief of the Albanians, and founder of the present Khedival line, as Pasha, an appointment which was recognised by the Porte in 1806. Meanwhile the face of European politics had changed, and England was engaged in operations against Turkey. With a view to striking a blow at the

Porte the British Government now despatched another expedition to Egypt in March, 1807, under the command of General Frazer. This expedition was, however, unsuccessful; after a severe defeat at El Hamad, terms were made with the Turks, and the British force embarked for Malta.

Second expedition to Egypt, 1807.

Egypt now passed through various phases of fortune with which this history has no concern, and the next period to be noted is the year 1876. In this year the extravagance of the Khedive, Ismail Pasha, had brought the country to the verge of bankruptcy and the unfortunate inhabitants were the victims of an extortionate

taxation and a corrupt system of justice. Pressure was accordingly brought to bear on the Khedive by the two Powers most interested in the country, England and France, and a dual control was established. In 1879 Ismail was deposed by the Sultan at the request of the above Powers, and Tewfik appointed Khedive in his stead. In 1881 as a protest against the way in which all the

Military revolt, 1881.

higher appointments in the army were given to Turks and Circassians instead of to native Egyptian officers, a military revolt broke out in Cairo, headed by Colonel Ahmed Bey Arabi. By the middle of May, 1882, Arabi had obtained the executive power in Egypt, the Khedive retaining little more than his title. Some time previously the British and French Governments had given the Khedive an assurance of their support, and on the 20th May the allied fleets entered Alexandria. On the 11th June serious riots broke out between the Christians and Muhammadans in that town. As a result a religious excitement, which had long been smouldering among the Muhammadans, was awakened throughout the country, and in three weeks some two-thirds of the Christian population had fled to Europe. On the 24th June the English and French Controllers, who till then had held decisive authority as representatives of the protecting powers, received notice that they would no longer be allowed to sit in council with the Egyptian Ministry, and Arabi announced his intention of resisting by arms any attempt to restore order by landing troops. At the same time it was announced that the Sultan had conferred on Arabi the first class of the order of the Medjidie.

Great alarm now began to be felt as to the safety of the Suez Canal; and the safeguarding of the indispensable fresh-water canal necessitated preparations for an advance on Cairo. The French Government at this time decided to take no part in the coming operations, and England was left to act alone. Arrangements for the expedition were quickly completed at home; a division was asked for from India; and on the 17th July British troops landed at Alexandria. On the 20th August the British base was changed to Ismailia. On the 13th September Arabi's army was crushed at Tel-el-Kebir; and Cairo surrendered to Sir Garnet Wolseley on the following day.

3rd Egyptian Expedition,
1882.

We must now turn to notice affairs in the Sudan. General Gordon had been appointed Governor-General of the Equatorial Provinces in 1874. In 1875 Darfur and Harrar were annexed, and Gordon was made Governor-General of the Sudan, where he laboured to destroy the slave trade and to establish just government. In 1879 he returned to Cairo, and was succeeded by Rauf Pasha Misrule and oppression now began afresh; the slave-traders were prepared to revolt, and a leader was to hand in Muhammad Ahmad.

Events in the Sudan, 1879-1884. In 1881 an expedition sent by Rauf Pasha to capture this man was destroyed, and Ahmad proclaimed himself Mahdi. Thus, when the Egyptian army was broken up at Tel-el-Kebir, the Sudan was already in flames. The rebellion spread rapidly, and in March, 1883, Major-General Hicks, who had been appointed Chief of the Staff of the Sudan Army by the Khedive, found himself at Khartum with a force of only 2,000 troops of little value. He advanced against the Mahdi's forces, but his command was practically destroyed at El Obeid in November. It was now determined to evacuate the Sudan, and in January, 1884, General Gordon left for Egypt to assist in the execution of this measure. Meanwhile Osman Digna had invested Sinkat and Tokar, and General Baker, who, with a mixed force of 2,500 men and 10 British officers, had proceeded to the relief of those places, was routed at El Teb. Suakin was now in danger, and on the 6th February, 1884, British bluejackets and marines were landed for the defence of the town. A policy of non-intervention in Sudanese affairs being no longer possible, it was now decided to send a British force of 4,400 men and 8 guns, under Major-General Sir G. Graham, to effect the relief of Tokar. On the 28th February Graham's force was disembarked at Trinkitat, and, advancing towards Tokar the next day, came under fire at El Teb. The enemy were defeated with great loss; Tokar was relieved; and the force returned to Trinkitat, whence they embarked for Suakin. An advance was then made upon Tamai, which was occupied after some severe fighting. The force was then re-assembled at Suakin and broken up.

It now became necessary to relieve Gordon at Khartum, but the expedition despatched for that purpose arrived too late.

Death of Gordon.

In February, 1885, Lord Wolseley urged the necessity of immediate action against Osman Digna, and with this object a large force, including a brigade from India, was concentrated at Suakin by the end of March. For political reasons, however, the withdrawal of the troops from the Sudan was ordered on 11th May; and nothing was achieved.

During the Dongola campaign of 1896 an Indian brigade reached Suakin for garrison duty, thus relieving the Egyptian troops for service on the Nile, and returned to India in November of the same year.

The power of the Khalifa and Mahdism was finally broken in 1898, and in 1900 Osman Digna was captured.

CHAPTER II.

THE EGYPTIAN EXPEDITION OF 1801.

IN January, 1801, it was decided to send an expedition from India for the capture of Batavia and Mauritius from the French. For this purpose a force consisting of His Majesty's 10th and 89th Regiments, with detachments from the 86th and 88th, a corps of Bengal sepoy who had volunteered for the service, and two companies of European and Native Artillery, were assembled at Trincomali under the orders of Colonel Wellesley, afterwards Duke of Wellington.

Shortly before the expedition sailed, Lord Wellesley, the Governor-General, decided to supersede his brother in the chief command, owing to the superior claims of General Sir David Baird. The latter officer now made all preparations to proceed from Calcutta to take up his new appointment; but, on the eve of his departure, orders arrived from England to the effect that, instead of attacking Batavia, the expedition should, in agreement with previous suggestions made by the Governor-General, be sent to the Red Sea, to co-operate with the army of Sir Ralph Abercrombie in the expulsion of the French from Egypt.*

The detailed plan of the Home Government was to send a battalion, some cavalry, and a few guns from the Cape, to be reinforced by the Indian Contingent; and the actual objects of the expedition were (1) to drive the French from Kosseir, Suez, and any other ports in the Red Sea of which they might be in possession; (2) in co-operation with Sir Ralph Abercrombie's army, to force the French from Upper Egypt; and (3) to conciliate the Egyptian population to our interests. Owing to the expected arrival of the Cape force in the Red Sea by the end of February, every effort was to be made to despatch the Indian contingent as quickly as possible.

* See map facing page 66.

These orders, in addition to being sent to the Governor-General, had also been repeated to the Governors of Fort St. George and Bombay, with the result that on General Baird's arrival at Trincomali he found that Colonel Wellesley (unaware as yet of his supersession) had, with his usual promptitude, already sailed to Bombay with the expedition, there to make further preparations for the voyage to the Red Sea. General Baird accordingly followed on to Bombay, writing at the same time an express letter to Colonel Wellesley, in which he was careful to inform him that he (Wellesley) had "been appointed second in command."

Arriving at Bombay on the 31st March, General Baird found that several transports were nearly ready for sea. On the 3rd April, by dint of much hard work, the first six were able to sail, Colonel Beresford being in command. It was the General's intention to have accompanied this detachment, but owing to the sudden illness of Colonel Wellesley his departure was delayed till the 6th. Colonel Wellesley's indisposition proved so severe that he was finally obliged to give up all idea of accompanying the expedition, and returned to his command in Mysore; nor is it without interest to note that the very vessel on which he was to have sailed foundered with all hands in the Red Sea.

It is unfortunate that available records make no mention of the arrangements for the embarkation and disembarkation of the troops for this expedition, nor of the number of transports that were employed.¹ It is, however, to be noted that the total

| | |
|---|---|
| Strength of the Indian Con- tingent. | strength of the Indian contingent was 166 officers, 54 native officers, 279 non- commissioned officers, 4,363 rank and file, and 477 gun lascars. |
|---|---|

These numbers include the 1st and 7th Bombay Regiments, now added to the force, in addition to the units mentioned on page 8.

To save time, the transports were sent off in detachments as soon as ready for sea. Mocha and Jeddah were to be ports of call, and the fleet was apparently to concentrate in the neighbourhood of Kosseir. Suez was to be the port of final disembarkation for the march inland.

¹The arrangements for the disembarkation of Sir R. Abercrombie's force in the face of the enemy at Aboukir (which do not come within the scope of this work) are of

great interest, and are given in detail in Wilson's "History of the British Expedition to Egypt," 1803.

All supplies for the expedition, including rations for the Cape troops, were to be sent in store ships from Bombay.

General Baird reached Mocha on the 25th April, and found that Beresford's six transports, together with a detachment of Bombay sepoys under Colonel Murray, who had arrived at that place some time before, had already sailed for Jeddah. Anxious lest these officers should attempt to capture Kosseir with insufficient force, he now sent orders to them to await his arrival before taking any offensive action. Meanwhile he began to make arrangements for the supply of transport camels for his force, inducing a prominent native to accompany him to Jeddah with a view to obtaining the co-operation of the *Sharif* of Mecca in that respect.

Owing to the lateness of the season the monsoon now made it impossible to reach Suez by sea; and the General's difficulties will be realised when it is stated that he had at present not one camel in his force for the now necessary march across the desert from Kosseir, nor, owing to the influence of the French, was it expected that any could be obtained at that place. The only transport animals in the force were some bullocks brought from Bombay, and owing to the distance from Kosseir to the Nile,¹ and the known scarcity of water and forage in the desert, these would be quite incapable of carrying more than their own requirements for the journey. To make matters worse, the navigation of the Red Sea was at that time fraught with difficulties, the few charts in existence being confessedly inaccurate. As evidence to the truth of this fact it is to be noted that seventeen ships of the transport fleet foundered on the voyage.

On arrival at Jeddah, Baird received news of the British successes in Egypt, and of the death of Abercrombie. He also learnt that the only places now occupied by the French were Cairo and Alexandria. Beresford and Murray, not having received their orders, had meanwhile proceeded to Kosseir.

On the following day the *Sharif* of Mecca arrived, and much to Baird's relief promised his assistance in procuring camels and horses. He also offered to raise an Arab force to co-operate with the British, but this offer Baird hesitated to accept.

¹ The nearest point on the Nile was Kena, or Gena, distant 120 miles from Kosseir.

On the 26th May, just as the General was sailing for Kosseir, Sir H. Popham arrived from the Cape with the information that a part of the 61st Regiment, some Light Dragoons, and a detachment of artillery were hourly expected, but that when he left Mocha no news was to hand about the remainder of troops and store ships from Bombay. Sir D. Baird now sailed for Kosseir, which was reached on the 8th June.

Kosseir was a cluster of mud hovels, and the coast was barren and inhospitable. The water was bad, and altogether the place was singularly uninviting.

General Baird found that Murray, who had been at Kosseir about three weeks, had succeeded in collecting sufficient transport for his own detachment.¹ He consequently decided that these troops should move forward to the Nile at the first opportunity, and resolved himself to follow so soon as the remainder of the army should arrive.

On the 15th June General Baird received a letter from General Hutchinson, commanding the British army in the neighbourhood of Cairo, dated 13th May. In this letter General Hutchinson stated his intention of pushing on towards Cairo with a view to containing the French force at that place, and preventing them from interfering with the disembarkation of the Indian contingent at Suez,² or with their subsequent junction with the army of the Grand Wazir. He also informed General Baird that he had requested the Wazir to lend him all possible assistance in the way of guides and transport. He gave a dismal account of the route from Suez to the Nile, but hoped that the Indian troops would find it less trying than those lately arrived from Europe. He held out no hopes of being able to help in the matter of supplies, and in fact suggested that a loan from General Baird would be welcomed, as, owing to the European ports being closed, his own force was in dire straits for money.

¹ It is interesting to note the very large amount of transport considered necessary in these days. Murray is said to have had 5,000 camels at this time, and yet these

were only "sufficient for his own detachment."

² General Hutchinson was of course unaware at this time that Baird's force would have to disembark at Kosseir.

Baird in reply informed General Hutchinson of his inability to reach Suez by sea, and of his consequent landing at Kosseir. He also informed him that he intended to send Colonel Murray across the desert to Kena, to reconnoitre the route and to get into communication with the British army. Murray started a few days later, and finding that water was procurable in small quantities at a few places along the route,¹ sent back the welcome intelligence to the base. The General thereupon decided to push forward at once, in small detachments, and the first body of troops, under the command of Colonel Beresford, started on the 19th June.

General Baird accompanied the first detachment to its camp, twelve miles from Kosseir. Here it was discovered that a large number of mussacks had leaked badly, and as the local supply of water was insufficient for the force, orders for the march of the second detachment from Kosseir the following day had to be cancelled, their camels and mussacks being used to carry water to Colonel Beresford's troops that night. The difficulties of water-supply, owing to the majority of the mussacks being faulty, now increased daily, while, to make matters worse, what water there was turned out to be of so brackish a nature that the troops were attacked by a violent form of dysentery. At one time,

indeed, it seems that General Baird
 March across the desert. seriously contemplated abandoning his

attempt to cross the desert and bringing back to the base the troops who had already started. By dint of careful staff work, however, these difficulties were eventually overcome. New wells were dug wherever possible, and posts with supply depôts were organized along the line wherever water existed. The troops were moved across the desert in small detachments, and detailed orders for the conduct of the march were issued to the officers commanding each party. A copy of these orders is given in Appendix C. By the 6th July a large part of the Indian Contingent had reached Kena, but there were still a number of transports that had not yet arrived at Kosseir.

Three days later, not having heard again from Hutchinson, General Baird wrote to the Duke of York, in England, for instruc-

¹ It was discovered that water was to be obtained by digging, and by watching and following up Arab horseman, who periodically collected round wells.

tions as to the part his force was to play; but before an answer could be obtained, news arrived to the effect that the French had entered into a treaty with General Hutchinson for the surrender of Cairo.

Thinking that his services would no longer be required, Baird now ordered preparations to be made for a return to Kosseir, whence he hoped to be able to start on the original expedition to Mauritius. The following day, however, he received the long-expected despatch from General Hutchinson. In it he was informed that owing to rumours of large reinforcements being on their way from Europe to join the French at Alexandria, the early capture of that port was of vital necessity. The British army from Cairo had already marched north, and expected to reach Rosetta on the 29th July. Baird was to procure boats as quickly as possible, and to follow on to that place with all his force at the earliest opportunity.

Baird accordingly prepared for an immediate advance with those of his troops which had already arrived. The Nile having now risen to such an extent that a march along its banks was out of the question, he decided to send the bulk of his stores and guns, and all his weakly men, by water, and to proceed with the remainder by the inland route. He also decided to leave two battalions to guard his communications between Kena and the sea.

About this time four companies of the 61st Regiment from the Cape, two companies of the 80th, the Bengal Horse Artillery, and some artillery and pioneers from India, arrived at Kosseir, but this addition to his force was accompanied by the unfortunate intelligence that several of his transports had foundered in the Red Sea.

As many river boats as were required were quickly obtained, and on the 27th August General Baird's force was concentrated at Rhouda. Colonel Montresor had meanwhile been sent forward to Rosetta to arrange with the inhabitants for provisions for the remainder of the journey to that place.¹

¹Colonel R. T. Wilson, in his "History of the British Expedition to Egypt," writes:—"Nothing of note occurred during General Baird's passage from Kena to Rosetta.

The inhabitants furnished the different supplies very readily, for which, to their astonishment, they were immediately paid.

On the 30th August General Baird reached Rosetta. He desired to advance on Alexandria immediately; but to his intense disappointment received an order from General Hutchinson to the effect that the French had already sent out a flag of truce, and were on the point of capitulating, and that the Indian Contingent was therefore to halt.

Fall of Alexandria.

Two days later the garrison of Alexandria—the last remnant of the French army in Egypt—surrendered to General Hutchinson, thus bringing the war in that country to an end. General Baird's troops had been so far unfortunate as not to see a shot fired throughout the campaign.

The British Government now decided that Egypt should be garrisoned until the end of the war by 6,000 of General Hutchinson's army and the whole of the Indian Contingent, the combined force to be under the command of Lord Cavan. To this course General Baird at first vigorously objected, stating that it was quite wrong that Indian troops (both British and Native) should be brigaded together with troops from England, whose regulations and pay were so entirely different. Subsequently, however, he withdrew his objections, and consented to serve under Lord Cavan's command.

Rumours of a treaty of peace between England and France now became frequent, and General Baird began to make preparations for his return to India. His transports were already waiting for him at Suez, and the knowledge that their hire was costing the East India Company £40,000 a month made the General all the more anxious to embark as early as possible. Definite news, however, was long in coming, and it was not until the 30th April that despatches arrived from England announcing the Treaty of Amiens, and giving orders for General Baird's force to proceed to Suez *en route* to India.

Declaration of peace.

General Baird had already caused accurate reconnaissances of the road from Cairo to Suez to be made, so there was no need of further delay. With the exception of the 10th, 61st, and 88th Regiments (which were to proceed to England) the whole force

proceeded on the 7th May towards Gizeh; whence, crossing the desert in successive detachments by five easy marches, they reached Suez on the 25th May. Here the transports were found ready for the troops, and, after a short delay occasioned by the necessity of fitting up accommodation for 230 Arab horses which Baird had purchased for the use of the cavalry in India, the whole fleet sailed southward on the 5th June.

The total deaths from disease in Egypt amongst the Indian Contingent amounted to 309 Europeans and 700 natives.

Writing of the Indian troops who took part in this expedition, Colonel Wilson, the historian of the war, says: "The Indian army attracted much surprise and admiration. The Turks were astonished at the novel spectacle of men of colour being so well disciplined and trained. . . . Never were finer men seen than those which composed this force, and no soldiers could possibly be in higher order."

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APPENDIX, A.

Composition of the Army under the command of Sir D. Baird.

Staff.

| | | |
|------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------------|
| Major General Baird, | 54th Foot, | Commander-in-Chief. |
| Colonel Auchmuty, | 10th Foot, | Adjutant-General. |
| Colonel Murray, | 84th Foot, | Quarter Master General. |
| Major Macquarie, | 77th Foot, | Deputy Adjutant-General. |
| Captain Falconer, | 71st Foot, | Deputy Quarter Master General |
| Captain Molle, | Scotch Brigade, | A. D. C. |
| Colonel Beresford, | 88th Foot, | G. O. C. Right Brigade. |
| Lt.-Colonel Montresor, | 80th Foot, | G. O. C., Left Brigade. |
| Lieutenant White, | 13th Dragoons, | Brigade-Major. |

Troops.

| | |
|------------|-------------------------------------|
| Detachment | Royal Artillery.* |
| Ditto | Bengal Horse Artillery. |
| Ditto | Bengal Foot Artillery. |
| Ditto | Madras Artillery. |
| Ditto | Bombay Artillery. |
| Ditto | Royal Engineers. |
| Ditto | Bengal Engineers. |
| Ditto | Madras Engineers. |
| Ditto | Bombay Engineers. |
| Ditto | Madras Pioneers. |
| Ditto | His Majesty's 8th Light Dragoons.* |
| Ditto | Ditto 10th Foot. |
| Ditto | Ditto 61st Foot.* |
| Ditto | Ditto 80th Foot. |
| Ditto | Ditto 86th Foot. |
| Ditto | Ditto 88th Foot. |
| Ditto | Bengal Volunteers, Native Infantry. |
| Ditto | 1st Bombay Native Infantry. |
| Ditto | 7th Bombay Native Infantry. |

* From the Cape.

APPENDIX B.
Disembarkation return of the Troops under the Command of Major-General Baird.

| | OFFICERS. | | | | | | | | | | N.-C. O.'s AND MEN. | | | | | LASCARS. | | | | |
|--|----------------------|---------|-----------|--------------|----------|--------------|------------|------------------|-----------|---------------------|---------------------|-----------|-------------|-----------|-----------|----------------|-----------|--------------|--------------|-----------|
| | COMMISSIONED. | | | | | STAFF. | | | | | NATIVE. | | Conductors. | Sergents. | Drummers. | Rank and file. | Syraings. | 1st Tindals. | 2nd Tindals. | Lascaars. |
| | Lieutenant-Colonels. | Majors. | Captains. | Lieutenants. | Ensigns. | Pay Masters. | Adjutants. | Quarter Masters. | Surgeons. | Assistant Surgeons. | Subadars. | Jemadars. | | | | | | | | |
| Royal Artillery | .. | .. | 2 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 | 1 | 1 | 41 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Bengal Horse Artillery | .. | .. | 1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 | .. | 1 | .. | 1 | 6 | .. | 69 | .. | 1 | 3 | 51 |
| Bengal Foot Artillery | .. | .. | 2 | 1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 | .. | 1 | .. | 1 | 7 | .. | 74 | .. | 3 | 3 | 87 |
| Madras Artillery | .. | 1 | 1 | 2 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 5 | 2 | 84 | .. | 6 | 5 | 143 |
| Bombay Artillery | .. | .. | 2 | 4 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 2 | 7 | 1 | 133 | .. | 6 | 5 | 158 |
| Royal Engineers | .. | .. | 1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Bengal Engineers | .. | .. | .. | 1 | 2 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Madras Engineers | .. | .. | .. | 1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Bombay Engineers | .. | .. | .. | 1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Madras Pioneers | .. | .. | 1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| His Majesty's 8th Light Dragoons | .. | .. | 1 | 2 | 1 | .. | 1 | .. | .. | 1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| " 10th Foot | .. | 2 | 6 | 16 | 5 | .. | 1 | 1 | 2 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| " 61st " | .. | 2 | 9 | 18 | 7 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| " 80th " | .. | 1 | 3 | 9 | 1 | .. | .. | .. | 2 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| " 86th " | .. | 2 | 4 | 8 | 1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| " 88th " | .. | 2 | 1 | 7 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Bengal Volunteers, Native Infantry | .. | .. | 2 | 10 | 1 | .. | 1 | .. | .. | .. | 6 | 6 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| 1st Bombay Native Infantry | .. | 1 | 1 | 11 | .. | .. | 1 | .. | 1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| 2d Bombay Native Infantry | .. | 1 | 1 | 13 | .. | .. | 1 | 1 | 1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| TOTAL | 10 | 9 | 42 | 104 | 19 | 2 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 12 | 26 | 28 | 5 | 332 | 125 | 5,227 | 6 | 16 | 16 | 439 |

APPENDIX C.

Instructions for Officers Commanding Detachments proceeding from Kosseir to Kena.

1. You will proceed with the detachment under your command on the evening of the to the New Wells, distance about 11 miles.

2. The wells are a little off the road, therefore be careful not to pass them, nor allow your camels and baggage to miss them. An officer's party is stationed at the wells. On your arrival there, which will be about 11 o'clock at night, you should not allow your men to straggle about, or keep each other awake, as a good night's rest will enable them to make the march of the next night with more alacrity. In the morning half a pint of wine should be given to each man, and their rice, which they must cook for that day and the following.

3. The men's canteens should be filled with *congu*, or the water in which rice has been boiled; and just previous to their marching, another half pint of wine should be issued to them, to mix with their *congu*. The men should be kept in their tents, and as quiet as possible during the heat of the day.

4. The musselsacks, or water-bags, will be filled up at the wells if any should have leaked out.

5. As you will find plenty of water at the wells of course you will not use any of the water carried from here. But be extremely careful of your musselsacks, that they do not get damaged, particularly in lifting them on and off the camels, which ought to be done with a tent pole.

6. On the evening of the you will proceed half-way to Moilah, which is about 33 or 34 miles from the wells; therefore if you start from the wells at five o'clock in the evening, and march till twelve at night, you will have marched seventeen and a half miles (at the rate of two and a half an hour), or half-way to Moilah. You will halt there, and in the morning issue half a pint of wine per man, and the rice which was cooked the previous day. No water is to be had at this halting place; you will therefore issue to your troops and followers from your casks and musselsacks a proportion of water. Two gallons of water for each man is sent with you, with an allowance for leakage. You should therefore in the morning issue a gallon per man, and fill the canteens in the evening before your march. If you find you will have water to spare you will issue it at your discretion. On the evening of the you will proceed

to Moilah, where you will find an officer's party. Water and provisions are to be had there. You will indent on the commissary for two days' provisions, to be carried with you, to serve on the way to Legaitte.

7. If you find your men much fatigued, you may halt one day and night at Moilah, and on the following evening you will proceed to the advanced wells about nine miles beyond Moilah. There you will fill up your mussacks, and cook rice for the following day. Your next march is half-way to Legaitte, which is about 35 miles from the advanced wells. You will take the same precautions and measures on this march as directed in that from the wells to Moilah; for as there is no water till you arrive at Legaitte, you must carry your provisions cooked for one day, and be very careful of your water. Your next march is to Legaitte, where you will find water and provisions. You may halt there a day and night if you find it necessary. Your two next marches carry you to Kena, distant 28 miles.

8. Every halting day the camel-drivers are to receive forty comaffes for each camel. The deputy quartermaster general will advance the money if you require it; 450 comaffes are equal to one dollar. You will endeavour to conciliate the drivers as much as possible, lest they desert. One headman will have the charge and direction of them, and you will give your orders through him.

9. You will write to me from the New Wells, Moilah, and Legaitte, mentioning any inconveniences or impediments you may have met with, and whether you halt, in order that the succeeding detachments may be guided by it. You will find fresh meat at Moilah and Legaitte, which you will issue to your men, also spirits, as your wine must be issued only on marching days. You have with you one gallon of wine for each European soldier which is to be issued on marching days at the rate of one pint per man.

10. You will endeavour to dissuade your men from drinking a great quantity of water, which has been found very hurtful and weakening; and when you are at those stations where water can be had, your men should be marched to the wells to fill their canteens morning and evening, and no more should be allowed. At those places where they cannot cook their victuals they must be persuaded to eat what is cooked the day before, as they will not otherwise be able to perform the succeeding march through faintness and weakness.

Route from Kosseir to Kena.

| | | |
|--------------------------|----|----------------------------------|
| Kosseir to the New Wells | .. | 11 miles ; water to be had. |
| Half-way to Moilah | .. | 17 miles ; no water. |
| Moilah (El Moella) | .. | 17 miles ; water and provisions. |
| Advanced wells | .. | 9 miles ; water. |

| | | |
|-------------------------|----|----------------------------------|
| Half-way so Legaitte .. | .. | 19 miles ; no water. |
| Legaitte (El Geita) .. | .. | 19 miles ; water and provisions. |
| Baromba (Bir Ambar) .. | .. | 18 miles ; water. |
| Kena | .. | 10 miles ; the Nile. |
| | | — |
| | | 120 miles. |
| | | — |

(Sd.) J. MONTRESOR,
Lieutenant-Colonel.

HEADQUARTERS
7 AUG. 191

CHAPTER III.

THE EXPEDITION TO MALTA IN 1878.

As a result of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78 the Russian Government entered into the Treaty of San Stefano with Turkey, by which almost complete independence of Turkey was secured for the populations of the Christian provinces and a new Bulgarian State was to be created, with a seaport on the Ægean Sea. The English Government refused to recognise this treaty, Lord Beaconsfield openly declaring that it would put the whole south-east of Europe directly under Russian influence. Russia offered to submit the treaty to the perusal of a Congress, but argued that the stipulations which merely concerned Turkey and herself were for Turkey and herself to settle between them. This was an untenable position, as it was impossible for the Great Powers to allow Russia to force on Turkey any terms she might think proper. Turkey meanwhile asserted that she had been coerced into signing the treaty. At this juncture, at the end of March 1878, the British Government determined to call out the reserves, to occupy Cyprus, and to summon a contingent of Indian troops to Malta.

Orders for the preparation and despatch of the Indian Contingent were issued in April, 1878. The force, which was designated the Malta Expeditionary Force, was placed under the command of Major-General J. Ross, C.B., British Service, and consisted of two batteries of artillery, two regiments of Native Cavalry, four companies of Sappers and Miners, and six battalions of native infantry, details of which are given in the Appendix. In order to complete regiments to the full established strength, volunteers of similar class composition were called for, but only men of good character and in every way fit for field service were allowed to volunteer. Regiments giving volunteers were allowed to recruit up to their full establishment. All furlough men were recalled, and their travelling expenses paid by the State. Regulation Field Service kit had to be taken, and in addition Government granted a free issue to each man of two canvas frocks, two

pairs flannel drawers, two jerseys, two pairs warm socks, and one pair English boots. Followers received a free issue of clothing on the following scale:—one blanket, one pair pyjamas, one great-coat, one lascar coat, one pair boots, one tin canteen, one havresack, two pairs socks, and two jerseys. Regiments of Native Infantry drew extra batta, and ration money in lieu of rations at the rate of Rs. 3-8-0 per mensem, while public followers received an addition of 50 per cent. on pay and batta, in addition to free rations. Forage for all horses, mules, and ponies accompanying the force was supplied by the State, with such assistance as the regiments were able to render after landing. With regard to equipment, infantry regiments took 50 picks, 50 shovels, and 100 billhooks, packed in three pairs of camel khajawahs. Complete camp equipage was taken, and quartermaster's stores estimated for three months' supply accompanied regiments. Infantry took 200 and cavalry 100 rounds of ammunition per man. No land transport was sent, but 2,000 sets of pack saddles for mules were ordered to be made up. The whole of the force was embarked at Bombay, with the exception of the 25th Madras Infantry, who sailed from Cannanore. Embarkation was carried out under orders from the Assistant Quarter Master General, Bombay Army, but no details are available as to the length of time that was taken over fitting up and despatching the transports, or of any of the arrangements that were made for the embarkation of the troops. The transport fleet consisted of 12 steamers towing 15 sailing ships, and Appendix B gives the numbers of men and animals accommodated on each ship.

The troops reached Malta in May, and remained there about a month, when, owing to a peaceful agreement having been arrived at between England and Russia, they returned to India.

APPENDIX A.

Composition of the Malta Expeditionary Force.

Staff.

| | | |
|---|-------|-----------------------------------|
| Major-General J. Ross, C.B., British Service | .. | Commanding. |
| Brigadier-General J. Watson, C.B., Bombay Corps. | | Commanding Cavalry Brigade. |
| Brigadier-General H. T. Macpherson, V.C., C.B., Bengal Staff Corps. | .. | Commanding Infantry Brigade. |
| Major F. J. S. Adam, Bombay Staff Corps | .. | Assistant Quarter Master General. |
| Major W. F. Keays | | Assistant Commissary General. |
| Captain S. D. Barrow, 10th Bengal Lancers | .. | Brigade-Major, Cavalry. |
| Major R. M. Lloyd, Bombay Staff Corps | .. | Brigade-Major, Infantry. |
| Major J. G. Watts, Bombay Staff Corps | .. | Brigade-Major, Infantry. |
| Deputy Surgeon-General J. Beatty | .. | Principal Medical Officer. |

Troops.

M. Battery, 1st Brigade, Royal Artillery.
F. Battery, 2nd Brigade, Royal Artillery.
9th Bengal Cavalry.
1st Bombay Cavalry.
2 Companies (Queen's Own), Madras Sappers and Miners.
2 Companies, Bombay Sappers and Miners.
2nd (P. W. O.) Gurkhas.
9th Bombay Native Infantry.
13th Bengal Infantry.
31st Punjab Infantry.
25th Madras Infantry.
26th Bombay Infantry.

APPENDIX B.

Embarkation Return, Malta Expeditionary Force, 1878.

| Steamer. | Tonnage. | Corps. | DETAIL. | | | | | | Sailing ship. | Tonnage. | Corps. | DETAIL. | | | | | | |
|-----------|----------|--------------------------------------|--------------------|------------------|------------------|------------|---------|---------|------------------------------------|----------|--------|---|------------------|------------------|------------|---------|---------|----|
| | | | European officers. | Native officers. | Native soldiers. | Followers. | Horses. | Ponies. | | | | European officers. | Native officers. | Native soldiers. | Followers. | Horses. | Ponies. | |
| Goo | 1,906 | 25th Madras Native Infantry. | 6 | 10 | 363 | 111 | 5 | .. | <i>Embarked at Cananore.</i> | | 963 | 25th Madras Native Infantry. | 5 | 4 | 337 | 66 | 5 | .. |
| Maldia | 1,645 | 31st Bengal N.I. | 6 | 8 | 362 | 93 | 6 | .. | <i>1st Detachment from Bombay.</i> | | 1,302 | M.I. Royal Arty. and Commissariat | 3 | .. | .. | 81 | 85 | .. |
| Madura | 1,942 | 31st Bengal N.I. | 4 | 7 | 350 | 93 | 4 | .. | | | 1,582 | N.I. Royal Arty. | 3 | 68 | .. | 79 | 62 | .. |
| St. Ouyth | 3,541 | 2nd Gurkhas and G. O. C. and Staff. | 9 | 14 | 673 | 169 | 9 | .. | | | 1,869 | F. 2 Royal Arty. | 4 | 91 | .. | 85 | 86 | .. |
| Bengal | 2,103 | 13th Bengal N.I. | 6 | 10 | 520 | 128 | 6 | .. | | | 1,117 | F. 2 Royal Arty. | 3 | 68 | .. | 73 | 67 | .. |
| Canara | 1,903 | Madras Sappers and Park Field Train. | 9 | 4 | 239 | 90 | 9 | .. | <i>2nd Detachment from Bombay.</i> | | 1,418 | 13th Bengal N.I. Nos. 3 and 5 Coys. Bombay Sappers. | 4 | 12 | 4 | 186 | 48 | 2 |
| Bangalore | 2,342 | 9th Bombay N.I. | 1 | 2 | 88 | 15 | 5 | 1 | | | 1,709 | 1st Bombay Lancers. | 2 | .. | .. | 108 | 115 | 20 |
| Suez | 2,140 | 9th Bombay N.I. | 9 | 14 | 622 | 150 | 9 | .. | | | 1,435 | Ditto | 1 | .. | 94 | 16 | 99 | 20 |
| Nankin | 2,423 | 1st Bombay Lancers. | 4 | 7 | 93 | 220 | 110 | 20 | | | 1,252 | Ditto | 1 | .. | 82 | 28 | 87 | 20 |
| Marina | 1,357 | 26th Bombay N.I. | 6 | 10 | 432 | 114 | 6 | .. | | | 1,544 | Ditto | 1 | .. | 103 | 16 | 108 | 20 |
| Macedonia | 2,272 | 9th Bengal Cav. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | | | 1,258 | 9th Bengal Cav. | 1 | .. | 80 | 15 | 80 | 20 |
| Trinacria | 2,107 | 1st Bombay Lancers. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | | | 1,336 | Ditto | 1 | .. | 91 | 20 | 104 | 8 |
| | | | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | | | 1,481 | Ditto | 4 | .. | 104 | 22 | 121 | 20 |
| | | | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | | | 1,169 | Ditto | 2 | .. | 83 | 13 | 91 | 20 |
| | | | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | | | .. | Ditto | 2 | .. | 86 | 13 | 94 | 20 |

CHAPTER IV.

THE INDIAN CONTINGENT IN EGYPT, 1882.

In consequence of the military revolt in Egypt, headed by Arabi Bey, it was decided in July 1882 to despatch a British expedition to that country,* and that one division of the force should be furnished by India.

In accordance with this plan, a scheme was drawn up by the Commander-in-Chief in India (Sir Donald Stewart) for the despatch to Egypt of a division consisting of two infantry brigades with divisional troops. This scheme was approved by the Viceroy, and the selected troops were warned for active service on the 6th July. The composition of the force was as follows:—

| | | | |
|-----------------------------|----|----|---|
| Major General Commanding .. | | | Sir H. Macpherson, V.C., K.C.B. |
| 1st Brigade | .. | .. | 1st Battalion, Manchester Regiment. |
| | | | 1st Bengal Native Infantry. |
| | | | 20th Bengal (Punjab) Native Infantry. |
| | | | 25th Bengal (Rattray's Sikhs) Native Infantry. |
| 2nd Brigade | .. | .. | 1st Seaforth Highlanders. (This battalion, which was at Aden, was to be reinforced by 2 companies from the 2nd battalion at Lucknow and was to be replaced at Aden by the York and Lancaster Regiment.) |
| | | | 31st Madras Native Infantry. |
| | | | 16th Bombay Native Infantry. |
| | | | 29th Bombay Native Infantry. |
| | | | 7th Bengal Native Infantry. |
| Divisional Troops | .. | .. | 13th Bengal Lancers. |
| | | | 7-1st Northern Royal Artillery (six 7-prs. of 400lb). |

* See map, facing, page 66 (1).

| | | |
|--|---|---|
| Divisional troops (<i>continued</i>). .. | } | <p>7-1st London Royal Artillery (four 40-prs. ; two 6·3 howitzers.)</p> <p>5-1st North Irish Royal Artillery, (four 40-prs. two 6·3 howitzers.)</p> <p>2nd and 8th Companies, Bengal Sappers and Miners.</p> <p>A. and I. Companies, Madras Sappers and Miners.</p> |
|--|---|---|

In addition to the above, the 4th and 31st Madras Native Infantry were to be sent to Aden as a reserve.

Preparations for the despatch of this force were being actively pushed forward, and the reinforcements for the Seaforth Highlanders, the York and Lancaster Regiment, and the two companies of the Madras Sappers, had already sailed,¹ when on the 25th July

the Home Government telegraphed that the Indian Contingent should consist of only one British battalion (the Seaforths), three Native Infantry battalions, three regiments of Native Cavalry, and two companies of Sappers, together with two battalions of Native Infantry as a reserve at Aden. This necessitated a change of the Commander-in-Chief's plans; and between the 25th July and the 12th August still further changes were necessitated owing to the Home Government telegraphing, first for another British Infantry battalion, and subsequently for some artillery. The fact that the whole force was not detailed at the same time, but that orders to the various units to hold themselves in readiness to embark were thus spread over the period 6th July—12th August, should be remembered when investigations are made as to the time taken over the embarkation of the contingent.

The final organization and composition of the force, which was designated the "Indian Division, Egypt Expeditionary Force," is given in Appendix A. The port of disembarkation was to be Suez, and the Government of India were informed that orders as to its future employment would be communicated to General Macpherson by Sir Garnet Wolseley, General Commanding in Chief, on arrival at that place.

¹This move was carried out in accordance with a telegram from Home directing that the Seaforth Highlanders should be relieved at Aden immediately, and held in readi-

ness to proceed to Suez at a minute's notice, to safeguard the southern end of the Suez Canal. The Highlanders eventually embarked for Suez on the 2nd August.

With regard to the establishments of units, British Infantry were to embark as strong as possible, while artillery units were to be brought up to war strength by transfers of men and animals from other batteries. Native cavalry and infantry were to embark as near their field service strength of 550 and 832 as possible. Most of the units happened to be below strength at the time, but volunteers from other units were not allowed. The numbers of the 29th Bombay Native Infantry, however, were augmented by attaching one company of the 27th Bombay (Baluch) Native Infantry to that regiment. The force was equipped on a modified Kabul scale, full transport (mules) being allowed for all units.¹ Hospital accommodation was arranged on the basis of fifteen per cent. for troops and three per cent. for followers, or a total of 420 beds, of which 125 were to form $1\frac{1}{2}$ field hospitals, and 295 to serve as general hospitals. With regard to ambulance transport, doolies and dandies were taken in the proportion of five per cent. for troops and one per cent. for followers. These were divided into three bearer columns, each consisting of 23 doolies and 74 dandies. In addition to two water pakhals being taken for each company, four Macdermott filters were supplied to each company of British infantry.

It was arranged that the force should be rationed from India, Aden supplementing to some extent the supply of fresh meat. One month's rations were shipped for the voyage, and a further three months' for consumption on shore. Firewood being scarce and expensive in Egypt, each transport was to take a forty days' supply for the troops and followers on board, and as much more as room could be found for. A three months' supply of lime juice was also to be taken, calculated at the rate of one ounce per man per day.

Careful arrangements were made for water-supply for the contingent on arrival at Suez, that town depending entirely, at ordinary times, on the fresh-water canal. Though all the transports were

¹It was also decided to procure some camel transport locally. After Suez had been occupied, the British Admiral telegraphed that 5,000 camels could be obtained on hire locally, and the Government of India therefore requested him to obtain 750 for the

use of the contingent. On the Director of Transport reaching Suez, however, it was found that only 13 camels were available, and these were animals which had been captured from the enemy.

fitted with condensers, the expense of retaining them for water supply only would have been great, and they would besides have been a long way from the camp. It was therefore decided that the Admiralty should erect a condenser at Suez capable of producing 4,800 gallons in 24 hours, and should further send a steam tank vessel with a capacity of 40,000 gallons to that place, while the Indian Government arranged to despatch 511 casks and 130 iron tanks in the transports, with a total capacity of 78,000 gallons, for the further storage of water.

With regard to the provision of labour for disembarkation, it was suggested by the Admiral at Suez that a coolie corps of 400 men, with English-speaking headmen, should be enlisted in India; but as it was believed that an efficient corps could not be raised in time, the Government of India decided that camp-followers should be given working pay instead.

Turning to the arrangements for taking up transports, it was decided to despatch the York and Lancaster Regiment, the reinforcements for the Seaforth Highlanders, and the Madras Sappers, as a preliminary measure, prior to the embarkation of the whole force,¹ and orders were sent to Captain Brent, R.N. the Director of Indian Marine, on the 9th July, to take up shipping for these units. Two ships were accordingly taken up on the 10th July; work was started on them on the 11th; and on the 15th they were ready for the troops. No further orders were issued at the time; but on receipt of the Home Government's telegram on the 25th (*vide* page 26), Captain Brent was instructed to take up sufficient tonnage for the troops therein ordered; and between that date and the 12th August he was given instructions to charter the balance of ships required by the additional troops for which the Home Government had asked. The total tonnage required was 95,529 tons, and the actual amount taken up was 47 ship totalling tons 112,357.

The Prince's Dock was given up for the use of the expedition, and all sheds were cleared out and placed at the disposal of the military and naval authorities. By the 27th July 19 ships had

¹ *Vide* footnote, page 26.

been taken up, and were set to work to take in their ballast and complete fittings, some providing their own coal and some being supplied from Government stores. From previous experience it was found that the work of ballasting and coaling should precede that of fitting. As only fourteen transports could be accommodated at one time in Prince's Dock, arrangements were made with the Superintending Engineer, Bombay, the Municipal Engineer, Bombay, the Bombay Port Trust, the Peninsular and Oriental Company, the Great Indian Peninsular Railway, and the Bombay, Baroda, and Central India Railway, to fit up 12 ships, the remainder being fitted up by the dock authorities. Forty-two transports had been finished by the 13th August, and the remaining five were all ready by the 5th September. The shortest time taken to fit up a ship was two days, the longest six and a half days. Day work from 7 A.M. till 7 P.M. was all that was asked of the workmen, it being found that night work in the dark was useless. In order to make the transports as cool as possible in the Red Sea the sides of iron ships were matted inside, and all ships were painted white. With regard to the fittings, 400 horse stalls and 110 double mule stalls were supplied by the Bombay Dockyard, and 1,500 horse stalls, 2,500 double and 590 single mule stalls by the Public Works Department and the Bombay, Baroda, and Central India workshops, Bombay, while 500 mule stalls were sent by train from Calcutta. Captain Brent subsequently stated it as his opinion that Bombay could be expected in the future to fit out and start transports at the rate of one a day, *i.e.*, 20 in 20 days and so on.

The embarkation spread over the period 21st July—12th September, and with the exception of the
 Embarkation of troops. 20th Bengal and 29th Bombay Infantry who embarked at Karachi, and the 4th and 31st Madras Regiments who sailed from Madras, the whole force was embarked at Bombay. The procedure adopted was that as soon as ships were fitted up they were brought alongside 'E' and 'G' sheds, Prince's Dock, to take in their stores, whence they were taken alongside the jetty to receive the troops. The allotment of troops to transports was carried out by Captain Brent in communication with General Macpherson. All units to be embarked at Bombay were concentrated

at Deolali, whence they were railed down to the Prince's Dock jetty, and embarked direct from the trains. All units took half their baggage animals, and all their water mules on board their own transports, the remaining half of the baggage mules being sent off as far as possible in vessels sailing the same day as the units to which they belonged. This plan of embarking mules and men in the same ships was in the first instance objected to on the ground that some ships were better able to carry mules than others, and that the comfort of troops would be greater if all animals were placed in separate vessels ; but this objection was overruled by the Commander-in-Chief, who stated that he was convinced by history that the governing principle in preparing such expeditions was so to embark the force that every portion of it should be able to disembark completely equipped from the ship or ships conveying it. This, he stated, was absolutely necessary if the landing was likely to be opposed, and was the best means of preventing confusion and delay even if there were no opposition. It further had the advantage that the fact of any ships being detained would not affect the efficiency of the remainder of the force, and any ship could be diverted to a different port or landing place with the confidence that the troops on board could be landed in complete order.

A statement showing the number of transports used, their tonnage, and the numbers of men and animals that were embarked on them, is given in Appendix B.

In addition to fitting out the Indian Division, the Government of India also despatched to Egypt 1,763 tents for the use of the troops from England and a muleteer transport column consisting of 3 British officers, 5 British Non-Commissioned Officers, and 600 native personnel. The transport column, however, arrived in Egypt too late to be of use, and never joined the army.

It was at first arranged that all transports should be discharged at Suez ; but before these orders reached the Director of Indian Marine some of the ships had already been taken up for a month. Eventually it was decided by Sir Garnet Wolseley that all transports were to remain undischarged.

Occupation of Suez.

Owing to the daily increasing agitation in Egypt, on the 10th July all Europeans were ordered to quit Suez, and the Suez end

of the Eastern Telegraph Company's cable was disconnected from the shore and taken on board a lighter, whence it was on the 21st transferred to the Indian Marine ship *Amberwitch*, specially sent from Aden for the purpose. At this time the *Dragon* and the *Rexdy*, of the East Indian Squadron, were at Suez, and Admiral Hewett was on his way there from Ceylon with the *Euryalus* and the *Ruby*.

Meanwhile Alexandria had been bombarded and the forts wrecked on the 11th July. On the 13th Sir Beauchamp Seymour had landed his seamen and marines, and on the 17th the first troops from Cyprus were landed in Alexandria. It being desirable that a corresponding move should be made from the Indian side, Rear-Admiral Hewett landed his Naval Brigade on the 3rd August; and this step had the effect of making the Egyptian garrison, together with the greater part of the Arab population of the town, withdraw without doing any damage. Admiral Hewett's prompt landing thus saved the town from being burnt, but he has unfortunately too late to secure any rolling stock.

The Naval Brigade now took up an advanced position, comprising the waterworks, the Victoria hospital, and two hillocks on each side of the railway, in line with the above buildings. In order to obtain a reserve of fresh water the gates of the dry dock were closed and caulked, and hoses from the fresh-water canal were turned on into it. By this means 10,000 tons of water were stored, and the garrison rendered temporarily independent of the canal.

On the 8th August the Seafortths and the Madras Sappers arrived from Aden, and General Tanner, landing on the following day, took over command of the town from Admiral Hewett. The main body of the enemy was at this time at Nefiche, with cavalry piquets near Chalouf, 10 miles north of Suez; but no collisions took place for the next few days.

Meanwhile the army corps from England had been concentrating at Alexandria, and it had been decided to seize the Suez Canal and transfer the main body of the army to Ismailia, which was to be the base of operations against Cairo.

On the 20th August, simultaneously with the seizure of Ismailia from the north, 400 of the Seafortths advanced along the fresh-water canal on Chalouf, 200 more being embarked on *H.M.S.*

Mosquito and *Seagull* to attack the place from the east *via* the maritime canal. The importance of this move lay in the fact that Chalouf (where a considerable force of the enemy had lately arrived) gave possession of the Suez Canal between Suez and the Bitter Lakes, and in the fact that there were, at that point, lock gates connecting the fresh-water and the maritime canals, which, if opened, would deprive Suez of its water-supply. The brunt of the fighting in this action devolved on the party which proceeded by the maritime canal. As soon as this party had landed, one company proceeded direct to the lock and closed the gates, which had already been opened. The remainder of the force, covered by fire of the ships' 7-pounders and gatlings, advanced against the enemy, who, to the number of about 600, had taken up a position on the west side of the fresh-water canal. Lieutenant Lang, Seaforth Highlanders, swam across this canal under a heavy fire, and succeeded in bringing back a boat to the eastern side; and, with the help of this and two other boats now brought from the men-of-war, the little party crossed to the enemy's side of the water and drove them north with great loss. The enemy showed no lack of courage, but their shooting was so bad that only two sailors were wounded; while their own casualties amounted to 168 killed and 75 prisoners. A large number of rifles and a quantity of ammunition was also captured in this spirited affair.

The following day, the first detachment of the troops from India having reached Suez, the Highlanders were sent up the maritime canal to occupy Serapeum. Thus communication *via* the canal, between Ismailia and the Indian contingent at Suez, was secured.

Transport from India now began to reach Suez daily. The first five ships to arrive were unloaded alongside the jetty, advantage being taken in the case of those with large hatchways to walk the horses up inclined planks from the main deck, and thence by a gangway on to the quay. The horses were put under cover of the railway sheds until evening, the infantry being marched direct to the camp which had been marked out for them. On the 23rd, however, orders were received that the Indian contingent was to concentrate at Ismailia. No more troops therefore were disembarked at Suez, but all, except detachments for the lines of communication and two troops of cavalry who had landed on the 21st.

and whose horses were now in good condition, were re-embarked and taken up to Ismailia *viâ* the canal. The cavalry above mentioned were ordered to march to that place on the 25th, and reached their destination on the 27th without incident and without a single casualty among their horses. The advantage of sending troops and transport on the same ships was exemplified by this march, as the cavalry were able to proceed without in any way upsetting existing arrangements.

Concentration at Ismailia.

On the 27th August Divisional Headquarters reached Ismailia, and on the same day the first train from Suez reached that place. When Ismailia had been captured on the 20th, a few trucks had been secured, but no engine had fallen into our hands, nor were there any facilities for landing one there from the canal. An engine was accordingly sent from Alexandria to Suez, and the railway line having in the meantime been repaired, a train was made up at the latter place on the morning of the 27th and proceeded to Ismailia under escort of some bluejackets and sappers.

On this day a general order was published notifying that the cavalry of the army (with the exception of the 19th Hussars) was to be organized in a cavalry division under the command of Major-General Drury-Lowe. The First Brigade was to be composed of the Household Cavalry, the 4th and 7th Dragoon Guards; and the Second Brigade was to include all the Indian cavalry, namely, the 2nd and 6th Bengal Cavalry and the 13th Bengal Lancers.

On the 28th August a mountain battery and some troops of Native cavalry disembarked at Ismailia. On this day the enemy had attacked General Graham's force at Kassassin with superior numbers, and the action had only been brought to a successful conclusion by a charge of the Household Cavalry and 7th Dragoon Guards late in the evening.¹ At 10 P.M. orders were received by General Wilkinson, commanding the Indian cavalry brigade, to proceed to the front as soon as possible with all available troops, and he accordingly marched at midnight with three troops of the 13th Lancers, two of the 6th Cavalry and one of

¹ This force, a part of the British Contingent, had been pushed forward along the fresh-water canal on arrival at Ismailia, *vide* page 36 and "Military History of the Campaign of 1882," page 63.

the 2nd Cavalry. It was decided that, though now detached from General Macpherson, the Indian cavalry should continue to be rationed by the Indian commissariat, and previous to marching they were supplied with three days' rations. The advantage of sending transport animals in the same ships as the troops was again exemplified by the rapidity with which General Wilkinson was able to advance to the front on the receipt of orders.

By the 29th August fourteen transports of the Indian contingent had arrived at Ismailia, and began to disembark their troops and stores. The remainder of the cavalry were at once issued with three days' supplies and sent up to the front. As there was only one small pier and a jetty available for the disembarkation, and as these were already overcrowded by the English contingent, the Madras Sappers were ordered to construct a subsidiary landing pier 15 feet wide, and this they erected by means of large baulks and planking in four hours. This pier was afterwards found insufficient for the requirements of the Commissariat, and was lengthened 100 feet into deep water by means of carts brought from Suez, which supported beams on which planking was laid. A roadway of matting was also made over the heavy sand up to the canal banks. The inconvenience experienced by the Indian troops in having to swim their horses ashore and carry stores from lighters, in water up to their waists, was thus avoided. In this connection it is of interest to note a remark in the Official History of the expedition to the effect that the absence during the earlier period of the disembarkation of any organized gang of labourers was severely felt, the fatigue duties thrown on the soldiers, and the necessity for continuously teaching fresh bodies of men, representing an inconvenience which should be remembered on future occasions. "The necessity for these fatigues," adds the Official History, "abstracted from the front a number of men whom it might have been very inconvenient to detain at the base."

A general hospital for natives was pitched on the beach, and from it the more serious cases were regularly sent to the *Hydaspes*, which had been fitted up as a hospital ship at Suez.

On the 30th August the Seaforth Highlanders arrived at Ismailia from Serapeum, and marched to Nefiche, where they were joined by the 7th Native Infantry. Nefiche was ordered to be the advanced base of the Indian division, and its troops were to be concentrated there; but General Macpherson detained the 20th and 29th Native Infantry at Ismailia to furnish fatigue parties, as no labour was obtainable locally. On this day the mountain battery proceeded to Kassassin, where it was to be attached to the cavalry brigade.

Nine more transports arrived on the 30th, and the work of unloading was vigorously carried on, a number of *kahars* now being lent by the Ambulance to the Commissariat to assist in landing stores. Strenuous efforts were now made to push 30 days' supplies forward to Kassassin, which had been named as the advanced depôt for the Indian division. Only three trucks per day could at first be placed at General Macpherson's disposal for the supply of his troops at the front, but as it was found that fodder could be procured locally in the neighbourhood of Kassassin, only rations for the men were at first despatched. Meanwhile the troops on the lines of communication were supplied from Suez, and rations for the detachment at Nefiche were sent up the fresh-water canal in boats towed by mules.

In order to expedite the formation of the advanced depôt seven men-of-war's boats, towed by a steam launch, were placed upon the fresh-water canal on the 2nd September; and on the following day, two more engines having arrived from Suez, a regular service of three trains per diem was started from Ismailia to Kassassin. The sapper telegraph train (10 miles of wire and three offices) arrived about this time, and detachments of the Madras Sappers were set to work to learn its manipulation; but much difficulty was afterwards found in the construction of lines by the Madras men, as they were neither strong enough nor tall enough for the work.

By the 10th September 21 days' supplies for 5,000 combatants and 6,000 followers of the Indian division had been collected at Kassassin. By this time the majority of the Indian contingent had reached Ismailia, and the Manchester Regiment had been detailed as the garrison of that place.

Operations up to the 9th September.

Having now completed an account of the disembarkation of the Indian troops, we will turn to the operations of those units which had been sent up to the front previous to the general advance.

From Ismailia to Kassassin by the railway is $21\frac{1}{2}$ miles, *viz.*, to Nefiche $2\frac{1}{2}$, to El Magfar $7\frac{1}{2}$, to Tel-el-Maskhuta 11, to Mahsameh $18\frac{1}{2}$ and to Kassassin $21\frac{1}{2}$. South of the railway, and generally parallel to it, ran the fresh-water canal, whose waterway was about 20 yards broad. At Mahsameh on the canal was an irrigating sluice, and at Kassassin a lock. Since the army on its march to the Delta would have to depend entirely on the canal for its water-supply, and as this could easily be drained between Kassassin and Ismailia by shutting the above-mentioned lock or opening the sluices at Mahsameh, the first object of the British was to seize those two points as soon as possible. With this view General Wolseley advanced on the 24th from Nefiche with 2 battalions, 3 squadrons, 2 guns, and the mounted infantry, drove the enemy from El Magfar, and captured a dam which had been constructed at that place across the canal. He was there attacked by about 8,000 of the enemy with 20 guns, who had been encamped at Tel el Mahuta, but being reinforced by 5 battalions, 8 squadrons, and 4 guns, he succeeded in maintaining his position, and on the following day drove the enemy back on Tel-el-Kebir with great loss. Kassassin was occupied the same evening. On the 28th August, General Graham, who held Kassassin with $2\frac{1}{2}$ battalions, 2 guns, and a few dragoons and mounted infantry, was attacked by about 9,000 of the enemy, but he succeeded in holding his own, and General Drury Lowe's cavalry from Mahsameh, charging at the end of the day, drove the enemy back in confusion. No Indian troops took part in any of these actions, General Wilkinson's detachment, which had been the first to start for the front, having only left Ismailia on the night of the 28th.

General Wilkinson reached Kassassin on the 30th August. From that day until the 7th September reconnaissances of the enemy's position were frequently made, and the enemy in their turn made a few attacks on our piquets, but nothing of especial interest occurred.

By the 7th September the various reconnaissances which had been carried out had brought in a fair amount of information as to the nature of the enemy's position at Tel-el-Kebir. On the same day the railway was for the first time reported to be in working order, and was able to carry enough stores to provide for the whole army and to allow of some surplus. Accordingly arrangements were now made for the advance to the front of the whole of Sir A. Alison's brigade (which had arrived from Alexandria on the 1st September), of the Indian contingent, and of the remainder of the artillery, which had hitherto been kept back at Ismailia. On the 8th the final orders for the march to Kassassin, and the concentration at that place of the whole army, were issued. The march was so arranged that the last troops would reach Kassassin on the 12th September.

About this time Arabi Pasha had been informed by Bedouins that the British force at Kassassin was only a small one, and that they (the Bedouins) had cut off communication between Kassassin and Ismailia. He therefore decided to make a combined attack on the former place from Tel-el-Kebir and Es Salihiyeh on the 9th September. Needless to say the Bedouins' information was entirely incorrect, for the British at Kassassin now numbered 8,000 men, not including the Guards, a cavalry regiment, and some Royal Horse Artillery, who were at Tel-el-Mas-khuta.

The Indian cavalry brigade were furnishing the outposts at Kassassin on the morning of the 9th September. At 4 A.M. a piquet of the 13th Bengal Lancers was attacked by a large number of the enemy. Colonel Pennington immediately took command and charged down on the attackers, driving them back with loss. About the same time Colonel Macnaghten, 13th Bengal Lancers, had started out with a patrol, as usual, to reconnoitre towards Tel-el-Kebir. He soon observed the enemy advancing in considerable force; and on receipt of this information in camp a cavalry regiment was at once sent to the front and the infantry brigade ordered to turn out. By 7 A.M. the infantry were in the positions which had already been allotted for them in the event of an attack on the camp; and at the same time both cavalry brigades moved out towards the enemy. It being now seen that the enemy were

advancing in two bodies, from the north and west, the cavalry were manœuvred so as to keep these two bodies separated and to afford each other mutual support, the Indian Brigade threatening the left of the Tel-el-Kebir column, and the 1st Brigade moving against the right of the column from Es Salihieh. At the same time orders were sent to the Duke of Connaught at Tel-el-Maskhuta directing him to advance from that place against the left flank of the Es Salihieh force.

About 7-15 A.M. our artillery opened on a train bringing up Egyptian troops. Half an hour later General Willis (in command) ordered a general advance of the British force. The enemy made no stand against our advance, and by 10-30 A.M. the infantry had followed them up to within 5,000 yards of the Tel-el-Kebir position, while the Es Salihieh force had retreated with equal haste before the 1st Cavalry Brigade.

It is possible that had an attack now been made on Tel-el-Kebir it would have succeeded. It would not, however, have been the decisive success for which Sir Garnet Wolseley wished, and which was indeed the essence of his strategy, for only a fraction of the army could have pursued, and the cavalry could not at once have pushed on to Cairo to save that city from the destruction with which Arabi had threatened it in the event of his defeat. General Willis therefore decided not to push his advantage any further that day. Sir Garnet Wolseley, who arrived on the field shortly after (having hurried by train from Ismailia that morning) approved of General Willis's decision, and by 2 P.M. all the troops had returned to camp.

Throughout this action the Indian cavalry attracted attention by their steadiness, and Lance Duffadar Aussen Singh and Trumpeter Narain Singh, 13th Lancers, were specially brought to notice for gallant conduct.

The Battle of Tel-el-Kebir.

The period 9th—12th September was taken up by the march to the front, and by the successive arrival in camp of those portions of the army which had not yet been concentrated at Kassassin. On the afternoon of the 12th September all troops detailed

for the front had arrived, and the distribution of the Indian contingent] was as follows :—

| | | | |
|---|----|--------------|---|
| ' H ' 1st and 7-1st Northern Royal Artillery. | | } Kassassin. | |
| 2nd Bengal Cavalry | | | |
| 6th Bengal Cavalry (less 3 troops) .. | | | |
| 13th Bengal Lancers | | | |
| Seaforth Highlanders | | | |
| Madras Sappers and Miners .. | | } Ismailia. | |
| 1st Battalion Manchester Regiment .. | | | |
| 7th Native Infantry (Lines of Communication). | .. | | Suel, Serapeum, Ismailia, Nefiche, Maskhuta, and Kassassin. |
| 20th Native Infantry (do.) | .. | | Chalouf, Genefeh, Fayid, Ismailia, Nefiche, and Kassassin. |
| 29th Native Infantry (do.).. .. | .. | | Suez, Ismailia, Nefiche, and Kassassin. |

Sir Garnet Wolseley had been always a great believer in night attacks, when possible, as the best means of passing with little loss over that destructive zone of fire which has to be traversed in front of works held by well-drilled soldiers armed with breech-loaders. The ground in this instance, unmarked by any disturbing feature, lent itself to the operation, provided the troops could be properly guided over the pathless desert. Further, it had been noticed that the outposts and piquets of the enemy were only sent out beyond their entrenchments at daybreak. Another advantage gained by a night attack would be that all exhaustion to the troops from the sun's rays and want of water would be obviated. For all these reasons therefore, Sir Garnet Wolseley decided to advance up to the enemy's position at Tel-el-Kebir by night, and to attack the entrenchments at the first gleam of dawn.

In order to make the attack as great a surprise as possible it was decided to advance directly the last troops had arrived from the base, *i.e.*, on the night of the 12th-13th September. For a similar reason no sign of the intended movement was to be given till after dusk. No hint of the intended attack was published in the camp, but on the morning of the 12th General Wolseley met his brigadiers before dawn, and explained to them on the ground the nature of the intended movement.

In order to guard against all chance of failure it was arranged that the two infantry divisions should be placed at a considerable interval from each other, and should be entirely independent. By this means it was hoped that in the event of one division failing to deliver its attack at the right moment, the other, wholly unaffected by this fact, would be able to give its independent blow, and would give the division that had failed time to recover itself and act as a support to the successful wing of the army.

Between the two divisions was to march the whole of the artillery. Throughout the campaign our guns had produced an immense effect on the enemy, and it was expected that arriving opposite the position at dawn, forty-two guns would be able to cover the rally of either division which needed support, or pave the way for a successful advance in the event of the infantry being unable to take the position with a rush.

The cavalry were to be on the right wing, ready to take up the pursuit, and the Indian contingent on the south of the canal, where, being on the line of retreat of the enemy, they could march direct upon Zagazig after the action, and so secure that important junction before the enemy could recover from their disaster.

They were, however, to move off an hour later than the main force, because, since their route passed through several villages, it was feared that by startling the inmates of these too soon, warning of the attack might be given. The Naval Brigade were to advance along the railway with the 40-pr. gun, in support of the Indian contingent.

The lines of Tel-el-Kebir, which had been under construction for six weeks, started from a point on the fresh-water canal about two miles east of Tel-el-Kebir bridge, and extended northwards for about four miles. The line consisted of six batteries connected by breastworks of varying profile, generally 7 feet broad and 4 feet thick, with a ditch 6 feet wide and 5 feet deep. The railway line was protected by a gun on each side of it, but was not blocked. The only advanced work was a 9-gun battery about a mile north of the canal and 1,000 yards in front of the position. The right of the line rested on the canal, on either bank of which was a work for three guns.

South of, and parallel to the canal, and at a distance of about 300 yards from it, was a deep irrigation channel. The intervening ground was, with the exception of a narrow strip of broken ground immediately south of the canal bank, covered with jowari crops, and south of this channel similar crops extended for a mile to the edge of the desert. In the middle of this cultivation, about half a mile in front of a prolongation of the enemy's position, was a large village.

Before describing the operations of the Indian contingent during the battle it will be well to quote the following general summary of the action from General Wolseley's despatch:—

“As soon as it was dark on the evening of the 12th September, I struck my camp at Kassassin, and the troops moved into position a little to the west, where they bivouacked. No fires were allowed, and smoking was prohibited.

“At 1-30 A.M. I gave the order for the advance of the 1st and 2nd Divisions simultaneously. The night was very dark, and it was difficult to maintain the desired formations, but by means of connecting files, and by the exertions of the staff, this difficulty was overcome.

“The Indian contingent and the Naval Brigade did not move until 2-30 P.M. To have moved them earlier would have given the alarm to the enemy, owing to the number of villages south of the canal.

“In moving over the desert at night there are no land marks to guide one's movements; we had, consequently, to direct our course by the stars. This was well and correctly effected, and the leading brigades of each division reached the enemy's works within a couple of minutes of each other.

“The enemy were completely surprised, and it was not until one or two of their advanced sentries fired their rifles that they realised our close proximity to their works.

“These were, however, quickly lined by their infantry, who opened a deafening musketry fire, and their guns came into action immediately. Our troops advanced steadily without firing a shot, and when close to the works charged with a ringing cheer.

“On the left the Highland Brigade had reached the works a few minutes before the 2nd Brigade had done so, and in a dashing manner stormed them at the point of the bayonet.

“On the extreme left the Indian contingent and the Naval Brigade, under the command of Major-General Macpherson, V.C., advanced steadily and in silence until an advanced battery of the enemy was reached, when it was stormed by the Seaforth Highlanders, supported by the native infantry battalions. The squadron of 6th Bengal Cavalry, attached temporarily to General Macpherson, did good service in pursuing the enemy through the village of Tel-el-Kebir.

“The cavalry division, on the extreme right of the line, swept round the northern extremity of the enemy’s works, charging the enemy’s troops as they tried to escape. Most of the enemy, however, threw away their arms, and, begging for mercy, were unmolested by our men. To have made them prisoners would have taken up too much time, the cavalry being wanted for the more important work of pushing on to Cairo.”

Turning now to the operations of the Indian contingent in detail, orders were issued on the 12th September at 3 P.M. for all tents to be struck after dusk, and all baggage packed but not loaded. One day’s cooked and two days’ uncooked rations, 100 rounds per rifle and 150 rounds per gun, were to be taken by the troops. Water bottles were to be filled with weak tea; and all baggage left in charge of small guards from each battalion.

At 6 P.M. orders were issued for the troops to be formed up on the canal bank at 2 A.M. in the following order:—

- Seaforth Highlanders.
- 7-1st Northern Royal Artillery.
- Sappers and Miners.
- 20th Native Infantry.
- 29th Native Infantry.
- 7th Native Infantry.

In pitch darkness at 1-30 A.M. the troops were roused, and at 2-30 A.M. the column moved forward in silence in column of fours. This formation was necessary owing to the restricted nature of the ground already alluded to. The cavalry followed in rear. The force had marched about three miles when the warning shots which preceded the attack of the Highland Brigade were heard. About a quarter of an hour later the enemy observed the column, and began to shell it. The Highlanders were

then pushed forward over the open ground against the guns, which were protected by some pits and covered by some trenches with about 400 men in them. The 20th Infantry at the same time passed round the battery, taking it in flank. The 7th Infantry supported the Highlanders, while the 29th followed in rear of the 20th. The mountain battery came into action on the canal bank, firing at the flashes of the guns.

The Seaforths advanced by rushes, firing volleys at intervals, and supported by the gatlings on the north bank. By 6 A.M. the enemy had been driven from their entrenchments on the south bank, and four guns had been captured.

The 20th Native Infantry had meanwhile advanced against a native village which was held in force by the enemy, and had carried it by a bayonet charge.

The whole line now advanced, driving the enemy before it, and capturing his guns. The cavalry were pushed forward to cut off the fugitives who were soon pouring into the village of Tel-el-Kebir from the northern side.

Soon after 7 A.M. General Macpherson reported to Sir Garnet Wolseley on the bridge the complete success of his brigade.

The total losses incurred by the Indian contingent in the action were one man killed and eight wounded.

Occupation of Zagazig and Cairo.

Sir Garnet Wolseley now ordered the cavalry to continue the pursuit, and to advance upon Cairo with all speed. The Indian contingent he ordered to march on Zagazig railway junction, and so break the connection between the various portions of the Egyptian army dispersed throughout the Delta.

General Wilkinson, with the 2nd (Indian) Cavalry Brigade and mounted infantry, at once moved by the north side of the canal to Aabasa lock, and, marching on Belbeis, seized that place about noon on the 13th, after encountering little opposition *en route*. General Drury Lowe, with the 1st Brigade and Horse Artillery, reached Belbeis some few hours after.

At 4-30 A.M. on the 14th the advance on Cairo was resumed. General Drury Lowe was in command, and his column consisted of 3 squadrons, 2nd Bengal Cavalry, 4th Dragoon Guards, 2 squadrons, 13th Bengal Lancers, and 100 Mounted Infantry. As the troops

approached the capital the inhabitants showed every expression of pleasure ; but as nothing was known of the state of affairs in the town, the General decided to halt his men some miles outside, and sent forward only a detachment. By this means the Egyptians were made aware of the arrival of a force in their vicinity without finding out how small was their actual strength.

It was soon seen that the Egyptians had decided to capitulate. Negotiations were now concluded. The citadel was occupied by a small party of cavalry ; Arabi Pasha and Toulba Pasha gave up their swords ; and, before dawn on the 15th, 10,000 of the enemy had surrendered their arms and started for their own homes.

Meanwhile General Macpherson, leaving Tel-el-Kebir with the Indian contingent at 7.40 A.M. on the 13th, had seized Zagazig the same afternoon. Here he succeeded in capturing 10 engines and 100 carriages, by which means railway communication with Tel-el-Kebir was at once opened. On this day the Indian contingent fought an action and covered 30 miles in sixteen hours and a half.

All points at which any concentration of the dispersed fragments of the Egyptian army could be attempted were now occupied in force with the utmost possible rapidity ; and on the 16th news arrived that Rosetta and Aboukir were ready to submit. By the 24th the last armed force and fortress in Egypt had been surrendered into our hands, and the war was at an end.

On the 26th September the whole of the Indian contingent, with the exception of the troops on the lines of communication, were concentrated at Cairo, and took part in the military ceremonies attendant on the reinstallation of the Khedive.

On the 5th October and subsequent days the contingent left Cairo for Suez, *en route* for India, the infantry and artillery proceeding by train, and the cavalry and transport by road. By the 27th October the last transport had sailed for India ; and on arrival at Bombay the various units were railed direct to their own stations.

Throughout the expedition the health of the Indian contingent had been excellent, and the total casualties from disease amounted to only one native officer, six men, and one follower, The losses among troop horses were, however, great, and amounted to a total of 233. Particulars of these figures are given in Appendix C.

Cavalry Brigade.

Brigadier-General H. C. Wilkinson, *h. p.*,
 late 16th Lancers Commanding.
 Major S. D. Barrow, Bengal Staff Corps.. Brigade-Major.

Troops.

2nd Bengal Cavalry .. Lieut.-Col. C. W. Campbell.
 6th Bengal Cavalry .. Lieut.-Col. J. Upperton.
 13th Bengal Lancers .. Bvt.-Lt.-Col. W. H. Macnaghten.

Artillery.

Lieut.-Col. T. Van-Straubensee, R.A. .. Commanding.
 Captain R. H. S. Baker, R.A. Adjutant.

Troops.

H. Battery, 1st Brigade, R. A. .. Major C. Crosthwaite.
 7th Battery, 1st Brigade, Northern Division. Major J. F. Frere.

Engineers.

Colonel J. Browne, C.S.I., R.E. .. Commanding Royal Engineer.
 Major W. G. Nicholson, R.E. .. Field Engineer.
 "A" and "I" Coys. Madras (Queen's
 Own) Sappers and Miners .. Major Hamilton, R.E.

Additional Infantry Battalion.

1st Bn., Manchester Regiment .. Lt.-Col. W. L. Auchinleck.

Reserve at Aden.

4th Madras Native Infantry Colonel Hodding.
 31st Madras Native L. I. Lieutenant-Colonel R. Griffith.
 Major M. A. Rowlandson, Madras Staff
 Corps Controller of Military Accounts.
 Captain H. H. Pengree, R.A. .. Commissary of Ordnance.
 Lieut.-Col. Luckhardt, Bombay Staff Corps Principal Commissariat Officer.
 Lieut.-Col. C. Hayter, Madras Staff Corps Director of Transport.

Total strength.

221 British officers, 104 departmental subordinates, 1,778 British warrant officers, non-commissioned officers and men, 5,323 native officers, non-commissioned officers and men, 7,315 followers, 1,896 horses, 724 ponies, 4,816 mules.

APPENDIX B.
Embarkation Return, *Egypt Expeditionary Force, 1882.*

| Date of leaving India. | Name of vessel. | Tonnage of vessel. | Troops, etc., embarked. | STRENGTH. | | | | | | REMARKS. | |
|------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------|---|-------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------------|------------|---------|---------|----------|--|
| | | | | British officers. | British N.-C. Os. and men. | Native officers, N.-C. Os. and men. | Followers. | Horses. | Ponies. | | Mules. |
| 31st July | <i>Malda</i> | 1,945 | "I" Company, Madras Sappers and Miners | 5 | 4 | 121 | 74 | 4 | .. | 72 | |
| 32nd " | <i>Bancoora</i> | 2,880 | York and Lancaster Regiment | 17 | 542 | .. | 109 | 3 | .. | .. | |
| | | | 2 Companies, 2nd Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders. | 7 | 219 | .. | 30 | 2 | .. | .. | |
| | | | Staff | 1 | .. | .. | .. | 1 | .. | .. | |
| 20th " | <i>Prithwa</i> | 2,159 | Cattle, Livestock and followers .. | .. | .. | 1 | 211 | .. | .. | .. | |
| 5th August | <i>Merion Hall</i> | 4,043 | Wing, 7th Bengal Native Infantry .. | 5 | .. | 470 | 70 | 6 | .. | 147 | |
| 6th " | <i>Kangra</i> | 1,952 | Detachment, 13th Bengal Lancers .. | 1 | .. | 80 | 60 | 87 | 43 | 13 | Lost 3 horses on the voyage. |
| | | | Ordnance Department | 1 | 8 | .. | 5 | .. | .. | .. | |
| 6th " | <i>Seily</i> | 1,675 | 2nd Wing, Native Infantry | 3 | .. | 327 | 57 | 4 | .. | 48 | |
| 7th " | <i>Boddara</i> | 2,939 | Detachment, 13th Bengal Lancers .. | 2 | .. | 88 | 59 | 82 | 50 | 12 | Lost 14 horses on the voyage. |
| 7th " | <i>Bhandara</i> | 2,939 | "A" Company, Madras Sappers .. | 3 | 8 | 121 | 49 | 3 | .. | 36 | |
| | | | Detachment, 13th Bengal Lancers .. | 3 | .. | 84 | 59 | 88 | 46 | 9 | Lost 7 horses on the voyage. |
| 7th " | <i>Northern</i> | 2,221 | Detachment, 13th Bengal Lancers .. | 1 | .. | 73 | 62 | 87 | 43 | 14 | Lost 12 horses and 4 ponies on the voyage. |
| 8th " | <i>P. & O. Steam-er.</i> | .. | Field Pay establishment | 2 | .. | .. | 4 | .. | .. | .. | |
| 8th " | <i>Tenasserim</i> | 1,760 | Detachment, 2nd Bengal Lancers .. | 3 | .. | 78 | 72 | 91 | 47 | 14 | |
| | | | Pay Department | 1 | .. | .. | 2 | 1 | .. | .. | |

Embarkation Return—contd.

| Date of leaving India. | Name of vessel. | Tonnage of vessel. | Troops, etc., embarked. | STRENGTH. | | | | | | REMARKS. | |
|------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|--|-------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------|------------|---------|---------|----------|---|
| | | | | British officers. | British officers, N.-C. Os. and men. | Native officers, and men. | Followers. | Horses. | Ponies. | | Mules. |
| 8th August .. | <i>Dryburgh Abbey</i> | 2,264 | Detachment, 2nd Bengal Cavalry .. | 1 | .. | 56 | 50 | 62 | 30 | 14 | |
| 9th .. | <i>Gula Sa</i> .. | 4,100 | Part, 7-1st Royal Artillery .. | 4 | 62 | 100 | 55 | 7 | .. | 146 | |
| 9th .. | <i>Ethiopia</i> .. | 2,032 | Detachment, 2nd Bengal Cavalry .. | 1 | .. | 51 | 50 | 57 | 3 | 12 | |
| 9th .. | <i>Zambesi</i> .. | 2,430 | Commissariat Department .. | 2 | 35 | .. | 380 | 3 | .. | 88 | |
| 9th .. | <i>Hyderabad</i> .. | 2,984 | Detachment, 6th Bengal Cavalry .. | 1 | .. | 55 | 74 | 57 | 34 | 16 | |
| | | | Staff | 18 | .. | .. | 80 | 28 | .. | .. | |
| | | | Commissariat Department .. | 1 | 30 | .. | 31 | 4 | .. | .. | |
| 10th .. | <i>Armenia</i> .. | 3,396 | Portion, 7-1st Royal Artillery .. | 2 | 50 | 58 | 72 | 8 | .. | 154 | |
| 13th .. | <i>Khing</i> .. | 2,600 | Detachment, 6th Bengal Cavalry .. | 1 | .. | 50 | 45 | 57 | 26 | 14 | |
| | | | Commissariat and Medical Departments .. | 1 | .. | .. | 56 | 1 | .. | .. | |
| 11th .. | <i>Chhindwara</i> .. | 1,983 | Detachment, 13th Bengal Lancers .. | 2 | 2 | 73 | 60 | 79 | 36 | 15 | Lost 5 horses and 1 pony on the voyage. |
| | | | Medical Department | .. | .. | .. | 1 | .. | .. | .. | |
| 11th .. | <i>Iris</i> .. | 2,219 | Detachment, 2nd Bengal Cavalry .. | 1 | .. | 66 | 60 | 72 | 40 | 0 | |
| | | | Medical Department | 1 | .. | .. | 2 | 1 | .. | .. | |
| | <i>Cian Macdonald</i> | 2,642 | Right Wing, 29th Bombay Native Infantry .. | 6 | .. | 379 | 104 | 7 | .. | 110 | |
| | <i>Inchione</i> .. | 2,292 | Wing, 29th Bombay Native Infantry .. | 3 | .. | 375 | 28 | 3 | .. | 84 | |
| | <i>Alleghany</i> .. | 2,283 | Wing, 20th Bengal Native Infantry .. | 5 | .. | 315 | 60 | 6 | .. | 80 | |
| 13th Aug. | <i>Naples</i> .. | 2,289 | Wing, 20th Bengal Native Infantry .. | 4 | .. | 262 | 105 | 3 | .. | 114 | |
| 15th August .. | <i>Chanda</i> .. | 2,022 | Transport Department | .. | 1 | .. | 66 | .. | .. | 155 | |

FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITION FROM INDIA.

Embarkation Return—contd.

| Date of leaving India. | Name of vessel. | Tonnage of vessel. | Troops, etc., embarked. | STRENGTH. | | | | | Mules. | REMARKS. | |
|------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--|-------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------|---------|--------|----------|-------------------------------|
| | | | | British officers. | British N.-C. O's and men. | Native officers, N.-C. O's and men. | Follow-ers. | Horses. | | | Ponies. |
| 25th August .. | <i>Khadulla</i> | 2,040 | Transport Department .. Hospital Establishment .. Commissariat and Medical and Postal Departments. | .. | 1 | .. | 88 | .. | .. | 180 | |
| 25th .. | <i>Dorien</i> | 2,743 | Transport Department .. Medical and Veterinary Departments .. | .. | 1 | .. | 129 | .. | .. | 306 | |
| 26th .. | <i>Hazare</i> | 2,078 | Detachment, 6th Bengal Cavalry .. Transport and Detachments .. | 3 | .. | 87 | 65 | 85 | 42 | 15 | |
| 26th .. | <i>St. Columba</i> | 2,222 | Detachment, 6th Bengal Cavalry .. Medical and Transport .. | 1 | .. | 94 | 86 | 99 | 50 | 15 | |
| 28th .. | <i>Chikla</i> | 1,944 | Transport Department .. Medical Department .. | .. | 2 | .. | 136 | .. | 1 | .. | Lost one horse on the voyage. |
| 30th .. | <i>Corinth</i> | 2,568 | Medical Department .. Detachment, 6th Bengal Cavalry .. | 2 | .. | 88 | 80 | 118 | 50 | 6 | |
| 30th .. | <i>Sardana</i> | 2,660 | Medical and Transport .. Detachment, 6th Bengal Cavalry .. Medical Department .. | 1 | .. | 1 | 13 | .. | 19 | 24 | |
| 1st September .. | <i>Ischia</i> | 3,084 | Transport Department .. Detachments .. Transport Department .. Medical Department .. | 1 | 3 | .. | 90 | 1 | 1 | 195 | |
| 2nd .. | <i>Meharajah</i> | 1,066 | Transport and Medical Department .. | 1 | 3 | .. | 200 | .. | .. | 440 | |
| | | | | .. | .. | .. | 118 | .. | 1 | 238 | |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------------|----|------------------|----|-------|---|----|----|----|-----|-----|----|----|-----|
| 5th | " | Africa | .. | 2,032 | Transport Department | .. | .. | 3 | .. | 98 | .. | .. | 224 |
| 9th | " | Egypt | .. | 1,716 | Transport Department | .. | 1 | 1 | .. | 104 | 1 | .. | 200 |
| 12th | " | P. & O. Revenue. | .. | .. | Medical Department | .. | .. | 1 | 2 | 56 | .. | .. | .. |
| | " | | .. | .. | Medical Department | .. | .. | 1 | .. | 5 | .. | .. | .. |
| <i>Aden Reserve.</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| <i>From Madras.</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 18th August | .. | Asia | .. | 1,766 | Head Quarters and Wing, 4th Madras Native Infantry. | 7 | .. | .. | 482 | 70 | 6 | .. | 11 |
| 25th | " | Goorkha | .. | 4,100 | Head Quarters, 31st Madras Native Infantry. | 6 | .. | .. | 493 | 79 | 6 | .. | 13 |
| 25th | " | Chupra | .. | 1,944 | Detachment, 4th Madras Native Infantry.. | 3 | .. | .. | 307 | 46 | 3 | .. | 6 |
| | " | | .. | .. | " 31st | 2 | .. | .. | 149 | 23 | 3 | .. | 2 |
| 5th September | .. | Assam | .. | 3,038 | Transport Corps for British Contingent | 2 | 6 | .. | .. | 393 | 2 | .. | .. |
| 12th | " | Ravenau | .. | .. | " | 1 | 2 | .. | .. | 272 | 1 | .. | .. |

APPENDIX C.

CASUALTIES AMONG TROOPS AND FOLLOWERS OF THE INDIAN CONTINGENT.

| | | | |
|---|----|--|--|
| H., 1st Brigade, Royal Artillery .. | .. | 1 man killed in action. | |
| 7-1st Northern Royal Artillery .. | .. | 1 follower slightly wounded. | |
| Detachment, 2nd Seaforth Highlanders .. | .. | 1 Non-Commissioned officer slightly wounded. | |
| 6th Bengal Cavalry | { | 1 Native officer died of disease. | |
| | | 1 man died of disease. | |
| | | 2 men wounded. | |
| 2nd Bengal Cavalry | { | 1 Native officer died of wounds. | |
| | | 4 men wounded. | |
| 13th Bengal Lancers | { | 1 Non-Commissioned officer killed in action. | |
| | | 1 man killed in action. | |
| | | 1 man died of disease. | |
| | | 5 men wounded. | |
| 7th Native Infantry | { | 3 men died of disease. | |
| | | 2 men killed at Ismailia by Arabs. | |
| | | 1 man and 1 follower wounded. | |
| 20th Native Infantry | { | 1 man died of disease. | |
| | | 1 follower died of disease. | |
| 29th Bombay Native Infantry .. | .. | 3 men severely wounded. | |

Losses in Horses.

| | Officers' horses. | Troop horses. |
|--|-------------------|---------------|
| <i>2nd Bengal Cavalry.</i> | | |
| Cast at Cairo and sold by Commissariat Department .. | | 19 |
| Cast at Bombay and sold by Commissariat Department .. | | 6 |
| Shot at Cairo by Committee as useless from overwork .. | | 25 |
| Died at sea on both voyages | 1 | 10 |
| Died at Ismailia | 1 | 1 |
| Drowned landing at Ismailia | | 3 |
| Shot at Ismailia | | 1 |
| Strayed and lost from the lines | | 5 |
| Died at Cairo | | 4 |

| | Officers' horses. | Troop horses. |
|--|----------------------|------------------|
| Killed at Tel-el-Kebir | | 2 |
| Shot at Bombay for infectious disease .. | .. 1 | .. |
| Died on railway journey to Lucknow .. | | 7 |
| | — | — |
| TOTAL .. | 3 | 83 |
| | — | — |

The regiment received 47 Syrian remounts in Egypt, but they were considered too small and not up to cavalry standard.

6th Bengal Cavalry.

| | Troop horses. |
|--|---------------|
| Lost at Tel-el-Kebir | .. 3 |
| Shot for glanders in Egypt | .. 19 |
| Shot by order of a Committee at Cairo as unfit for work .. | .. 48 |
| Cast at Cairo and sold | .. 27 |
| Shot for Glanders in India | .. 25 |
| | — |
| TOTAL .. | 122 |
| | — |

13th Bengal Lancers.

| | Troop horses. |
|------------------------------|---------------|
| Lost on outward voyage | .. 28 |

CHAPTER V.

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1885.

ON the 8th February 1885 it was decided by the Home Government to send an Indian contingent to Suakin*, to hold that place through the summer; and a telegram was sent to the Viceroy to that effect.

Steps were immediately taken for the despatch of the force, which was composed as follows:—

Troops.

| | | | |
|-----------------------------|----|------------|------------------------------|
| 15th Sikhs | .. | Left India | 22nd February. |
| 9th Bengal Cavalry | .. | .. | 23rd and 27th February. |
| 17th Bengal Infantry | .. | .. | 24th February. |
| 28th Bombay Infantry | .. | .. | 28th February and 1st March. |
| 1 Company Madras Sappers | .. | .. | 2nd March. |

The whole was under the command of Brigadier-General J. Hudson, C.B., Bengal Staff Corps.

The contingent sailed complete with three months' supplies and all camp equipment and regimental transport, the whole force amounting to 3,000 men.

In addition to the actual Indian brigade the following corps, etc., were supplied by the Indian Government for duty with the British force at Suakin.

War Office Transport, etc. 4,500 camels (for baggage only, equipped with sulectahs and a proper proportion of headmen and drivers).

500 riding camels (complete with saddles and proportion of attendants).

150 ponies for mounted infantry (complete, with saddles, bridles and materials for repairs).

Corps of camel-drivers, 2,050, for camels purchased at Suakin.

Corps of muleteers, 300 strong.

Corps of bhisties, 300 strong.

Corps of dhoolie-bearers, 500 strong with 100 Lushai dandies.

Corps of labourers, 900 strong, of whom 400 were to be especially adapted for railway work.

*See map facing page 64.

The requisitions for these various corps were received by the Government of India between the 11th and 21st February, and by the 5th April the whole force had been embarked and despatched from India complete in every respect.

The transport of the Indian contingent was almost entirely in regimental charge, and consisted of 1,973 mules, 150 bullock carts, and a corps of over 500 dhoolie-bearers, who were chiefly employed as labourers.

The personnel of the medical branch consisted of one Principal Medical Officer, one Brigade Surgeon, two Surgeons-Major, and nine Surgeons. Hospital provision was made on an estimate of twelve per cent. sick for troops and three per cent. for followers. All sick unlikely to be fit for duty in the field were to be sent back to India fortnightly.

Two field hospitals of 100 beds each were formed, and a base hospital of 288 beds under a Brigade Surgeon was also provided. The transport *Cz ir witc* was selected as a hospital-ship for the Indian contingent, and contained 125 beds. Ambulance transport for five per cent. of troops and one per cent. of followers was also supplied.

After disembarkation at Suakin constant small night attacks on the part of the enemy were very harassing to the troops.

Shortly after Sir G. Graham's arrival a defiant letter was received from Osman Digna, and a reply was sent warning him of the consequences of any hostility. He was at this time stated to be at Tamai with some 7,000 men, about 1,000 at Haspin, and a small force at Tokar.

The plan of campaign was divided into two phases:—

First.—The destruction of Osman Digna and the clearance of the country for the construction of the railway.

Second.—The construction of the railway and location of troops for its protection.

From the sea coast of Suakin a sandy plain rises gently, in a westerly direction, for a distance of ten or twelve miles, to where, at an elevation of about two hundred feet above sea level, it meets the foot of the volcanic range of mountains which bounds it on the west. The

Features of the country.

country in the vicinity of Suakin is fairly open. Towards Tamai it is covered with a thick scrub of prickly mimosa, varying in height from six to eight feet. The country is intersected by numerous *khors* or water-courses.

The enemy's tactics consisted in long range firing from cover followed by desperate hand-to-hand assaults from the bush. Their movements were stealthy and sudden and carried out with extraordinary rapidity by small groups of spearmen.

The line of railway was to follow the caravan route to Berber, and lay in a north-westerly direction from Suakin. To crush Osman Digna's power, before the railway could be proceeded with, it was necessary to advance to Tamai, thence return to Suakin and again advance along the proposed line of the railway. First of all, however, the enemy's force at Hashin had to be broken up. Accordingly on the 19th March the cavalry brigade and Indian infantry advanced.

Hashin lies west of Suakin, the route for the first seven miles traversing a level, sandy district. At this point a group of black, rocky hills is met with and thence, westwards, thicker undergrowth extends to the base of the Waratab range. A mile and a half further on is a conspicuous isolated ridge, half a mile in length, running from east to west. The slopes are steep and rugged and destitute of vegetation, but the bush at its base is about seven feet high. To the north of this lies Hashin Hill, and separated from it by a wide ravine is a lower eminence, in rear of which is situated the squalid village of Hashin; beyond this again, is a wide *khor*, choked with scrub.

At about 9-30 A.M. on 19th March a small force of the enemy was seen, which retreated, apparently, upon the main body at Hashin. Later on the whole force retreated westwards leaving a portion in occupation of Hashin (Dihilbat) Hill whence it fired occasionally upon the cavalry. The force returned to camp soon after mid-day.

On the following day a force of about 8,000 men, including the Indian contingent, advanced towards Hashin under the command of Sir G.

Attack on Hashin.

Graham. The formation was three sides of a square with the cavalry covering the front and flanks. The infantry reached the hills east of Hashin at 8-35 A.M. and redoubts were thrown up on them. The enemy, meanwhile, had fallen back on Dihilbat Hill.

Orders for attack were issued, the 2nd Brigade to lead, supported by the Indian contingent and followed by the artillery. The Guards Brigade moved in support of the whole and the cavalry protected the flanks; the Berkshire Regiment advanced up the slopes in attack formation, supported by four companies of the Royal Marines, the other half battalion of the Marines moving on the right rear of the Berkshires. A heavy fire was opened by the enemy, who were, however, driven from the summit. The Indian and Guards Brigades with the artillery had meanwhile advanced and occupied the gorge between Dihilbat and the smaller hill.

Considerable difficulty was encountered in moving through the bush, and the enemy made many unavailing attempts to attack.

Two squadrons of the 9th Bengal Cavalry, while in pursuit of the Arabs, were charged from the bush. One squadron dismounted and opened fire, but was driven back upon the Guards' square with a loss of nine men. On the right the 5th Lancers and two squadrons of the 9th Bengal Cavalry charged with great effect and completely checked a body of the enemy who were attempting to turn the British right flank.

At 12-45 P.M. the Indian Brigade was recalled, and retired, covered by the 2nd Brigade. At 2-30 P.M. the whole force (*zarcba*) assembled at Dihilbat Hill, retired under the fire of the Horse Artillery. The force, with the exception of the East Surrey Regiment, left to guard the *zarcba* and redoubts, returned to Suakin at 6 P.M. The losses amounted to one officer and eight non-commissioned officers and men killed, and three officers and thirty-six non-commissioned officers and men wounded. The enemy's strength was estimated at 3,000. The trying night attacks on our troops were now discontinued.

The next step was to crush Osman Digna at Tamai. Before doing so, however, it was necessary, for reasons of supply, to establish an interme-

Preparations for advance
on Tamai.

diate post in the desert, and for this purpose the following force under the command of Sir J. McNeill, was despatched:—

British.

1 squadron, 5th Lancers.
 Berkshire Regiment.
 Battalion Royal Marines.
 1 Field Company, Royal Engineers.
 Detachment Naval Brigade with 4 Gardner guns.
 Ammunition Column.

Indian Contingent.

15th Sikhs.
 17th Bengal Native Infantry.
 28th Bombay Native Infantry.
 1 Company, Madras Sappers and Miners.

The force was formed up in two squares at 7 A.M. and moved off in a south-westerly direction, the British square in advance.

The orders given to Sir J. McNeill were to make three *zarebas* eight miles from Suakin, one capable of holding 2,000 camels and the flanking ones for one battalion each. The Indian Brigade was to march back with the empty transport, making an intermediate *zareba* half-way to Suakin and leaving one battalion there to return to Suakin.

The Indian Brigade was echeloned to the right rear of the British square; inside the Indian square was the transport. The advance was difficult owing to the dense scrub. The baggage animals had, in many cases, been overladen, and frequent halts were necessary. In consequence the average rate of progress was little more than one and a half miles an hour.

The cavalry soon reported small bodies of the enemy retreating towards Tamai. At a distance of five miles from Suakin the camel convoy was rapidly falling into confusion and it was considered impossible to carry out the original programme. A modification, to form the *zarebas* six miles from Suakin, was reported to Sir G. Graham by telegraph and approved by him.

At about 10-30 A.M. the force reached the halting ground known as Tofrik, and was disposed as follows. The British square was marched

Disposition of troops at Tofrik.

to the east; the Indian Brigade, leaving their camels at the place indicated for the *zareba*, formed in three sides of a square, a large covering party protecting the north, west, and south, faces; the Sikhs on the west, 17th Bengal Infantry on the south, and the 28th Bombay Infantry on north. The eastern face was assumed to be protected by the British square. Subsequently, the bush in front of the Bombay regiment being very dense, two companies of the 17th Bengal Infantry were brought up on their right. Small piquets from the flank companies of the various regiments were thrown out about 150 yards in front of the Indian Brigade. The work of constructing the *zarebas* now commenced, the Indian Brigade working-parties being taken from alternate ranks of alternate sections, thus preserving the front rank intact. At 2 P.M. the defensive work was nearly complete. The Indians were standing easy with bayonets fixed. One half battalion of the Berkshires were outside their *zareba* cutting brushwood near the 15th Sikhs. The marines were inside their own *zareba*. The other half battalion of the Berkshires were having their dinners on the left flank of the 17th Bengal Infantry. The camels had been unloaded and were filing out preparatory to the return march. Shortly after 2-30 P.M. news was received that the enemy were collecting in front and advancing rapidly. Notice was given to call in the working-parties, when the cavalry was seen galloping in, closely followed by the enemy in their usual small groups. The working-party of the Berkshires moved back and stood to their arms. The native infantry piquets ran in on the flanks of their companies and the lines opened fire. The right flank of the 17th Bengal Infantry was somewhat disordered by the 5th Lancers riding through it, and Sir J. McNeill, observing that the regiment was unsteady, although the officers were doing their best, ordered some of the Berkshire Regiment from the other face of the *zareba* to move over, but it was too late. The six companies of the 17th Bengal Infantry broke after firing one volley, the two companies on the right, whose ranks had been broken by the cavalry, retired in confusion into the Berkshire *zareba* and were rallied on the south front supported by some of the Berkshire Regiment. Others retired towards Suakin. The left of the line fell back in more regular formation to the Marines' *zareba*.

Attack by Arabs.

Stampede of transport.

On the retreat of the 17th Bengal Infantry the Arabs stampeded the animals collected to the left rear of that regiment and swarmed into the Berkshire *zareba*, stabbing and cutting everywhere. The Gardner guns could not be got into action. Large bodies of the enemy rushed round in every direction charging on the fence with the utmost courage, and intervening between the *zarebas* and the transport animals they destroyed an enormous number of the latter.

The right half battalion of the Berkshires, after getting to its arms, made a most gallant resistance. One hundred and twelve
 Gallantry of Subadar Gurdit Singh. Arabs who entered the *zareba* at the first rush were killed. Two soldiers of the Berkshires were saved from certain death by the magnificent daring of Subadar Gurdit Singh of the 15th Sikhs, who, placing himself between the pursuers and their prey, killed three Arabs in succession by rapid sword-cuts.

The 15th Sikhs and 28th Bombay Infantry stood firm, maintaining an intact line and receiving and repelling successive attacks with a heavy fire, as also did the two companies of the
 Staunchness of the Indian troops. 17th Bengal Infantry who were in line with the Bombay Infantry. Hundreds of dead Arabs were afterwards counted in front of the Sikh position. The Bombay regiment was less directly attacked, but fought steadily and added its quota to the slain.

The remaining half battalion of the Berkshires was dining when
 R. pulse of the enemy. the alarm was given. It formed rallying square and repelled two attacks without loss, and killed 200 of the enemy. Twenty minutes after the action commenced the "Cease fire" was sounded, yet in that short period 1,500 Arabs were killed, to take no account of the wounded.

Major Graves of the 20th Hussars, who had left the *zareba* at
 Action of the Cavalry. 1-30 P.M. for Suakin, met the relieving squadron of the 9th Bengal Cavalry but hearing firing at the *zareba*, returned with the two squadrons. About one mile from the *zareba* they came upon a number of camel drivers, some native infantry, a few British soldiers and a number of camels, mules, etc., all in full retreat on Suakin, closely pursued by the enemy

in much greater force, who were cutting down and killing them in large numbers. The squadron promptly charged, and when the enemy was checked, dismounted every available man, and, firing volleys, stopped the pursuit. Remounting and pressing on they delivered more volleys within 300 yards of the enemy. The Arabs then retired on the *zareba*, leaving many dead and wounded on the ground. It was now observed that the enemy were trying to turn the left flank of the cavalry with a view to falling again upon the transport, so one troop was sent to intercept them. The cavalry, joined by a troop of the 5th Lancers, drove the Arabs, with dismounted fire, past the eastern side of the *zarebas*; they dispersed and did not again assemble in any numbers. A strong cavalry cordon was formed round the transport and baggage, and Major Graves took a despatch to Suakin, announcing the result of the action. By 4 P.M. all was quiet. As soon as possible the *zareba* was completed and the night passed quietly.

The British casualties in this action were 150 killed, 174 wounded, and 148 missing, the latter number including 124 native followers.

The following day Sir G. Graham arrived at the *zareba* with three battalions of the Guards and a convoy of twelve hundred camels.

Return to Suakin.

On the 24th March another convoy proceeded to the *zareba*, escorted by the 15th Sikhs 28th Bombay Infantry, and the 9th Bengal Cavalry. Three miles from the *zareba* the force was met by an escort of the Coldstream Guards and Royal Marines who had come to take over the convoy. On its way back it was attacked by the enemy in considerable force and in closing up the square more than one hundred camels were left outside and either killed or lost.

On the following day a water convoy reached the *zareba* without mishap. The *zarebas* near Hashin were now dismantled. On the 26th March a large convoy escorted by—

2 guns, G-B Royal Horse Artillery ;
 1 squadron each from the 5th Lancers and 20th Hussars ;
 Grenadier Guards ;
 East Surrey Regiment ;
 Shropshire Light Infantry ;

9th Bengal Cavalry ;

15th Sikhs ;

28th Bombay Native Infantry ;

under the command of Sir G. Graham, proceeded to the *zareba* (now known as McNeill's) at 6 A.M. After two hours' march the enemy were seen in small numbers and a few shots were exchanged between them and the cavalry, and by 9-15 they were swarming in the thick bush. After half an hour's desultory firing a rush was made at the right-front corner of the square but repulsed. Only one casualty resulted, and having handed over the convoy to the Coldstream Guards the escort returned to Suakin.

On the 31st March it was reported that Osman Digna's force had been withdrawn from Tamai. The mounted infantry and a troop of the 9th Bengal Cavalry were sent there and reported that the village was still held. Sir G. Graham, therefore, issued orders for an advance on the morrow.

At 4-30 A.M. on the 2nd April the following force, about 7,000

Advance on Tamai. strong, marched from Suakin—

Guards Brigade.

2nd „

1 Company Royal Engineers.

4 Mountain and 4 Gardner guns.

G-B Royal Horse Artillery.

Cavalry Brigade.

Indian Contingent.

The force was formed in one large oblong the convoy being placed inside. McNeill's *zareba* was reached at 8-30 A.M. and a halt made for breakfast. The 28th Bombay Infantry and two Gardner guns, manned by the Royal Marine Artillery, were left as garrison. The force was joined by the Grenadier Guards, Berkshire Regiment, 24th Company Royal Engineers, mounted infantry, and a troop of the 9th Bengal Cavalry. At 4-30 P.M. they reached Tesela Hill, where the troops bivouacked for the night.

At 8 next morning the troops marched off in the following order :—

The Second Brigade (Berkshire Regiment, Royal Marines and 15th Sikhs) under General Hudson, in front. The Guards Brigade with the Royal Formation of column.

Horse Artillery on the right flank. Sir J. McNeill with the East Surrey, Shropshires and two Gardner guns remained at Tesela to protect the transport. The cavalry and mounted infantry reconnoitred to the front. The right and right-front was covered by the 5th Lancers and a squadron 9th Bengal Cavalry, and the left and left-rear by the 20th Hussars and the remainder of the 9th Bengal Cavalry. The objective was Osman Digna's head-quarters at New Tamai between Tesela Hill and the *khor* Ghoub, and the occupation of the wells in the *khor*. The ground between Tesela and the *khor* was broken by three low ridges, between which lay the village; this was occupied without serious opposition by 9 A.M., and twenty minutes later the square had reached the edge of the *khor*, firing being kept up all the time between the mounted infantry and the enemy's scouts.

The Second Brigade then crossed the *khor* under the fire of the Artillery, a high point in the centre being occupied by the Berkshires, while the 15th Sikhs crossed the detached hills to the left and front. The guns then came into action on the far side of the *khor*, and the Arabs gradually withdrew into mountains to the south-west.

No signs of water were found and, it being considered useless to follow up the enemy, Sir G. Graham ordered a retirement. After burning Osman Digna's village and destroying large quantities of ammunition, the force returned to the Tesela *zareba* at noon, and

Return to Sua in. reached Suakin the following day. Sir G. Graham now proceeded to carry out

the second part of his instructions. McNeill's *zareba*, being of no further use, was closed and the stores withdrawn. Orders were, however, received on

Railway construction.

the 15th April to suspend the construction of the railway and to hold Suakin for the present. By the 16th April the railway had reached a point within one mile of Handub. On this date orders

Camel Corps.

were issued for the immediate formation of a camel corps, each of the Indian contingent regiments furnishing its quota for a combined company. On the 30th April the railway was completed as far as Otao. On 6th May the Camel Corps, two companies mounted infantry and

the 9th Bengal Cavalry marched soon after midnight from Suakin to attack a Shaikh who was threatening the line of communications. A force from Otao, comprising a company of mounted infantry, the 15th Sikhs, and 200 friendly natives co-operated. The district was cleared of the enemy by 7 A.M., and his camp captured.

In accordance with orders from England the withdrawal of the expeditionary force from Suakin began on the 17th May.

On the 27th May Lord Wolseley forwarded his recommendations for the protection of Egypt. The garrison of Suakin was to consist of 1 squadron Indian cavalry, 1 garrison battery, 1 company Madras Sappers and Miners, 1 British and 3 Indian battalions, with 150 British mounted infantry and 100 men from the Indian battalions as a camel corps.

Lord Wolseley, in his final despatch of 15th June, alluded to the Indian contingent as follows:—“The Indian contingent, under Brigadier-General Hudson, C.B., showed high soldier-like qualities, and was of the utmost value in the operations round Suakin.”

Sir Gerald Graham in his despatch of 30th May said:—“ . . . The 15th Sikhs on several occasions displayed their splendid marching powers . . . the force was composed of the British troops of Her Majesty, and of the native soldiers of her Army in India . . . but though the troops were drawn from so many different sources, all were animated and bound together by a firm determination to preserve untarnished the reputation of the British Army.”

It should be recorded that on sailing from India the places of some fifty sick of the 15th Sikhs were filled by volunteers from the 45th Sikhs.

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CHAPTER VI.

ABYSSINIA.

WHEN the British expedition to Abyssinia* was contemplated little was known of the topography or resources of the country; various investigations were, therefore, made, from which it appeared that Abyssinia proper consisted of a high mountainous table-land, the eastern boundary roughly following the 40th degree of east longitude. Between this mountainous region and the sea there is a tract of arid, low-lying, waterless country, inhabited by savage tribes. At Massowah this tract is only a few miles broad, but at Tajurrah it widens out to between two hundred and three hundred miles. These two regions differ totally as regards climate, inhabitants, and physical character, the high lands being salubrious, well watered, and with good communications, while the low country is waterless, with few facilities for communications, and uncultivated.

There were three points of communication between the sea and the uplands—Massowah, Amphilla Bay, and Tajurrah. The road from Massowah climbs the eastern boundary of the highlands, while that from Tajurrah traverses two or three hundred miles, and that from Amphilla Bay fifty to one hundred miles of the low-lying country, before ascending to the highlands.

The highlands are very healthy, but at certain seasons of the year, March till November, malaria is prevalent in the valleys. The rainy season is from May to September; little rain falls during the remainder of the year. The average rainfall is about thirty-five inches, July and August being the wettest months. Rain seldom falls between 6 A.M. and noon. The temperature is mild; tents or cover of some kind is, however, essential. Massowah itself is very hot, the shade temperature in July exceeding 120°.

The main political divisions of the highlands were Tigré in the north, Amhara in the centre, and Shoa in the south. Amhara comprised the districts of Wag, Lasta, and Begemder. On the western slopes of the highlands lie Wogera and Koara, where the highest mountains are found. On the shores of Lake Tsana are the districts of Dembea, Chelga, and Mecha, and south of these is the province of Gojam.

Abyssinia is inhabited by a mixed race; the majority of the people are of Shemite origin and speak a language closely allied to Arabic and Hebrew. The ancient tongue was the Ethiopic, and while this was preserved there was comparative civilisation in the highlands; the modern dialects are derived therefrom but have become contaminated by the proximity of Arabic-speaking tribes. Of the early history of Abyssinia little is known. The invasion by the Ptolemies and the penetration of Grecian art and literature is proved by the inscriptions found at Adulis and Axum.

Christianity was introduced at the beginning of the third century; Islam, however, supervened and Abyssinia sank into torpid oblivion for about a thousand years. Subsequently the Portuguese opened up communications with Europe, and in 1520 A.D. a fleet arrived at Massowah. In 1526 the Portuguese missions sailed for India with an Abyssinian Ambassador; the latter subsequently visited Portugal.

On the invasion of Abyssinia by a Muhammadan army, a Portuguese force was sent from India to aid the Christians of Abyssinia. On March 25th, 1542, this force defeated the invaders, but was itself beaten in a subsequent engagement.

In 1804 Lord Valentia sent his secretary, Mr. Salt, into Abyssinia. He again visited it in 1810 but apparently failed to reach Amhara.

In 1841 an embassy was sent from India with little result. In 1846, Ras 'Ali sent a mission and presents to the Queen. In 1848 Mr. Plowden was appointed Consular Agent; he reached Debra Tabor in 1849 and effected a treaty of commerce with Ras 'Ali, ratified by His Majesty three years later.

Lij Kassa, known as the Emperor Theodore, was born in 1818, and fought his way to the throne in 1855, assuming the title of Theodore III.

Mr. Plowden was murdered in 1860 and Theodore avenged his death. Captain Cameron succeeded Plowden as Consul in Abyssinia, and on his arrival in 1862 he received a letter from Theodore to forward to Her Majesty the Queen. Shortly afterwards the Emperor made Cameron and other Europeans prisoners and cruelly tortured them. A Mr. Rassam was subsequently sent to negotiate, but he, too, was made a prisoner. Theodore's atrocities growing worse and worse, diplomatic proceedings were entered upon. These failed in their object and preparations were made for despatching an expedition.

Bombay was selected as the base of possible operations. Under Preparations for 1867 expedition. Sir Robert Napier's orders Colonel Phayre began investigations, and Massowah was decided upon as the point of disembarkation. Sir R. Napier considered that the expeditionary force should consist of 12,000 men, and that a large amount of transport would be required. He advocated the employment of mules, camels, carts, and 3,000 coolies. He also recommended the allocation of funds to enable supplies to be procured. He represented that the Government responsible for the arrangements should have a free hand, and deprecated misplaced economy. He considered that, with the exception of carriage, the force could be equipped in from three to four months; he suggested that Aden, Egypt, and Abyssinia itself should be indented on for transport, and that it should be collected as near the point of disembarkation as possible; that an advanced party should be despatched as soon as practicable, and that the troops sent from Bombay should be relieved by others from Bengal and Madras.

On July 25th 1867, the Secretary of State for India telegraphed orders to begin the collection of transport, and asked what would be required from England. The officers to command were now selected. All the troops and officers were drawn from the Indian establishment. The assistance of the various departments—Foreign, War Office, and Admiralty—was freely given; transports were arranged for; a telegraph was constructed, suitable for service

in the field; signalling equipment was prepared; a search light was provided; preparations were made for laying down a railway, but this was subsequently sent from Bombay. Condensers were supplied; the Enfield factories manufactured breech-loading fire-arms for the European portion of the contingent, and mountain guns for mule carriage were prepared at the Royal Gun Factories, and all other contingencies foreseen as far as possible.

The question of currency necessitated a great deal of correspondence; eventually dollars, purchased in Austria, were sent out by the Bank of England. Special rates of pay were fixed for the individuals taking part in the expedition.

Military operations.

On the 16th September, 1867, the advanced party left Bombay to reconnoitre a landing place on the shores of the Red Sea, and on the 7th October an advanced brigade sailed from Bombay taking rations for two months in addition to one month's supply for boardship. A further supply for four months was despatched shortly after their departure.

On the 11th November a General Order was published directing the despatch of the force to Abyssinia under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir Robert Napier, G.C.S.I., K.C.B., (for detail of force *vide* Appendix A).

It had been foreseen that the Navy would be called upon to play an important part in the expedition, and the following ships were present in Annesley Bay:—*H. M. S. Octavia, Satellite, Spiteful, Star, Dryad, Nymphé, Daphne* and *Vigilant*, all under the command of Commodore L. G. Heath, C.B.

A rocket brigade of two batteries was organised from officers and men of the Royal Navy and attached to the army.

The Reverend Dr. Krapf, Mr. Dutton, and Mr. Haussmann were engaged as interpreters on salaries of from

Interpreters.

£500 to £600 a year.

Foreign officers from Italy, Prussia, France, Austria, Holland, and Spain were permitted to accompany the force.

Foreign Attachés.

Five thousand breech-loading rifles with 2,500,000 rounds of ball ammunition were despatched in September from England to Bombay. The Indian troops were armed with the discarded Enfield rifles on the return march from Magdala.

Arms.

Embarkation.

Although the greater portion of the force embarked at Bombay, a brigade was shipped at Calcutta and Karachi and smaller units at Vingorla and Calicut. Two hundred and five sailing vessels and seventy-five steamers in all were employed in connection with the expedition. In addition eight ships were engaged in the Mediterranean. Captain Tryon was appointed principal agent for transports. The embarkation was carried out most successfully; no accident occurred to troops or followers, and only two horses and one bullock were injured. During the voyage fever and dysentery broke out on one of the transports, and 45 out of 270 coolies died. The total tonnage employed was 300,000 at a monthly hire of £450,000. The total number of persons of every class sent to Abyssinia for purposes of the expedition was sixty-two thousand, and of animals fifty-five thousand.

Owing to rough weather the reconnoitring party did not reach Aden until the 26th September; it arrived at Massowah on October 1st, but finding the harbour unsuitable, landed at Malkatto in Annesley Bay on October 4th. Zula was finally selected as the place for landing.

Operations during October and November 1867.

On the 21st October the fleet conveying the advanced brigade arrived, and on 4th November a party started to reconnoitre the route to Senafé *viâ* Kumayli, which was explored and was found suitable. The distance was 62½ miles.

The 10th Regiment and Mountain Train reached Senafé on December 6th, and the 3rd Light Cavalry on 7th. The Sind Brigade arrived at Annesley Bay on 4th December. Hitherto the scarcity of water at the landing place had been much felt, and mules and camels had died of thirst and from want of attention. The arrival of steamers with water, and of the Sind Brigade, remedied this state of affairs. Great trouble had also been experienced in obtaining native labour and with the Persian and Egyptian transport muleteers.

During the last week in December a reconnaissance was made of the road from Senafé to Adigrat, a distance of only thirty-seven miles. This was divided into three marches.

Sir Robert Napier arrived at Annesley Bay on the 2nd January, 1868. His first care was to stock the depôt at Senafé.

By January 28th Sir R. Napier considered an advance to Antalo justified. Instructions were sent to Aden The advance. to push on the troopships, and a brigade was warned to be in readiness to march from Senafé. Sir Robert himself left Zula for the front. The railway did not make the progress expected, and by the 31st January only three miles had been completed.

On the 6th February, the Commander-in-Chief reached Adigrat, where a permanent entrenched post was established. Prince Kassai arrived at this place with a deputation and the troops were paraded in his presence. The general conduct of the Abyssinians was satisfactory, and the health of the troops good. Parties were pushed forward to repair the road, and the Commander-in-Chief himself followed on the 18th February. In two marches Adabaga was reached, and from here officers' servants and the cavalry syces and grass-cutters were sent back to Annesley Bay.

On the 25th February the Commander-in-Chief advanced to the Dyab, a stream between Adabaga and Hauzen, to meet Prince Kassai. As the result of several interviews the Prince promised to afford security to convoys, but Sir R. Napier neglected no precautions to render himself independent.

On the 26th February the British column commenced its advance to Antalo. After a difficult march a halt was made at Dongolo. Next day a march of eight miles brought the force to the banks of the Agula, where camp was pitched. This short march had proved very trying. On February 28th a still more difficult march of fifteen miles was made to the valley of Dolo. Here the force halted on the 29th. On the 1st March an advance was made to Eikullet, nine miles. On 2nd, after a march of twelve miles, Buyah was reached. A halt of ten days was made at Antalo, and here a main depôt was formed. Preparation was now made for an advance towards the south. On the 12th March the force marched *viâ* Mashik and the Alagi pass to the Atsala valley.

Halts were made at Masgah on the 12th and at Mashik on the 13th and 14th. Distance from Antalo $16\frac{1}{2}$ miles. By this time the telegraph line had been laid from Zula to Adigrat, a distance of 101 miles. On 17th March the First Brigade marched to Bulago and on the 18th to Makan. The distance from Atsala is fifteen miles and the march difficult. On the 18th Sir R. Napier with some Pioneers advanced to Ashangi, fourteen miles from Makan. On the 20th March the Commander-in-Chief with the main body of the Pioneers moved on to Mussagita, a march of eight miles. On the 22nd Lat, a march of seven miles, was reached. Here new distributions of the troops were made and orders issued to proceed without baggage. On 23rd a march of ten miles was made to Marawah; this was very severe as each man carried a weight of 55lb. After a day's halt to rest the troops, the Commander-in-Chief with the First Brigade moved to Wandach, eight miles, followed at one day's interval by the Second and Third Brigades. Next day a march of seven miles brought the advanced brigade to Muja. The following morning after a $6\frac{1}{2}$ miles march the Takazze was reached. On the 28th March a halt of two days was made at the Santara, $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles beyond the Takazze. This is on the edge of the Wadela table-land at an elevation of 10,000 feet.

Here the thermometer varied between 20° and 110° in the tents. Between the Takazze and the Bashilo, besides the Wadela plateaus, lie the plateaux of Talanta and Daont, north of the Bashilo; in the fork formed by that river and the Kulkulla is grouped the knot of mountains of which Magdala is the key. The route to this fortress was much intersected by ravines. In the most important runs the river Jedda. From information received it was decided to follow a south-westerly direction; accordingly on the 31st March the First Brigade moved to Gahso and on the 1st April to Abdikum, followed by the Second Brigade which halted on the 1st April at Gahso.

On this date the total force in Abyssinia numbered nearly 11,000 fighting men and 15,000 followers, distributed as under:—

Head-quarters and the First Brigade, First Division; at Abdikum. Head-quarters of the First Division and the Second Brigade at Gahso.

Details of the First and Second Brigades, First Division, between Wandach and Antalo.

Second Division at Antalo, Adigrat, and Senafé.

On the 2nd April the Commander-in-Chief with the First Brigade moved to Sindi, and Sir Charles Staveley with the remainder of the First Division to Abdikum. On the 4th April Sir R. Napier moved up to the Talanta plateau. On the same day the advanced guard seized the entrance to the plateau, followed by the First Brigade, the Second Brigade occupying Bethor. From the Talanta plateau the Abyssinian camp at Islamgie became visible. On the 6th April the Second closed up to the First Brigade, and here several days delay occurred on account of the want of supplies. On April 9th the main body advanced five miles to the brink of the Bashilo valley and encamped within sight of Theodore's army. On the further side of the Bashilo lay a rugged mass of broken ground, in the centre of which the heights of Selassie and Fahla rose to almost an equal height with the Talanta plateau.

Magdala was concealed by these heights from the British position. This rugged country was bounded by the table-lands of Talanta and Ambala Sieda. Magdala was separated from the former by the Menjara ravine, and from the latter by the Kulkulla, both tributaries of the Bashilo. The mountain mass of Magdala forms a crescent of which Magdala is the eastern and Fahla the western peaks. Midway between the two is the peak of Selassie. Magdala and Selassie are connected by the saddle of Islamgie, and Selassie and Fahla by that of Fahla. Magdala is 9,150 feet, Selassie 9,100 feet above sea level and 3,000 feet above the Menjara and Kulkulla ravines.

The sides of Magdala are scarped and steep, but at two points they fall to the terraces of Islamgie and Sangallat. From these alone can an entrance be made to the *amba* by the Kohit-ber and Kaffir-ber gates. From the foot of the Fahla saddle the Arogie valley runs down to the Bashilo, up which Theodore had constructed the road by which he dragged his guns into position at Fahla. Between the upper portion of the stream, which forms this valley, and one of its tributaries, lies the Arogie plateau.

On April 7th Sir R. Napier reconnoitred the Bashilo, ten miles beyond which lay Magdala. On the 10th the troops moved down to the Bashilo. The Fahla spur was the immediate objective. On the 9th orders had been issued to the First Brigade, First Division, to

Action of Arogie and
capture of Magdala.

occupy the Gombagie spur; on the following day the Second Brigade was to advance to the bed of the Bashilo at 10 A.M. Three cavalry regiments were detailed to hold the Bashilo. The Commander-in-Chief, on arriving at the Affijo plateau, at once ordered a regiment to occupy the point where the King's road debouched from the Arogie ravine, and directed the remainder of the First Brigade to move up in support. Almost simultaneously with the completion of this movement a round shell passed over the head of the staff and the action of Arogie began. Theodore, imagining that the mountain battery was merely transport, sent 6,000 Abyssinians to capture it. The Naval Brigade opened on the mass with rockets and partially checked the movement, but a portion advanced against the British column on the plateau while another pressed on to the head of the pass to attack the artillery and baggage. The 4th (King's Own) Regiment in skirmishing order, supported by a wing of the Baluchis, a detachment of Royal Engineers, and the Bombay Sappers, advanced to the Arogie plain and opened fire. The Abyssinians slowly fell back and were finally driven off the plain. A party, however, inflicted some loss on Sir Charles Staveley's right flank from a cactus grove on Fahla hill. Another party attempted to turn Sir C. Staveley's right, but was repulsed. In the meantime a sharp action had been fought at the point where the King's road issued from the Arogie valley.

"A" Battery, with an escort, had now ascended from the defile. On seeing this, Theodore rushed down the mountain and was met by the fire of the battery. The enemy still continued to advance, however, and the detachment of Pioneers went forward to meet them, a close contest between bayonet and spear ensuing; the Abyssinians were driven off with great slaughter, but not until they had inflicted many spear wounds. Further on the left considerable numbers of the enemy pressed towards the head of the defile where the baggage had arrived. The latter was parked under cover, and the escort, consisting of two companies of the King's Own Regiment, checked the enemy's attempt to penetrate the defile. Closed in by other troops the Abyssinians suffered severely, the Sniders, especially, doing great execution. The action which had commenced at 4 P.M. was over by 7 P.M.; heavy rain fell during the

greater part of the time. Theodore's forces retired in good order, and, where favourable ground offered, made stubborn counter-attacks.

The British troops bivouacked on the ground covering the issue of the Arogie valley. Their loss only amounted to twenty wounded ; that of the Abyssinians was estimated at seven hundred killed and twelve hundred wounded. At midnight Theodore sent the following message to Mr. Rassam :—" I thought that the people now coming are women ; I find that they are men. I have been conquered by the advanced guard alone. All my gunners are dead ; reconcile me with your people." At daybreak he sent to sue for peace.

By dawn on the 11th April the First and Second British Brigades had taken up their positions on the Affijo plateau and Arogie plain. The Baluchis were pushing forward in skirmishing order, when the flag of truce was seen approaching. Unconditional surrender of himself, his force, and the British prisoners were Sir Robert Napier's terms. Meanwhile Theodore, finding that matters were not so bad as at first appeared, plucked up courage and returned an insulting letter to the Commander-in-Chief ; he soon thought better of it however, and shortly after sunset the British captives reached Sir Robert Napier's camp. On the 12th April an apology for the tone of his previous letter was sent by Theodore. On the 13th April Theodore resolved to make an attempt to escape from Magdala. His troops, however, declined to accompany him, thousands surrendered to the British, and he himself re-entered the fortress. Double the period of the armistice having expired, Theodore's surrender not having been effected, and news having been received that the enemy were recovering from their defeat, the Commander-in-Chief determined to attack.

Before the troops had formed up, news of Theodore's departure from Magdala reached Sir R. Napier ; he at once sent word to the Gallas offering 50,000 dollars for his capture. Some cavalry were sent forward to watch the western side of the fortress until the main body should come up. The Sind Horse held the Bashilo and detachments watched the Minjara ravine. At 7 A.M. fifty troopers proceeded to the Fahla saddle to communicate with those of Theodore's troops who wished to surrender.

Sir R. Napier then ordered Sir Charles Staveley to advance and occupy Fahla and Selassie. On the advance commencing at 8-30 A.M. the Armstrong guns and the mortars took up a covering position; one mountain battery, advancing a short distance with the column, took up a position on a spur on the left of the road to cover the head of the escort; the second battery followed in rear of the leading battalion. A company of Baluchis ascended the first accessible spur on the right into Fahla, supported by two companies of the same regiment on another spur. At midday the head of the column reached the Fahla saddle, whence two companies, supported by the remainder of the Second Brigade and a battery, were pushed on to the summit of Selassie. The path was so difficult that only three guns could be man-handled to the top.

On the arrival at the summit of the Second Brigade, some 20,000 of Theodore's troops, who were there, laid down their arms. The Armstrongs and mortars were then brought up by elephant. Theodore himself joined his guns on Islamgie, intending to move into the citadel with them and defend himself to the last. At this time the detachment of Bombay cavalry had reached the Islamgie saddle, and Sir C. Staveley, seeing the Abyssinians advancing towards their guns, sent a company of the 33rd Regiment to the saddle to keep them under fire. Theodore, meeting these two detachments, mounted his horse, ordered two of his guns to be dragged into Magdala, and firing off his rifle called out a challenge for a champion to meet him. As he kept at a distance it was impossible to cut off his retreat from the fortress; at the same time he was unable to escape down the Islamgie saddle. After some exchange of shots the Abyssinians withdrew into the *amba* and the gate was closed. Some 200 Gallas, who had been massacred by Theodore, were discovered by the detachments, much to their disgust. The British Commander now reconnoitred Magdala and prepared for an attack on the fortress. Beyond the Islamgie saddle the rock of Magdala rose in a steep scarp to a height of 300 feet. A double line of defence, in each of which was a small gate, crowned the scarp; this was approached by a steep and rugged path. That the defences had not been abandoned was evident, though the strength of the garrison could not be determined, and Theodore himself was occasionally seen. Twelve guns and four rocket tubes now opened fire on

Magdala gate at a range of 1,300 yards, meeting, however, with no reply from the fortress. Sir Charles Staveley then made dispositions for the attack, the First Brigade leading, supported by the Second. The 33rd Regiment was to advance across Islamgie, two companies in skirmishing order, two in support. The remaining six companies headed by a detachment of Royal Engineers and "K" Company of the Madras Sappers and Miners, carrying powder bags, ladders, etc., were to form the storming party. Two companies of Bombay Sappers and Miners were to bring up the rear. On nearing the foot of the steep ascent the skirmishers, reinforced by the supports, were to cover the advance of the storming party. The 45th Regiment was to follow the 33rd in line, and the bulk of the First Brigade, moving in column, was to form the reserve. Two companies of the 10th Native Infantry were to remain at Selassie to guard the surrendered arms and clear the Abyssinians off the mountains. The Armstrong guns and eight mortars were to advance as far as practicable along the main road south of Selassie and cover the infantry advance, while the two mountain and Naval Rocket Batteries at the foot of Selassie were to keep up a fire on the fortress. The latter opened at 3 P.M., but the heavy guns could not approach nearer than 2,400 yards, and the mortars, finding the range ineffective, soon ceased firing. During the cannonade the enemy remained under cover. At 4 P.M. the order to storm was given. The 33rd Regiment, covered by the fire of the skirmishers, soon reached the outer gate, in spite of the fire of the defenders. Here the advance was arrested, for the gate was closed and powder bags were not at hand. It was broken down by crow-bars, and a stone wall 12 feet high was found to form a formidable obstacle.

The garrison maintained a constant fire through the loopholes, without, however, inflicting much loss. Meanwhile some of the 33rd mounted the wall by means of ladders, and, taking the defenders of the gate in flank, drove them with heavy loss up a narrow path, and rushing through a small gate-way, seventy yards further up, gained the summit of the fortress and planted the English standard. The followers of Theodore threw down their arms and begged for quarter, which was, of course, granted. The fortress, though so easily captured, was of great

strength, and a properly arranged defence would have entailed heavy loss upon the assailants. When he saw that further efforts were useless, Theodore gave the order "*Sauve qui peut,*" and drawing his pistol committed suicide. Early on the morning of the 13th the main body of the cavalry advanced from the Bashilo and threw out piquets to watch the approaches from the fortress to the British camp, the Kaffir-bir gate being watched by the Gallas. Next day the cavalry withdrew to its former position. Thirty pieces of ordnance, superior in calibre to that of the British, were captured. The total force employed in the assault numbered about 3,500. The British loss was not serious.

After the capture, the garrisoning of Magdala was entrusted to the 33rd and a wing of the 45th Regiment under Brigadier General Wilby. Order was with some difficulty established, and guards were posted at the gates. The crown and royal seat of Theodore were taken possession of, and his body was buried, without military honours, in the Church of Magdala, a Committee of Investigation as to the cause of his death being held. The Gallas were a source of much trouble, and it was frequently necessary to fire upon them to prevent the molestation of water-parties. The larger number of Theodore's subjects were allowed to leave for their own districts, and every care was taken to protect them. The disposal of Magdala caused Sir Robert Napier much trouble, several claimants coming forward. Wagshum Gobaze declined the responsibility. After dismantling the fortress and arranging for a safe conduct for those Abyssinians who desired to pass through Gallas territory to their homes, it was handed over to Queen Masteeat. The elephants and heavier ordnance having been sent off in advance on the 15th, orders were issued for the evacuation of Magdala by 4 P.M. on the 17th. At that hour the work of dismantling the fortress and the destruction of the captured ordnance began. On the 18th the last of the British forces crossed the Bashilo on its homeward route and encamped that evening on the Talanta, while Masteeat lost no time in establishing herself and her followers in Magdala. On the 19th preparations were made for the withdrawal of the whole force to Zula, arrangements being made for the safeguarding of the baggage from the numerous marauders who hung upon the flanks and rear, and upon

whom the rear-guard was obliged on several occasions to open fire.

On Talanta plain the released captives were handed over to the foreign officers of their own nationality. The plunder was sold by auction, and the proceeds issued to the troops as prize-money. The campaign was declared to be over, and the Commander-in-Chief issued a complimentary order to the troops engaged. On the 22nd April, Sir Robert Napier with the last of the force marched to the brink of the Jemma ravine and on the 23rd reached Bethor. On the 24th he moved to Abdikum and received in audience a large number of notable Abyssinians who had been liberated on the fall of Magdala. The force continued its retirement, and on the 10th May reached Mashik. Here the Queen fell seriously ill and remained in camp, but her two brothers departed. On the 12th at Antalo the Commander-in-Chief received congratulatory telegrams from Her Majesty, the Duke of Cambridge, and the Secretary of State for India. On the 21st May Sir Robert Napier arrived at Adigrat, and the Second Division was broken up, all troops hereafter remaining in the country being considered as belonging to the First Division, the Staff of the Second Division at once embarking for India. On the 24th May the Commander-in-Chief reached Senafé, and held a review of the troops next day in honour of Her Majesty's birthday. Prince Kassai was present, and on the following day a present of arms was made to him on the understanding that they were to be used solely in the defence of his own country. Four Chiefs of Tigré here swore allegiance to him. Sir R. Napier told Prince Kassai that, if he so desired, he might send some Tigré men to Aden for instruction in the use of the weapons which had been presented to him, being unable to accede to his request that British instructors might be left behind for the purpose. Prince Kassai had shown himself very friendly to the expedition. Through the failure of the land transport corps, Sir R. Napier had been obliged largely to look to local resources; it was necessary to complete the campaign before the rains broke, and any delay would have been serious. Owing to the ravages of locusts the supplies available in Abyssinia had fallen to a very low ebb, and it was essential to enlist the Prince's active sympathy. He, shortly after the meeting with Sir R. Napier, sent in 10,000 dollars worth of grain; the half-pro-

mised armament had, therefore, proved a successful bait. Looking at the transaction from another point of view, a strong ruler was the surest guarantee of the peace of Abyssinia. The present of arms consisted of 12 howitzers and mortars, 725 muskets with 350,000 rounds of ammunition, besides other minor items and a large amount of commissariat stock.

Corps and batteries were now gradually moved down in three stages to Kumayli, where they were entrained and railed to the pier-head at Zula. Particular attention was paid to the comfort of the troops during these movements. All surplus baggage, etc., was taken under escort to Zula and stored under a guard. On the 29th May the last of the troops evacuated Senafé, Prince Kassai accompanying the Commander-in-Chief to the head of the pass, whence he returned to Senafé.

Mr. Dufton, who had been attached to the Intelligence Department, was attacked by Shohos in the Kumayli Pass, and died from the wounds he received. He had rendered valuable services to the expedition as the result of experience gained in travel in Abyssinia. A small punitive force was despatched in pursuit of the Shohos but with little result.

On the 1st June the Commander-in-Chief with the last column of the force reached Kumayli, and on the day following, Zula, where the embarkation had been busily progressing. By this date all stations except Zula and Kumayli had been evacuated. On the 10th June Sir Robert Napier, having handed over to the Egyptian Governor, Abdul Kadir Pasha, the care of some railway plant and buildings which could not be removed until after the monsoon, started for Marseilles. On the 11th June the 25th Bombay Native Infantry was the only regiment left at Zula, as a guard for the stores.

While these events were happening the present Emperor, Menelik. Menelik, who was one of Theodore's pages, effected his escape. He entered Ankober at the head of a few followers and seized the reins of government. In 1881 King John obtained his submission and he reverted to the position of Ras of Shoa. On John's death in 1889 he became King of Ethiopia.

During the Italian campaign against Menelik in 1896 the Abyssinian army practised much the same tactics as in the 1868 war, the overlapping of the adversary's flanks and an assault

carried out by sheer weight of numbers : their arms were, however, of more modern pattern, and their success was largely due to faulty tactics on the part of the Italians.

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APPENDIX A.

Staff of the Abyssinian Expedition.

Commander-in-Chief.—Lieutenant-General Sir Robert Napier, G.C.S.I.,
K.C.B. ¹

Military Secretary.—Lieutenant-Colonel M. Dillon, Rifle Brigade.

Deputy Adjutant-General.—Colonel the Hon'ble F. Thesiger, 95th Foot.

Deputy Quarter Master General—Lieutenant-Colonel R. Phayre,
Staff Corps.

Political Officer.—Brigadier-General W. L. Merewether, C.B., Staff
Corps.

Commanding Divisions.

Major-General Sir C. W. D. Staveley, K.C.B.

„ „ G. Malcolm, C.B.

Commanding Royal Artillery.

Brigadier-General J. G. Petrie, R.A.

Commanding Royal Engineer.

Lieutenant-Colonel H. St. Clair Wilkins, R.E.

Principal Medical Officer.

Inspector-General of Hospitals S. Currie, M.D., C.B.

Commanding Brigades.

Colonel J. E. Collings, 33rd Foot.

„ W. Wilby, 4th Foot.

„ D. M. Stewart, Bengal Staff Corps.

„ J. W. Schneider, 2nd Bombay Native Infantry.

Deputy Commissary General.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. W. Lucas, Staff Corps.

Intelligence Department.

Major J. A. Grant, C.B., Bengal Staff Corps.

„ Roome, Staff Corps.

Colonel J. Brazier, C.B., Retired List, Bengal Army.

Mir Akbar 'Ali.

Director of Transport.

Major R. P. Warden, Staff Corps.

APPENDIX B.

COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE.

Cavalry.

Head-quarters Wing, 3rd Dragoon Guards.
10th Regiment, Bengal Native Cavalry (Lancers).
12th " " " "
3rd " Bombay " "
3rd " Sind Horse.

Artillery.

2 Rocket Batteries, Naval Brigade.
G. Battery, 14th Brigade, R. A. (Armstrong guns).
No. 3 Battery, 21st Brigade, R. A., with Mountain Train.
No. 5 " " " " "
No. 5 " 25th " " "
No. 1 Company, Native Artillery.

Engineers.

10th Company, Royal Engineers.
4 Companies, Bombay Sappers and Miners.
3 " Madras " "

Infantry.

1st Battalion, 4th Foot (King's Own Royal Regiment).
26th Foot (Cameronians).
33rd Foot (Duke of Wellington's).
45th Foot (Sherwood Foresters).
21st (Punjab) Bengal Native Infantry.
23rd " " " (Pioneers).
2nd Bombay Native Infantry (Grenadiers).
3rd " " "
5th " " " (Light Infantry).
8th " " "
10th " " "
18th " " "
25th " " " (Light Infantry).
27th " " " (1st Baluchis).
1 Company, 21st Bombay Native Infantry (Marine Battalion).
Bengal Coolie Corps (2,000 strong).
Bombay Army Works Corps (1,000 strong)

NOTE TO APPENDIX B.

These troops were distributed as follows : Those from Antalo to the front composed the First Division under Sir Charles Staveley with Colonels Schneider and Wilby as Brigadiers. All troops between Senafé and Antalo composed the Second Division under Major General Malcolm.

The Antalo Garrison commanded by Brigadier General Collings, consisted of :—1 Wing, Native Cavalry ; 1 Battery, Royal Artillery ; 1 Company, Sappers and Miners ; and 2 infantry regiments. The Adigrat garrison commanded by Major Fairbrother consisted of .—1 squadron ; 2 guns, Royal Artillery ; 1 company, Sappers and Miners ; and a half battalion of infantry.

The Senafé garrison was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Little and consisted of :—1 squadron, 1 company Native Artillery, and 12 companies Native Infantry from 4 regiments.

The Zula command was under Brigadier General Stewart, and comprised 1 squadron, 2 companies Sappers and Miners, and 4½ battalions Native Infantry.

APPENDIX C.

CASUALTIES DURING THE EXPEDITION.

Casualties among British Troops during entire campaign.

| | | | | | |
|-----------------------|----|------------------------------|----|----|-------|
| Total strength | .. | .. | .. | .. | 2,674 |
| Admission to Hospital | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1,332 |
| Total deaths | .. | 11 Officers, 35 other ranks. | | | |
| Total invalided | .. | .. | .. | .. | 333 |

Casualties among Native Troops and Followers invalided.

| | | | | | |
|---------------|----|----|----|----|-------|
| Native troops | .. | .. | .. | .. | 570 |
| Followers | .. | .. | .. | .. | 6,056 |

(of these 512 died).

The number of natives treated in hospital was 14,137. The chief causes of sickness were fever, dysentery, rheumatism, diarrhœa, and scurvy, in the order named.

Reporting on the sickness in the Army Works Corps and Bengal Cooly Corps, the Chinese, Mahrattas, Gentoos, and Musalmans were said to have fared best in the order named. Those who suffered most were Purdesi Brahmans, Parsis, and Portuguese.

Of the 1,943 Bengal Kahars 235 died and 545 were invalided.

Transport Animals.

| | | | |
|------------------------------------|----|----|--------|
| Lowland Train—Strength on 1st May | .. | .. | 26,883 |
| Casualties to 1st May | .. | .. | 6,920 |
| Highland Train—Strength on 1st May | .. | .. | 7,690 |
| Casualties to 1st May | .. | .. | 1,175 |



CHAPTER VII.

SOMALILAND—THE COUNTRY AND PEOPLE.

SOMALILAND* occupies that part of the African continent known as the "Horn of Africa" between the equator and the 12th degree of north latitude.

Geographical Position.

It is bounded on the north by the Red Sea, on the east by the Indian Ocean, and on the west and south-west by Abyssinia and Jubaland, the latter a portion of the British East Africa Protectorate. The country forms a triangle, measuring 600 miles along the coast from the French port of Jibuti to Cape Gardafui; 1,100 miles from Cape Gardafui to Kismayu; and thence through Harrar to Jibuti about 900 miles. The whole of this area, covering some 320,000 square miles, is partitioned into spheres of influence among Great Britain, France, Italy, and Abyssinia.

The Golis, a chain of mountains running roughly parallel to and at a short distance from the northern coast

Physical Geography.

form the backbone of the country. Correctly speaking this name applies to the hills behind Berbera, but it is a convenient term for the whole range. The northern slopes of these mountains, which vary in height from 5,000 to 6,800 feet, descend in a series of bluffs, similar to the Ghats of India to the maritime plain, a long strip of arid country between the base of the slopes and the shores of the Gulf of Aden, varying in width from 60 miles to some 200 yards at Cape Gardafui.

To the south of the Golis lies a large plateau, which, beginning with an altitude of nearly 5,000 feet, stretches right across the country with a very gradual fall to sea level on the south-east coast. This inclined plateau extends, therefore, over the greater part of Somaliland. It is covered with belts of dense thorn jungle interspersed with open spaces, where the grazing is good. In the higher portion of the plateau, called Ogo, there are a number of torrent beds which either lose themselves in the bush, or drain into the Nogal valley. These only contain water after the occasional showers of

* *Vide* map 15 in pocket.

rain which generally fall in April and May, and again in August and September. Water can, however, usually be found by digging at certain places in the sandy beds. Otherwise, the only permanent supply is obtained from wells dug by the Somalis, or their Galla predecessors, in the scattered outcrops of hard gypsum rock. These watering places become scarcer towards the interior, where there is a wide belt of waterless bush country, called in the north the " Sorl " or Northern Haud, and in the south the Haud (or Aya). South of this again some wells are found in the low-lying lands towards the coast.

The bush country forms a barrier between the tribes of the British Protectorate and those further south in Italian and Abyssinian territory. In the west, near Harrar, it is not a formidable obstacle, but eastwards it widens to over 100 miles. In the dry season it is uninhabited, but after rain it furnishes a common grazing ground to the tribes on all sides, who frequently contend for the possession of its rich pastures. This bush country is divided by the Nogal into two portions, the Northern Haud, or Sorl, and the Southern Haud.¹

The Nogal is a wide open valley, bordered by broken hills. It collects a great part of the drainage of the higher plateau round Burao through its principal tributary, the Tug Der, and runs in an east-south-easterly direction towards Illig on the Italian coast, eight miles south of the mouth of the Wadi Nogal. The open and level part of the valley, where the bush is either very sparse or entirely lacking, has an average width of about twenty miles. There is no running stream, but a good water-supply from wells and springs, and the grazing is fair. Unlike the Haud it is in every respect an easy country for military operations.

The only other important valleys are those of the Tug Darror and the Webi Shebeli. Of these our troops visited only the upper portion of the latter, the Tug Gebi, which is similar in character to, but narrower than, the Nogal. The Webi Shebeli is a large river, rising in the Abyssinian highlands and flowing south-east and south towards the Indian Ocean through dense forests. Within a short distance of the coast it turns southwards and loses itself in

¹ The latter is frequently mentioned in this narrative as " The Haud."

marshes not far from the mouth of the Juba. The Tug Fafan descends from the Harrar highlands, and drains the Ogaden country to the east of the upper Webi Shebeli, finally losing itself in the marshes south-east of Faf. This river, and its tributary the Jerer, forms stagnant pools in the dry season, but after rain causes extensive floods, especially about Faf.

In the north-west corner of the Protectorate are a few villages surrounded by cultivation. With this exception the whole country is a wilderness, the only permanent settlements being on the sea-coast. From Berbera, the largest of these trading villages, which possesses a good harbour, a track runs south-south-east, by Shaikh-Burao, Kirrit, and Garrero to Bohotle, a distance of nearly 200 miles. This has been our main line of communication in the Protectorate since 1902. The distances along it from water to water nowhere exceed about 45 miles, and are usually much less. It gains the plateau 40 miles from Berbera by a deep cleft in the scarp, formed by a ravine coming down from Upper Shaikh. The slopes of the hills are here well-wooded, and the ravine in which Lower Shaikh lies contains a stream. The climate is all that could be desired, and the scenery is picturesque, in marked contrast to the appearance of the country further inland.

At Bohotle there is a strong masonry fort on the edge of the basin containing the wells. The distance from this place across the Haud to Mudug is about 114 miles, with a few wells, yielding a scanty supply of water, at Damot, 42 miles from Bohotle. The first wells in the Mudug district on this route are at Badwein, from which place Galkayu is about 33 miles south and Bera some 25 miles south-west.

These are the three principal well-basins in the Mudug district, which is shaped something like a horse-shoe, and is rather more open than the surrounding tracts, containing excellent grazing. Galkayu is connected with Obbia on the Italian coast by a trade route some 50 miles in length, with wells at fairly frequent intervals. The slope of the country southwards is nowhere perceptible, until the route from Shaikh emerges on to the open grassy downs, which border the sea-coast within a short day's march of Obbia. The latter consists of a few mat huts collected round two stone houses belonging to the Chief of the place. The so-called port is formed

by a natural breakwater of rock, which enables small boats to land through the surf.

In such a country, where movement is possible in every direction, and is only dependent on the water supply, the number of routes is, of course, almost unlimited.

The whole country is divided into spheres of influence under the British, Italian, French, and Abyssinian Governments. British Somaliland stretches along the coast from Loyi Ada, near Jibuti, for some 450 miles towards the point of the Horn, with a maximum breadth of 200 miles. Its area is about 68,000 square miles, and the population is estimated at about 250,000. It includes a large portion of the Ogo, or higher plateau, the best part of Somaliland, which, as regards climate, may be called a white man's country. The Italians possess the point of the Horn and the south-east coast down to the mouth of the Juba river. The limits of Abyssinian territory are less clearly defined, but they include the central portion of the country from the Webi Shebeli to the eastern edge of the Ogaden country. The French have a slice of hinterland behind their port of Jibuti, and have made a railway towards Har-rar, which is to be continued to Adis Adeba, the capital of Abyssinia. The approximate boundaries of the several spheres of influence are shown on the accompanying pocket map.

Berbera, the principal town and seaport in British Somaliland, was occupied by Great Britain in 1884. The town is divided into the eastern native quarter, enclosed by a circular embankment as a protection from floods, and laid out in wide streets with some stone buildings, including mosques, a custom-house, and a pier; and the official town, the Shaab, containing the Residency and officials' quarters, a jail, a treasury, and court-house. On the beach twenty feet below is a large stone water-tank. Near by is a detached fort, connected with the pier by a trolley-line. The population varies from 25,000 in the trading season to 5,000 in hot weather. Water is brought eight miles by a pipe from Dubar, and furnishes a supply of some 6,000 gallons per diem, while the tanks have a cubic capacity of some 19,000 feet.

The climate is not unhealthy, but the heat is intense during the prevalence of the south-west monsoon. The harbour, formed by

a spit of land $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles in length, is the only one on the Somali coast where vessels can anchor in all weathers. The trade is principally with Aden, and in a lesser degree with the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea.

The People.

The Somalis comprise various tribes, occupying certain well-defined tracts and quite independent of each other, being more often than not at feud among themselves. The following is a list of the more important tribes, each of which is sub-divided into clans and sections under the control of recognised headmen or *akils* :—

| <i>Tribe.</i> | <i>Locality.</i> |
|----------------|--|
| Isa. | Country on either side of the Anglo-French Boundary. |
| Habr Awal. | } British Protectorate. The first four along the coast in the order given, from west to east. The two last in the interior; the Gadabursi in the extreme west; the Dolbahantas in the Nogal and adjoining territory. |
| Habr Toljaala. | |
| Habr Gerhaji. | |
| Warsangli. | |
| Gadabursi. | |
| Dolbahanta. | |
| Mijjarten. | Italian territory; point of the Horn and eastern coast down to Obbia. |
| Hawiya. | Italian territory, coast below Mijjarten. |
| Marehan. | Italian territory; interior; north of the Hawiya. |
| Ogaden. | Interior; north-west of the Marehan. |

The Ogaden are nominally under Abyssinian influence. A large section of the Habr Gerhaji live inland north of the Habr Awal. The three Habr tribes claim descent from a common ancestor, from whom they are collectively known as the Ishak tribe.

There is, in addition, a lower class or caste, the Midgans, distributed among all the tribes. They are outcasts, who live by hunting, and are very expert trackers and guides. Workers in iron and leather are also said to belong to a lower class, as in India.

It may be mentioned that protection clauses have been inserted in our treaties only with the Habr Awal, Habr Toljaala, Habr Gerhaji, and Warsangli.

The Somalis trace their descent from certain Arab chiefs, who, according to tradition, introduced the Muhammadan religion into the country about 450 years ago, and intermarried with the Galla tribes of the coast. The descendants and followers of these settlers have gradually extended their conquests down to the Juba river, and the present inhabitants are, therefore, a mixed race, in which the Galla strain appears to predominate. They still speak what seems to be a Galla language, which is not Semitic except for a few borrowed Arabic words, and has no connection with the Bantu languages of East Africa. Very little is known of the Galla tribes inhabiting parts of Abyssinia and Jubaland, but from the brief descriptions of travellers they appear to resemble the Somalis in many respects. That they once held the whole of Somaliland is proved by the fact that the numerous barrows or grave-mounds scattered over the country are to this day called Galla mounds.¹ Many of the wells, and the few remains of stone buildings, are also supposed to be the work of this people. The Somali of to-day is a nomad pure and simple, content with a portable house, made of a frame-work of poles supporting a few mats. These mats² also do duty for camel-saddles, and the whole apparatus can be packed up and loaded for a move in a few minutes. The women do most of the hard work involved by the wandering habits of the Somali. The men appear to think they do enough in looking after the camels, and spend their spare time, when they are not quarrelling, in talking and singing in chorus with a mournful drone.

The Somali approaches the African type in colour and texture of hair, which is usually short and crisp, but his features are regular and show no trace of the thick lips and flat nose of the negro. In build he is tall and spare, with no great muscular development, but he is very wiry and capable of great endurance. Next to excitability and inordinate vanity, his chief characteristic is avarice, which accounts for his strong inclination to loot camels, the principal wealth of the country, on every possible opportunity.

Opinions differ as to the Somali's fighting qualities. but at any rate he appears to possess little sense of discipline or confidence in

¹ These mounds are about ten feet high and fifteen feet in diameter through the base. They all originally contained an inner

chamber, which has now in most cases fallen in, leaving a hollow on the top.

² Called *Herios*.

his leaders. Colonel Swayne gives a favourable opinion of the Somalis as soldiers in his report on his operations (see page 103). The Somali is full of resource, and makes an excellent scout in his own country. He is brave, quick to learn, and soon becomes a good shot. He has few vices, although impatient of restraint, and somewhat unamenable to discipline. On the other hand he is vain, lazy, and unable to make a prolonged effort. The Dolbahantas, who are further removed from civilising influences, are undoubtedly the hardiest tribe with which we have come into contact. They formed the bulk of the Mulla's following, and many of the men who served us best in the native scouting corps and levies belonged to this tribe, and had a blood-feud with the Mulla. The Isa are also said to be bold fighters, addicted to night-attacks, a mode of tactics not often resorted to by other Somalis.

The Somali is not a *ghazi*, and although the Mulla's influence was so great as to imbue his followers with a very fair semblance of the fanatical spirit, they did not on any occasion stake their all on one rush, but invariably attacked in several lines of extended groups, with the riflemen distributed along the front. When the centre of their line is checked, the wings wheel inwards like the horns of a Zulu *impi*, but their formation is much less dense than that adopted by other African savages, and is, doubtless, very suitable for bush-fighting.

They are armed with spears of two kinds, a small and light one for throwing, and one of stouter make for thrusting. They also carry small round leather shields, about one foot in diameter; and some are armed with short straight double-edged swords, called *bilawas*. The Mijjarten also use a club, and the Midgan carry a bow and poisoned arrows, and a knife. Rifles were scarce in the country before the Mulla's appearance.

The dress of a Somali consists of a *tobe*, several yards of cotton sheeting, which is wound round his waist and thrown over his shoulders. The *tobes* of the Mulla's men were of red ochre colour resembling the soil of the Haud. The coast Somalis generally wear white.

Our connection with Somaliland dates from the year 1827, when the Habr Awal elders signed a treaty of peace and commerce with the British

Government, and agreed to pay compensation for the plunder of a merchant vessel wrecked on their coast. In 1855 the Somali coast was put under blockade until reparation had been exacted for the murder of a British officer near Berbera.

Prior to the Mahdi's rebellion, Egypt had, since 1870, held the northern coast of Africa from Suez to Cape Gardafui with garrisons at Berbera and other places. On the evacuation of that port by the Egyptians in 1884, four tribes placed themselves under the protection of the British Government, *viz.*, the Habr Awal, Habr Gerhajis, Habr Toljaala, and Warsangli. (The treaty with the Warsangli was concluded in 1886.)

At this time the Italian possessions in Africa were confined to a small coaling-port at Asab on the Red Sea, but in 1885 Massowah was handed over to them, and shortly afterwards they established the colony of Erithrea on the shores of the Red Sea. They then announced a Protectorate over a considerable portion of Somaliland and eventually over Abyssinia. Their claims to the latter country were abandoned after the disastrous battle of Adowa in 1896, but they still retain their Somaliland possessions. In 1891 it was found necessary to define the boundary of their Protectorate with that of the Imperial East Africa Company on the Juba river, and in 1894 the northern limits of their territory were settled with reference to those of British Somaliland. The southern portion of their Protectorate, east of the Juba river, is administered by the Benadir Trading Company. Here there are a few Italian officials and some native levies, but elsewhere their occupation of the country is purely nominal.

Harrar, after its evacuation by the Egyptians, was, in 1887, seized by Menelik, then King of Shoa; and from this base the Abyssinians have extended their conquests into the valley of the Webi Shebeli, thus laying claim to the western portion of central Somaliland. The facility with which the Abyssinians acquired their new possessions was due in no small measure to rifles imported through Jibuti, the chief port in French Somaliland, and the centre of the arms trade in this part of Africa. The French obtained their first footing here by the purchase of Obok from a local chief in 1885. In 1888 the eastern boundaries of their possessions, which

had in the meantime grown considerably, were delimited with respect to British territory.

To return now to the British Protectorate, which, as we have seen, was established in 1884 by agreement with the tribes. For the first fifteen years little trouble was experienced in dealing with the Somalis. The military operations, which were from time to time necessary, were on a very small scale, with the exception of those undertaken by the Zeila Field Force in 1890 against the Mamasan section of the White Isa, who had raided Bulhar and attacked a caravan near Hensa. Owing to the skilful tactics of the enemy the punishment meted out to the tribe on this occasion was not severe, but the results of the expedition were on the whole satisfactory. The offending clans made their submission on the withdrawal of the punitive force, and the attitude of the whole tribe has since that date been friendly towards the British authorities.

The other expeditions undertaken on behalf of the protected tribes were directed by the local authorities, who usually employed Somali troops assisted by contingents from the friendly tribes. In 1893, however, a small force of seventy-five regular troops from Aden, assisted by forty Somali levies, was sent to punish the Aidagalla section of the Habr.

At this time Somaliland was one of the most prosperous of our African colonies, and the only one, it is said, which was entirely self-supporting. The only danger to be apprehended to the security of the Protectorate was towards the western border. Here the growing power of Abyssinia had absorbed some of the tribes, and the others looked to us for protection. In 1897, however, the spheres of influence of the two Governments were defined by treaty, and some 17,000 square miles of territory, which had previously been considered British, were handed over to King Menelik.

The Protectorate was administered from India until the 1st October 1898, when the control was taken over by the Foreign Office. About this time the Mulla, Haji Muhammad Abdullah, of the Habr Sulaiman clan of Ogaden Somalis, began to give trouble. Having gained a reputation for sanctity by several pilgrimages to Mecca, he had established his influence

over certain of the more remote tribes. Among these the Ali Gheri Dolbahantas, with whom he was connected by marriage, and the Ogadens were his chief supporters. At first he appears to have used his influence for good by settling disputes between the tribes, but it soon became apparent that he intended to organize a religious movement against the British Government. Early in 1899 he raided the Protectorate as far as Burao, proclaiming himself to be the Madhi and announcing his intention of ruling the interior, leaving the coast only to the Europeans. It will be noted that he has succeeded in some measure in making this threat good, owing to the country being too poor to repay complete occupation.

It was currently reported at this time that the Mulla was demented, and this may be the reason why he became known as the "Mad Mulla."

In August, 1899, the Mulla again advanced to Burao and threatened Berbera, which was thereupon reinforced by a detachment of 200 native infantry from Aden. On this the Consul-General, Colonel J. Hayes Sadler, proposed that an expedition should be sent into the interior, but, owing to the state of affairs in South Africa, operations against the Mulla were deferred. Not having obtained the support he expected from our tribes, the Mulla retired to the Ogaden country. In June 1900 the Abyssinians sent a force against him and defeated a body of Somali spearmen, who attacked them while in *zareba*. In July he again raided our Protectorate, and at the end of the year sanction was given to the Consul-General to raise a force for the protection of the country.

The several expeditions undertaken against the Mulla will be described in the next chapter. Including the two phases of the 1903-1904 operations, which were practically separate campaigns, there have been in all four expeditions.

In the operations under Colonel Swayne in 1901 the Mulla was twice defeated in the Nogal district and driven across the Haud to Mudug, the British force being then withdrawn to Burao by order of Government.

In 1902 Colonel Swayne again advanced against the Mulla, who had re-entered the Protectorate, and drove him back to

Mudug. Later, in attempting to follow him up across the Haud, Colonel Swayne encountered his main body at Erigo. The enemy were driven off, but the Somali levies were so demoralised by the severe fighting that a retreat to Bohotle became necessary.

The control of the operations was then entrusted to Brigadier-General Manning, who advanced from Obbia in February 1903, with a force mainly composed of Indian and East African troops. Mudug was successfully occupied, and the Mulla was, with the assistance of the Abyssinians, driven across the Haud into the Nogal. The disaster which befell Colonel Plunkett's detached column at Gumburru had, however, increased the Mulla's prestige, and further operations became necessary. Major-General Egerton, who commanded the re-organized expedition, succeeded in totally defeating the enemy's main body at Jidballi in January 1904. The Mulla, however, with his personal following, escaped to the Warsangli country on the north side of the Sorl, and when a column was sent out against him from Las Dureh he retired into Italian territory.

The Somali Field Force was broken up in June 1904, a garrison of Indian troops being maintained in the country until 1905. The defence of the Protectorate was then entrusted to local forces supported by a special corps of 600 men recruited in the Punjab. The Mulla has now been assigned a tract of country in Italian territory, but still appears to maintain his influence over the Dolbahantas in the south-east of our Protectorate. In 1905 the administration of the Protectorate was transferred from the Foreign to the Colonial Office.

CHAPTER VIII.

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SOMALILAND.

The Isa Expedition of 1890.

THIS expedition was directed against the Mamasan section of the White Isa, to punish them for raiding the Habr Awal at Bulhar and for an attack on a caravan at Hensa, in which two French priests were killed.

The Zeila Field Force, under command of Captain J. R. C.

| | |
|----------------------|------------------|
| Naval Detachment .. | 10 of all ranks. |
| Aden Troop .. | 64 " |
| Arab levy .. | 20 " |
| 17th Bo. Infantry .. | 224 " |
| Bombay Sappers .. | *30 " |
| | — |
| Total .. | 348 |
| | — |

Domvile, composed of the troops detailed in the margin, embarked at Aden on the 9th and 11th January and landed at Zeila on the 13th. The force then marched along the coast about thirty miles eastwards to Bula Ado, where it

halted from the 17th to the 27th January. On the 19th the cavalry raided some Isa *karias* near Gerissa, distant a long march into the interior. One hundred camels and a large flock of sheep were captured, while some of the enemy were killed and others taken prisoners. The camels and prisoners were brought into camp, but the guard with the sheep was ambuscaded when returning at night, and a native officer and ten sowars, out of a party of thirty-six of all ranks, were killed.

On the 27th the force marched into the interior, and on the 29th halted at Husain, about forty-five miles south-south-east of Bula Ado.

The site chosen for the *zareba* at Husain, although the best that could be found, was unfavourable, being on the banks of a *nala* in broken ground. At 2-35 A.M. on the 30th, just after the moon had set, the camp was rushed by a party of 25 of the

* The troops were subsequently reinforced by 1 British officer, 40 Bombay Sappers, and 9 sowars from Aden. As, however, a garrison of fifty-one of all ranks was left at Zeila, the strength of the force in the field was not actually augmented.

enemy who used their long spears as poles and leapt over the *zareba*.¹ They were driven out with a loss of eight killed, but not before they had killed four of the 17th Bombay Infantry, and wounded sixteen including Captain Hughes.

After this affair the force recrossed the maritime plain by a more westerly route than that by which it had advanced, burning several encampments and capturing some of the enemy's stock *en route* to Zeila, where it embarked on the 3rd February. The offending clans afterwards submitted, agreeing to allow caravans a safe passage through their country in future and to abstain from further outrages.

Operations against the Mulla Muhammad Abdullah in 1901 and 1902 under Lieutenant-Colonel E. J. E. Swayne.

The Mulla's repeated raids into British territory induced the Government, at the end of 1900, to sanction the raising of a local force for the defence of the Protectorate. By February, 1901 the levy was completed to the strength shown in the margin, under the command of (Local) Lieutenant-Colonel E. J. E. Swayne. The mounted troops were under Major W. G. L. Beynon, I.S.C., and Captains G. E. Phillips and M. McNeill, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, each commanded a corps of infantry. The strength of the levy was 1,500 rifles² with twenty-one British officers.

With the co-operation of an Abyssinian force, the Mulla, whose head-quarters were at Milmil and Bohotle, was driven into the Dolbahanta country. The enemy's strength was at this time estimated at about 5,000 men, the greater part of whom were mounted; they probably had some 500 to 600 rifles.

In April, 1901, Colonel Swayne moved to Burao, which was then made the advanced base. Rain having fallen, the advance into the

¹It appears that the small party which attacked the *zareba* formed the advanced guard of a larger force, which remained behind in the bush and did not support the attack. The British commander was criticised for not making a higher *zareba* with a banquette to enable the men to fire over it. The force, arriving in camp at 5

P.M., had no time for the construction of strong defences. Experience shows that it is usually better to widen the thorn fence round camp when time permits rather than increase its height.

²This includes fifty drill instructors, etc., from the Punjab.

Nogal district commenced on the 21st May. Samali, or Somala, some twenty-five miles south-east of Eil Dab, was reached on the 30th May, and here a strong *zareba* was made for the bulk of the transport, Captain McNeill being left in command with 370 rifles and about 100 spearmen and tribal horse. The main body then pushed on towards the Mulla's position, but the latter, evading Colonel Swayne, delivered three determined assaults on the *zareba* at Samali on the 2nd and 3rd June. The enemy were beaten off with the loss of 600 killed and wounded, and, being intercepted at Odergoeh by the main column, their retreat became a rout, and the Mulla fled to Mudug. In a short time, however, he returned to the Nogal, and Colonel Swayne, who was at Bohotle, moved out with 700 rifles along the southern edge of the valley. The Mulla again retreated, but his rear-guard was overtaken and defeated at Ferdiddin on the 17th June. Captain D. A. Friedrichs, R. E., and nine men of the levy were killed in this action, and Lieutenant F. A. Dickenson and sixteen men were wounded. The Mulla, with his chief adviser Haji Sudi,¹ once more fled across the Haud while Colonel Swayne returned to Burao, orders having been received to confine operations to our own territory.

The enemy's total losses during the campaign were estimated at 1,200 killed and wounded, while 800 prisoners were captured. Colonel Swayne, in his final report on his operations in 1901, made the following observations:—

The levies had covered some 1,170 miles in three months, including delays at Burao, and had frequently marched thirty miles a day. On days of action as at Odergoeh, on two occasions in the Ararsameh country, at Kurmis, on several occasions in the Ali Gheri country, and at Ferdiddin, forty miles had been covered. Besides this, detached sections and companies had traversed an aggregate distance of 1,700 miles. This does not include the work of parties of scouts and spies, who frequently worked two days ahead of the force.

The infantry carried, besides rifle, bayonet, equipment, and 100 rounds of ammunition, two days' rations of dried meat and dates, and a sheep-skin containing about a gallon of water. Blankets and superfluous clothes were left behind at Burao. Every British officer was mounted.

Although the men in some cases were excited in action, they soon settled down to work, and on no occasion did the loss caused by the enemy's rifle fire

¹ This man was formerly an interpreter in the British Navy.

affect them so as to cause them to hesitate in their advance. At Ferdiddin, the Somalis, on their own initiative, extricated the maxims from the dead camels and worked them, paying proper attention to sights and trial shots. They took up new positions whenever the advance of the infantry rendered this desirable. In the same action the mounted corps, which had suffered severely in men and animals, was ordered temporarily to fall back on the infantry, but advanced with them directly a forward move was made.

No attempt had been made to teach the men, in the limited time available, anything except generally to obey orders, to shoot and to learn the formations and movement necessary for general cohesion. They could march well, and being all more or less used to inter-tribal fighting, they quickly adapted themselves to our tactics. They understood the care and loading of transport animals, could live on meat alone, and could go easily for two days, subsisting only on the water they themselves carried.

I had no difficulty in at once finding as many riders as were necessary to utilise such ponies as we were able to buy or capture.

Some difficulty occurred at the start owing to there being no non-commissioned officers or training staff available, the men we eventually used for this purpose being mostly coast policemen, some of whom had less than a year's service.

The men learned fast, however, and directly non-commissioned officers began to come forward amongst them there was no further trouble.

It was not advisable nor was it necessary to dragoon the levies, whose mobility was, to a great extent, the outcome of their being an irregular corps.

Provided the men are treated with the same consideration as is used in the native army in India, they will readily respond by doing their best. It was unfortunate that many of the officers could only communicate with their men through interpreters, who, in some cases, were prone to make the most of their positions.

The levies were placed under the Burma Military Police Regulations and Somaliland Order in Council of 1899. There was very little crime and the punishments, which it was found necessary to inflict in a few serious cases of plundering, having been very severe, a stop was at once put to anything of the kind.

In December 1901 the Mulla once again entered the Protectorate, raiding the tribes and threatening Burao, which was garrisoned by 650 men. Steps were now taken to re-organise the levy which had in the meantime been reduced. Six officers of the King's

African Rifles¹ were sent out from England and 300 troops were ordered to be held in readiness in British Central Africa.

The operations which took place at the beginning of 1902 were unimportant, being intended to prevent the Mulla from tampering with the Protectorate tribes. It was not until the 26th May that Colonel Swayne was able to advance from Burao towards Wadamago and Bohotle, with a force consisting of 1,200 infantry and 70 mounted troops. The Mulla, who was near Baran with 12,000 mounted men and 3,000 foot, then retired to Erigo, one day's journey north of Mudug, leaving a body of mounted men at Damot to observe the movements of the British force. On the 15th June Colonel Swayne moved on Damot, driving the Mulla's men into the Haud.

It was deemed inadvisable at this time to advance to Mudug, and, indeed, there was not sufficient water at Damot to enable the force to cross the Haud. Accordingly, it was decided to move eastwards into the Nogal to clear that district of the enemy and drive them away northwards, or back to Mudug, where they would increase the Mulla's water difficulties. July and August were spent in these operations. Meanwhile the Mulla's force was daily increasing and caravans of rifles, which were smuggled into the country through Mijjarten ports, were reported to be reaching him in Mudug. Colonel Swayne, therefore, asked for a reinforcement of 300 of the 2nd Battalion, King's African Rifles. These troops were despatched, as well as sixty Sikhs from British Central Africa.

On the 2nd October the 2nd King's African Rifles joined Colonel Swayne at Baran, where he had arrived at the end of September, sixty miles east of Bohotle, and the advance on Mudug commenced the following day. The column which, with the exception of the 2nd King's African Rifles, consisted entirely of Somali troops and levies, numbered about 150 infantry and 500 mounted troops. It also included two 7-pr. guns and four maxims. On the 5th October it encamped in dense bush at Awan Erigo. Next morning, news being received that the enemy were advancing in force, the column moved out of camp in search of a more open space.

¹ Six additional officers were subsequently sent out.

When it had marched about two miles without reaching the open, the mounted scouts galloped in and reported that the enemy were close at hand. Accordingly the column, which was moving in loose square, was halted, and the formation was dressed as far as the thick bush and the large number of transport camels would permit. After waiting for some time the force again advanced slowly and was almost immediately attacked from all sides. The rear and right face, where two companies of the King's African Rifles were stationed, stood firm, but the Somali levies on the left and front faces fell back on the centre in sudden panic, with the exception of one half company which charged to its front. The enemy advanced very rapidly, firing as they came up to the muzzles of the guns. Captain Angus, R.A., was here killed at his post. Major Phillips was killed while rallying his men, and Captain Howard and Lieutenant Everett were wounded about the same time. In spite, however, of the confusion into which the column had been thrown by the first onset, the officers succeeded in rallying their companies, which now re-formed and drove the enemy back. In the meantime the camels had stampeded through a gap in the left rear corner of the formation and had scattered their loads broadcast in the bush. When the enemy had been driven off most of the camels and their loads were recovered, but a maxim gun, which had been dropped by its bearer during the action, was carried off. Our casualties in this engagement amounted to two officers, fifty-six levies, and forty-three transport followers killed, and two officers and eighty-four levies and followers wounded. Sixty-two dead bodies of the enemy were counted close to the scene of the action. It was in this action that Lieutenant-Colonel A. S. Cobbe won the Victoria Cross.

After the fight, Colonel Swayne retired to more open country, and on the 11th October fell back towards Bohotle, as the levies were too much shaken to allow him to continue his advance.

Campaign against the Mulla Muhammed Abdullah, 1902-04.

First Phase. Operations under Brigadier-General W. H. Manning.

The check at Erigo left our advanced force concentrated at Bohotle, with the Mudug oasis still in the possession of the Mulla,

against whom a third campaign was now to be undertaken. Colonel Swayne having been invalided and recalled to England to advise the Foreign Office, the direction of operations was entrusted to Brigadier-General W. H. Manning, Inspector-General of the King's African Rifles. His first step was to call for regular troops to replace the Somali levies, who could no longer be relied upon for close fighting. Accordingly, re-inforcements from British Central and East Africa, amounting to some 800 men, were ordered to embark for Somaliland ; and on the 21st November a wing of the 1st Bombay Grenadiers left Aden for Berbera, followed at a short interval by 150 Punjab Mounted Infantry from India.

As soon as a flying column could be got ready, Bohotle, which was surrounded by hostile piquets, was relieved and garrisoned by a company of Bombay Grenadiers and the British Central African contingent of Sikhs. A flying column was then stationed at Garrero to act on the Berbera-Bohotle lines of communication.

The control of the operations was handed over by the Foreign Office to the War Office on the 10th December, on which date the force in the country amounted to 2,674 of all ranks. A few days later, when the consent of the Italian Government to operate in their territory had been obtained, it was decided at a Cabinet Council to proceed with the Somaliland Expedition. In addition to the reinforcements already despatched from India it was arranged to send the following troops to Somaliland. For disembarkation at Obbia direct :—One regiment from the Punjab, one section of a native mountain battery, one company of Sappers and Miners, the Bikanir Camel Corps, one native field hospital, and one section of a British field hospital. For disembarkation at Berbera :—One Pioneer regiment. Six months' rations were to accompany the troops. At the same time Lord Milner was informed that it had been decided to accept General Ben Viljoen's offer to raise a Boer contingent for service against the Mulla. These were to be sent to Obbia as soon as they could be raised and equipped, together with a company of British mounted infantry from South Africa.

The plan of campaign approved by the War Office contemplated combined operations from Obbia and Berbera ; the former place, from which the

main advance was to be made, having been reported as suitable for landing troops. The following general instructions were then issued for the guidance of the General Officer Commanding :—

1. The primary object to be the expulsion of the Mulla from Mudug.
2. The Italian Government made it a condition of their assent to the landing of a force at Obbia that operations should aim at preventing the Mulla from retiring south-west.
3. If the Mulla should retire or be driven from Mudug, he should be pursued, but not for a greater distance southwards or westwards than four or five days' march. (This restriction was subsequently removed, and after the occupation of Mudug General Manning was practically given a free hand.)
4. An Italian Officer to accompany the Obbia force as Political Officer, and his advice to be taken with regard to the future control of the Mudug district.
5. The occupation of Mudug to be reported to the Secretary of State with a view to the issue of further instructions.
6. An Abyssinian force was to occupy the eastern frontier of their own territory and act as a stop to the Mulla, if he retired in that direction.
7. The base at Obbia was to be closed by the end of April, and the Obbia column to return *via* Bohotle.
8. Attention to be paid to the improvement of roads and water supply in our own Protectorate.

The plan of basing a column on Obbia or some other point on the south-east coast had already been proposed in Colonel Swayne's time, and had the advantage of taking the enemy's position in rear by a shorter and easier line of approach than that from our own side of the country. The direction of the advance, moreover, tended to drive him either north or north-east into British territory, or westwards to the Webi Shebeli, where the Abyssinians would be able to deal with him. It is obvious that no other plan would have offered so many chances of success, but the following difficulties were inherent to the scheme :—

1. The uncertainty of obtaining camels in sufficient numbers in an unknown part of the country.
2. The difficulty of landing on the south-east coast, which caused considerable delay, especially in the disembarkation of transport.

3. The necessity of removing the base from Obbia before May, when the south-west monsoon begins to blow. This removal of the base obliged the column, as stated in the general instructions, first to concentrate at Mudug and eventually to march to Bohotle with all its impedimenta. It can easily be seen that this operation, as compared with a simple advance from a permanent base, required exceptionally good transport. This, however, as events proved, was not forthcoming, and how far the dearth of camels contributed to the indecisive outcome of the operations can best be judged from the following narrative.

Obbia Column.

| | |
|---|----------------------|
| Lahore Mountain Battery, two Guns | } From India direct. |
| 3rd Sappers and Miners, No. 17 Company. | |
| 2nd Sikhs, Punjab Frontier Force | |
| Bikanir Camel Corps (200 men). | } From South Africa. |
| Native Field Hospital. | |
| 1 Section British Field Hospital. | } From Berbera. |
| British Mounted Infantry, 1 Company (141 men). | |
| Boer Mounted Infantry, 1 Company (100 men). | |
| Punjab Mounted Infantry, 1 Company (150 men). | |
| 1st King's African Rifles (Yaos) (350 men). | |
| 3rd King's African Rifles (Soudanese) (98 men). | |
| 5th King's African Rifles (Sikhs) (102 men). | |

The detail of the Somaliland Field Force, as it was eventually constituted, is given in the margin. Particulars of Command and Staff will be found in Appendix A. General Manning assumed direct command of the column at Obbia, where the troops from Berbera arrived on the 27th December, and formed an entrenched camp. Troops from South Africa and India arrived in January. The total of the Obbia Column amounted to eighty-six British Officers and 2,256* of other ranks, including native officers.

The strength of the Berbera Column was 78 British Officers

Berbera Column.

| |
|---|
| 1st Bombay Grenadiers, $\frac{1}{2}$ Battalion. |
| 7th Bombay Pioneers |
| Sikh Contingent, British Central Africa (105 men). |
| 2nd King's African Rifles and Details (Yaos) (700 men). |
| 6th King's African Rifles (Somalis) (400 men). |
| Telegraph Battalion, R. E. (56 men). |

and 2,297* other ranks. The functions of this force were to keep open the lines of communication to Bohotle, and to provide a moveable column for the defence of the Protectorate and for co-operation with General Manning in case the Mulla should be driven north-

* These figures are approximate only. The strength of the force varied from day to day according to disembarkations and

re-embarkations. The grand total was under 5,000 of all fighting ranks.

wards. Colonel J. C. Swann commanded the lines of communication and Major J. Gough the movable column.

Brevet-Colonel A. N. Rochfort and Captain R. P. Cobbold accompanied the Abyssinian force of 5,000 men, which King Menelik agreed to send to the Webi Shebeli under Fitaurari Gabri.¹ The months of January and February were occupied in collecting

the main column at Obbia and preparing for the advance to Mudug. Great difficulties were experienced in landing, the heavy seas making it impossible sometimes for days together to do any work. The Senior Naval Officer attributed the difficulties of disembarkation to the exposed anchorage, indifferent landing places, and lack of appliances. Horses and mules swam ashore, and very few were lost. Camels were either towed ashore, or landed in Madras surf-boats, according to the state of the sea. The plentiful supply of military labour and the combined efforts of seamen and soldiers alone enabled the disembarkation to be carried out successfully.

During this period of preparation, the staff duties were not lightened by the fact that the force consisted of so many different nationalities—British, Boers, Indians, East Africans, Soudanese, and Somalis. Requisitions for stores, etc., had to be made by wire from Aden.

On the 14th January a column of 500 rifles under Lieutenant-Colonel Cobbe, V.C., left Obbia and marched into the interior, returning on the 28th. Under cover of this reconnaissance a line of advanced posts was pushed forward towards Mudug as under :—

| | | | |
|-----------|-----------|-----|-------------------------------|
| Gabarwein | 1st stage | 10 | miles, intermediate distance. |
| Lodobal | 2nd .. | 13 | " " |
| El Dibbar | 3rd ... | 18½ | " " |
| Dibit | 4th ... | 15½ | " " |

Major R. G. Brooke, D.S.O., who was in charge of the advanced lines of communications, made several venturesome rides with a few Bikanir camel sowars to within a short distance of Galkayu, the centre of the Mudug district and the first objective of the column. As a result of his reports it was decided to advance from Dibit by the circuitous but fairly well-watered route by Wargallo. One month's

¹ An Abyssinian military title meaning "commander of the advanced guard."

supplies for the whole force were pushed up the line towards Dibit, but owing to the lack of transport a great part of it accumulated at the nearer posts.

The hopes which had been entertained of drawing a number of camels from the country round Obbia were not realised, chiefly owing to the obstructive attitude of Yusuf 'Ali, Sultan of that place, who was, with the assent of the Italian authorities, deported to Aden on the 29th January. As this chief afterwards rendered us good service, it is improbable that he was actually disaffected. It is more reasonable to suppose that avarice, the Somali's besetting sin, prompted him to manipulate the local camel market to his own advantage. A number of rifles and ammunition, both of French make, were found in his house; also several treasure chests, which, had he been content with his lawful commission on the purchase of camels, could scarcely have contained so many rupees.

After his removal, a reconnaissance was made to El Hur on the coast south of Obbia, where some ponies and camels were obtained. A few purchases were also made at Obbia, but the bulk of the transport had to be brought round by sea from Berbera. Some 3,000 camels were required to move the whole force to Mudug, but of these only a portion had been collected and disembarked towards the end of February. The dry season was, however, already more than half over, and any further delay would probably have made it impossible to bring the Mulla to action.

Accordingly, General Manning marched from Obbia on the 22nd with a flying column, 800 strong, leaving the remainder of the troops to follow twelve days later with a month's supplies for the whole force, which it was intended to concentrate in Mudug by the 15th March. He reached Dibit on the 25th February with the mounted troops, and waited there one day for the infantry, which had halted at Aolu, nine miles short of Dibit, to graze the camels.

The Mulla's Harun¹ with the bulk of his forces, was at this time reported to be at Galadi and Dudub. He probably had under him altogether some 12,000 men, a large proportion of whom were mounted and able to make rapid marches. There was, therefore,

¹ His own *karias* and personal following.

a possibility of General Manning's advance being opposed beyond Wargallo.

On the 27th February the column, reinforced to a strength of about 1,000 men from the garrisons of the posts, left Dibit and marched by Inideenli and Rakhan to Wargallo, where it arrived on the 3rd March. The wells at these places had already been occupied by Major Brooke, working in advance with a few mounted troops, and on the 3rd a small party, consisting of 3 officers, 30 Punjab mounted infantry, and 50 Bikanir camel-sowars acting under his orders, left Wargallo for Galkayu, where they arrived early the following morning, and at once made a *zareba*. A few of the enemy's scouts were seen during the day, and the party had to stand to their arms once or twice in the night. On the 4th March they were reinforced by the remainder of the mounted troops and on the 5th by the infantry of the column.

Meanwhile Colonel Swann had been instructed to occupy Damot, an operation which was successfully carried out on the 4th March. Another force under Lieutenant-Colonel Plunkett, reconnoitring to the south of Bohotle, encountered a party of the enemy's spearmen at Lasakante, killing fifteen of them and making sixteen prisoners.

To return to the operations of the main force on the south side of the Haud. The reserve column, strength 841 rifles, left Obbia with the supplies on the 6th March, and, marching generally by night, arrived early on the 10th at Dibit, where they met the returning camels of the flying column. A convoy was then sent on to Galkayu with seventeen days' supplies for the force at that place, while the remainder of the camels were sent back to bring up supplies from Lodabal, the main body of the column halting five days at Dibit. By the 24th March the whole force was concentrated in Mudug, with the exception of about 700 men at Obbia and the various posts on the lines of communication. These included the section of the Mountain Battery and 172 mounted troops at Dibit. In the meantime the occupation of the Mudug district had been completed by the despatch to Bera and Badwein of small columns, which had taken possession of the wells at those places without firing a shot. The enemy's position at Dudub and Galadi was screened by a belt of thick jungle, which lies immediately to the

west of Bera, and efforts were made to burn this with a view to the next advance, but the thorn-trees of this country being juicy even at the driest time of the year, it was found that the bush would not kindle.

Owing to the enemy's inactivity the operations had so far been attended with no difficulties except those due to scarcity of water, but the movement to Mudug had been a severe tax on the transport and each step in advance was now to lead into more difficult country. Communication had been established between the Berbera and Obbia forces by a party of forty-seven Somali Mounted Infantry, who crossed the Haud from Bohotle and arrived at Galkayu on the 18th March. These were followed on the 25th March by a column

under Lieutenant-Colonel Plunkett, consisting of 308 men of the 2nd King's African

Advances to Galadi. Rifles, 25 Somali mounted infantry, and two guns, Camel Battery.¹ The necessity of holding the line down to Obbia in strength had induced General Manning to send for this reinforcement.

All was now ready for an advance to Galadi, and on the 26th the General marched to Bera with the available troops. Here the column was made up to a total strength of 867 infantry and two guns by additions from the garrison of the post and by the arrival of Colonel Plunkett's party from Galkayu, where they had rested for one day. The advance was resumed on the 28th March, on which date Major Kenna, V.C., who had been sent on with a covering party of 240 Mounted Infantry, occupied Dudub and captured a few prisoners. It was ascertained from these that the Mulla himself had left Galadi, but that the wells there were still held by a few of his men. Accordingly Major Kenna made a night-march on the 29th and, reaching Galadi at 8 A.M. on the 30th, surprised a party of the enemy's spearmen as they were drawing water. These were chased for some miles through the bush, several being killed and a few made prisoners.

General Manning, following the mounted troops, reached Galadi on the 31st March with the guns and about 450 infantry. When it became probable that the enemy would not be encountered, the greater part of the 2nd Sikhs, 328 men, had been sent back to Gal-

¹The greater part of the Bikanir Camel Corps was finally sent to Bohotle to replace troops taken from that side.

kayu from the first bivouac out from Bera, owing to the uncertainty of the water supply, and also to relieve the strain on the transport. Sixty¹ men had been left in *zareba* at the Dudub wells, and an escort of 50 rifles had been sent back to Bera on the morning of the 31st with the empty camels of the column. The distance from Galkayu to Galadi is about eighty miles, or $4\frac{1}{2}$ days' march as made by General Manning's column, and subsequently shortened to four marches by convoys, etc., coming up to the front.

The usual method of conducting these marches was to start at day-break, or sometimes an hour or two earlier, and continue on the move with short halts every hour, until about 11 A.M., when the camels were unloaded and sent out to graze under a guard, the baggage being deposited in the centre of a rough square, formed by the several detachments of troops as they came in. The worst hours for marching were from 10 A.M. to noon, as in places where the bush was so thick as to prevent the air from circulating, the heat was stifling. Each man carried at least 40lb. of kit on his back,² and in these circumstances the daily allowance of one gallon of water, reduced by evaporation to three-fourths of that amount, was often insufficient to quench his thirst and provide for his cooking.³

A fairly open spot was, if possible, chosen for the mid-day halt, and a company was fortunate if it found a clump of trees near its assigned position, otherwise the men lined up in the open and made such shade for themselves as was possible with *pagris*, blankets, etc., supported on brushwood. The heat in Somaliland is due to the direct rays of the sun, and not so much to refraction and hot winds, as is the case in India; consequently the least shade gives some relief, and the men became expert in the construction of these temporary shelters. A good plan, sometimes adopted, was to alter the position of the troops in column at the mid-day halt. It was then unnecessary to make any changes in the dark before starting the following morning.

¹ Including a few mounted infantry, whose horses had broken down.

² Rifle, 100 rounds of ammunition, *chagu* or canvas water-bag, water bottle, one day's ordinary rations, one day's emergency rations, axe, cape or blanket, havresack, etc.

³ Occasionally the allowances were reduced

to half a gallon per man, but it cannot be said that the force as a whole ever actually suffered from want of water. It was rather the knowledge of the consequence which would ensue from running short of water that acted as such a drag on the operations.

At about 3 P.M. the camp would be roused by a jarring sound on the bugles, known in this country as the "camel call," which had the merit of being easily recognised by the Somali camel-men. Within half an hour of the return of the transport to camp the column would be once more in motion in a loose single-rank square, which was the formation for the march. In the open, with good camels, it was possible to maintain some cohesion, but in close country, which was the rule, the camels were compelled to advance along one or two jungle paths, and all trace of a square was lost soon after starting, so much so that the rear-guard gradually fell back to a distance of from $1\frac{1}{2}$ to 3 miles behind the head of the column. The advanced troops usually halted at sunset and made a *zareba* for the night. It often happened that the rear-guard arrived in camp long after dusk. This was the case on the occasion of the last march but one towards Galadi, when it was observed that the enemy had lighted a number of signal-fires on the flank of the march to give warning of our approach to the *karias*, which the Mulla had left behind on his retreat to Wardair. On the level plain it was difficult to estimate the distance of these beacons from the line of march, or even to distinguish them from the cooking-fires of the advanced guard, which had halted a mile or two in front.

Galadi proved to resemble Dudub and the other well-basins of this district.¹ It is a large shallow depression of bare white rock, dotted with trees, the largest of which are near the wells. Here the Somalis collect their flocks when they drive them to water. Consequently the ground swarms with ticks and vermin.

The mounted troops, working ahead of the infantry, had moved without transport. The men had consequently to subsist for nearly two days on half a biscuit each, and some mutton, while the horses had nothing but camel-mats to eat. The country being at this time completely dried up there was not a blade of grass near Galadi.

¹ The cleansing of the wells is the first task to be performed on arriving at one of these localities. The following may be taken as a fair example of the material that has to be removed from them. Broken *hans*, or water-vessels made of plaited fibre; a Somali corpse or two; a collection of rot-

ting timber and filth of all kinds. The water is impregnated with salts and the gaseous fumes often rendered men working in the wells insensible. Several Royal Humane Society medals were earned on these occasions, but at least one death occurred before relief could arrive.

Small columns sent out from Galadi effected large captures of stock from the *karias*, which the Mulla's hasty retreat had left scattered over the country. One of these columns under Colonel Plunkett proceeded some forty miles in the direction of Wardair and returned to Galadi on the 6th April. Captures were also made at Dudub and by small parties sent out from other posts mentioned below, the actual number of the camels, reported as captured, being :—Galadi 1,228, Dudub 60, Bera 100, Damot 2,000.

Great numbers of sheep were taken on each occasion and were a useful addition to the meat supply of the force, but of the camels captured only a very small proportion were fit for transport purposes.

The Abyssinians had meanwhile reached the valley of the Webi Shebeli, and on the 4th April halted after a twenty mile-march on the left bank of the river in fairly thick bush near Burhilli. At about 11 A.M., after the arrival of the main body in camp, but before a *zareba* had been made, they were attacked on three sides by about 1,100 Somali tribesmen. The attack came as a surprise, and severe hand-to-hand fighting ensued, lasting some forty-five minutes, when the enemy were driven off. Many were killed while trying to cross the river. Colonel Rochfort, who was present, reports that little control was exercised over the fighting by the Abyssinian commanders, but that individually the men, who preferred their swords to their rifles, rushed into the fight in the keenest possible manner. At the conclusion of the action those who had killed their man or men presented themselves one by one before the commander of the force, dancing a war-dance and proclaiming in loud tones their devotion to their Emperor and country. The custom of firing a shot in the air, which signifies an enemy slain, was also observed. The Abyssinians pursued all day. Their losses amounted to 21 killed and 10 wounded, those of the enemy to nearly 300 killed and only 2 or 3 wounded.¹

The Somaliland Field Force was now disposed as follows :—

General Manning held Galadi with about 650 rifles,² pending the arrival of reinforcements. The remainder of the Obbia Column

¹ The small proportion of wounded to killed is significant.

² The escorts of convoys arriving at

Galadi between the 1st and 13th April, and remaining there, brought this total to about 750.

was extended along the lines of communication, now some 230 miles in length, and was mostly split up into small parties, except at Galkayu, where there was half a battalion of the 2nd Sikhs, ready to move up in support if required. At Bohotle, in addition to the garrison of the post, there was a movable column of about 500 men, which was to take part in the forthcoming enveloping operations against the Mulla, who was at Wardair. The Abyssinians at Burhilli were well placed to prevent the enemy from breaking either to the south or west, and his only safe line of retreat lay to the north-west, where it was doubtful the tribes would support him.

In order to cross the eighty odd miles of waterless bush country which lay between Galadi and Wardair, General Manning intended to establish water-posts for the first two marches out of the former place, and then to advance to the foremost post, carrying five or six days' water in tins for the 800 or 900 troops that would be available when the half battalion at Galkayu and other details arrived at the front. It was first necessary to collect a reserve of a fortnight's rations at Galadi, and for this purpose convoys were arranged for both from Galkayu and Bohotle, which the reinforcing troops were to bring up with them. Major Gough was ordered to cooperate in the advance on Wardair by moving out from Bohotle with the movable column in a south-westerly direction towards Daratoleh.

It was feared that the rains, which would enable the Mulla, hitherto restricted to the wells, to move freely about the country, might begin at any time. General Manning, therefore, determined

| | All ranks. | to utilise the time which must |
|-----------------------------|------------|-------------------------------------|
| 1st K.A.R.'s | 122 | elapse before the reinforcements |
| 2nd K. A. R's | 264 | could arrive, by sending a column |
| 5th K. A. R's | 51 | out, strength as in the margin, |
| Camel Battery | 21 | under Lieutenant-Colonel Cobbe, |
| British M. I. | 23 | v.C.,D.S.O., on the 10th April with |
| Boer M. I. | 23 | orders to reconnoitre the road |
| Somali M. I. | 11 | from Galadi to Wardair, and to |
| | --- | |
| Total combatants of whom 22 | | |
| were officers | 515 | |
| | --- | |

occupy the latter place if practicable.

In the special instructions issued to him, Colonel Cobbe was informed that the main column would leave Galadi on the 17th

April, and he was to secure the water supply at Wardair, if possible, but to refrain from attacking the enemy's main body. It was considered probable that he would reach Wardair before the enemy could concentrate in force to oppose him. This forecast proved to be wrong.

Ten days' rations and six days' water in tins were taken with the column, and one day's supply of water had been sent out a march in advance under escort of the fifty Sikhs of the 5th King's African Rifles who were to accompany the reconnaissance. This party was led too far to the south by the guide, and in following them the column had to make a *détour* before regaining the proper direction on the 12th. In order to economise water the mounted portion of the column left Galadi a day later than the infantry, which they overtook on the 13th. A few of the enemy's mounted scouts were encountered on the 12th and 13th, and on the 14th the column, continuing the advance, became involved in very dense bush. The troops were in danger of losing not only the track to Wardair, about which there was some uncertainty, but also each other, for so limited was the field of vision that the left flank company passed within fifty yards of Colonel Cobbe without being seen, and got in front of the advanced guard. Of the mounted infantry which had been sent on to reconnoitre, not a trace could be discovered. Accordingly, the column, having been turned about, was made to march back on its own tracks, and as the former rear-guard, now the advanced guard, was clearing the thick bush, it was suddenly fired into. The enemy, however, proved to be only a scouting party of mounted men who had been hanging on to the rear of the column and had themselves been taken by surprise by the retrograde movement; and a few rounds from the 7-pounders soon dispersed them. The mounted infantry, attracted by the sound of the firing, now arrived, and the column, continuing its march into more open country, halted for the night at a spot about forty-two miles west of Galadi, on the north side of the more southerly of the two Gumburra hills. These hills are situated about half way between Galadi and Wardair and, although of no great elevation, form conspicuous land-marks in the surrounding plain. They lie north-west and south-east of each other at a distance of not more than four or five miles apart, athwart what is called the

middle Wardair road, which Colonel Cobbe had been endeavouring to follow. Of the other so-called roads and tracks to Wardair, one passes to the south and the other at some distance to the north of the hills. On hearing of Colonel Cobbe's difficulties, General Manning decided to recall him and advance by the northern road, which would have brought him within some twenty miles or less of Major Gough's line of advance. This decision, however, was taken too late to prevent the disaster to Colonel Plunkett's party, which occurred about one and a half miles south-east of the northern hill and some four miles from the *zareba*.

On the night of the 14th only about two days' water was left in the tins, and one object of the reconnaissance, the location of the enemy,¹ who were evidently in the neighbourhood in some force, had been fulfilled. Accordingly it was decided to return to Galadi, leaving a post at Gumburru. With this intention work on the *zareba* was commenced at day-light on the 15th. It happened, however, to rain that morning, and enough water was collected to enable the column to remain out a day or two longer and reconnoitre the enemy, while awaiting orders from General Manning. Throughout the 15th and 16th the piquets and patrols were in close contact with the hostile scouts, and on the latter date a patrol of twenty-eight mounted infantry under Captain Shakerley was suddenly attacked by the enemy's horsemen, when crossing an open space about two miles from camp. The mounted infantry immediately dismounted and returned the fire, eventually retiring a short distance to a more favourable position, where they formed a small circle. Here they were almost surrounded by some 200 of the enemy, who attacked them most persistently, one man and one horse being killed within twelve yards of the circle. Rifleman Miller, 60th Rifles, who volunteered for this dangerous duty, rode back to camp for reinforcements, but before these could arrive, and just before the ammunition of the patrol gave out, the enemy drew off, being alarmed by the near approach of Captain Luard's company of Yaos, who were returning from a reconnaissance and had marched to the sound of the firing. In this skirmish Lieutenant Chichester, 6th King's African Rifles, was killed, while one Burgher and two Somalis

¹ The tenor of the instructions for the column commander was to avoid attacking the enemy if encountered in strength.

were wounded. The same day a convoy arrived at the *zareba*, bringing water and rations from Galadi, with an escort of fifty of the 2nd Sikhs under Captain Vesey.¹

Next morning, the 17th April, two parties of Yaos were sent out to reconnoitre, and about 8 A.M. The Gumburru disaster. Captain Olivey, who commanded the company in the Wardair direction, sent in to say that, having met a large force of the enemy, he was retiring towards the *zareba*. Accordingly Colonel Plunkett was ordered to support him and bring him in, taking for this purpose another company of Yaos and forty-eight men of the 2nd Sikhs under Captain Vesey, who asked leave to join the party. At about 9 A.M., as they were about to start, another message arrived from Captain Olivey to the effect that he was now within one and a half miles of the *zareba*, and that no enemy was in sight. This report was shown to Colonel Plunkett, who must have met Captain Olivey very soon after leaving camp and have taken the latter on with him to engage the enemy. No news was received from him, but about 11-45 A.M. it was reported that firing had been heard. It was scarcely audible, but a look-out party sent to a tree, 1,000 yards from camp, distinctly heard a burst of maxim fire. Some mounted Somalis were sent out to report, and at 12-45 P.M. one of them returned with Colonel Plunkett's guide, whom he had picked up wounded in the bush. This man reported that the column had been cut up. Soon after this a few fugitives confirmed the disastrous news. In all thirty-seven Yaos² and one Somali, the sole survivors of the fight, and most of them wounded, straggled into camp during the afternoon, and from their reports it was possible to gather what had happened. The battle-field was visited in January 1904 by a British Officer³ attached to the Abyssinian forces, and statements as to the distances, etc., will be based on his account.

It appears that Colonel Plunkett in his eagerness to engage the enemy was drawn on to a distance of four miles from the *zareba* in a westerly direction, where there is a comparatively open space some 500 yards in extent, partly surrounded by thick bush,

¹ He had arrived at Galadi about the 12th April with a convoy from Galkayu.

up in the bush.

³ Major J. W. Jennings, D.S.O.,

² Two others were subsequently picked R.A.M.C.

which from this point stretches almost continuously to Wardair. Near this spot he was attacked by the whole of the Mulla's forces, numbering perhaps some 8,000 men. The column, 224 of all ranks, had apparently formed three sides of a square in single rank on the march out with the Sikhs in the front face. Afterwards a half company was thrown across the rear face. On the repulse of the first attack on the front, the column appears to have pushed on to the middle of the open space mentioned above, for some of the wounded survivors owed their escape to having been left on the ground, in rear of the scene of the main action. The first assault, which was made by horsemen, was followed by further attacks from all sides by riflemen on foot, supported by masses of spearmen. All were successfully repelled until the ammunition gave out. Captain Olivey's company and the Sikhs had taken with them 100 rounds per rifle in their pouches, the remainder, 150 rounds per rifle. There was no reserve ammunition. Moreover, the Sikhs used solid bullets not suited to stop a charging savage. Most of the officers were by this time killed or wounded, and Colonel Plunkett now gave the order to the remnant of his men to charge through the enemy and make for camp. He himself was immediately afterwards shot through the head. Only a few succeeded in reaching the *zareba*.

The enemy evidently fought with great ferocity and courage, charging up to within ten yards of the rifles and even penetrating the square in the earlier stages of the fight. The final attacks, which overwhelmed the square, or what was left of it, when Colonel Plunkett gave the order to break through, were made by a mob of spearmen, who included a number of Adonis. The latter are a tribe of negro type, dwelling on the Webi Shebeli, some of whom the Mulla pressed into his service. It seems probable that the action began about 10-45, reached its climax at 11-45, and was all over soon after 12 o'clock. But as no European or Indian survived the fight, any account of it must necessarily be imperfect, seeing that Yaos are said to be unable to count above ten. Their statements, however, that the enemy surrounded them like a *boma*¹ and that the dead lay piled in heaps, may be taken as being

¹ A thick thorn fence, or *zareba*.

substantially accurate ; and there can be no doubt that the losses¹ inflicted by Colonel Plunkett's brave men deterred the enemy from following up their success. Thus the remainder of Colonel Cobbe's column was able to return to Galadi unmolested. The immediate result of the action was to deprive the force of nearly 200 valuable lives, to disarrange the General's plans, and to show that the enemy possessed a fighting spirit which had previously been entirely underrated, and which, added to the extreme difficulty of the country, made them a very formidable foe. Lieutenant-Colonel Plunkett, Captains Johnston-Stuart, Olivey, Morris, and McKinnon, Lieutenants Gaynor and Bell (2nd K.A.R.), Captain Vesey (2nd Sikhs), Lieutenant Sime, I.M.S., and 176 other ranks, including 2 native officers of the 2nd Sikhs, were killed. The wounded were returned as 28 ; 11 men, therefore, escaped unscathed.

When the full extent of the disaster was realised in the *zareba* it was too late to undertake any measures to retrieve it. A party of mounted men were sent out to pick up stragglers, but they were driven in by a strong force of the Mulla's horse, whose dust could be seen from the *zareba*.

The defences had in the meantime been improved in preparation for an expected attack. The night, however, passed quietly except for the movements of the enemy's scouts in the bush round the *zareba*, and at 1 P.M. on the 18th Major Kenna's mounted infantry arrived from Galadi.

The first message from Colonel Cobbe, despatched from Gumburru at 1 P.M., had reached Galadi on the evening of the 17th. Fortunately there were sufficient troops to form a relieving column, owing to the arrival that morning from Galkayu of half a battalion of the 2nd Sikhs and a company of Soudanese (3rd King's African Rifles) with a large convoy of supplies, part of which, with its escort of 50 of the 7th Bombay Pioneers, had joined the column at Dudub, after crossing the Haud direct from Damot. The convoy had with great difficulty found its way by a hitherto unexplored route to Dudub, where it arrived with its water completely exhausted.

General Manning now altered his plans, which had been to reinforce Colonel Cobbe with a small column,² and marched himself

¹ Deserters from the enemy estimated their losses at about 1,000.

² He had decided to do this, and to order

Colonel Cobbe to return to Galadi, on receiving news of the fighting on the 16th.

at 1 A.M. on the 18th April with all the available troops, *viz.*, 300 rifles of the 2nd Sikhs, 60 Soudanese, and 100 mounted infantry, to relieve Gumburru; about 200 men being left to garrison Galadi. In order to move as light as possible, kits were left behind, and only water and rations for three or four days, together with ammunition and hospital stores, were taken with the column.

The mounted infantry started ahead of the other troops, and making a forced march of over forty miles in twelve hours, arrived at Gumburru, as has been stated, at 1 P.M. on the same day. The infantry halted at about sixteen miles from Galadi and made a *zareba* in which the rations and most of the water-tins were deposited, with the Soudanese and fifty of the 2nd Sikhs as guard. The remainder of the column, about 250 men, marched early the following morning and halted at 9 A.M., about fourteen miles from Gumburru. Here another *zareba* was made, and news awaited from Colonel Cobbe, who had been instructed to retire from Gumburru, if possible. If unable to withdraw, 150 of the relief column were to endeavour to obtain touch with him and help him to cut his way out. At about 10-30 a small party of Burghers¹ rode in from Gumburru, and reported that Colonel Cobbe had left his *zareba*, and was on his way to join the relief column with the whole of his transport, the enemy having made no attempt to hinder his withdrawal. His arrival at 1 P.M. brought up the force under General Manning's immediate command to 700 men, *i.e.*, remainder of Colonel Cobbe's column 350 men, 2nd Sikhs 250 men, mounted infantry 100. Full details of the disaster had only reached the General on the march out from Galadi. On leaving that place his information was to the effect that Colonel Plunkett had been repulsed with loss. Consequently he made his arrangements simply with a view to the withdrawal of the column from Gumburru and not with the intention of an advance beyond that point. Therefore, although Colonel Cobbe had still two or three days' water, it was not considered possible with the supplies in hand for the whole force to march to the scene of Colonel Plunkett's fight. Accordingly the combined column retired to Galadi, where it arrived on the 20th April.

¹ The Boer Mounted Infantry, who were partly Boers and partly Colonists.

Some anxiety was felt as to the fate of Major Gough's column, which had in the meantime moved out of Bohotle in supposed co-operation with the advance from Galadi, for, although a messenger had been sent to recall him, the circuitous route by which the man would have to travel made it uncertain whether the order would reach him in time. Major Gough's objective was Daratoleh, which is scarcely more than forty miles from Gumburru in a straight line, but the Bikanir camel sowar who carried the message had to proceed *viâ* Mudug, Damot, and Bohotle, a circuit of some 300 miles. This circumstance illustrates the difficulty of carrying out combined operations in this country and the advantage accruing to the Mulla from his occupation of interior lines.

The following account of Major Gough's march to Daratoleh is taken from the diary of Captain G. M. Rolland, v.c., who was Intelligence Officer to the Column, which consisted of 350 infantry and about 200 mounted troops.

The column left Bohotle on the afternoon of the 13th April. On the 16th Major Gough, hearing from prisoners that the enemy intended to occupy Danot, pushed on with his mounted troops to seize that place, and ordered the infantry under Major Rowlands to follow on with all speed. On arriving at Danot, however, it was found that there was insufficient water there for the whole of the infantry, and word was accordingly sent back to Major Rowlands that he was to send 200 men back to Bohotle, and to advance with the remainder. On the arrival of the infantry at Danot, Major Gough decided to push on to Daratoleh, which was reported to be held by 500 of the enemy. The whole of the 2nd April was spent in preparation for the march of 27 miles to Daratoleh, and, as Major Gough had decided that his whole force was to be mounted, the Yaos were taught how to ride behind the Bikanirs on the double saddle.

| | | |
|--|---------|---|
| On the 22nd the force, strength as per margin, left camp at 4-30 A.M., | | the Somali Mounted Infantry acting as advanced guard. Some of the enemy's patrols were encountered about 8 o'clock, and at 10-20 A.M., Captain Howard of the Somali Mounted Infantry galloped back with the information that the enemy were advancing in force. The column was at once halted and formed square round the camels. Five minutes later the enemy appeared through the thick bush and attacked the square with |
| Action at Daratoleh. | | |
| | Rifles. | |
| Bikanir Camel Corps | 50 | |
| Somali Camel Corps .. | 50 | |
| Somali Mounted Infantry | 50 | |
| King's African Rifles | 50 | |
| B. C. A. Indian Cont. | | |
| Sikhs | 13 | |
| Total of all ranks with one maxim | 213 | |

great courage, advancing to within 50 yards before they opened fire. It was noticed that many of them were wearing sun hats, fezes, and bandoliers, which could only mean that a disaster had occurred to some other column. The attack was kept up with vigour till 2-30 P.M., by which time out of the 300 rounds of ammunition per man with which Major Gough has started only 100 rounds per man were left. In the circumstances it was now decided to retire slowly towards Danot. The enemy followed up the retirement, but, the square formation being maintained, they could make no impression, and at 5-30 P.M., they drew off. It was during this retirement that Captain Walker, Major Gough, and Captain Rowlands won the Victoria Cross. No further fighting occurred that day, and Danot was reached safely about an hour after midnight.

The casualties in the Daratoleh fight were:—two British officers and thirteen other ranks killed; four British officers and twenty-five other ranks wounded. Captain C. M. Bruce, Royal Field Artillery, and C. Godfrey, D.S.O., I.A., (B.C.A. Indian Contingent) were killed, and Majors A.G. Sharp, Somali Mounted Infantry, and H. B. Rowlands, King's African Rifles, Captains E.M. Hughes, I.A., (Bikanir Camel Corps) and R. E. Townsend were wounded. Major Rowlands subsequently died of his wounds at Bohotle.

The enemy's numbers in the Daratoleh fight were estimated at about 300 riflemen and 500 spearmen. Of these perhaps 150 were killed or badly wounded, and 11 rifles were captured. The flying column brought back all its wounded and most of the dead; no rifles were lost.

Major Gough had now to decide whether to make another attempt to advance, after resting his men, or to return to Bohotle. On the one hand there were some indications of the Galadi column having suffered a reverse, and, on the other, his orders were to cooperate in an advance on Wardair. He decided to await further news, and wrote to Colonel Swann at Bohotle that he would start to return on the 25th, unless news of the Galadi column was received before that date. At the same time he asked for a water convoy to be sent to meet him. On the following day a messenger arrived from Bohotle with news of the Gumburru disaster and the intended withdrawal to Galadi. Accordingly the force

marched at 12-30 P.M. the same day, and reached Bohotle on the 28th April.

It is now necessary to return to the operations of the Obbia column under General Manning's direct command. It was impossible to renew the advance towards Wardair, as the whole of the available transport was required to bring up to Galkayu the garrisons and supplies at the posts between that place and Obbia. It was accordingly decided to withdraw the bulk of the troops at Galadi and Mudug, holding the former place and also Dudub with detachments which would both cover the movements of convoys in rear and deny the use of these wells to the Mulla, while the Abyssinians operated against him from the west.

On the 23rd April General Manning marched from Galadi, leaving a garrison of 380 King's African Rifles under Colonel Cobbe. For Dudub a garrison of eighty Sikhs and six Somalis was detailed on the 24th, and the remainder of the force was withdrawn to the Mudug district and distributed between Bera, Galkayu and, eventually, Badwein, headquarters being established at Galkayu.

The base had been removed from Obbia on the 17th April, but there was still a considerable quantity of supplies at the various posts on the lines of communication. General Manning estimated that when these had been brought to Galkayu he would have, after sending the Lahore Mountain Battery (one section) and a large portion of the mounted infantry to Bohotle, sufficient to ration his force up to the end of June.

The work of rolling up the lines of communication was now energetically proceeded with, and the last convoy from the south reached Galkayu on the 20th May. This task might have been completed nearly a month earlier, had there been enough camels to spare after providing for the column which was then operating from Galadi. In that case a renewed advance on Wardair would have been possible, while the enemy was weakened by his heavy losses at Gumburru. As it was, the defeat of a single detachment had been sufficient to put a stop to the advance, and the force was compelled to assume a passive attitude. It needs no further explanation to prove that

insufficient transport was the principal cause of the failure to bring the operations to a successful conclusion.

Somali camels, although able to endure great privations, soon lose condition when worked continuously without a rest. As an instance of the wastage in transport it may be mentioned that one convoy, moving across the Haud, lost 100 out of 700 camels in a six days' march. Many of the camels were only able to lift $1\frac{1}{2}$ maunds, whereas four maunds is the normal load for the Somali animal. There was just sufficient transport left to move the force to Bohotle, but the margin to spare was small, and the resources of the country, in this respect, appear to have been temporarily exhausted, so that camels had to be ordered from Aden and eventually from India. (See Appendix C.)

A considerable portion of the Obbia force, chiefly mounted troops, was now transferred to Bohotle, leaving under General Manning's direct command some 750 rifles, in addition to the garrisons of Dudub and Galadi. These had been rationed for another month by a convoy which left Galkayu on the 19th May.

During this month the Mulla remained in the vicinity of Wardair, moving, however, on one occasion south to Bur, but keeping a strong detachment at Gumburru. His scouts were active round Galadi, and on the 17th a party of *ilalos*, or Somali scouts, were attacked outside the post. Some ten days later a grazing guard near Bohotle was fired on by a party of horsemen. This enterprise on the part of the Mulla's scouts no doubt indicated that the Abyssinians were pressing him from the south-west, and that he was feeling his way for a move out of their reach. His *karias* were also moved about from time to time in search of fresh pasturage, and this gave rise to various rumours as to his intentions. So meagre was the information that on the 4th June General Manning reported from Galkayu as follows:—

The whole situation is one of absolute mystery. We have no particle of really trustworthy information, which should lead us to believe that the Mulla has shifted his quarters. In fact, had he done so, in consequence of the approach of the Abyssinians, we should almost certainly have been in communication with the latter ere this.

Our allies, whose movements had been slow from want of transport, were, as subsequent reports show, at this time advancing by Hahi,¹ on Gerlogubi. On the 31st May they surprised the Bagheri tribesmen, a section of Ogadens attached to the Mulla, at a place called Jeyd, capturing 1,000 camels and killing a great number of spearmen. Beyond this point they do not appear to have advanced, owing to difficulties of water and supply.

In the meantime our troops were still holding the Galadi and Mudug districts. This period of inaction was the least interesting part of the six months' campaigning in Southern Somaliland, which for the majority consisted of inactivity alternating with long dreary marches in a singularly unattractive country.

Several heavy showers fell in May, completely altering the aspect of the country, which in its normal condition is most desolate during three-quarters of the year. The improved grazing greatly assisted the marching of convoys, but it also enabled the Mulla to move in any direction, and he might now be expected at any point on the long line of posts held by our troops, stretching at one time from Obbia to Berbera.

Early in June arrangements were made to evacuate the posts on the south side of the Haud, and by the 17th of that month the force was concentrated at Badwein. A number of troops had already been sent to Bohotle, and the column that was now to cross numbered 1,473 combatants, inclusive of the escort of a convoy that had been delayed at Badwein by news received from Damot.

The post of Damot, or more correctly Dermo, guarded the only wells between Badwein and Bohotle, being seventy-two and forty-two miles from these places, respectively. The safety of General Manning's communications depended, therefore, on the retention of this place. South of the wells are two small dome-shaped hills, commanding a good view on all sides over the Haud, which, at that time of the year, is a wide expanse of verdure, dotted with red-brown ant-heaps.

¹ This place appears to be situated on the Buseli-Gerlogubi road about midway between those places. It is not the Hahi situated to the west of Gerlogubi. From

Hahi they turned east towards Bur, on hearing that the Mulla was at the latter place. Jeyd is, therefore, south or south-west of the position occupied by the Mulla.

There had been some sniping round the post on the 8th and 9th June, but not much importance had been attached to this, as a convoy had been sent on to Bohotle with forty rifles as escort, leaving only ninety men to garrison Damot. The convoy got through without any incident, but on the 11th a small party of Bikanir and Somali sowars, carrying despatches to Bohotle, were cut up before they had proceeded twelve miles on the way. A water post of sixteen men in the same direction owed their escape from a similar fate to the intelligence of the Yao sergeant in command, who, seeing that the enemy were too numerous to be resisted, buried all the spare ammunition and, slipping out unobserved into the bush, made his way back to Damot with his men.

On the 13th the piquets on the hills above mentioned sighted a body of the enemy's horsemen in the distance, threading their way through the bush towards the post. The alarm being at once given, the raid failed to be a surprise. After a certain amount of wild firing and shouting as they rode round the *zareba*, the enemy retired without having left the cover of the bush. Captain Hoskins, who commanded the post, kept his men under cover, and did not allow them to return the fire, as that would only have disclosed the weakness of the garrison. The defences, which had to be hastily improved during the next few days, consisted at the time of a low shelter trench and the ordinary *zareba*, or thorn fence.

From these and similar events, and also from the reports of the *ilalos*, it was ascertained that the Mulla with the whole of his following was engaged at this time in passing between Damot and Bohotle on his way to the Nogal, whither he had been persuaded to go by the Dolbahantas, when driven from the neighbourhood of Wardair by the Abyssinian advance. Damot was for some days completely cut off from Bohotle, and the communications to the north of the latter place towards Garrero were threatened by a body of the enemy's horsemen, the wires being cut in several places. A reconnoitring party composed of Somali Mounted Infantry was sent out from Bohotle towards Damot, but they returned without having effected anything, as a number of our Dolbahantas took the opportunity to desert. This was attributed to the fact that the Mulla had given out that, on reaching the Nogal, he would

exterminate the families of any men who fought against him. There were very few other mounted troops available, as the majority of the Punjab Mounted Infantry had been invalided to India with scurvy, and the Burghers had just left for South Africa on the completion of their six months' engagement. Of the British Mounted Infantry (60th Rifles) part were with General Manning and part at Bohotle.

The garrison of the latter place at this juncture amounted to just over 1,000 rifles,¹ exclusive of Somali troops and sick. It was not considered advisable to send out a column of less than 800 rifles to Damot, and the officer commanding the lines of communication decided that the balance was not sufficient to ensure the safety of the fort at Bohotle. This guarded the wells and supplies on which General Manning's force, now about to leave Mudug, depended. The Mulla, therefore, passed his *karias* through in safety between the 9th and 16th June, protecting them with some 5,000 horsemen whom he used most skilfully to mask Bohotle and threaten Damot. He also spread rumours that he intended to attack Bohotle, which helped to conceal his real object of reaching the Nogal in safety. In carrying out his plan he interposed between the two main British forces, so that all communication with General Manning was cut off for more than a fortnight, and the situation appeared sufficiently serious for the Imperial Government to call upon Aden and India to hold reinforcements in readiness. At the same time he offered the Bohotle garrison the best opportunity which occurred during this campaign of dealing an effective blow.

General Manning's force left Badwein on the 18th June, reaching Damot on the 21st, after four days of comparatively easy marching. Owing to the few showers of rain which had fallen the grazing was good and the nights were cool. The extreme length of the column, however, delayed the rear-guards more than usual. During the march one man of the 2nd Sikhs died of heat apoplexy, another of the same regiment lost his way in the bush and failed to find the column, while a third was wounded on piquet duty. The neighbourhood of Damot was found clear of the enemy. They

¹ A Strength Return, dated Bohotle, 13th June 1903, gives the force at that place as 1,156 combatants of all ranks, not including sick.

had perhaps been taken by surprise by the sudden appearance of General Manning's force from the other side of the Haud, and had, therefore, made no attempt to oppose it in the thick bush. After a day's halt, and reinforcing the Damot garrison with 250 rifles, the march was resumed on the 23rd, and next day, at a distance of twelve miles from Damot, the column came across the tracks of the Mulla's *karias*, many of them quite fresh. One large Dolbahanta *karia* with its camels and sheep was captured in the very act of crossing, and the Somali Mounted Infantry reported that there were several others out on the left flank waiting for the column to pass before crossing over on their way to join the Mulla in the Nogal. The column, however, pushed on without delay, and arrived at Bohotle on the 26th June. As there had not been sufficient transport to bring in the Damot garrison with the main body, a column of 700 rifles and two guns was sent back to effect the withdrawal of the post. On the completion of this operation on 3rd July, a garrison of 400 rifles was left at Bohotle, and the remainder of the force was moved down to Garrero, Burao, and Shaikh.

With these movements the first phase of the operations ended. In the meantime reinforcements had arrived in the country, and the organization of a new expedition had been entrusted to Major General Sir Charles Egerton, K.C.B., D.S.O.

The strategy of the campaign had been justified by the fact that the Mulla had been driven into a part of the country where it was possible to strike at him again, but the camels had been marched to a standstill and an immediate prosecution of the pursuit was out of the question.

Second phase. Operations under Major-General Sir C. C. Egerton, K.C.B., D.S.O.

Major-General Sir C. C. Egerton landed at Berbera on the 4th July 1903, and on the 16th assumed command of the Somali-land Field Force, which had been strengthened by reinforcements from India and Aden. He at once proceeded to reorganize the force. The distribution of troops finally decided upon is shewn in the margin. Brigadier-General Manning remained in command

of the African troops, forming the

Mounted Troops.

1st Corps.

- 1st Company, British Mounted Infantry (60th Rifles).
- 2nd Company, British Mounted Infantry (60th Rifles).
- 3rd Company, British Mounted Infantry (60th Rifles).
- 4th Company, Somali Mounted Infantry (attached 1st Brigade).
- 5th Company Somali Mounted Infantry (attached 1st Brigade).

2nd Corps.

- 6th Company, Poona Mounted Infantry.
- 7th Company, Ambala Mounted Infantry.
- Bikanir Camel Corps.

1st Brigade.

- 1st King's African Rifles.
- 2nd " " "
- 3rd " " "
- 4th " " "
- 5th " " "
- Indian contingent, B.C.A. Camel Battery.

2nd Brigade.

- 1st Battalion Hampshire Regt. (Wing).
- * 27th Punjabis.
- * 52nd Sikhs.
- No. 28 Mountain Battery (two guns).

Lines of communication.

- *101st Grenadiers.
- *107th Pioneers
- 6th King's African Rifles (Somalis).
- No. 17 Comy., 3rd Sapps. and Miners.
- No. 19 Comy., 3rd Sapps. and Miners.
- Telegraph Section R.E.

Detail.

| | |
|--------------------------|--------|
| Total fighting strength— | |
| British Officers .. | 250 |
| British, other ranks .. | 1,082 |
| Indian, all ranks .. | 3,650 |
| Africans .. | 1,407 |
| ----- | |
| Total .. | 6,389† |

A detail of commands and staff is given in Appendix A.

before Jidballi, but on the whole levies was rather unsatisfactory.

1st Brigade, and Lieutenant-Colonel C. G. M. Fasken, with the local rank of Brigadier-General, was appointed to command the 2nd Brigade. The mounted troops were at first divided between the two brigades, but in October, 1903, they were formed into a separate command under Major (Local Lieutenant Colonel) P. A. Kennà, v.c. The 27th Punjabis were, on arrival in the country, attached to the 1st Brigade, four companies being sent to Kirrit to form part of a movable column based on that place. This column was subsequently broken up, and when the force took the field it was organized as here shewn, except that some of the troops from the lines of communication participated in the active operations. In addition to the force here detailed, two corps of Somali Irregulars, of 500 men each, were raised in October and November, the Gadabursi Horse under Major Beresford, and the Tribal Horse under Major Bridges. The latter did some good reconnoitring the service rendered by these

* The Indian Army was renumbered in 1903 and regiments are here given their new titles. The 2nd Sikhs became the 52nd Sikhs, the 1st Bombay Grenadiers the 101st Grenadiers, and 7th Bombay Pioneers the 107th Pioneers, etc.

† This total was eventually increased to over 7,000 combatants, chiefly by drafts from the Indian regiments. In December 1903, including the Tribal Horse, the maximum strength of the force amounted to 8,380 combatants.

Two courses were now open to General Egerton:—(1) To advance against the Mulla as soon as a force of sufficient strength could be provided with transport. (2) To wait until the enemy's retreat southwards could be blocked, and then to operate against him with two strong columns in the Nogal, with a fair prospect of dealing a decisive blow.

It was considered that the first plan would be indecisive in its results, and it was decided to adopt the second alternative, which, with certain reservations, was finally approved of by the Secretary of State. General Egerton was given a free hand as regards his movements in the Protectorate and in adjoining Italian territory as far as might be necessary. As, however, Government were averse to the reoccupation of Mudug by the British, the Abyssinians were asked to send a force to Wardair and Galadi, and assistance was given them to enable them to do this.

As no immediate advance was contemplated, and as the Mulla himself remained inactive, a further movement of troops towards the base¹ was ordered in August, with the object of facilitating their supply and of setting free a larger portion of the transport to stock the advanced depôt. Strong working parties of the Indian regiments were employed to assist the Pioneers in making a cart road up the Shaikh pass, while at the same time the communications between Berbera and Wagon's Rust (foot of Shaikh pass) were improved in readiness for the "buck" waggons, which had been ordered from South Africa. Several months were thus spent in preparing for the advance and in purchasing remounts and camels to replace those worn out and lost in the previous operations. Besides the Somali Camel Transport Corps which was being raised as rapidly as possible, the transport consisted of 5 Indian and 1 Arab Camel Corps, the "buck" waggons from the Cape, 3 *ekka* trains, and some 300 mules (see Appendix B). When available, the whole of this transport was distributed as follows on the lines of communication:—

Berbera to Wagon's Rust—"buck" waggons; Shaikh pass—mules; Upper Shaikh to Burao—*ekkas* and camel carts; Burao onwards—camels. Camels also frequently worked down the line to

¹ General Manning had sent the 2nd Sikhs to Shaikh and the British Mounted Infantry to Bihendula in June.

Berbera, and the Indian Transport Corps may be said to have borne the brunt of the hard work, both in the preliminary task of forwarding supplies to the front, and in their superior utility as transport to marching columns.

Kirrit was made the advanced base, as a route branches from that place towards the Nogal by Wadamago and Eil Dab in the Ain valley. Supplies collected at Kirrit could be forwarded in either direction to Eil Dab for a campaign in the Nogal, or to Bohotle, if the Mulla went south. Efforts were made to improve the water supply along the main routes, and water-boring operations were commenced under Major Joly de Lotbiniere, R.E., but unfortunately the thickness of the porous strata which overlies the hard rock throughout the greater part of Somaliland proved too great for the plant which had been provided.

By the end of October all was ready for an advance, and a movement of troops was then begun, the 1st Brigade moving to Bohotle and the 2nd Brigade to Wadamago and eventually to Eil Dab. The Mulla was at this time at Adadero in the Southern Nogal. As the general idea of the operations was to drive him towards the north, it was first intended to move the 1st Brigade to Damot, in order to make it appear that a re-occupation of Mudug was the object of the advance. The 2nd Brigade was then to march to Dariali, which was to be the advanced base for further operations, while the mounted troops were to push on and seize Gerrowei and Kallis. As, however, it was thought possible that the Mulla might evade the columns and escape southwards, it was eventually decided to defer the advance and wait for the Abyssinians, who had not yet commenced the long march from Harrar that was necessary to bring them into line. In order to hasten their advance, the 1st Brigade left Bohotle on the 11th November, crossed the Haud to Galadi, and returned on the 27th, having left a garrison of 400 rifles at the latter place, with six weeks' rations, to hold the wells until the arrival of the Abyssinians and ensure them their water at the end of the eighty miles march from Wardair. A raiding party which was met on the way back from Galadi was dispersed and their camels captured. General Egerton had undertaken to supply the

¹ With the exception of the 52nd Sikhs and No. 28 Mountain Battery who were ordered to stand fast at Shaikh. The latter (two guns) were now mounted on camels.

Abyssinians on arrival at Galadi with a month's grain, and this was now being rapidly pushed up the line. The diversion of so large a portion of the transport for this purpose, and for the movement to Galadi was the chief reason for not advancing into the Nogal in October or early in November, as first intended. November passed without news of the approach of the Abyssinians having reached head-quarters. Arrangements were now made for a naval demonstration at Obbia, and Yusuf 'Ali, who had been reinstated as Sultan of that place, was encouraged by a gift of rifles and by assistance in the way of supplies to occupy Mudug. This he appears to have done on the 12th December.

On the 4th December the Tribal Horse reconnoitred to Jidballi, Reconnaissance to Jid- forty-five miles east of Eil Dab, and there en- balli. countered some of the enemy's horsemen.

Some days later a second skirmish took place near Badwein¹ where the Tribal Horse were posted. The latter lost three men killed and one wounded, but succeeded in taking a prisoner, who reported that there was a hostile body encamped at Jidballi on

200 Tribal Horse.
100 British Mounted In-
fantry.
100 Indian Mounted In-
fantry.
50 Bikanirs.
100 Hampshires.
150 27th Punjabis.
1 Maxim.

their way to surprise Badwein. Accord- ingly on the 17th December a column, strength as in the margin, under Colonel Kenna, left Eil Dab with orders to recon- noitre the enemy's position. Before start- ing, information was received by wire from Bohotle that the Mulla was reported to have left Kallis and Adadero and moved up into

Haisamo, which is a hilly district on the northern edge of the Nogal valley behind Bur Anod and the Shile Madu range. This report may have led Colonel Kenna to expect a considerable amount of opposition. At any rate when he approached the hostile encamp- ment before daybreak on the 19th with his mounted troops it became evident from the large number of fires that the enemy were in force. Accordingly he halted and waited for daylight, when he sent the Tribal Horse round to the rear of the position, supporting them on his left with two sections of the Poona

¹ About thirteen miles east by north of Eil Dab, and not to be confused with Badwein in the Mudug district. Badwein is a common name in Somaliland, meaning a large lake or sea.

Mounted Infantry. He then ordered a company of British Mounted Infantry to advance and fire into the encampment, which brought the enemy swarming out to the number of some 2,000. The mounted infantry fell back on the Bikanirs, but the enemy refused to be drawn into the open. After several unsuccessful attempts to induce them to leave their position, Colonel Kenna, having sent orders to the Tribal Horse to rejoin the main body, retired on his infantry support, and returned to Badwein, followed by some of the enemy's mounted men. Our casualties in this very successful reconnaissance, owing to the wildness of the enemy's fire, amounted only to two men of the British Mounted Infantry wounded and one missing, and two killed and two wounded of the Tribal Horse. In withdrawing from the right flank of the position a sepoy of the Poona Mounted Infantry lost his horse and, becoming separated from the rest of his section, was followed closely by the enemy. Lieutenant Carter rode back alone and brought the man in. For this act of gallantry he was awarded the V. C.

News of this reconnaissance reached General Egerton at Kirrit on the 21st December. On the same day he received a letter from Colonel Rochfort from which he gathered that, owing to difficulties of water and transport, it was hopeless to expect the Abyssinians to arrive at Galadi within a reasonable time, if at all. It was, therefore, useless to defer the advance any longer on their account. The Mulla was known to have moved from Adadero, and the presence of a force at Jidballi pointed to a resolve on his part to move northwards. Consequently General Egerton decided to recall the Galadi garrison which had practically fulfilled its object; to bring up the remainder of the 2nd Brigade and the mounted troops to Eil Dab, with a view to attacking the hostile force at Jidballi, and to move up the 1st Brigade from Bohotle to the right flank. Accordingly headquarters were transferred to Eil Dab on the 23rd December, and the following movements were ordered:—

A convoy with escort of 400 rifles to leave Bohotle on the 29th December, ostensibly to ration and reinforce Galadi, but with secret orders to bring back the garrison of that place by the 10th January, to form a support to the operating columns. Advanced base to be moved from Kirrit to Eil Dab.

The 52nd Sikhs and the two guns of the 28th Mountain Battery to reach Eil Dab by the 4th January, thus completing the concentration of the 2nd Brigade.

The 1st Brigade to march from Bohotle to Yaguri and to reach the latter place by the 7th January.

A convoy with rations for the 1st Brigade to leave Eil Dab on the 4th for Higloli with an escort of the Gadabursi Horse and 200 rifles, 27th Punjabis. This detachment after meeting the 1st Brigade at Higloli was to form a post at Yaguri.

In the meantime a close watch was kept on Jidballi by the Tribal Horse, and the enemy's force at that place was reported to be daily increasing in numbers, so much so that it was now decided to concentrate both brigades for the attack.

Mounted troops.

2 Companies, British Mounted Infantry.
2 Companies, Indian Mounted Infantry.
1 Company Somali Mounted Infantry.
Bikanir Camel Corps
Tribal Horse.
Gadabursi Horse.

Artillery.

2 Guns, No. 28 Mountain Battery.
Infantry, 2nd Brigade.
Wing, Hampshire Regiment.
Wing, 27th Punjabis (less detachment in camp).
52nd Sikhs.
No. 19 Company, Sappers and Miners.
2 Maxim gun detachment, 107th Pioneers.

1st Brigade.

King's African Rifles (about 500 men).
Detachment, Sappers and Miners.
Total strength 2,200 regulars (including some 600 mounted troops) and 1,000 irregulars.

Accordingly, on the 8th January the 2nd Brigade and mounted troops, accompanied by General Egerton, marched to Badwein, and next day to a point twenty miles east of that place, where it had been arranged to concentrate the whole force, with five days' rations and two days' water in tins. Here a large bivouac, protected by a barbed wire fence, was formed, and early the following morning the troops detailed in the margin fell in for the march to Jidballi, distant about twelve miles, 200 rifles being left in camp to guard the transport.

The advance began at 5 A.M. in echelon from the centre, the 52nd Sikhs leading. A short distance behind them on the right flank marched the 1st Brigade, while the left wing (or echelon) was formed by the Hampshires and 100 men of the 27th Punjabis. The mountain battery (two guns), the staff, the field hospital, and ammunition camels were in the centre, with a rear guard of 100 rifles, 27th Punjabis. In this formation the force was ready either to attack or to

form square for defence. The main body of mounted troops marched at a distance of half a mile on the left flank, while the front was covered by a company of Somali Mounted Infantry, and the Gadabursi Horse.

Daylight revealed the whole array moving steadily forward over country which was nearly as open and flat as a parade ground. It was not expected that the enemy would await the attack of so large a force. Direction was maintained by a Royal Engineer officer, who had been out with Colonel Kenna's reconnaissance of the 19th December, and at about 8 A.M. he was able to check his bearing by the tops of two trees, which were just visible over a long swell in the ground, and marked the site of the *balli*. Messengers now began to come in from the mounted scouts in front with reports that the enemy were in position awaiting our advance. The square was shortly afterwards closed up and halted for the issue of thirty extra rounds per rifle, while the mounted troops swept forward in several lines to envelope the right of the enemy's position. At 9-25 A.M. a sharp rattle of musketry broke out from that quarter. The square meanwhile had advanced to a second position within 1,000 yards of the *balli*, beyond which a group of led horses was to be seen.

These had at first been taken for the Somali Mounted Infantry, but a few shots coming from their direction showed that they were hostile. The enemy's skirmishers could now be distinguished lying down in the short grass within 700 yards of the square. As these advanced through some low scrub to the attack the order to open fire was given, and the crackle of musketry soon swelled into a deafening roar. The enemy's fire was inaccurate, most of their bullets passing overhead. Owing, however, to the depth of the square, several casualties occurred, chiefly in the rear face, during the ten minutes or so while the action was at its height. The enemy made a determined and brave attempt to close, but their extended lines soon melted away under the hail of bullets which was directed on them from the front and left corner of the square. Only a few came within 400 yards of the rifles. On the wings they appeared to be in greater force and were better supported. The ground, which dipped towards the *balli*, rose slightly on the right, so that the Gadabursi Horse and Somali Mounted Infantry on this flank were out of sight of the square.

At the beginning of the action these troops were charged and driven back in disorder, and their stampeded horses were to be seen careering wildly about the plain. Lieutenant Welland, R.A.M.C., was here shot while attending a wounded hospital assistant, and Lieutenant Smith, who attempted to rescue him, found him already dead and was unable to bring away his body. The enemy followed up this success, but in spite of the slight advantage which the ground gave them were unable to make any impression on the right face of the square. To the left there were a few patches of scrub, somewhat thicker than elsewhere, where the enemy collected in some numbers, only, however, to suffer heavier losses from the fire of the maxims and of the left face, which was thrown forward in echelon. By 10 A.M. the enemy were in full flight, pursued by the shells of the mountain battery, which burst well into a crowd of fugitives beyond the *balli*. The "cease fire" was now sounded as the mounted troops charged across the front of the square, following close on the enemy, and in a few minutes the whole mass rolled out of sight in the dust and haze.

The infantry then advanced to a point about half a mile beyond Jidballi, and orders were at once sent back to the transport to advance. During the afternoon the mounted troops returned in detachments, having followed up the enemy for a distance of about twelve miles. The latter, although kept well on the move, had still some fight left in them at the end of the pursuit, for when the ammunition of the mounted infantry began to run short, they formed line and turned on their pursuers. Our casualties in the action amounted to three officers (Captain the Hon'ble T. Lister, Lieutenants C.H. Bowden-Smith and J. R. Welland) and sixteen other ranks killed. Nine officers (Majors F. B. Young and G. T. M. Bridges, Captains G. C. Shakerley and E. H. Llewellyn, Lieutenants H. H. R. White, H. E. Reinhold and A. E. Andrews, Lieutenant-Colonel G. T. Forestier-Walker and Captain G. R. Breading, and twenty-seven other ranks wounded. Total—nineteen killed and thirty-six wounded. Captain Lister, who was orderly officer to Colonel Kenna, returned to camp with a message about noon and left shortly afterwards to rejoin the mounted troops. Later he was reported missing, and search parties were at once sent out,

but his body was not recovered until next day. He had been killed a few miles from camp.

The enemy were estimated to number 6,000. Six hundred and sixty-six bodies were counted on and near the position, 350 of these being found close to the square. To these must be added those accounted for in the pursuit, so that probably 1,000 were killed. A large number of prisoners and 366 rifles (chiefly Gras, of French make) were captured. Jidballi proved to be merely a dry rain-pool with a few trees and grass huts close by. It is situated at the bottom of a depression¹ in the open Nogal valley about eight miles distant from Bur Anod, a detached hill which rises at the western extremity of the Shile Madu range. The wells were few in number and the water indifferent, the supply at Adur, four miles south-east, being much better.

The position was apparently held by the Mulla as a strong advanced post to protect the grazing in the Nogal, and to cover his retreat to the north, which he had already resolved on if unsuccessful in the fight. During the action he himself is said to have remained at Hudin with a large force, while the Harun was at Gaolo. The fact that heavier losses were not inflicted on the enemy was due to their being well extended and on the move, and to their making the most of all available cover. Moreover it appears that only a portion of their line, which was about two miles long, actually attacked the square, otherwise a more effectual blow might have been dealt at the Mulla's power. The punishment, however, received in the pursuit practically disposed of this force, which was mainly composed of Dolbahantas, the pick of the Mulla's fighting men.

General Egerton now resolved to adhere to his original plan of temporarily occupying the southern edge of the Nogal, thus cutting off the Mulla from his line of retreat towards Mudug and from such of his *karias* as were still in the Southern Haud. Accordingly the mounted troops, supported by the 1st Brigade, were directed on Gerrowei and Adadero, and the 2nd Brigade on Dariali, as soon as supplies were brought up from Badwein. These arrangements resulted in touch being temporarily lost with the enemy, but it was considered better to make certain of preventing his escape south-

¹This hollow contains some scattered clumps of bushes, so that a force moving towards it without scouts might be surprised; otherwise the position had nothing to commend it from the enemy's point of view.

wards than to endeavour to reap the immediate fruits of the victory by an advance to Halin or Hansoga, whither the Mulla was variously stated to have fled¹.

On the 11th January a convoy of empty camels with the captured rifles left for Badwein to bring up supplies. On the 12th and 13th the mounted troops and 1st Brigade marched for Dumodleh, and on the 14th reconnoitred Hudin, but no traces of the enemy except dead bodies were met with. The supplies from Badwein having arrived, the 2nd Brigade with Force headquarters left Jidballi on the 15th, and marching by Derigobbo and Duhung reached Dariali on the 17th. A convoy of rations was sent to overtake the 1st Brigade at Kurtimo. The latter with the mounted troops reached Gerrowei on the 20th, capturing on the way some 2,500 camels and a quantity of sheep.

A post was established at Dariali and communications with Eil Dab were opened *viâ* Yaguri, the garrison of Badwein being withdrawn. Burao was reinforced to the extent of some 450 rifles by the shifting of garrisons on the lines of communication, and by the breaking up of the movable column, which had been formed from the Bohotle and Galadi troops.

Orders were now issued for the two brigades to gain touch on the 24th January 1904 with a view to combined operations in the neighbourhood of Gaolo and Halin. On the 21st the 2nd Brigade and Headquarters, with No. 5 Company, British Mounted Infantry, and a company of Somali Mounted Infantry from the movable column, left Dariali, and, marching across the Nogal *viâ* Arde Jiffita, reached Gaolo on the 25th. On the same day the 1st Brigade and mounted troops occupied Halin. All the enemy's tracks passed by the columns led northwards, and it was evident that the Mulla had ordered up his *karias* from the south to join him in Haisimo or the Sorl. From Gaolo and Halin numerous signal fires were seen on the edge of the Sorl, and, as at Galadi in March of the preceding year, this portended a retirement. Traces of the enemy's occupation

Mulla's flight to the north. were discovered at both these places, and a few prisoners were taken. On the 29th, the mounted troops having been detached to Hansoga, the 1st Brigade

¹ Deserters stated that he had gone to Halin, but, as was often the case, their information was misleading, and he probably went to Hansoga in the Haisimo district.

ascended the Bosaso pass, sending a party to communicate with the 2nd Brigade, which had reconnoitred as far as the Anane pass. Both these passes lead to the Sorl, which is a bush-grown waterless plateau about 1,000 feet above the level of the Nogal. Between the escarpment, which forms the edge of the plateau, and the Shile Madu Hills, which run roughly parallel to it on the south, lies the broken and hilly district of Haisamo. Hither, as has been already mentioned, the Mulla had probably betaken himself after his defeat at Jidballi, but he was too wary to risk a second fight, and during the course of the encircling movements in the Nogal he had moved the remainder of his men and the greater part of his flocks across the Sorl towards Jid 'Ali in the Warsangli country.

Orders were now issued for the 1st Brigade, rationed up to the 15th April and reinforced by 350 rifles¹ from the lines of communication, to hold the Nogal; while the 2nd Brigade, preceded by the mounted troops, was to leave Hansoga on the 1st February and return to the Ain valley, reconnoitring Haisamo and the country to the north of Bur Anod *en route*. In pursuance of these instructions General Fasken's column, less 170 rifles left as a temporary garrison at Hudin, reached Eil Dab on the 12th February, two days after the mounted troops which had returned *viâ* Bohol and Ferogul. Before the advance into the Nogal Captain R. G. Munn had proceeded to the Ogaden country in order to induce the tribesmen to attack the Mulla's raiding parties. Finding his efforts unavailing he rejoined General Egerton's staff at Eil Dab on 8th February.

A movable column as detailed in the margin, under Major

Two Companies Indian Mountain Infantry, detachment of Bikanirs (fifty rifles), 27th Punjabis, 52nd Sikhs, detachment, Sappers and Miners, Ilalos 100 rifles.

R. G. Brooke, D.S.O., was now formed at Eil Dab, while the remainder of the troops moved down the line to Shaikh and Berbera, to refit and prepare for the next advance.

General Egerton had in the meantime transferred his headquarters to Berbera, and as a brief rest was necessary for the 2nd Brigade, which had been marching with only occasional halts since early in January, the time was utilised in stocking Las Dureh with supplies for the column which was to be based on this place for operations in the north-east of the Protectorate. Las Dureh is some

¹ These were 1st Brigade troops (K. A. Rs.) which had returned from Galadi.

seventy miles south-east of Berbera and rather more than half that distance from Shaikh. It lies in a gap in the hills, so that the ascent from the maritime plain to the plateau is more gradual here than elsewhere. An observation post was established on the coast some 230 miles east of Berbera at Las Khorai, which was to be the ultimate objective of the column. The remainder of the Tribal Horse which with the Gadabursis had been considerably reduced in numbers after the Jidballi fight, were now disbanded with the exception of a mounted company of 100 men. In their place a levy of 270 Somali riflemen was raised to operate in the Musa Abukr country under Lieutenant-Colonel C. E. Melliss, v.c., who had proceeded thither in January for that purpose. On the 26th February this officer reconnoitred to within a day's march of Jidballi and reported that the Mulla and Harun were in the neighbourhood of that place.

Considerable captures of stock, amounting to over 3,000 camels, besides sheep, were made by raiding parties of the 1st Brigade during February in the Nogal.

News was received that the Abyssinians had reached Wardair on the 14th January, and, after reconnoitring Gumburru, had withdrawn to Gerlogubi on the 1st February owing to shortness of supplies. On the 28th March they were compelled for the same reason to return to Harrar. The part taken by our allies in the operations had not, therefore, been important, except in so far that their presence about Wardair deterred the Mulla from flying in that direction.

Orders were now issued for the concentration of the troops detailed in the margin at Las Dureh, and on the 10th March the column under Brigadier-General Fasken left that place reaching El Afweina, a distance of eighty-five miles, on the 15th. Major Brooke's column, which left Eil Dab on the 9th arrived about the same time. After a day's halt the advance was resumed by the main column on the 17th in a northerly direction towards Jid 'Ali, by Gud Anod

Operations north of the Sorl.

—
Mounted troops.

| | | Rifles. |
|---|----|---------|
| 3 companies, British Mounted Infantry | .. | 250 |
| Bikanir Camel Corps | .. | 150 |
| Mounted Levy | .. | 10 |
| <i>Infantry.</i> | | |
| Hampshires | .. | 250 |
| 27th Punjabis | .. | 350 |
| 52nd Sikhs | .. | 250 |
| 107th Pioneers | .. | 150 |
| Sappers and Miners | .. | 50 |
| Italos | .. | 100 |

and Megebu. At Megebu the mounted troops encountered a hostile raiding party and killed 50 of them, capturing 23 rifles, 27 camels, and some 1,200 sheep.

The enemy had apparently been unaware of our advance up to the 14th and had then moved further east; consequently Jid 'Ali and neighbourhood was found unoccupied when the column arrived there on the 21st. The next objective was the district marked Rat in the maps. The country now being traversed formed a portion of the Ogo, or high plateau of Somaliland, which was here quite open and fairly well supplied with water in the various *tugs* or water courses. The climate, moreover, is bracing, owing to the elevation, so that conditions were favourable for marching except that the grazing was poor, and for this reason the Indian camels, which had worked continuously since their first arrival in the country, were now rapidly losing condition. The route was flanked on the north by the mass of hills into which the plateau is broken on its outer edge. To the south lay the waterless Sorl, on the further side of which the Nogal was held by the 1st Brigade, while the Mulla was prevented from escaping to the south-west by Major Brooke's column, based on El Afweina. The result of the operations, therefore, could only be to drive the enemy into the country of the Mij-jartens, a tribe nominally subject to the Italians. On the 25th February General Egerton had telegraphed for permission to operate in their Protectorate, but no answer had yet been received. Brigadier-General Fasken had been instructed not to cross the boundary, and to withdraw his troops through the passes to Las Khorai early in April, before his supply of rations gave out. The column which left Jid 'Ali on the 23rd March reached Bihen two days later, where a post of 150 rifles was established. Starting again on the 27th it marched by the Tug Gebi to Ausaneh, arriving there on the 30th. This was the limit of advance.

The infantry were now joined by the mounted troops which had preceded them by about a day's march, and had reconnoitred some twenty-five miles further south-east. Notwithstanding good marching the force was unable to come up with the Mulla, who it appears crossed the Italian boundary on the 27th March with the mounted infantry close on his heels. The latter had been able to keep in advance of the infantry and transport by

reason of the rations carried by the Bikanirs on their camels for the whole of the mounted force for one or two days. Had the detachment of camel sowars been larger it is probable that considerable captures would have been made; and it appears that the only method of coping with a Somali enemy is to employ a mounted force equipped in this manner, which in country like the Ogo is able to operate independently for several days. The Haud and Southern Somaliland generally, it may be mentioned, are less favourable for mounted troops, owing to the thick bush and long distances to be traversed without water.

The column was now withdrawn to Baran near Bihen, whence the mounted troops withdrew to Jid 'Ali, while the infantry with the bulk of the transport were pushed over the difficult Aiyu pass to Las Khorai. The rise to the watershed from Baran on this route was perhaps not more than 1,000 feet in some 20 miles, the fall to the sea-coast being at least 6,000 feet in the same distance. The maritime plain is here only some 8 or 10 miles in width, the mountains descending to it in two drops or lines of bluffs, the intermediate plateau of Al being well wooded and green. Las Khorai is a hot sweltering place on a sandy beach consisting of one or two stone houses surrounded by the usual mat-huts.

In the meantime the Italian Government had consented, subject to certain conditions, to the proposal to extend the operations into their territory. Intimation of this did not, however, reach General Egerton in time for him to countermand the march of the force under General Fasken to Las Khorai, where the latter arrived on the 10th April. Orders were now issued for the troops at Las Khorai to stand fast, and for the 1st Brigade to hold the Nogal, if possible, to the end of April, while arrangements were made for the Rat district to be reoccupied by a column, under the command of Colonel

| | | |
|--------------------|-----|---------------------------------------|
| * Mounted troops.. | 500 | Kenna, consisting of the infantry of |
| Infantry .. | 500 | Major Brooke's column and the mounted |
| Somalis .. | 150 | infantry troops.* |

The Mijjarten Sultan, who had been either unwilling or unable to prevent the Mulla from obtaining an asylum in his country, was now reported to be anxious to attack him. As it was considered probable

that the Mulla would make for Illig, which was held by some of his men, arrangements were made to seize that place. Accordingly a detachment of 130 Hampshires was sent by sea from Berbera to co-operate with a naval force for this purpose. The operation was successfully carried out. The enemy, to the number of about 100 riflemen with a backing of spearmen, held a strong position on the cliffs above Illig, protected by *sangars* and two stone towers.¹ As a direct attack would have entailed considerable loss, it was decided to land a force of 752 of all ranks at daybreak on the 21st April at the mouth of the Gallule river, 3½ miles north of Illig. Owing to the surf it took two hours to disembark all the men. As soon as the landing was completed the force marched along the sea-coast towards Illig in preparatory formation for attack. Within a short distance of the place the right flank was pushed further out and forwards to overiap the defences. The enemy awaited the attack in their works, shouting defiance and blowing horns. They then opened fire with rifles and an old gun, firing canister, but the seamen and marines, supported by the Hampshires on the left, were not to be denied, and advancing by short rushes to within one hundred yards of the position, they charged and carried it with the loss of three killed and eleven wounded. Entrance to the principal work was effected by Petty Officer J. Murphy, who battered down the wooden door under fire from the loop-holes. Captain the Honourable H. Hood, Midshipman A.G. Onslow, R.N., and Corporal Flowers, R.M.L.I., also rendered signal service in clearing a cave, from which sniping had been going on. The maxims, which had been brought up by hand, were turned on the flying enemy. The defences and the village itself, from whence sniping had taken place, were then demolished, the work being completed by about mid-day. Fifty-six corpses of the enemy were counted, and a number of wounded received medical aid.

The Hampshires and fifty marines were left on the shore to prevent the enemy reoccupying their defences, which were demolish-

¹ The cliffs, at the base of which the village lies, are about 250 feet high. They were crowned by a stone and mud wall, ten feet high and twelve feet thick at the base. This was intended to protect the stone towers from the fire of the ships. The stone towers were situated a short distance inland from this wall, and were surrounded by walls and connected with the cliffs by covered ways. There were several caves in the face of the cliffs.

ed on the two following days by working parties from the ships. It became necessary to re-embark the garrison on the 25th owing to the daily increasing surf, caused by the oncoming monsoon. The Isa Mahmud tribe were invited to reoccupy the village, which had belonged to them before its seizure by the Mulla.

The operations of the Las Dureh column in March had driven the Mulla to Bilbilo on the Tug Darror. Final escape of the Mulla. Mijjarten pressure now forced him to move again. As sufficient rain had not yet fallen to enable him to recross the Sorl in safety, he went to Baran, secure, as he supposed, in the knowledge that the whole of Colonel Fasken's force had gone to Las Khorai. The advance, however, of Colonel Kenna's column to Baran about the 24th April forced him to fly south towards Halin. Hearing that this place was held by our troops, he turned south-south-east, and, making a detour, reached a point in the Nogal, some twenty miles west of Illig, about the 7th May.

Colonel Kenna, meanwhile, was making the final effort of the campaign to round up the fugitive Mulla, or rather his *harun*, for the most hopeful view of the situation scarcely included the prospect of laying hands on Muhammad Abdullah himself, unless the tribes should give him up. The movements of Colonel Kenna's column were rapid. The infantry marched some forty-five miles in two days from the neighbourhood of Baran to Biliyu. Here they were joined on the 27th by the mounted troops which had been to Baran, and now made another march of fifty miles into the Sorl to Kheman, where some stragglers from the *harun* told them of the Mulla's flight to the Lower Nogal.

On returning to Biliyu, after covering 100 miles in thirty-six hours on one gallon of water per man and none for horses, orders were received recalling the column. With the return of Colonel Kenna to Las Khorai, and the escape of the Mulla from the corner into which he had been driven, the campaign came to an end, for it was not the intention of Government to extend the operations to any distance beyond the Protectorate boundary. Moreover, the transport still remaining fit for work was not sufficient to maintain the troops in their present positions. The 1st Brigade in the Nogal had for some time been on reduced rations, supplemented by

camel meat, and the necessity of using the whole of their transport for bringing up supplies had rendered these troops immobile, and unable to move into the Lower Nogal, when the Mulla arrived there.

Accordingly the troops were withdrawn towards the base, the 1st Brigade by Eil Dab, and the mounted portion of Colonel Kenna's column by El Afweina and Las Dureh, while the infantry followed General Fasken's troops, which had already embarked at Las Khorai for Berbera.

By June the bulk of the force was concentrated at the latter place, and orders having been received for Demobilization of the force. demobilization, the various corps were despatched in transports to their destinations, with the exception of the 101st Grenadiers, the 107th Pioneers, and the two companies of the Indian Mounted Infantry, which were to garrison the country until the arrival of the reliefs from India in the autumn.

Since the first landing of a force at Obbia in January 1902, the object kept in view had been to drive Conclusion. the Mulla northwards, and to this end he had been slowly but doggedly pursued throughout the length and breadth of the country.

His power had been broken at Jidballi, and his following had then ceased to exist as a fighting force, or as a solid objective for General Egerton's columns, while nearly 10,000 of his camels¹ and 462 rifles had been captured. The Mulla himself had escaped capture owing to the failure of the Mijjarten Sultan, on whose co-operation it had unfortunately been necessary to rely. Nevertheless, our engagements with the protected tribes had been kept, for these had been relieved from the fear of his devastating raids, in which neither age nor sex were spared. The Mulla owed his escape principally to the rapidity of his movements. Only mounted troops were able to compete with him in this respect. In the opinion of those qualified to judge, the transport for mounted troops should consist of Arab or other trotting camels, lightly equipped, each camel-man leading another loaded camel. The camel-men should be armed and there should be an escort of camel sowars, such as

¹ Exclusive of those captured by Yusuf 'Ali at Obbia in 1904, and by General Manning during the first phase of the operations.

Bikanirs, carrying five or six days' rations for themselves. The mobility of mounted troops would by this means be at least doubled, enabling them to cover distances at the rate of forty miles a day in pursuit of a broken enemy. Infantry will always be necessary as a support to the mounted troops, and to provide escorts to convoys. The vulnerability of the large convoys of water, etc., that are necessary constitutes one of the chief difficulties to be encountered in campaigning in this country. As it is impossible to be continually halting to close up, the only safeguard against surprise is to receive timely warning of an attack from mounted scouts thrown out to a distance of several miles.

The best method of disposing of the transport of a fighting column is illustrated by the action of Jidballi. At Erigo the force was encumbered with its camels, which stampeded and were only recovered after the enemy had been repulsed.

APPENDIX A.

COMMAND AND STAFF.

First Phase of the Operations.

Obbia Column—

| | |
|--|---|
| Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Manning (Local Brigadier-General) | General Officer Com- manding Southern Field Force with Obbia Column. |
| Major (Local Lieutenant-Colonel) G. F. Forrestier- Walker, R.A. | Chief Staff Officer. |
| Major C. L. Petrie, D.S.O., Manchester Regiment .. | Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General. |
| Major E. M. Woodward, Leicester Regiment .. | Assistant Quarter Master General for Intelligence. |
| Major P. A. Kenna, V.C., D. S.O., 21st Lancers .. | Commanding Mount- ed Troops |
| Major W. H. Rycroft, 11th Hussars .. | Base Commandant. |
| Brevet-Major R. G. Brooke, 7th Hussars .. | Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, Lines of Commu- nication. |
| Captain H. deB. Codrington, Supply and Transport Corps | Chief Supply and Transport Officer. |
| Captain (Local Major) M. L. Hornby, D. S. O., 2nd Punjab Infantry (Frontier Force) .. | Chief Transport Officer. |
| Lieutenant-Colonel J. F. Williamson, C.M.G., R.A.M.C. | Principal Medical Officer. |
| Commander E. S. Carey, R. N. | Provost Marshal. |
| Lieutenant E. W. Huddleston, R.I.M. .. | Marine Transport Officer. |

Berbera Force—

| | | | |
|--|----|----|--|
| Lieutenant-Colonel J. C. Swann, I.A. | .. | .. | Commanding Lines of Communication. |
| Captain J. H. W. Pollard, R. S. Fusiliers | .. | .. | Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, Lines of Communication. |
| Brevet-Major C. R. Ballard, Norfolk Regiment | | .. | Chief Transport Officer. |
| Brevet-Major J. E. Gough, Rifle Brigade | .. | .. | Commanding Flying Column, Bohotle. |
| Captain G. M. Rolland, 1st Bombay Grenadiers | | .. | Intelligence Officer. |

Second Phase of Operations.

| | | | |
|---|----|----|--|
| Major-General Sir C. C. Egerton, K.C.B., D.S.O. | .. | .. | General Officer Commanding, Southern Field Force. |
| Major H. E. Stanton, D.S.O., R.A. | .. | .. | Chief Staff Officer. |
| Major C. O. Swanston, D.S.O., 18th (Tiwana) Lancers | | | Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General. |
| Major R. G. Brooke, D.S.O., 7th Hussars | .. | .. | Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General. |
| Major (Local Lieutenant-Colonel) G. T. Forrestier-Walker, R.A. | .. | .. | Assistant Quarter Master General for Intelligence. |
| Major R. F. Allen, R.E. | .. | .. | Commanding Royal Engineers. |
| Lieutenant-Colonel W. R. Yielding, C.I.E., D.S.O., Supply and Transport Corps | .. | .. | Director of Supply and Transport. |
| Colonel J. F. Williamson, C.M.G., R.A.M.C. | | .. | Principal Medical Officer. |
| Commander E. S. Carey, R. N. | .. | .. | Provost Marshal. |
| Brevet-Colonel (Local Brigadier-General) W. H. Manning, C.B. | .. | .. | Commanding 1st Brigade. |
| Captain J. H. Lloyd, 6th Gurkha Rifles | .. | .. | Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, 1st Brigade. |

| | |
|--|---|
| Lieutenant-Colonel (Local Brigadier-General) C. G. M. Fasken, 52nd Sikhs (Frontier Force) | Commanding 2nd Brigade. |
| Captain P. C. Elliot-Lockhart, D.S.O., Guides Infantry | Deputy Assistant Adjutant-Gener- al, 2nd Brigade. |
| Major (Local Lieutenant-Colonel) P. A. Kenna, V. C., D. S. O., 21st Lancers | Commanding Mount- ed Troops |
| Captain A. Skeen, 24th Punjabis | Staff Officer, Mount- ed Troops. |
| Lieutenant-Colonel (Local Colonel) J. C. Swann, I.A. | Commanding Lines of Communication. |
| Captain J. H. W. Pollard, Royal Scots Fusiliers .. | .. Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General Lines of Com- munication. |
| Captain G. M. Molloy, Poona Horse | .. Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, Lines of Communications. |
| Major E. M. Woodward, Leicester Regiment | .. Base Commandant. |

APPENDIX B.

Statement of Casualties.

| FIRST PHASE. | | | | SECOND PHASE. | | |
|---------------------|---------|----------|----------|---------------|----------|----------|
| — | Killed. | Wounded. | Missing. | Killed. | Wounded. | Missing. |
| British Officers .. | 13 | 3 | .. | 3 | 10 | .. |
| „ rank and file | 2 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 18 | 1 |
| Indian officers .. | 56 | 6 | 1 | *26 | †36 | .. |
| „ rank and file | 128 | 48 | .. | | | |
| Total .. | 199 | 58 | 2 | 34 | 64 | 1 |

* Includes 19 Somali Irregulars killed.

† Includes 16 Somali Irregulars wounded.

Separate figures for Indian and African Troops are not available for 2nd phase of the operations.

APPENDIX C.

NOTES ON TRANSPORT.

First Phase of the Operations.

The transport employed in the first phase of the operations consisted almost entirely of Somali camels with the exception of a few Aden camels on the Berbera-Bohotle line. Most of the former were purchased from the tribes in our own Protectorate. The following table shows the source of supply of camels for the Obbia Column and the total loss on that side until the arrival of General Manning's force at Bohotle on the 26th June 1903 :—

| | Camels. |
|--|---------|
| Purchased on Obbia side | 971 |
| Raided on Obbia side | 540 |
| Received from Berbera by sea | 1,070 |
| Received from Bohotle across the Haud and not returned | 2,150 |
| | |
| Total for Obbia Column | 4,731 |
| Balance on 26th June | 1,667 |
| | |
| Total casualties | 3,064 |
| | |

A loss of 63 per cent.

There are no figures to show the wastage on the Berbera side, but on the 5th June Colonel Swann reported that, having met all requirements of the Obbia force, he had still 1,000 camels left. The transport for the whole force therefore works out as follows :—

| | |
|--|-------|
| Used by the Obbia Column as per table above | 4,731 |
| Remaining on the Berbera side on the 5th June | 1,000 |
| | |
| Total, not including casualties on the Berbera side .. | 5,731 |
| | |

Thus not less and probably a good deal more than 6,000 camels were required for the six months' campaign.

The transport was organized into cadres of 200 each under a British War-rant Officer or Non-Commissioned Officer with one Indian and two Somali assistants, three Somali headmen, and seventy-five drivers. Each cadre

consisted of three squads under one headman with twenty-five drivers. Hired transport was also largely used on the Berbera side.

Second Phase of the Operations.

The transport landed at Berbera for the operations under General Egerton consisted of :—

| | |
|--|--------|
| Indian camels, four silladar corps, and one baluch corps | 2,847 |
| Cape " buck " wagons | 80 |
| Ekkas | 482 |
| Mules | *1,973 |

In addition there were about 1,000 Arab camels landed at the end of the first phase in May and June and some 6,000 Somali camels purchased after General Egerton's arrival. Those remaining from General Manning's operations were nearly all worn out and need not be taken into consideration.

During the second phase of the operations 1,324 Indian camels died or were destroyed up to the end of March 1904, and the proportion of casualties in the Somali transport corps was still heavier. No camels returned to India, the balance remaining on demobilization being disposed of locally after providing for the needs of the Protectorate garrison.

As already stated, the Indian camel proved superior to the local animal for transport purposes, and practically saved the situation in the second phase of the last campaign. Requiring more grain and water than the Somali camel, it is better able to stand hard continuous work. It was latterly found necessary to give the Somali camels grain, but even then they wore out more quickly than the Indians. Their carrying power is only three maunds compared with five maunds borne by the latter. Indian are also better than Somali camels for marching with columns, as they straggle less and keep a more compact formation ; but this is of course partly due to the Indian attendants being better trained than the Somali camel-men, and to superior gear. The *herios*, or mats used as saddles, proved unsatisfactory, as they took longer than the ordinary saddle to adjust and were continually working loose on the march.

Camels are the only transport suitable for Somaliland. Owing to the bad roads neither the " buck " wagons nor the *ekkas* were a success. Mules were only useful in such places as the Shaikh pass in the Golis range.

In addition to the regular transport, hired camels were used between Berbera, Kirrit, and Bohotle.

* Taken from Disembarkation Returns and includes mules for " buck " wagons.

Under General Manning the transport was worked on the convoy system, but in the second phase a combination of the staging and convoy system was adopted on the line of communications. Contrary to the experience gained in many other countries, it was considered that the latter system, *i.e.*, through convoys from the base to the front, was preferable in Somaliland.

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CHAPTER IX.

BRITISH EAST AFRICA.

THE British East Africa Protectorate* is bounded on the east by the Indian Ocean, on the west by the Uganda Protectorate, on the south and south-west by German territory ; the northern boundary has not yet been accurately determined. It comprises some 300,000 square miles of territory.

Boundaries.

Political Divisions. The Protectorate may be divided into—

- (1) The mainland territories of the Sultanate of Zanzibar.
- (2) The Sultanate of Witu.
- (3) British East Africa Proper, comprising the old chartered territory of the British East Africa Company, and the region between the Tana and the Juba not included in either Zanzibar or Witu, which extends from along the coast from Kipini to Kwaihu.

The dominions of the Sultan of Zanzibar consist of a strip of coast ten miles wide from high-water mark, extending from the mouth of the river Uмба on the south to Kipini on the Ozi on the north ; and some islands off the coast, as well as the town of Kismayu and a radius of ten miles round it.

Zanzibar.

Physical features. The interior of British East Africa is a vast plateau, with elevated tablelands rising gradually from the coast ; the ordinary level of the country varying from 3,000 to 6,000 feet above the sea.

In the meridional rift, a chasm running east and west for some 700 miles through Africa, lie the fresh water lakes of Naivasha and Baringo, the salt lakes Elmenteita and Nakuro, and the flooded saline basins of Lakes Rudolf, Stephanie and Suguto.

Lakes.

Rivers. The chief rivers, which flow from the watershed of the rift, are the Juba, which rises in Abyssinia and running south-east, forms the eastern frontier ; the Tana, rising on Mount Kenia, and the Sabaki, formed

* See maps 15 and 16 in pocket.

by the united waters of the Tsavo and Athi. All these flow in an easterly direction to the Indian Ocean.

The Tana and Juba are respectively navigable for some 200 and 400 miles.

We are concerned here only with the Seyyidieh Province and Jubaland, in which alone the military operations of expeditionary forces sent from India have taken place.

The former, of which the capital is Mombasa, is divided into the Vanga, Mombasa, and Melindi districts. The coast is characterised by numerous creeks lined with extensive mangrove swamps. Inland there are plantations of sugar-cane and cocoanut, and fields of millet, Indian corn, and plantains. This cultivated area extends some twenty miles from the coast, when it gives place to a more pastoral region, which merges into the scrub of the waterless Nyika.

The Uмба valley is fertile, producing abundance of rice, and has populous Wadigo villages on both sides of the river.

The population of the Vanga district was in 1900 some 25,000, including 500 Arabs, 4,000 Swahilis, and the rest Wadigo, Wasegua, Waduruma and other savages, the whole comprised under the generic term Wanyika. The most numerous are the Wadigo, extending over the whole coast region from Mombasa to Tanga. Most of the Wadigo are in the Vanga district; they are peaceable people, who formerly suffered much from slave-raiding by Shaikh Mubarak. They have no settled government, but one or two chiefs exercise authority beyond the limits of their own villages.

Vanga town was burnt and sacked by Mubarak of Gazi, when he rebelled in August 1895, when it had a population of some 300. In 1897 it had 600 inhabitants, and a few Indian shops. The population of Gazi decreased after the rebellion, but is gradually recovering.

The Mombasa district, including the island, the coast line between Freretown and Kurwitu, the Rabai and Chogni hills, Shimba, and the Duruma country, has a population of some 50,000.

Mombasa. The island of Mombasa, has an area of nine square miles and a population of some 25,000. It is fertile except on the shores of the Indian Ocean, and is mainly covered with cocoanut plantation.

The coast from Freretown to Kurwitu forms a narrow strip between the sea and the hills of Rabai, Ribe, Chogni and Jibana, and has in it the deep creek of the Mtwapa. The country is undulating and wooded, with numerous villages and plantations. In the rebellion of 1896 it suffered much from the adhesion to the rebel cause of its chief Shaikh Hamis-bin-Kombo. The population of this coastline, including the villages of Mtwapa, Jauri, Kijipoa and Kurwitu, each under its own headman, is about 2,000, who profess the Musalman faith and speak the Swahili language.

Some eight miles behind the coast strip rises a range of hills running north and south, having eight distinct summits, the highest, Jibani, 1,087 feet above sea-level.

The tribes of these districts include a considerable proportion of Christians, for there are mission-stations at Rabai, Ribe, and other places. North of the Rabai is the Senawe range, rising to 1,132 feet in Chogni peak.

The Shimba range, south of Mombasa, rises to 1,200 feet and is fertile and thickly peopled by Wadigo.

Mombasa town is built on the eastern side of the island, which is three miles in length and one-and-a-half miles broad. Like other eastern towns, it is a labyrinth of narrow streets and lanes. Supplies are chiefly drawn from the mainland. The old Portuguese fort forms a military store and jail.

Malindi lies to the north of Momasa and south of the river Tana. The fertile coast zone, which has a considerable population, extends far into the Nyika. Large quantities of Indian corn, millet, copra, and rubber are produced, and cattle, horses, and camels do well in this district near Malindi and Mambrui.

The population numbers some 10,000, distributed principally in the coast towns of Malindi, Takaungu and Mambrui, and in Tanganiko, fifteen miles inland. Provisions and water are abundant at Malindi, which is fertile and prosperous, having an annual rainfall of fifty-four inches. Kilifi, the port of Takaungu, has a good anchorage in the mouth of the creek which extends fifteen miles into the interior. Tanganiko was destroyed by the rebels

in 1895, but has since been rebuilt. The coast from Takaungu to five miles north of Mambrui is lined with villages and farms, round which a considerable amount of grain is raised for export.

Beyond Mambrui the country is uninhabited, except for some nomad Gallas and Wasania who live by hunting.

Inland is the fertile undulating tract of Giriama, extending from the Rabai hills on the south to the river Sabaki on the north. This country is generally pastoral and agricultural, with scattered forests. It is arid in the dry season, and the water-supply is scanty and in some streams is brackish.

East Africa was settled by immigrants from Persia during the eighth century of the Christian era, and subsequently many flourishing towns were established by Arab and Persian settlers.

Early history.

In 1497 Vasco de Gama touched at Mombasa and Malindi; three years later the former town was taken by the Portuguese; in 1507 Lamu was captured by Tristan da Cunha; Zanzibar and Malindi were occupied at a later date, and by 1528 Portuguese sovereignty was established over the whole of the East African coast south of the Equator.

Portuguese domination.

Portuguese domination was, however, short-lived. During the seventeenth century the Imam of Masqat held a commanding position in western Asia, and began to encroach on the east coast of Africa. In 1660 the Arabs took the fort of Mombasa from the Portuguese; and by 1698 Zanzibar was taken and the Europeans were expelled from the coast.

The control of Masqat was, however, nominal, and the coast towns maintained a practical independence until the beginning of the nineteenth century, when the Imam Saiyid Said began to consolidate his power in East Africa; and Mombasa and the whole coast came under the rule of Masqat in 1837.

Masqat control.

Three years later the Imam transferred the seat of government from Masqat to Zanzibar, and established his authority over the whole coast. In 1844, under the ægis of the Sultan, the German missionary Krapf established near Mombasa a mission-station which still flourishes.

On the death of Saiyid Said in 1856, he left his dominions between two of his sons; the elder was to succeed to Masqat, and the younger to the sovereignty of Zanzibar and the African territory, an arrangement which led to a family dispute that was settled by the intervention of the Indian Government.

The Government of India had long been interested in the prosperity of East Africa, owing to the great influx of British Indian subjects who developed and in course of time practically monopolised the trade. On this account the dispute between the rulers of Masqat and Zanzibar was referred for arbitration to the Governor-General of India, by whose award the sovereignty of the two was finally separated.

To equalise the award, an annual payment of some £9,000 was to be made by Zanzibar to Masqat, as compensation for the loss sustained by the latter in the separation. The payment of this compensation was subsequently undertaken by the Indian Government, and in 1862, by a declaration made by Great Britain and France, Zanzibar was recognised as an independent state.

In 1870 Bargash-bin-Said, who proved to be a ruler of capacity and enlightenment, succeeded to the sovereignty of Zanzibar.

He was quick to perceive the advantages of encouraging British enterprise, and his dominions were administered throughout his reign with the advice of the British Consul-General, with the result that, while his power and trade were extended far into the interior, British influence became paramount, and was characterised by the presence of thousands of British subjects on the coast, and of British steamers for trading purposes, and warships to protect the trade.

Between 1880 and 1885, German subjects began to acquire a footing among the tribes of the interior, behind the southern part of the Zanzibar Coast, and in February 1885 the German Government granted a charter to a company, the result of which was the recognition of a German Protectorate over Usagara in August 1885.

In 1886 an agreement was signed by Great Britain and Germany and later accepted by France, defining the boundaries of the dominions of the Sultan of Zanzibar, who acquiesced in the

arrangement. By this convention, his sovereignty was restricted to a belt of ten miles running parallel with the coast from the Portuguese frontier on the south to the German protectorate of Witu on the north, some islands being also included.

The British and German spheres of influence were defined by a line running from the mouth of the Uмба river to Lake Jipe, and thence after skirting the northern base of Kilimanjaro, to the point at which the first degree of south latitude intersects the eastern shore of Victoria Nyanza. Kilimanjaro was included in the German sphere; to the north, the British sphere was bounded by the Tana river.

A "British East Africa Association" was at once formed to develop the British region, and concessions of certain rights were granted by the Sultan to both the German and British Companies.

The Sultan Bargash died in 1888, and was succeeded by Saiyid Khalifa. In September 1888 the Association was incorporated under Royal Charter as the "Imperial British East Africa Company," with power to exercise the right of government beyond the limits of the Sultan's territory, within the sphere of British influence, by treaty with the tribes of the interior. The Company's staff at once began the work of taking over the administration of the Sultan's territory, and developing the country in the interior.

Meanwhile the proceedings of the German company had caused insurrection in their territory, and their agents fled to Zanzibar. Their Government intervened, and the coast was not recovered without much fighting, the German blockade being aided by a British squadron.

By an Anglo-German agreement signed on the 1st July 1890, Germany resigned her protectorate over Witu, and over the region north of Kipini, and recognised the protectorate of Great Britain over the islands of Zanzibar, Pemba, and Mafia. The British sphere of influence was defined by the Congo State and the watershed of the Nile on the west, by the Italian sphere of interest on the north, and by the

German sphere on the south. In August 1890 France recognised British and German sovereignty in these regions in return for the recognition of her protectorate over Madagascar.

Next year the boundary between the British and Italian spheres was defined, and thus by 1891 the Imperial British East Africa Company had acquired the whole of the coast line between the Uмба and Juba rivers.

Although the coast of Africa had long been open to European enterprise, the exploration of the interior was not undertaken until close upon the middle of the nineteenth century. The German missionaries Krapf and Rebmann discovered Kilimanjaro and Mount Kenia and explored Teita and Ukambani in 1848-49.

In 1861 and succeeding years Baron Von der Decken explored a considerable portion of the interior, but was killed at Bardera on the Juba river in 1865. Frequent journeys into the heart of Africa were undertaken, until the greater portion of the country had been opened out by 1890, among the principal explorers being Fischer, Thompson, Count Teleki, Peters, Jackson and Lugard.

On the 4th November 1890 a protectorate was declared by the British Government over those portions of the Company's territory which formed part of the Zanzibar Sultanate, and on the 19th November over Witu and the coast between the Tana and Juba rivers.

In September 1894 a protectorate was established over Uganda, and subsequently extended as far as the western limits of Kikuyu. The remainder of the British sphere between the Zanzibar and Uganda boundaries and the Tana river and the German frontier was placed under the British Government on the 1st July 1895 when the whole of the territories east of the Uganda Protectorate was incorporated in the "East Africa Protectorate."

For some time subsequent to the transfer to the British Government of the territory forming the Seyyidieh Province, the country was in a state of disturbance. The cause of trouble was a dispute over the succession to the chieftainship of Takaungu between Rashid-bin-Salim, the

son, and Mubarak-bin-Rashid, the nephew of Shaikh Salim-bin-Hamis, who died in February 1895.

Mubarak being turbulent and fanatical, the other claimant was supported by the British. Mubarak thereupon retired upon Gonjoro, fifteen miles inland, and, with 1,500 of Salim's armed slaves who were quartered there, threatened to attack Takaungu. He was encouraged in these proceedings by the chief of Gazi.

The Company's administrator applied for assistance to the British Government, and a ship of war was ordered to Kilifi, the port of Takaungu, while Mubarak was summoned to Zanzibar to meet Sir A. Hardinge, the Consul-General. He, however, declined to obey, and an expedition was sent to Gonjoro, which was evacuated without resistance. Afterwards Mubarak opened fire on the British camp from the adjacent hills, and thus all hope of a peaceful settlement was at an end.

From Gonjoro Mubarak retreated to Sokoke, and with his brother Aziz, who had meanwhile burned Tanganiko and looted the Indian traders there, he took refuge with Mubarak of Gazi. The latter promised Sir A. Hardinge that he would arrest and disarm the rebels, but he did not prevent them from making a second attack on Takaungu, which was repulsed by Captain Raikes.

Mubarak again took refuge at Gazi, but the chief of that place now promised to co-operate with the Consul-General in seizing the rebel chief.

Sir A. Hardinge proceeded to Gazi with an armed force under Admiral Rawson, and found the place deserted, the chief and the rebels having fled together to Mweleh, a fortified stronghold fifteen miles inland. The British force attacked and took Mweleh, when the rebel leaders fled in different directions into the jungle. It was decided to wait for an Indian contingent of troops, promised by the Government, before following up these scattered bands; but four months elapsed before their arrival, and during this period the rebels reassembled, and were joined by the Swahili chief of Mtwapa, north of Mombasa, and were actively assisted by the tribes behind the coast.

Malindi was attacked by the rebels, and the Government then decided to send troops from India to supplement the 300 men of

the newly-arrived Indian contingent. The rebellion was suppressed by the occupation of all the food-centres, and the constant pursuit of the insurgents.

Operations of the Mombasa Field Force.

The 24th Bombay Infantry ¹ under command of Lieut.-Colonel A. A. Pearson, left Karachi on the 5th March 1896, and anchor was dropped in Mombasa Creek on the 15th March. The ship was cleared of all troops and baggage by 5 P.M. next day.

On the 19th the party detailed in the margin embarked on *dhow*s which were towed by a steam pinnace to Rabai. At Rabai two men were drowned in disembarking. The detachment marched thirty-three miles inland to Mbungu post, thirty-five miles north-west of Mombasa.

At Shimba.

1 British Officer.
Subadar Din Muhammad.
50 rank and file.

At Wangá.

2 British Officers.
Jemadar Baz Khan.
105 rank and file.

At Gazi.

Jemadar Nur Din.
25 rank and file.

On the 20th the detail noted in the margin, under Lieutenant Tarver, proceeded to Shimba in *dhow*s, and next day Lieutenants Holbrooke and Fielding embarked in H.M.S. *Wigeon* for Wangá, and Jemadar Nur Din proceeded in the same vessel to form a post at Gazi.

On the 22nd Captain Tighe, D.S.O., with Lieutenants Woolridge and Mitchell proceeded in H.M.S. *Barossa* with sixty rank and file to Wasin, whence they were to travel in boats to Pongwe to attack and burn a stockade which was being built there.

At Mkono.

Captain Tighe, D.S.O.
125 rank and file.

On completion of this work, Captain Tighe was to take on sixty-five men from Lieutenant Holbrooke and march to his post at Mkono.

On the 24th March Lieutenant Parker marched from Rabai to Quabongo, which he burnt, and made Bongo's son a prisoner. Large quantities of supplies and gunpowder were destroyed, but no opposition was met with.

¹ One company of the regiment was absent on the Baluch-Afghan Boundary Commission and was replaced by a Hazara Company of the 26th Bombay Infantry.

On the 26th Lieutenant Mitchell with forty-eight rifles proceeded in the S. S. *Juba* to relieve the detachment of the Mombasa contingent at Malindi.

At Melindi.

Lieutenant Mitchell.
48 Rifles.

Kubu and several other minor chiefs came in to Mkono with a large following of bowmen on the 31st March. Mubarak was reported to be living in the jungle near Mweleh, near which place the rebel leaders Ayub, Aziz, and Sebi had established themselves at Gandini.

On April 2nd the headquarters of the regiment moved to Shimba, and were joined by Major Tulloch's and Lieutenant Parker's detachments, which had preceded them. The column was to form the main attack on Mweleh, where Mubarak had concentrated in the Kamari forest. On this date the distribution of the troops was—

Operations against the
rebels.

- (i) On the Uganda road, cutting the enemy's line of retreat north, at
 - (a) Samburu, (b) Maji-ya-chumbwi, (c) Mbungu, (d) Rabai, (e) Shimba, (f) Chengoni.
- (ii) Main attacking column at Shimba moving on Mweleh.
- (iii) Cutting the line into German territory at Wanga, Mkono, and a column advancing from Mkono to the west of Mweleh, so as to cut off retreat from Momandi and Kisigan. In addition Gazi, Malindi, Karwitu, Roha and Bamber were held.

On the 3rd April the main column marched in two parties, the first a light column for fighting, the second with the baggage, starting from Shimba at 9 and 10-30 A.M., respectively. After marching four hours, the camp was formed on the left of the stream flowing towards Mweleh.

Captain Tighe with eighty rifles marched from Mkono to Mdwai, leaving his post in charge of a native officer who had full instructions with regard to patrolling. Similar orders were given to the Wanga post. All roads leading to German territory were to be blocked and a patrol sent towards Pongwe. Three days' rations were carried so as to enable the column to follow up any track of the enemy. Mdwai was reached in six hours. In the village was found a house belonging to Aziz, four of Mubarak's Enfield guns, three kegs of powder of German manufacture, some boxes of percussion caps

and a sword. The headman was absent, but presented himself in the evening with six others, all in a state of intoxication. They were taken prisoners. Mdwai was selected as the objective, as it was on the road to Mkwachi on the Lueni-Momandi road, which Captain Tighe had orders to block.

On the same day at 7 A.M., Captain Melliss marched from Mbungu for Maji-ya-Chumbwi along the old Masai track, and struck the Uganda road at 10-30 A.M. Two non-commissioned officers and twenty-five rifles were left here to watch the Masai track leading to Mweleh and south. Water was plentiful in the water-holes near the junction of the two roads.

The advance was then continued to Maji-ya-Chumbwi, a distance of two-and-a-half hours westwards on the Uganda road.

On the 4th April the main column marched, the attacking column moving at 2 A.M., for Minny Jaka's stronghold. No opposition was met with, and after burning the villages the column moved on to Mweleh, which was also deserted, and encamped on one of the western spurs. In the afternoon a patrol on Mweleh hill captured an armed rebel, who said he would lead the column to Mubarak's hiding place, which was within an hour's march of camp.

Captain Tighe's force marched at midnight for Mkwachi, the captured headman leading the column. At 4 A.M., three of the prisoners escaped. The village was reached at 5-30 A.M., and a rush made for it, when numbers of men armed with guns and bows ran out of the houses into the jungle, and were pursued and fired on by the advanced guard. A number of armed men threw down their arms at Captain Tighe's command, and it was discovered that the village was friendly, belonging to the Wadigo and not to the Wadruma. Three men were wounded and two women killed by the fire of the advanced guard, the women being mistaken for men in the dense jungle.

Patrols were sent out in the direction of Lueni and Mweleh, but the men were so exhausted by their exertions that the march towards Mweleh, and blocking of the Momandi road had to be abandoned.

At 3 A.M. on the 5th a column of 100 men marched to attack Mubarak's village. It was found deserted and was burnt, and large quantities of grain were destroyed. Captain Tighe returned

to Mkono this day, and the patrols from other posts saw nothing of the enemy.

Next day a patrol revisited Mubarak's stronghold, and burnt five outlying villages and a quantity of Indian corn. Major Tulloch marched at 3 A.M. from Mweleh with a flying column towards Visiani, and on the 7th April arrived at Momandi, near which one of the enemy's picquets was met with, and a prisoner taken. The whole of Mubarak's magazine was found in dense jungle, and a stockade was constructed. Following on Mubarak's tracks, Major Tulloch heard on the 8th that he had gone almost due west in the direction of the Samburu range. The column advanced ten miles, and then returned to the stockade to await the arrival of rations.

On the 12th April information was received from Major Vos Wissman that Mubarak and his followers had crossed into German territory, somewhere north-west of Tanga; and about a week later the rebel chief and his following surrendered and were disarmed in German territory.

Desultory operations of a similar nature against rebels continued until May, and in June 24th Bombay Infantry returned to India.

CHAPTER X.

JUBALAND.

JUBALAND,* the north-easterly province of the British East Africa

Geographical position.

Protectorate, lies between the province of Tanaland and the Juba river, which forms the eastern boundary of the Protectorate, dividing it from Italian Somaliland. The province has about ninety miles of coast line from the mouth of the Juba to Port Tula, and extends inland up the right bank of the river for a distance of about 440 miles to the 6th parallel of northern latitude, but effective control is only exercised to about 120 miles inland. This portion is divided by the equator into Lower Juba, or Kismayu district, and Upper Juba, or the Ogaden and Gosha district. In the far interior lies Boran, an almost unexplored region. The strip of forest country about eighty miles long,

Physical geography.

between the Juba river and the chain of numerous lakes about ten miles to the west of it, into which the river overflows when in flood, is called Gosha. The river is in flood in April. It then falls, rising again in July. After remaining in flood for some time the river once more subsides and remains very low in December, January, and February. At this season the lakes appear to dry up almost completely, and water then becomes very scarce in the country away from the river. Moreover, owing to the *tse-tse* fly, cattle cannot be taken to drink except at certain places along the river. It is, therefore, possible during the dry season to deny the water supply to the tribes within the protected area.

The mouth of the river is closed by a bar with a depth of only one fathom at high water, and the crossing is difficult owing to rollers. Inside the bar the river itself is a fine navigable waterway, 250 yards wide at Yonti. In the summer of 1891 Commander Dundas, R. N., took a steamer with a 2½ foot draught up to the Bardera rapids. On the 30th March, 1901, however, it was found impossible

* See maps 15 and 16 in pocket.

to take a steam launch further than seventeen miles above Yonti owing to the shallows, but the river rose immediately afterwards and was in full flood by the 21st April.

Kismayu, the principal town of the province, is situated on the coast twelve miles south-west of the mouth of the Juba river. It consists of a collection of native huts surrounding the stone Residency where the Sub-Commissioner resides. Kismayu Bay forms the only anchorage available for ocean steamers along the entire Eastern Somali coast during the south-west monsoon (April to October). The bay is shallow, and ships have to anchor about a mile out and discharge their cargo into large *dhow*s and these in turn into small boats.

The water at Kismayu being brackish, the supply for Europeans is brought from Turki Hill, a stone fort on a sandhill on the right bank of the river a little above the Arab village of Gobwen. Ten miles north of this place is Yonti, where there are a stockade post and two Somali villages. From Yonti there are two routes, one north between Lake Wama and the river to the Gosha country, and the other north-west along the southern shore of the lake and past its western end to Afmadu.

The latter, a collection of water-holes about sixty-seven miles north-west of Yonti, is the head-quarters of the Sultan of the Ogaden tribe. In 1898 there was a post on a fairly open site at Helished near Lake Wama, about $12\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Yonti on the route to Afmadu. Seven miles beyond Helished is Kurkumes, which is said to be the only permanent watering place on this route in the dry season. Twenty-three miles further on is another watering place, Kumbi, at the north-western end of the lake. This lake, also called Lake Hardinge, is about thirty miles long with a maximum width of nearly five miles. Like most of the other so-called lakes it is dry at the end of February. It is connected with the Juba river by the Bulbula creek, but it is uncertain whether it obtains most of its water through this channel or from the water course at its north-western extremity. It is very shallow even in the flood time and is surrounded by a fringe of grass and dense jungle, beyond which the country is open for some distance. Such open spaces appear to be the exception in this province. Towards the interior there are belts of thick bush, extending for many miles. Along the

coast are some low sand-hills, but elsewhere the country is flat and evidently a continuation of the great plain of Southern and Central Somaliland, which is described in chapter VII. Notwithstanding the existence of a large river, the conditions of warfare are here very similar to those prevailing in the latter country.

The climate is said to be healthy, and, except for a few cases of sunstroke and scurvy, the health of the troops in 1898 and 1901 was good. The dry season lasts from December to April, when the rains begin and continue to about October.

The Wagosha, or inhabitants of the riverain tract called
 The people. Gosha, are runaway slaves of the Somalis, and came originally from various tribes in East Africa. Some 12,000 of them are settled on the right bank of the river in British territory and have cleared a great deal of the forest for cultivation. As they possess a few rifles, they are able to protect themselves in some measure from their former masters.

With the exception of these people and a few Arabs and Swahilis in and around Kismayu, the inhabitants of the province are chiefly Gallas and Somalis. The former live in Boran in the interior, and very little is known about them. The latter are divided into Marehans, Ogadens, and Hertis. The Marehans appear to be located on the right bank of the Juba river, above Berbera, and like the Gallas they live too far inland for us to have had many dealings with them. The Ogadens occupy the interior south of the Gallas and Marehans down to Lake Wama. They came originally from the east side of the Juba river, driving the former inhabitants to the north and west, and are a fierce, warlike tribe, differing in no marked degree from their kinsmen in the interior of Somaliland, except that they are even more intractable. There are no horses in Jubaland, and the tactics of the Ogadens in this country are similar to those of the Isa tribe of Eastern Somaliland who also fight on foot. Both these tribes almost always endeavour to surprise an adversary or to lay ambushes for him. The partiality of the Ogadens for close quarter fighting may be attributed to the fact that they have not more than two or three hundred rifles.

They are said to number about 6,000 fighting men. As, however, the Abdullah section held aloof during the campaigns of 1898 and 1901, only about 4,500 could possibly have taken up arms against us.

The Hirtis dwelling on the coast are Mijjartens, who came originally by sea from the neighbourhood of Cape Gardafui. Although at first inclined to be troublesome, they have, on the whole, been loyal since 1895, but they did not prove very useful in obtaining information or assisting the operations in Jubaland.

Scattered among the Ogaden, and subject to them, are about 2,000 Gallas and Wabonis; the former a remnant of the original population of the country,¹ and the latter slaves or the children of slaves captured by the Somalis.

What is known of the province dates from the year 1887 when the Imperial British East Africa Company arranged for the lease of a considerable tract of coast territory on the mainland from the Sultan of Zanzibar.

History.

In 1890 a treaty was made with Germany delimiting the British sphere of influence in East Africa generally, and in the following year, by an agreement with Italy, the Juba river was fixed upon as the eastern boundary of the territories administered by the Company. In 1895 these territories were taken over by the Imperial Government and divided into two administrative areas, the Uganda Protectorate and the East Africa Protectorate, both of which are under the control of the Colonial Office.

From the beginning of the Company's rule the Somali tribes of Jubaland were a source of constant anxiety to the administration, but by the time they came under the direct control of Government the Hirtis had become amenable to British influence. The Ogadens, however, continued to give trouble, and in the early part of 1897 the Sub-Commissioner of the province had to remonstrate with them on account of an unprovoked raid on the Boran Gallas. In the autumn some Ogaden spies, arrested in Gosha, killed two of our native police and escaped. The Sultan Ahmad Marghan was threatened with severe measures, unless the culprits were given up or blood money paid. He appeared willing to comply with these demands, but was prevented from doing so by the young bloods of the tribe, who were only waiting for an opportunity to show their hostility to the British authorities. Such an opportunity occurred in April 1898, when a Galla slave

¹ A tribe called the Bajuns inhabiting certain islands on the coast are said to be the real aborigines of Jubaland.

fled from his Somali master and placed himself under British protection. He was followed up and killed, the murderer escaping to Afmadu. As security for the surrender of the latter some cattle belonging to him and his section of the tribe were seized. The Ogadens then retaliated by raiding into the Kismayu district and it became necessary to take steps to coerce them.

The 27th Baluchis and a wing of the 4th Bombay Infantry were at this time serving in East Africa, and a portion of these troops, not required in Uganda for the suppression of the Sudanese mutiny, were available for service in Jubaland. Detachments from the two regiments, amounting in all to some 460 men, were accordingly sent from Mombasa to Kismayu in April to strengthen the garrison of the province, which consisted of three companies of East African Rifles.

The whole force, subsequently reinforced by four companies of Uganda Rifles, was placed under the command of Major W. Quentin. During the operations, which lasted five months, no engagement of importance took place, although owing to the surprise of a small party of sepoys by the enemy, the British losses were on one occasion rather heavy. Considerable captures of stock were effected, and at the end of August the Ogadens submitted. They were then made to pay a fine of 500 head of cattle and to restore all captured arms.

After the submission of the Ogadens in 1898 Mr. A. Jenner, sub-commissioner of the province, made several tours through the country, and found the inhabitants friendly. The Ogaden Sultan, Ahmad Marghan, and other chiefs were constant visitors to Kismayu, and practically the only symptoms of disorder in the province were due to the quarrels between the Hirtis and Ogadens as to grazing rights.

In the autumn of 1900 Mr. Jenner arranged to make another journey into the interior with the object of opening up a district to the north-west of Kismayu in the direction of the so-called Lorian swamp. All was quiet in the province, and there was no outward sign of any ill-will towards the Sub-Commissioner, who indeed had always been very friendly with the Somalis and had much too high an opinion of their character. Had it not been for this misplaced confidence in their good faith, he would scarcely have ventured into the midst of these treacherous savages with an escort of only

forty Somali police. It appears that he had once found it necessary to detain for a few months at Kismayu an Ogaden chief, named Hasan Yera, who was suspected of complicity in the murder of some friendly natives. After his discharge this man conceived a violent hatred towards Mr. Jenner, and on it becoming known that the latter intended to make a tour, he secretly arranged with other disaffected chiefs to murder him. The actual execution of the plan was left to Omar Marghan, a brother of the Ogaden Sultan, who at the head of about 300 men attacked the Sub-Commissioner's camp before daybreak on the 16th November. Mr. Jenner and all but nine of his escort were killed before they could offer any resistance.

At about the same time a party of Boran traders returning from Kismayu to their own country were attacked and cut up by the Ogadens about twenty-five miles north of Afmadu. News of an intended rising of the tribe had already reached Mombasa, and Colonel T. Ternan, C.M.G., D.S.O., Acting Commissioner and Consul-General at that place, at once proceeded to Kismayu, where he arrived on the 25th November. On receiving his report on the situation in Jubaland the Imperial Government decided to send an expedition to that province to punish the Ogaden tribe for the outrage. Orders were issued for the despatch of troops from Bombay and Mombasa to Jubaland, the command of the Ogaden Punitive Expedition being given to Colonel Ternan. Operations began in January, 1901, and practically ceased at the end of April, when the Ogaden Sultan agreed that a fine of 5,000 cattle should be paid by the tribe. At the same time he promised to endeavour to obtain the surrender of the instigators of Mr. Jenner's murder. The force was broken up on the 12th June, when the Indian troops sailed for Bombay.

Military Operations.

Expedition against the Oganda Somalis in 1898.

In 1898 it became necessary to coerce the Ogadens and punish

| | |
|------------------------|--------------|
| 4th Bombay Rifles .. | Wing. |
| 27th Baluchis .. | 2 Companies. |
| East African Rifles .. | 3 .. |
| Uganda Rifles .. | 4 .. |
| Total .. | 1,060 men. |

them for raiding into the Kismayu district. The force detailed in the margin was assembled in Jubaland under Major W. Quentin,

but only a portion of those troops were available at the

outset of the operations, the remainder being sent to Kismayu as reinforcements became necessary.

On the 7th March, 1898, a wing of the 4th Bombay Rifles reached Mombasa to replace the 27th Baluchis, Force in Jubaland. most of whom had already been sent up country to assist in quelling the mutiny of the Sudanese troops in Uganda. At this time the troops in Jubaland consisted of three companies of East African Rifles (Sudanese and Swahilis), and on the 4th April a company of the 4th Bombay Rifles, under Lieutenant Ford, was sent by orders of the Consul-General to Kismayu, in consequence of the hostile attitude of the Ogadens. This company established itself at Turki Hill on the 7th April and proceeded to reconnoitre the road towards Yonti, in which direction a party of the East African Rifles had been ambuscaded a few days previously. On the

evening of the 12th it was reported that the police post at Yonti was in danger of attack, and at 4 A.M. the following morning Lieutenant Ford marched to its relief with twenty-six rifles and a maxim gun. On arrival at Yonti, he found that the enemy had already attacked and taken the post, killing eleven of the police, and retiring on the approach of the troops. It was impossible to follow them up with his small force, and on the 14th, on the urgent request of Mr. Jenner, the Sub-Commissioner, he withdrew his men to Turki Hill.

In the meantime Major Quentin had received orders to send Major Quentin's operations. to Kismayu a second company, which he decided to accompany himself. This reinforcement landed on the 15th April and marched to Turki Hill immediately afterwards; the two following days being spent in bringing up the ammunition (600 rounds per rifle) and the supplies, which were to ration the two companies for two months.

The Ogadens were reported to be collecting in large numbers near Lake Wama, and on the 18th April Major Quentin advanced with 150 men, making two short marches to Yonti. Hearing that the lake was dry, he now sent back for camels, *pakhals*, etc., and halted until the 22nd. Taking with him an escort of eighty rifles, he then pushed on to the lake, which, contrary to the report, proved to be half full of water, due to rain having fallen during

the month. The remainder of the column was now brought up, and a reconnaissance of the lake was carried out; but the enemy profiting by the delay at Yonti, had driven off their herds in the direction of Afmadu, and the column was compelled by shortness of rations to return to Turki Hill on the 27th.

In the meantime the remaining two companies of the 4th Bombay Rifles had arrived from Mombasa, and were followed on the 7th May by 128 men of the 27th Baluchis under Captain Tanner.

On the 17th May Major Quentin transferred the head-quarters of the force to Yonti, the garrison of Turki Hill being eventually reduced to seventy-five men.

It had been decided to build a stockade at Yonti, and as no timber was available on the British side of the river, permission was obtained from the Italian Resident to cut palm trees on the left bank and bring them across in canoes. On the evening of the 21st May Lieutenant W. F. Stevenson, attached 4th Bombay Rifles, was returning from the Italian side, after finishing work for the day, in a canoe with a native officer and eleven men of his regiment, when the canoe capsized just after they had pushed off from the bank. Most of the men managed to scramble ashore, but Lieutenant Stevenson and a non-commissioned officer were drowned.

On the 30th May a large party of Ogadens was sighted close to Yonti post and pursued for some distance, their losses being reported as about twenty-five killed. It was then found that the enemy had killed a camel-driver and twenty-eight camels, which were grazing in the bush under a police guard. These had allowed the camels to stray too far and, on being attacked, had run away.

A post of about 150 rifles under Captain Tanner was now established at Helished on Lake Wama, and at 6 A.M. on the 22nd June a native officer and forty-one rifles were sent out from this place to reconnoitre the roads towards Malkhana and Kurkumes. The party had reached a point, about two miles from camp, where the road passes through a hollow with thick bush on both sides, when they were suddenly attacked by about 400 Somalis. The main body

Fight near Helished. was marching in single file with an advanced guard fifty yards in front and a rear-guard 100 yards in rear. The bush was very thick to within ten yards of the road, and the first attack was made from the right. When the

men turned to meet it they were assailed in rear by another part of the enemy. The attack was so sudden that the commander (Jemadar Radha Singh, 4th Bombay Rifles) and several sepoy, who were for the most part Sikhs, were killed before they could use their arms. The remainder retreated, firing towards the lake, and when clear of the jungle succeeded in checking the enemy.

The sound of the firing being heard at Helished camp, Captain Tanner proceeded to the spot with sixty-two men of his regiment. Twenty-seven bodies were recovered, and one man was reported missing. A reconnaissance was then made along the road as far as Malkhana but no trace could be found of the enemy, who effected their retreat through the bush, carrying off twenty-seven rifles and 1,640 rounds of ammunition.

The post at Helished was now reinforced by a section, the force under Major Quentin's command being at this time disposed as follows:—At Kismayu about 100 Sudanese and Swahilis; at Turki Hill 91 rifles; at Yonti 151 rifles; at Helished 168 rifles. Various reports were received that the enemy intended to attack one or other of the posts, and on the 14th July they raided some Government cattle close to Kismayu. Accordingly, as the force in the country was not sufficient for active operations, a reinforcement of 350 rifles of the Indian contingent of the Uganda Rifles was sent from Mombasa to Kismayu, where it arrived on the 23rd July, bringing up the force under Major Quentin's orders to about 1,000 rifles, including two companies of Sudanese in the Gosha district. One hundred and fifty men were left to garrison Kismayu and the remainder were moved up to Yonti and Lake Wama.

On the evening of the 3rd August Captain Fry of the 4th Bombay Rifles, having obtained information that a large number of the enemy's cattle was near the west end of the lake, started with about 300 men from Helished, forded the lake, and arrived at day-break at an Ogaden encampment. The enemy were taken completely by surprise and many were killed, while some 450 head of cattle were brought back to camp. Ten days later Major Quentin made a second large capture of stock in the same locality, and on the following day a deputation came in from the Somalis saying that they wished to make peace. Eventually, the Sultan and the

Raid on the enemy's camp .

principal chiefs of the Ogadens having come into camp, peace was declared, and a fine of 500 head of cattle was inflicted on the tribe. It was also stipulated that two chiefs were to be held as hostages until all the captured rifles had been returned. By the 3rd October twenty-two Martini-Henry rifles and six Sniders had been given in, and on the 9th November the Sub-Commissioner reported that the Ogadens had complied with the terms imposed. The expedi-

End of the expedition.

tionary force was accordingly broken up on that date; the 4th Bombay Rifles left Kismayu for Mombasa on the 18th, and sailed to Bombay in December. The detachment of the 27th Baluchis and the Uganda Rifles also returned to Mombasa, being replaced by 150 men of the new Indian contingent for the Protectorate, who arrived at Kismayu under Captain Watson on the 7th November.

Before the breaking up of the force Lake Wama was thoroughly reconnoitred. During an examination of the Bulbula Creek Captain Tanner was seized by a crocodile, when filling his water-bottle at the river. He was dragged into the water, but succeeded in freeing himself and in regaining the shore with the help of some of his men.

The Ogaden Punitive Expedition of 1901.

This expedition was undertaken to punish the Ogaden Somalis for the murder of Mr. Jenner on the 16th November, 1900, when touring in Jubaland, of which province he was Sub-Commissioner.

Colonel T. Ternan, C.M.G., D.S.O., Acting Commissioner and Consul-General in East Africa, arrived at Kismayu on the 25th November. On the following day he reported to the Foreign Office that the whole of the Ogaden tribe with the exception of one section were in revolt, and at the same time recommended that the following measures should be taken:—

The troops in Jubaland to be brought up to a strength of about 1,000 men by reinforcements from Mombasa and India. Kismayu to be held by one company assisted by a naval detachment and local levies. Gobwen (Turki Hill) and Yonti to be held by one company each. A force of 600 men to proceed to Kumbi at the north-western end of Lake Wama, and after establishing a supply depôt there with one company as garrison, the remainder to advance to

Afmadu, the head-quarters of the Ogaden tribe. Further operations were to depend on circumstances.

The Foreign Office agreed to these proposals, and on the 12th December Colonel Ternan was appointed to the command of the punitive expedition. Arrangements were made with the Indian Government for the dispatch of a wing of a native regiment, and a section of a mountain battery from Bombay, and fifty camel sowars from Aden, while a reinforcement of 200 men of the East African Rifles was at once sent from Mombasa to Kismayu, thus bringing the force of Protectorate troops in Jubaland to a strength of 500 rifles.

Omar Marghan, brother of the Ogaden Sultan, was reported to have led the attack on Mr. Jenner's camp, and there was good reason to suppose that the Sultan himself had been aware of what was going on. Accordingly he was ordered to come in to Kismayu, and on his failing to comply with the summons it was decided to treat him as an enemy.

Preparations for the expedition were now hurried on, and, in view of the impending arrival of the Indian troops, the pier at

Preparations at Kismayu. Kismayu, which had formerly been unapproachable at low water, was lengthened 100 feet and made available at nearly all tides. A trolley line 1,200 yards long was laid down from the pier to the town, where two sheds were prepared for the storage of rations, etc. The water-supply was improved and extra wells were dug for the large number of transport animals which were expected. Condensed water for drinking purposes for Europeans and Indian troops on their arrival was supplied by H. M. S. *Magicienne*, which remained at Kismayu during the operations. The defences of the town were at the same time strengthened and a hospital was established at Kismayu.

The troops from India and Aden having arrived at Kismayu in three transports on the 12th, 15th, and 22nd January, the punitive force was constituted as shown in the margin, the total strength being forty-three British officers and 1,404 other ranks, exclusive of scouts, but including 242 Somali Police and armed porters.

Naval Detachment for defence of
Kismayu.
Aden Camel Co. p. (52 rifles).
One section, No. 9 Mountain Battery.
Wing, 16th Bombay Infantry.
5 Companies, East African Rifles.
1 Company of Somali Police.
2 Companies of Armed Porters.
1 Native Hospital.
100 Somali Scout, and Guides.

A detail of the staff is given in Appendix A.

The steam launch *Geraldine* was used for forwarding supplies from Gobwen to Yonti, which was made the advanced base.

Disposition of the troops.

The transport consisted of 590 camels, about 900 porters (exclusive of armed porters), and a number of carts, donkeys, and oxen.¹ Three months' supplies were landed with the troops, but as all the camels had not yet arrived from Aden, the column only took with it rations for twenty-five days, in addition to other stores, when it left the coast on the 24th January. One company of the 16th Bombay Infantry and one company of armed porters were left at Kismayu to assist the naval detachment in holding that place; half a company of the 16th was left at Gobwen and a company of the same regiment occupied Yonti. The remainder of the force, about 1,000 rifles, advanced from the latter place on the 28th January and reached Kumbi on the 1st February. The lake was found to be quite dry, and the column, making a short cut, marched up the lake-bed. From Kumbi a light column moved forward on the 4th February and occupied Afmadu on the night of the 5th without opposition. Orders were then sent back for the remainder of the troops and the baggage to come up, and the whole of the advanced force was concentrated at Afmadu on the 10th February. The Ogaden Sultan with his personal following gave himself up on the 7th February, on condition that his life should be spared. He was sent off to the coast on the same date under an escort, which took with it all the empty camels, to bring up a fresh supply of rations.

A strong defensive post was established at Afmadu, and on the 12th February a flying column under Colonel Ternan, consisting of one company 16th Bombay Infantry, three companies East African Rifles, the Aden Camel Corps, and one gun No. 9 Mountain Battery (a total strength of rather under 400 men) left Afmadu, and marched in a north-westerly direction towards the Jiro district,

¹ Four hundred and ten camels were brought from Aden, the remaining 180 were Somali camels collected at Kismayu. Forty-eight of the latter died before the column returned to the base on the 12th March. In that time only fourteen of the Arab camels from Aden had died. These figures show that the Arab is better than the Somali camel for transport purposes in this country. Apart from the water question the porters were found to be the most convenient form of transport, and for the Goshā district they were certainly the best. The bullock-carts broke down and had to be abandoned.

where the chiefs, personally concerned in the murder of Mr. Jenner, were said to be. Ten days' rations were taken with the column and 150 transport camels, including sixty for the carriage of water. The country to be traversed was quite unknown, and the water supply along the track could not be depended upon. Owing to the thick bush the column was in places stretched out to a length of two miles. A water pool was found at Gulia, an open place some thirty-five miles from Afmadu, and one at Ghulima twelve miles further on, where the column arrived on the 15th.

After Ghulima, according to native reports, there is no water until the Boran country is reached, a distance of perhaps 200 miles, so that the column here found itself on the edge of a waterless stretch of country similar to that known as the Haud in Somaliland.

On the 16th the way lay through very thick bush, and from the number of fresh tracks all around, it was evident that the enemy was in some force in the neighbourhood. Having marched ten miles without reaching open country, Colonel Ternan decided to encamp and reconnoitre for the enemy. Samase, where the halt was made, is about fifty-seven miles north-west of Afmadu. The Camel Corps, forty strong, with a Sudanese rifleman mounted on each camel behind the rider, had been sent on early in the morning to reconnoitre under Major Legh, 16th Bombay Infantry, who had temporarily relieved Captain Gordon, suffering from sun fever. The remainder of the force, with the exception of the rear-guard which had not yet come in, was formed up in three sides of a square with the company of the 16th Bombay Infantry in the front face and a company of East African Rifles on each flank. Each face of the square was about 120 to 150 yards in length, and the bush was so thick that it was impossible to see across the camp from one side to the other. The men were still under arms and were engaged in cutting down the bush to form a *zareba*, when they were suddenly

Encounter with the enemy. attacked from the right rear. The officer in command of the rear guard was the first to observe the enemy, creeping through the bush on his right front, when he was still at a distance of two or three hundred yards from the camp. He immediately sent on a man with the information, but the enemy moved through the bush so quickly

that they arrived simultaneously with the messenger, and a small party of them broke in at the gap in the right rear corner of the camp before the rearguard could be doubled up to close it. Here they came upon the hospital tents, which were being pitched, and in the hand-to-hand fighting which ensued a considerable number of casualties occurred among the medical staff and patients. Lieutenant-Colonel Maitland, I.M.S., had unfortunately taken off his accoutrements on arrival in camp, and when he was running to get his revolver, he was attacked and killed by two of the enemy, who according to their usual custom fought in pairs. Dr. Mann, who was also unarmed, closed with one of the enemy and received a wound in the head before his adversaries were disposed of; while Captain Gordon, who was close by the hospital and had his revolver by him, dropped one of the pair that attacked him, the other making off. The enemy then got among some cattle, which had been captured a day or two previously, and stampeded them by cutting them with their knives and spears. This added to the confusion caused by the sudden attack, and for a few minutes there was a certain amount of wild firing inside the camp, as a portion of the transport attendants, one man in ten, were armed with rifles. The troops, however, remained steady, and the gap having been closed up, the enemy were driven off after ten minutes' sharp fighting. Of those who broke into the square not one succeeded in getting out again. Seventeen dead bodies of the Ogadens were counted, and their total losses were estimated by Colonel Ternan at about 150 killed and wounded. The casualties on the British side amounted to seventeen killed, including Colonel Maitland, and twenty-two wounded.

Major Legh returned with the Camel Corps in the afternoon. He had seen nothing of the enemy, and the bush was so thick that he had found it necessary to dismount the men and proceed on foot.

Owing to shortness of supplies and water it was now decided to return to Afmadu, and on the 17th the column marched back to Ghulima, followed up by the enemy, who hung on the flanks but did not attempt to come to close quarters.

Next day the retreat was resumed, and the enemy continued to follow up the column at a respectful distance until within a day's

march of Afmadu, which was reached on the 20th February. In concluding his report of the action at Samase, Colonel Ternan stated that he intended to remain at Afmadu for the present, but did not recommend its permanent occupation, and that, as regards eventual arrangements, he was of opinion that a force of 600 men would be necessary to hold the country, with a post of 300 men (200 of whom should be camel corps) at Mfudu, a place on the Juba river about 150 miles from its mouth and 40 miles distant from Afmadu.

Information was now brought in that the enemy had some cattle at a place called Tabtu, about 45 miles west of Afmadu, and arrangements were made for a flying column to visit this place and return before the drying up of the water-holes round Lake Wama made it necessary for the whole force to return to the coast. On the 1st March, however, Colonel Ternan received a despatch from Sir C. Eliot, Chief Commissioner, E. A. Protectorate, which caused him to change his plans.

Prior to advancing from Afmadu into the Jiro district, Colonel Ternan had indented for another two months' supplies for the Indian troops, in case of the operations being prolonged beyond the period at first arranged for, and the despatch, which he now received, informed him that the Foreign Office were unable to understand the reason of his demand for the extra rations, as it was desirable to bring the operations to a conclusion as soon as possible; that he was not to continue the pursuit if there was no immediate prospect of capturing the men who were responsible for Mr. Jenner's murder; and that reparation might be enforced by the detention of the Sultan and Chiefs. He was further required to render a report of the actual situation in Jubaland and of the movements he proposed to make.

Colonel Ternan, reading these instructions in the light of an order to close the expedition with the least possible delay, gave up the idea of going to Tabtu and marched his force down to the coast, arriving at Kismayu on the 12th March. He now received further instructions, which were to the effect that the immediate breaking up of the expedition was not intended, that Mfudu might be occupied in

accordance with his suggestion, and that further military operations were left to his discretion.

Later, in reply to Colonel Ternan's explanation of his return to the coast, the Foreign Office repeated their instructions as to the occupation of Mfudu and the detention of the Sultan, and informed him that the Indian troops could be retained until further orders.

Accordingly Colonel Ternan decided to march with a column into the north of the Gosha district, which for some months past had been in a disturbed state, and where some rebel Wagosha chiefs had combined with the Ogadens to make war on the loyal population. It was further intended, after establishing a strong post at Mfudu, to return to Yonti and make a second advance into the Afmadu country with a view to bringing the enemy to terms by driving him back into the waterless desert.

On the 25th March head-quarters moved to Yonti, and on the 28th a column of 450 rifles under Colonel Ternan marched from that place towards Mfudu up the right bank of the Juba river. Owing to the prevalence of the tse-tse fly in this part of the country, the transport consisted almost entirely of porters, carrying a month's supplies for the column. Arrangements were made at the same time for a river convoy of country boats (dug-outs), which left Yonti with supplies for Mfudu on the 30th March, but did not reach the latter place until the 16th April. This was owing to the river not having yet risen sufficiently to allow of the boats being towed by the launch to a greater distance than 17 miles above Yonti.

On the 2nd April the column forded the Webi Yero, a branch near the place where this arm of the Juba rejoins the main stream after leaving it near Ukur some three marches further up. Then marching up the narrow island formed by the two branches of the river, the force reached Bua on the 4th April, having burnt *en route* villages, the inhabitants of which had taken up arms against the Government.

A detachment of 29 East African Rifles was left at Bua, and the force marched the following day to Ukur. The enemy attempted to oppose the march, but were easily driven back, losing a chief and three or four Wagosha killed. There were no casualties on the British side. At Ukur the western branch of the Juba had to be

crossed in boats at the river had risen considerably in the last few days. Leaving a detachment to guard the ferry, the force advanced to Mfudu on the 7th April and halted there two days, while a strong post was being built on the banks of the river. This post was garrisoned by 120 East African Rifles, and the remainder of the force commenced its return march on the 10th, and arrived at Songoro Mafula on the 14th. Here the steam launch *Geraldine* was met on its way up stream with further supplies for Mfudu, the river being now in full flood. Colonel Ternan availed himself of this opportunity to return by river, and the barge containing the supplies having been left moored to the bank under a guard, he arrived at Yonti in the launch on the 14th April.

The column reached Yonti three days later, orders having been in the meantime issued for a concentration at Kurkumes with a view to an advance to Afmadu. This movement was, however, postponed and eventually cancelled, as Colonel Ternan had to proceed to Kismayu to meet Sir C. Eliot, whose arrival was expected on the 21st April.

After conferring with Colonel Ternan on the situation, the Commissioner interviewed the Ogaden Sultan, who promised on behalf of the tribe to pay a fine of 5,000 cattle and to do his best to obtain the surrender of Mr. Jenner's murderers. Sir C. Eliot then telegraphed to Government to the effect that in his opinion active operations might cease, and that the fine in cattle, which the Sultan had promised to collect, might be enforced by holding certain posts and by maintaining the blockade of the Ogaden country, and that therefore the greater part of the Indian contingent might now be dispensed with.

As a result of this telegram and of further correspondence with Sir C. Eliot, it was decided to send back the Indian contingent to Bombay and to retain only 350 Sudanese as a permanent garrison. Of these 100 were to be formed into a camel corps, and the remaining 250 were considered sufficient to hold the post at Kismayu, Yonti, and, for the time being, Mfudu. The Aden Camel Corps were to be kept in the country until the new corps had been equipped and trained.

Accordingly orders were issued on the 8th May for the reconstitution of the East African Rifles serving in Jubaland into three

companies of infantry and a camel corps, and the remainder of the troops were moved to the coast for embarkation. By the end of the month all arrangements for the breaking up of the force had been completed, and the Indian troops left Kismayu for Bombay in the S.S. *Nevasa* on the 12th June.

APPENDIX A.

COMMAND AND STAFF.

Operations in 1898.

Major W. Quentin, 4th Bombay Infantry, Commanding the Force.

Lieutenant C. A. W. Ford, 4th Bombay Infantry, Staff Officer.

Captain P. P. Kilkelly, I.M.S., Senior Medical Officer.

Ogaden Punitive Expedition 1901.

Lieutenant-Colonel T. Ternan, C.M.G., D.S.O.

Captain H. W. Rattigan, K.O.S.B.'s Staff Officer.

Captain H. R. Cook, R.A., Intelligence Officer.

Captain C. W. Justice, A.S.C., Director of Transport.

Captain E. G. Vaughan, I.A., S. and T. Corps, Chief Commissariat Officer.

Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. Maitland, I.M.S., Principal Medical Officer.

Dr. Mann, East Africa Protectorate Staff, Acting Political Officer.

CHAPTER XI.

UGANDA—THE COUNTRY AND PEOPLE.

THE Uganda Protectorate* is bounded on the east by British East Africa, on the south by German territory, on the west by the Congo Free State. On the north it is coterminous with the Sudan. The Protectorate comprises several large provinces :—Uganda proper, Buddu, Toru, Umyoro, Bulamwezi, Singo, Bwera, Chagwe, Usoga, Kavirondo, and Nandi.

Geographical limits.

For administrative purposes it is divided into the Eastern Province (now transferred to the East Africa Protectorate) the Central Province, Rudolf Province, Nile Province, Western Province, Uganda Province. Of these the kingdom of Uganda, or Uganda Province, is most important and most advanced, while the Rudolf Province, the northern portion of the Central Province, and the eastern districts of the Nile Province are but little known.

This great territory comprises the equatorial region lying between the lakes, inhabited by a settled population, thus differing from the rest of East Africa, the inhabitants of which are principally wild and in some cases nomadic.

Physical features.

The greater part of the country lying to the east, north, and south-west consists of high tablelands, which are dry and bare except along the rivers. These elevated tablelands, which are sparsely inhabited, possess a temperate climate, for the most part healthy for Europeans. The central portion of the Protectorate, the lacustrine regions, and the banks of the Nile are fertile, well wooded, tropical in characteristics and densely populated, but are damp and unsuitable for permanent occupation by Europeans.

The chief physical features of the Protectorate are the four great lakes, Victoria Nyanza, Albert Nyanza, Albert Edward, and Rudolf, all of which lie partially within the British sphere. The Victoria

The lacustrine region.

* See map 16 in pocket.

Nyanza is some 250 miles in extreme length, and has an area of nearly 30,000 square miles. The other lakes are also of great extent, Rudolf, 190 by 20 miles; Albert Nyanza, which is over 2,000 feet above sea level, 90 by 20 miles; Albert Edward, 3,000 feet above the sea, 30 by 40 miles. These are all fresh-water lakes; there are also a number of salt lakes to the south of Lake Rudolf, situated in the meridional rift, which runs for several hundred miles along the 36th meridian E., having mountain ranges or the scarped edges of plateaux on either side.

From the high ground on either side of the meridional rift rivers flow east into the Indian Ocean, and west into the Victoria Nyanza and the Nile.

Rivers.

The Nile issues from the northern extremity of Victoria Nyanza, falling some twenty feet over a ledge of rock. Thence after a series of rapids the river flows north-west for about seventy miles, when it enters Lake Choga. Beyond this lake it is joined at Mruli by the Kafu, which drains a large portion of the Uganda and Western Provinces. The Nile then turns north-east for fifty miles to Foweira, then due west until it enters the Albert Nyanza. Flowing north from this lake, it forms the western boundary of the Protectorate until it reaches the Egyptian Sudan.

In the south-west of the Protectorate are several rivers of importance, the Semliki, flowing into the southern end of lake Albert; the Katonga, falling into the north-western corner of the Victoria Nyanza; and the Kafu. On the east side of the Protectorate are the Nzoia, draining the country north-east of Victoria Nyanza, and the Turkwel, which loses itself in the sand near the south-western shores of Lake Rudolf. In the north and north-east are the Assua, Kos and Tu—tributaries of the Nile.

From the elevated plateaux detached mountain masses rise to a height of 17,000 feet in the summit of Ruwenzori to the south-west. Mount Elgon, 60 miles north-east of the Victoria Nyanza, rises to 14,000 feet. These two mountains cover a large area, their lower slopes providing a hilly country with a temperate climate.

Mountains.

The soil is fertile throughout the southern and western districts of the Protectorate, but the people have little knowledge of agriculture. Coffee, cotton, and rubber grow in abundance, the latter in districts below 5,000 feet in altitude. The southern half of Uganda, below the 2nd degree of north latitude, is a country of forests, resembling the forests of temperate regions. The forests of the west and centre are tropical in type. The elephant provides large quantities of ivory. Camels are found west of Lake Rudolf, and there are herds of cattle, goats, and sheep in all inhabited parts of the Protectorate. Horses are not indigenous, but those brought up from the coast are said to stand the climate well. Iron, coal and gold in small quantities, and salt are among the minerals.

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Communications. have been made in various parts of the Protectorate ; but in forest regions there are generally only winding footpaths.

The waterways provide most important communications. The great lakes are navigable for steamers ; the Nile from Victoria Nyanza to Fajao, a few miles east of Albert Nyanza, is navigable only in a few places for a small steam launch, owing to rapids and falls. From Fajao it can be navigated by small steamers as far as Dufile, where navigation is barred by rapids to Fort Berkeley ; from here to Khartum the river is passable for steamers.

Off the main lines of communication the usual transport is man and pack animals ; the latter can be used owing to the absence of the tse-tse fly throughout the larger part of the Protectorate.

As already indicated, the climate of Uganda varies in different localities. It is remarkably temperate on the whole, considering the equatorial position of the country, the temperature being modified by the vast expanses of water in the lacustrine region, which cool the air, and affect the prevalent winds. The thermometer rarely rises above ninety degrees in the shade during the day, and does not often fall below sixty degrees at night. The rainfall averages some sixty inches, the heaviest downfall occurring from March to May and August to November. These months are character-

ised by heavy thunderstorms, occurring usually in the afternoons or at night; at other times of the year there are occasional showers. By the heavy storms the rivers become raging torrents, overflowing their banks, while the numerous swamps throughout the country are frequently rendered impassable.

At the beginning of 1900 the population of Uganda was estimated at 4,000,000. The indigenous people are negroes. In the province of Uganda the inhabitants are Bahima, a people of common origin with the Abyssinians, Gallas and Somalis. The negroes are black; the Bahima peoples of light brown colour. The Bantus, a mixture of these two, inhabit the country between the three great lakes—Victoria, Albert, and Albert Edward.

The earlier history of Uganda is unknown, depending on legendary and mythical native traditions. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the King Kamanya gained celebrity by his victories over the fierce tribes north of Lake Choga. His son Suna, then sixteen years of age, succeeded him in 1836. Cruel, despotic, and warlike, he spread the fear of the Baganda over the neighbouring nations, overran Ankole and Unyoro, and after desperate fighting subdued the coast tribes of Usoga, thousands of whom were slaughtered after being disarmed.

In 1860 Mutesa succeeded his father Suna, and was king of Uganda when the country was first approached by Europeans. In the first half of the nineteenth century Arab traders established trading depôts in the southern portion of the kingdom, and Mutesa was converted to Islam soon after his accession.

In 1858 Speke, who with Burton¹ had been exploring Lake Tanganyika, reached the southern shore of Victoria Nyanza, to which he gave its name. Two years later Speke and Grant explored the great lake and the sources of the Nile, and reached Uganda, where they were hospitably received by Mutesa.

They then marched down the left bank of the Nile to Unyoro, and made their way to Gondokoro, where they met Baker,² who

¹ Afterwards Sir Richard Burton.

² Afterwards Sir Samuel Baker.

had come from Egypt, and had discovered Albert Nyanza, known locally as Dueru, Lueru, or Luta Nzige.

In 1874, when General Gordon was Governor of the Sudan, communication was again established with Egypt, and Colonel Long proceeded from Gondokoro to Foweira, and thence to Mengo, Mutesa's capital, from whence he returned by the same route. Stanley visited the country at a later date, and a Christian mission was established in 1878.

In 1877 Emin was received by the king of Unyoro; and in 1879 another party of missionaries reached Uganda, having travelled from Suakin and along the Nile.

Mutesa was succeeded in 1884 by his son Mwanga, who was weak and cruel, encouraged the Arab traders, and showed hostility to Christians. The kings of Uganda.

In 1885 Bishop Hannington was killed by orders from Mwanga and for the next two years there was a persecution of native Christians, culminating in a general massacre in May 1886.

In 1888 Mwanga was driven from the throne, his elder brother Kiwewa elected king, and religious liberty was proclaimed. In October of that year, however, the Muhammadans obtained the ascendancy, the Christians were driven south, and the missionaries were expelled; the king was deposed, and his brother Kalema elected in his place.

Meanwhile Mwanga was allied with the exiled Christians, who, under a Protestant chief named Apolo, now the *katikiro* or prime minister, succeeded in restoring him in October 1889, and drove out the Muhammadans. The Christians and Mwanga were, however, expelled again for a short time, but were restored on the approach of an expedition sent by the British East Africa Company under Messrs. F. J. Jackson and Gedge, who arrived in April 1890, but returned without having come to any definite arrangement with the king.

In December 1890 an expedition under Captain Lugard¹ reached the country. Having settled matters between the rival factions of Roman Catholics and Protestants, Lugard marched against the Muhammadans, who were supported by Kabarega, king of Unyoro, and,

¹ Captain Lugard, Norfolk Regiment, now Sir F. D. Lugard, K.C.M.G., etc

having defeated them on the frontier, started to explore the country to the south and west, leaving Captain Williams at Mengo in charge of affairs in Uganda.

Lugard marched westward across the Semliki, and reached Kavalli's. Here he met Selim Beg, who had command of the remnant of Sudanese troops left by Emin when Stanley brought him away in 1888. These numbered some 800 men, with 8,000 women, children, and followers, and now took service under the Company, with the title of the Uganda Rifles. After recrossing the Semliki, Lugard built a line of forts between Toru and Unyoro, which he garrisoned with Sudanese, and then returned to Uganda.

Here in January 1892 civil war broke out between the Protestants and Roman Catholics; the former, supported by the Company's troops, prevailing, while the king and his party fled to the islands. Mwanga, however, eventually returned to Mengo, and placed himself in Captain Lugard's hands. The country was then divided into three provinces, apportioned between the three religious parties. Lugard returned to England, and in March 1893 a mission under Sir Gerald Portal, High Commissioner in East Africa, was sent to enquire into Uganda affairs. On Portal's departure, Captain Macdonald, R.E.,¹ who remained as Acting
Captain Macdonald, Com-
missioner. Commissioner, had a difficult situation to deal with. The Muhammadans adopted a disloyal attitude, assembled a large force in the capital, and began intriguing with the Sudanese, and Selim Beg despatched a mutinous message to Macdonald. For a time matters were settled; some Muhammadan chiefs were arrested, their followers were attacked and defeated by the Protestants, the Sudanese were disarmed, and Selim was deported.

Meanwhile the Sudanese who had been left in the forts to guard the country against the depredations of Kabarega, king of Unyoro, broke out and looted in all directions, and incurred the hostility of the surrounding inhabitants. The Sudanese were, however, withdrawn by Captain Owen and Mr. Grant and concentrated at Port Alice, Lubwa's, and a few other places. Recruits were enlist-

¹ Now Brigadier-General Sir J. R. Macdonald, etc.

ed from them and the establishment was raised to 600, with a reserve of 300 on half pay.

Meanwhile Colonel Colville arrived in Uganda as Acting Com-

| Military operations in Unyoro. | | | |
|--------------------------------|----|----|--------|
| Europeans | .. | .. | 8 |
| Sudanese | .. | .. | 450 |
| Baganda Riflemen | .. | .. | 3,400 |
| Spearmen | .. | .. | 13,000 |
| Maxim guns | .. | .. | 3 |

missioner, and advanced with the force detailed in the margin against Kabarega, who had been a source of great trouble to Uganda. The capital of

Unyoro was occupied without opposition, the king escaping to the forests of Pudonga. Colville returned to Uganda, and was invalided to England, whither Macdonald had also proceeded; Captain Thurston was left in command in Unyoro, and inflicted several defeats on Kabarega's followers; and on June 19th, 1894, the Uganda Protectorate was proclaimed by the Imperial Government.

Mr. Berkeley, first Commissioner of Uganda, arrived in June 1895. Meanwhile the king of Unyoro was defeated, and half his territory was incorporated in the kingdom of Uganda; the remainder and Usoga being added to the Protectorate in 1896.

Mwanga's cruelty and religious persecutions had made him

Trouble in Uganda. odious to the majority of the people, and after a few years of British protec-

tion he represented only a small portion of the community, who formed a reactionary party opposed to civilisation and Christianity.

The peace of Uganda was also menaced by Unyoro, for king Kabarega was greatly incensed at the establishment of the British Protectorate. In the eastern portion of the Protectorate the war-like Nandi tribe, occupying the Mau plateau were inclined to be hostile, resenting the passage of caravans through their country. In May 1897 it became necessary to despatch an expedition to punish the Kamasia tribe, who inhabit the country on the eastern borders of Nandi. During the progress of these operations arrangements were made for an escort for an expedition under Major Macdonald to survey and explore the northern portion of British East Africa. The troops selected were three companies of Sudanese which had just taken part in the Kamasia expedition.

Meanwhile a plot against the British administration was discovered. A few leading chiefs were arrested, and Mwanga fled to Buddu, where he collected a large following. The same month Major Ternan with 300 Sudanese and some Waganda defeated Mwanga, who fled to German territory.

In September 1897, the Uganda Rifles were distributed in Unyoro, Toru, Buddu, Kampala, Lubwa's in Usoga, Kavirondo, and Mau district. Major Ternan had proceeded to England, and the command devolved on Major Thurston, D.S.O., Oxfordshire Light Infantry, who was at Kampala. In British East Africa, under Major Hatch

| | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Indian Contingent (Punjabi Muham- | whose head-quarters were at |
| madans) | Mombasa, were the troops noted |
| Sudanese | in the margin. At Mombasa |
| Swahilis | were some 300 Indian sepoy |
| Arabs | under Captain Barratt, D.S.O. |
| Somalis and Goshas | and Lieutenant Scott, D.S.O. |

| | |
|-------|-------|
| Total | 1,120 |
|-------|-------|

whose head-quarters were at Mombasa, were the troops noted in the margin. At Mombasa were some 300 Indian sepoy under Captain Barratt, D.S.O. and Lieutenant Scott, D.S.O.

The expedition under Major Macdonald, who was accompanied by eight European officers¹, was sent to the country north of Lake Rudolf, to watch British interests in view of the activity of the French under Captain Marchand, and of the Abyssinians. Macdonald was to explore the territories lying on the northern and eastern frontier of the East Africa and Uganda Protectorates, examine the districts in the Juba region, and at the same time cultivate friendly relations with the tribes inhabiting that portion of the British sphere. The expedition was accompanied by 30 Sikhs, the Sudanese already mentioned, and 450 Swahili porters.

The expedition, which was organized in three columns under Captain Austin, Captain Kirkpatrick, and Lieutenant Macdonald, was concentrated at Ngare Nyuki on the 17th September, and preparations were made for a further advance.

¹ Captain E. M. Woodward, Leicestershire Regiment, Captain H. H. Austin, R.E., Lieutenant Macdonald, 14th Sikhs; Lieutenant the Honourable A. Hanbury Tracy, R. H. G., Captain R. Kirkpatrick, Leicester Regiment; Lieutenant R. Bright, Rifle Brigade; Surgeon Captains Mc Loughton and Ferguson.

During the advance, the Sudanese mutinied at various stations and retired towards Uganda, looting stations, and the country *en route*; whilst their numbers were swelled by other Sudanese residing in the districts traversed. Major Macdonald pursued the mutineers with the Sikhs and armed Swahili porters, and in the middle of October we find him at Lubwa's, where the mutineers, and the garrison of that post had made prisoners of and confined their officers, Major Thurston and Messrs. Wilson and Scott. On the 19th October the mutineers to the number of 320 attacked Major Macdonald's force, but were defeated, and driven into the fort at Lubwa's, which was strongly placed on a promontory jutting out into Napoleon Gulf, from the north-western extremity of which is the issue of the Nile. Here they murdered their English prisoners and were invested.

Fighting took place throughout October and November, the fort being invested all the time. In November the troops in British East Africa were set in motion, and a force under Captain Harrison advanced towards Uganda, and application was made to India for reinforcements, whilst the Indian troops at Mombasa were also hurried to the scene of operations. In December the situation in Uganda had become exceedingly grave, as not only had Mwanga, the exiled king of Uganda, escaped from German territory, and been joined by many of his old adherents in order to create a diversion in favour of the invested mutineers; but there were serious indications that the Sudanese garrisons of Buddu and in the various forts in Unyoro, numbering some 800 men in all, provided with maxims and Hotchkiss guns, were disposed to throw in their lot with their besieged brethren at Lubwa's, and overthrow the British administration of Uganda. To cope successfully with the dangerous complications that threatened the Protectorate, Macdonald, leaving a watching force at Lubwa's, proceeded to Buddu, where he defeated Mwanga's forces, disarmed the wavering Sudanese in that province, and then turned his attention to the mutineers who had early in January escaped from Lubwa's and were endeavouring to join the Sudanese in Unyoro. At the beginning of February a force was despatched to Unyoro under Lieutenant Scott, who forestalled the arrival of the mutineers and restored confidence in that prov-

ince, by sending the majority of the Sudanese down to the capital, where they handed in their arms. The mutineers themselves shortly after were attacked by Macdonald at Kijembo on the Nile, and dispersed; and later they were routed and their stronghold captured by Captain Harrison at Kabagambi on the 28th February.

After this last successful action the remnants of the mutineers crossed the Nile and fled into Wakedi country, whilst Captain Harrison's force, continuing its march into Unyoro, joined hands with Scott, and proceeded to occupy the various posts in the country with our forces, pending the arrival of the reinforcements called for from India.

CHAPTER XII.

EXPEDITION TO UGANDA.

ON the 20th November 1897 the requisition for troops reached the Government of India; on the 3rd December the 27th Bombay Light Infantry¹ embarked at Bombay on board the transport *Nowshera*, and reached Mombasa on the 12th December. The battalion, numbering 14 British officers and 743 native ranks, under command of Lieut.-Colonel W. A. Broome, disembarked by the 15th with all their baggage and stores, and on that date Colonel Broome proceeded to Ndi to select a camping ground for his battalion near railhead.

The troops were intended to take the place of the British East Africa Protectorate troops despatched to Uganda, and to be at hand in case reinforcements were required. On December 30th the movement to railhead began, and by the 8th January the corps was concentrated at Ndi, with the exception of one company left at Mombasa. The battalion was encamped at the foot of high hills $2\frac{3}{4}$ miles south of the railway line, where a water-supply was ensured by damming a stream.

On the 9th serious news was received of the situation in Uganda, where Lieutenant Macdonald and a missionary, Mr. Pilkington, had been killed; while it was reported that the Sudanese at Buddu would probably join the mutineers. Colonel Broome was asked to supply an officer to take the place of Captain Barratt, reported sick, at Machakos, and to go with his Indians to the front, and to send a company to that place to relieve the Indians.

Captain F. J. Fowler, D.S.O. accordingly proceeded on the 12th January 1898 to relieve Captain Barratt, and on the 14th a company under Major Price, with a *maxim* gun and a month's supplies, started for Machakos.

¹ Now 127th Prince of Wales' Own Baluch Light Infantry

In his diary on the 17th January, Colonel Broome wrote "The country (Teita) around is one mass of dense scrub jungle entirely uninhabited except on the mountains where the Wa-Teita live : there is but one road, the Mackinnon road, which runs fairly parallel with the railway. The inhabitants are friendly, but are timid and afraid of white men or troops ; they are a very primitive race, living in caves on the mountain sides, armed with bows and arrows. The resources of the country are next to nothing, small quantities of *mahendi*,¹ goats, Indian corn, and fowls, but they are not willing to sell. The available transport locally are the Wa-Teita coolies, and physically they are very inferior, and can carry loads of only 50 lb. The railway line is now laid within six miles of Tsavo." Human transport was afterwards supplemented by donkeys.

On the night of the 26th January intimation was received that reinforcements were urgently required in Uganda, and the company of the 27th at Machakos was ordered to advance at once to the Ravine Station, supported by other troops from Ndi. Two companies under Captain Southey started on the 1st February, and on the 5th orders were received for the despatch of five companies to the front.

Great difficulties with transport were experienced. On the night of the 27th March 300 porters reached Ndi from Mombasa. Of these 26 ran away during the night. 267 loads were sent off to Tsavo by the remainder, but of these 156 threw down their loads within 5 miles of camp, and bolted into the bush. The loads were recovered but only some 70 porters returned. Meanwhile the permanent force in Uganda was organised into two battalions of Swahilis and Sudanese, and on the 31st March three companies of Swahilis arrived at Ndi. It was also decided to organize in India a contingent of 400 men for service in Uganda. More troops were sent from India. On the 25th February the 4th Bombay Rifles left Bombay in the troopship *Dalhousie*, and reached Mombasa on the 7th March.

At midday on the 20th March Colonel Broome received a letter from Mr. Weaver, District Officer, Ndi, written from Magangi near Boura, requesting the help of troops, as the Magangi people had rejected all

overtures of peace on behalf of the British East Africa Protectorate. The tribe numbered some 1,000 men, armed with bows and poisoned arrows. Colonel Broome left Ndi at daybreak on the 21st, with three British and two native officers, seventy-eight rank and file, seventy rounds of ammunition per rifle, and ten days' rations, and marched fourteen miles to Milaleni.

At 10-30 next morning the column reached the District Officer's camp in Magangi's valley, 9 miles by a bad road, and 5,000 feet above the sea level. Mr. Weaver reported that the chief of Magangi had himself attempted to murder him two days previously, and had been shot in the act, and he requested Colonel Broome to take steps to make the people acknowledge the authority of the Government of the Protectorate.

That afternoon Colonel Broome reconnoitred the enemy's valley, and as the District Officer pointed out four villages where the chief offenders lived, in all some 200 huts fairly close together, he decided to attack them first.

At 4-30 on the 22nd March 1898 the column left camp and arrived at dawn on a mountain just opposite and 150 feet above the villages. Lieutenant Hulseberg was sent with thirty-five men to rush the villages, the remainder of the column being disposed to cut off the retreat of the inhabitants. It was found, however, that there were very few men in the villages, as they had nearly all left during the night. The column then proceeded in two parties up either side of the valley. Little opposition was met with; some forty or fifty of the enemy were killed, and sixty head of cattle captured. One native officer of the 27th was slightly wounded. The column reached camp at 2 P.M., and returned to Ndi by the 25th.

On the 4th April Colonel Broome received orders to proceed to Uganda and assume command in that Protectorate, leaving two companies in East Africa. He accordingly left Ndi on the 13th April, but transport difficulties daily increased, and the movement of the headquarters of the regiment up-country was very slow; on reaching the Ravine Station further delay occurred, and Colonel Broome did not reach Kampala until the end of July 1898.

In the meantime severe fighting had been going on in Uganda, but the first detachment of the 27th Bombay Infantry, under

Major Price, did not reach Kampala until the 6th of March. Major Macdonald had arrived at Kampala on the 27th February, to dispose of the approaching reinforcements, and Major Price was ordered to proceed at once to Bukumi in north-west Singo, where Mwanga was reported to be assembling his forces. In the meantime, Captain Sitwell, with the force detailed in the margin, had advanced from Kawanga in Buddu towards Bukumi; while Captain Harrison, who had defeated the mutineers

60 Sudanese.
1 Maxim gun.

in a hard-fought action at Kabagambi at the end of February and occupied Unyoro, had been ordered to send a force from Hoima in a south-westerly direction to co-operate with Major Price.

On the 13th March Captain Sitwell reached Bukumi, where he was joined by Major Price's column next day. The enemy, numbering some 800 with fire arms, withdrew north-west from Bukumi, and divided into two parties of 400 each, one party moving to Kijanguti, while the other proceeded towards Bugoma with the spoil they had previously captured. Major Price divided his force into three columns, and advanced against the latter party, whom he dispersed, capturing a good deal of baggage and cattle, and rescuing several hundred women and children. About the same time Iyrita, a rebel Unyoro chief, with some 500 men, moved south, apparently with the intention of joining Mwanga's party; but on the 17th March he was defeated by Captain Barratt, D.S.O., who had been sent from Unyoro to co-operate with Major Price.

Meanwhile the rebels who had gone to Kijanguti moved in an easterly direction round Major Price's right flank, and attacked a party of loyal Waganda, who were driven back to Matiana, leaving the whole of the northern part of Singo open to the enemy. To restore confidence, Lieutenant Hanbury Tracy was sent with 40 armed Swahilis to Matiana on the 23rd March, with orders to keep open communications with Major Price, while Lieutenant Bright with 45 Swahilis and 400 Waganda proceeded to the north of Bulamwezi, where he was reinforced by 50 more Swahilis under Captain Ashburnham, who, with Major Martyr, D.S.O., arrived in Kampala on the 24th March with a force of 67 Somalis, 50 Swahilis, and 25 Indians.

* As it was important to prevent the rebels who had raided into Singo from joining the Sudanese mutineers assembled east of Mruli, Major Price was ordered to move a force into north-west Singo with the object of cutting off the retreat of the Muhammadans, and Mruli was strongly reinforced.

The Muhammadan rebels were driven north across the Kafu river, and were afterwards attacked and dispersed on the 2nd April by Corporal Brodie, R. E., with a force of fifty-six Swahilis, who had been sent out from Fort Hoima. After this the rebels, finding they were liable to attack from both north and south, abandoned for a time their idea of joining the Sudanese, and retired west into southern Unyoro. Here they endeavoured to effect a junction with the chief Iyrita, but on the 10th April Captain Fowler, with forty Sudanese and fifty Swahilis, attacked and dispersed them in Bugoma, inflicting a loss of fifty-five killed and wounded.

Two days later Iyrita was attacked at dawn by Captain Bilal Effendi, who had been sent out by Captain Harrison with a small column of forty East African troops and fourteen Sudanese.

Meanwhile Major Price, leaving a small garrison at Bukumi, moved against Mwanga, who was assembling his forces in Kawanga and north Ankole. Moving in three columns, by a series of night operations he dispersed Mwanga's following on several occasions, and subsequently returned to Kijanguti, where he began to form a post on the 27th April.

The Sudanese mutineers gradually reassembled after their defeat by Captain Harrison, and advancing towards Mruli, built a small fort nearly opposite that place on the east bank of the Nile. As their presence so close to Mruli was a source of encouragement to Mwanga's faction, Captain Southey, with 150 men of the 27th Bombay Infantry, who arrived at Kampala on the 30th March, was sent on the 6th April to Mruli, and was followed a few days later by Major Martyr with a reinforcement of 70 men.

On arriving at Mruli on the 24th April Major Martyr decided to attack the fort held by the mutineers, and on the 26th crossed to the east bank of the Nile with detachments of the 27th Bombay Infantry,

Indian Contingent, East African Rifles, and a few Swahilis and a maxim gun. After a sharp engagement the Sudanese were defeated and their fort was captured. The enemy fled to the hills, but were not pursued owing to the approaching darkness, and Major Martyr, after destroying the fort, withdrew his force to a new work which had been constructed on the east bank of the Nile opposite Mruli. In this engagement twenty-five mutineers were killed: the British loss amounted to ten killed and twenty-seven wounded, including, of the 27th Bombay Infantry, Subadar Sher Din and five men killed, and Subadar-Major Yar Muhammad and nine wounded.

On the same day Lieutenant Malcolm, who had been sent to garrison Foweira, attacked another party of mutineers who had moved north towards the Shuli country. Hearing of their march he left Foweira with a force of fifty East African Rifles, thirty Swahilis, and a maxim gun, and on the third day overtook them at Alagoyu, where he defeated them with heavy loss, having four killed and five wounded himself. He then returned to Foweira. After these two engagements and the losses they had suffered during the operations before reinforcements from India had arrived, the Sudanese no longer constituted a serious danger to the Protectorate, out of which they had been driven. Major Macdonald, therefore, on the 3rd May handed over the command of the forces to Major Martyr at Kampala, and resumed the special duties connected with his expedition. The remnant of the Sudanese mutineers retired a few miles east of Mruli, and constructed a stockade, but no attempt was made by them against the British position at Mruli, beyond an attack on a patrol on the 30th May, which was easily repulsed.

In June Major Price took effective steps to clear Unyoro of hostile gatherings under Mwanga and Iyrita and to reoccupy Fajao, a post which had formerly been held near the Murchison Falls on the Nile. The operation commenced on the 17th June, on which date Captain Southey marched from Masindi in command of the column detailed in the margin with instructions to clear the enemy from east Unyoro and then proceed to Chikerota

Operations in Unyoro.

| | | |
|----------------------|----|----|
| 27th Bombay Infantry | .. | 44 |
| Uganda Rifles | .. | 20 |
| Waganda | .. | 75 |

marched from Masindi in command of the column detailed in the margin with instructions to

and halt for further orders. Lieutenant Hannyngton, 27th Bombay Infantry, with twenty men of his regiment and twenty Uganda Rifles was directed to reinforce Captain Southey at Kinamuzi from Mruli, and the officer commanding at Foweira was instructed to despatch a column to co-operate.

The occupation of Chikerota on the 25th June prevented any further raids in Busindi, and on the arrival of reinforcements at Hoima and Masindi, operations for clearing western Unyoro were begun. Captains Carleton and Tickell of the Uganda Rifles, with a force of 32 men of the 27th Bombay Infantry and 70 Wanyoro, left Masindi on the 26th June for Kasigala, where they were joined by 55 of the 27th Bombay Infantry and 26 Swahilis under Captain F. J. Fowler, D.S.O., and 150 Waganda under the chief Kasa. These troops, formed in three columns, traversed a large area, reconnoitring in all directions, and reached Fajao unopposed on July 3rd. It was ascertained that some of the enemy had crossed to the north side of the Nile, but the majority had not crossed. A garrison of sixty men of the 27th was posted at Fajao under Lieutenant Hannyngton, and the remainder of the force was formed into two columns under Captains Carleton and Tickell; the former proceeded in the direction said to have been taken by Mwanga, while the latter marched towards Kiswata. Captain Carleton was unable to find Mwanga, and after passing through the country east of Chikerota, returned by the Masindi road to that place.

On the 8th July, when at Btiggeri, Captain Tickell ascertained that a considerable force of rebels under Iyrita were in the forest about eight miles distant, in a south-easterly direction. The enemy were surprised at dawn and dispersed, losing twenty killed; the British casualties were one killed and four wounded.

On the 12th July, near Bamateggi, Tickell ascertained that Iyrita was in the forest near Parbidi. On the approach of the British force the enemy dispersed, but kept up a continuous fire from the jungle for nearly two hours. Pursuit was impossible, but the rebel camp was destroyed, and all their property, including some cattle, was captured, while ten dead bodies and a number of blood-tracks were found. The British loss was three wounded. On the following day a small party of rebels were encountered, and seven killed.

At this time Captain Carleton's column was met advancing from the opposite direction, and the enemy dispersed through the forest and apparently left that part of the country.

In the meantime the Sudanese mutineers, who still remained a few miles east of Mruli, had assumed an aggressive attitude, and on the 27th June fired on a convoy of canoes proceeding from Kisalize to Mruli. As they were now reported to occupy a strong position, where they were a standing menace to the peace of the Protectorate, Major Martyr decided to attack them about the beginning of August. Captain Fowler was in command of the stockade of Mruli on the 30th July, with a garrison of details of the 27th Bombay Infantry, Uganda Rifles, and native levies. His force was employed in keeping watch over the mutineers' position, which was visible from a look-out post some 300 yards in front of the stockade. He also patrolled the surrounding country. His orders were not to disturb or attack the enemy, so that they might not be put on the alert.

Major Price, commanding the troops in Unyoro, was directed to proceed to Mruli with two companies of the 27th Bombay Infantry and half a company British East African Rifles. At Mruli he was joined by Major Martyr with 150 Sudanese troops and a 4-pr. gun.

On the night of the 3rd August two columns, as detailed in the margin, marched against the mutineers in their neighbouring position at Jeruba.

Attack on the mutineers.

No. 1 Column.

Major C. H. U. Price.

27th Bombay Infantry, 4 British officers, 237 native ranks.

Uganda Rifles, 1 British officer, 24 natives.

No. 2 Column.

Major C. Martyr, D.S.O.

Uganda Rifles, 2 British officers, 159 Nubians.

East African Rifles, 1 British officer, 53 natives.

27th Bombay Infantry, 1 British officer, 7 men.

One 7-pr. gun, Captain Carleton.

3 maxim guns, Lieutenant P. H. Dyke, 27th Bombay Infantry.

close to that of the enemy, waiting for dawn, to make a combined attack with the other column. No. 2 column, starting from Mruli at 12-15 A.M., arrived within half a mile of the position at 5 A.M.,

but owing to the dense jungle did not gain touch with No. 1 column until 6 A.M., when a general advance was made in the direction of the enemy's stockade. The 7-pounder gun was brought into action at about 400 yards.

The enemy attempted a flank attack on the British left, but were driven off by a party of the 27th under Lieutenant W. O. Grant. The troops charged the stockade, the enemy bolting as they entered it. The women and children had left during the night, and Bilal Amin had gone north with six men the previous day. The enemy lost forty killed, and the attacking party one porter killed and two men of the Uganda Rifles wounded.

Next day a column of eighty men of the 27th and fourteen Uganda Rifles under Lieutenant C. Price, marched towards Mahorsi hills, and surprised a party of mutineers, killing one and wounding two. On the 6th August this column moved about ten miles east up the Nile, and in the morning were attacked by some 200 Lango armed with bows and arrows, who were driven off with a loss of two killed. The same day a portion of the same column pursued a party of sixty Nubians for about four hours, driving them out of three villages and dispersing them with a loss of one killed and thirteen wounded.

After their dispersal near Mruli the mutinous Sudanese gave no further trouble. Major Price and Captain Fowler returned to Kampala on the 27th August with a detachment of their regiment. On that date the distribution of the 27th Bombay Infantry was as follows:—

| | |
|----------------------------------|---|
| British East Africa ¹ | 2 British officers, 186 men. |
| Uganda Protectorate | Kampala .. 10 British officers, 457 men. |
| | Masindi-Unyoro .. 2 British officers, 66 men, 1 Maxim gun. |
| | MasaRa-Buddu .. 1 British officer, 14 men. |

On the 22nd August Lieutenant Hannington with twenty rifles, 27th Bombay Infantry, formed part of a column under Captain Ponsonby, Uganda Rifles, which attacked Iyrita and his followers at Kinega, killing twelve.

¹ For operations in Jubaland, see chapter VIII.

Early in September Hoima was attacked and the fort burnt by Chikakule and his gang, who expelled the garrison of sixty Waganda. A native officer and twenty-five men of the 27th Bombay Infantry recaptured the fort and dispersed the rebels.

On the 6th of September Lieutenant C. U. Price, commanding the detachment of the 27th Bombay Infantry in Buddu, arrived at Masaka, and found that Captain M. J. Tighe, D.S.O., had moved on to Kabula. Captain Tighe, who left orders for Lieutenant Price to follow him, pursued and dispersed the rebels in Buddu and Ankole, and by the middle of the month he drove the rebel chief Gabriel into Toru with a loss of fifty-nine killed and eleven prisoners. Lieutenant J. A. Hannington, commanding at Masindi, reached Hoima on the 7th September, and found all the villages in the vicinity destroyed. Jemadar Din Muhammad, whom he sent to Hoima in command of 25 rifles on the 1st September, was attacked by Chikakule with 450 men with firearms and 300 spearmen on the 7th, but the Waganda were driven off and followed up for about a mile.

Major Price arrived at Masindi on the 16th September and assumed command of the troops in Unyoro. At his request a company and a half of the 27th under Lieutenant W. O. Grant were sent to garrison Kisalizi.

On the 27th September Captain Hicks, Uganda Rifles, with a section of the 27th Bombay Infantry and some Uganda Rifles and levies attacked Chikakule's camp about sixteen miles south-east of Hoima, and killed seven of the enemy.

On the 28th Major Price wrote from Masindi that seventy mutineers were encamped opposite Kisalizi on the east bank of the Nile, while the remainder with Bilal Effendi and Mwangi were some eight miles off to the east. Kabarega, with 400 guns and 700 cattle, had left the mutineers, and was two days' journey to the north-east. The Wakedi were harassing and fighting with the mutineers.

On the 9th October Lieutenant Hannington left Kisalizi for Kitabu, with a view to rejoining the detachment at Masindi. On arrival at Kitabu he heard that the Wakedi had crossed the Nile and gone to Shambas. He at once despatched Subadar Alahdad Khan with thirty men to Kamanina with orders to hold the

stockade, destroy the boats, and cut off the retreat of the Wakedi.

Next morning Lieutenant Hannyngton left Kitabu for Kamanina, and had gone about two miles when he received a note from the Subadar reporting his arrival at Kamanina, where he had burnt the stockade but had seen no enemy. While Lieutenant Hannyngton halted to read this report, the advanced guard got about 150 yards in advance of the column. Five minutes after resuming the march,

Action near Kitabu.

a rifle was discharged which was the signal for about seventy Nubians and a large number of rebels to charge down to within sixty yards of the column, firing heavily. Hannyngton opened fire, and himself went to recall the advanced guard, which he found surrounded by the enemy. Having no weapon, he returned to the main body, which he found split into two parties by the jungle; four men were dead, and he joined three who were firing, and opened fire himself. Two of these men were shot down almost at once, and Lieutenant Hannyngton plunged into the jungle to look after the rear-guard. Unable to find them, he returned to find one man firing, who was almost at once shot, while he himself was shot through the right arm and had his left hand shattered by another bullet. Being helpless, he went into the jungle, and finding a Waganda man, took him to Upodia, where he arrived at about 3 P.M. He lay down under a tree about 500 yards from the stockade, being too weak to proceed further, and sent for help to Lieutenant Grant at Kisalizi, to which place he was carried on a stretcher.

The rear-guard fought their way to Kitabu, where they arrived that night, and eventually seventeen men and two followers, including eight wounded, arrived at Kisalizi. They reported that over 100 of the enemy were killed and wounded, of whom 20 to 30 were mutineers.

Subadar Alahdad Khan patrolled in the direction of the Nile on the 10th, and was attacked by the rebels and a few mutineers, of whom forty or fifty were seen to fall during the action. Having no rations and hearing firing in the direction of Kisalizi, he returned to Kitabu, avoiding the stockade by a *détour*, as he heard it was held by Nubians, and reached Kisalizi on the morning of the 11th.

The casualties were Jemadar Muhammad Shah¹ and thirteen men killed, Lieutenant Hannington and eight men wounded. The rebels took 14 rifles, 1,500 rounds of ammunition, and all the baggage, the porters having thrown away their loads.

Reinforcements were ordered to Kisalizi, where on the 12th October Lieutenant Hannington reported that the mutineers were apparently building a stockade about a mile and a half from his camp. He attacked the enemy, who were in great strength, on the evening of the 12th, and had two men wounded.

On the 14th October Captain Southey, with sixty-nine of the 27th, marched for Unyoro, and was followed on the 15th by Captain F. J. Fowler, D.S.O., with the force detailed in the margin. On the 13th

3 British officers and 130 men, 27th Bombay Infantry.

3 British officers and $\frac{1}{2}$ company Uganda Rifles.

1 British officer and $\frac{1}{2}$ company East African Rifles.

October Lieutenant Hannington wrote that the mutineers had moved off from Kisalizi in a westerly direction, devastating the country as they went.

His reconnoitring patrols brought in Lawelli, a Waganda chief, who gave himself up. He had hitherto been with Mwanga. It was estimated that 260 Sudanese mutineers, including Bilal-Amin, Rehan, Jardine, Jannan, and Alikani, and 542 Waganda rebels had crossed the Nile. Mwanga was still on the east bank near Mahoris.

Captain Fowler arrived at Kisalizi on the 23rd October, and left next morning for Bututi, where the mutineers and rebel were reported to be, but he heard that they were building a stockade at the junction of the Lugogo and Kafu rivers, and directed his march accordingly.

¹ Jemadar Muhammad Shah exhorted his men to stand fast and die where they stood, setting the example on his side of the position and fighting to the last, and his men did the same. Naik Yusuf Khan, in charge of the rear-guard to save the ammunition from falling into the hands of the enemy, opened the boxes and distributed the cartridges to his men, under a heavy fire. Five times the

Nubians and Waganda charged this heroic little band, who charged the enemy and then retreated on the Kitabu stockade, which they held until the enemy retired when they continued their retreat fourteen miles to Kisalizi, with ten out of seventeen wounded. Havildar Nihala also greatly distinguished himself during these operations, with Subadar Alahdad Khan's party.

Half an hour after daybreak on the 27th, Captain Fowler attacked the enemy's camp at Kiweri and dispersed and pursued them in a northerly direction towards the Kafu river. He killed sixty and had one man killed and four wounded. Following in a westerly direction, he reached the Maanja river on the 31st October, and found that the enemy had crossed in canoes, which they had destroyed. The river was impassable, and a bridge that he attempted to build was carried away by a flood in the night. He accordingly marched to Busibiha, the nearest ford, by which he crossed the river on the 6th November, and reached Kisala on the 10th November. Here he received news that the enemy had attacked Bukumi, a French mission station, but had been beaten off and retired towards Kijanjuti.

After reaching Kijanjuti and joining forces with Captain Meldon, Uganda Rifles, whom he found watching the enemy with some sixty Sudanese, Captain Fowler decided to attack on the 23rd November; but receiving news of the advance of a column under Lieut.-Colonel Coles, he determined to await it so that a more effective blow might be struck. On the night of the 23rd a party of the enemy opened fire on the camp and sentries, but they were driven off by the piquets in a few minutes. Owing to swollen rivers and miscarriage of letters, Lieut.-Colonel Coles' column did not join with Captain Fowler's as expected; but, coming into contact with the enemy's piquets on the morning of the 25th November, attacked them, and Captain Fowler was unable to reach the position until noon. He then deployed, and a running fight ensued, the enemy being driven to the west to the Kaniogora river. The jungle was thick and little could be seen.

Between the 26th November and 7th December Captain Fowler pursued a portion of the enemy's force moving north-west towards the Bogoma forest, Lieut.-Colonel Coles following another body south-east. The mutineers scattered in small bodies all over the country, and some thirty surrendered with their arms. The whole of the marching was through difficult country amid swamps and continuous rain. Between the 7th and 21st December Captain Fowler's column searched the country between the Kitumbusi and Maanja rivers, but with small result. On the 21st he joined

Lieut.-Colonel Coles' force at Kinakulia and thence proceeded with sixty-two rifles to reinforce Major Price in operations against the mutineers in the Budonga forest.

Major Price, with a native officer and thirty-five rifles of the 27th Bombay Infantry, left Masindi on the 3rd December 1898 to operate against Iyrita in the Budonga forest. In conjunction with Captain Ponsonby and thirty-five Uganda Rifles he attacked the enemy at dawn on the 6th and killed twenty-four, having one Wanyoro killed and eight Wanyoro and two Uganda Rifles wounded.

On the 7th December, when *en route* to Bisu, he surprised thirty rebels, killing seven and taking four prisoners. The column returned to Masindi on the 1st January 1899.

During January the various detachments of the 27th Bombay Infantry returned to head-quarters at Kampala, being relieved by the newly raised Indian contingent of the Uganda Rifles, and arrangements were made for their return to India.

On the 14th January an advanced detachment left for the coast, another detachment marched on the 21st and another on the 25th. The headquarters left on the 1st March.

On the 11th May the regiment embarked on board the *Clive* for Karachi, where they arrived on the 20th.

In closing his diary of the campaign, Colonel Broome, wrote:—

Conditions of service in Uganda. “The distance from Mombasa to Kampala is 796 miles through a foodless country, with the exception of a few goats picked up occasionally, and plantains obtainable only in the countries of Usogo and Uganda. The first 100 miles the railway was used¹, the second 100 miles lay through a waterless country, and being on the coast limit the heat was intense; the various stations along this road numbered seven only, and were in charge of Protectorate officials. I found that their authority in nearly all cases did not extend beyond the fort walls, consequently this, together with the general apathy and disinterestedness in the move of the regiment, quite precluded our getting both food, animals, and in many cases transport.

¹ The railway has since been constructed to the lake.

The first detachment left Mombasa on the 23rd December 1897, and the last detachment arrived at Kampala on the 26th July 1898, taking a period of seven months. Owing to the want of transport, the regiment had frequently to live on the meagre resources of the country, pushing on to Uganda with their ammunition and tents, as urgent appeals for reinforcements had been received all down the road, and the Uganda Protectorate was reported in a critical position.

The advance of the regiment, as rapid as circumstances would permit, and the arrival in Kampala of the first detachment some six weeks after leaving Ndi, followed at intervals of three weeks by successive detachments, saved the situation. I look upon this march as one of the most difficult performed by troops in recent times, bearing in mind its length, that the transport consisted solely of porters of various countries and dialects, and that the caravans were run independently by officers of the regiment, to whom the country and its ways were entirely strange.

Half way the Mau range of mountains had to be crossed at an altitude of 8,200 feet, where, in contrast to the first part of the march, the cold was intense, killing several of the porters. From here the road lay through dense primeval forests, or through miles of elephant grass along a single path. Two rivers of considerable depth, which had mud and slush for a mile on each side, had to be crossed.

The Nile was crossed in canoes. The elements themselves were dead against us, for it rained every day from the day we left Machakos to arrival at Kampala, and in Usogo and Uganda heavy thunderstorms occurred daily. The detachments on arrival in Uganda received no rations till I brought them up myself in July. Major Price's detachment, which was the first to arrive in Uganda, were five months without rations, and this officer existed himself for three weeks solely on Indian corn. The regiment succeeded, notwithstanding difficulties in getting to Uganda, completely smashing up the mutineers of the Uganda Rifles and in restoring quiet and order in the whole Protectorate.¹

¹ It must be noted, that the severest fighting was over before the arrival of the 27th, the mutineers having been signally defeated at Kabagambi and driven out of the country at the end of February. A full account of the pre-

vious operations, which are of great importance but do not come within the scope of this work, will be found in Major H. H. Austin's book, *with Macdonald in Uganda*.

The casualties of the 27th Bombay Infantry during the campaign were:—

Killed.—Two native officers, one lance naik and 18 privates.

Wounded.—One British officer, one native officer, one naik, one bugler and 17 privates.

Died from disease.—One native officer and 13 privates.

The total killed and wounded during the operations from beginning to end amounted to 835, the greater number having occurred prior to the arrival of the expeditionary force from India.

APPENDIX.

SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT.

The difficulties of transport in Africa at that time will be gathered from the foregoing narrative, which may be supplemented from a report by Lieutenant E. G. Vaughan, Chief Commissariat Officer in British East Africa, dated Kilkuyu, 10th July 1898, in which he gives some valuable information regarding supply.

Lieutenant Vaughan arrived in Mombasa in April 1898, and on May 4th despatched supplies for the troops in Jubaland. Next day he left to try and catch up Colonel Broome. He found that supplies for the Indian troops which were despatched from Bombay were sometimes even weeks on the railway part of the journey alone, and it took him nine days to travel by rail the 150 miles from Mombasa to Ndi. At Ndi he was delayed five days for donkey transport, and eventually left that place on the 18th May. The system of transport from the rail-head was by contract at Rs. 35 per load of 50 lb to Kikuyo, a fifteen days' march. The contractors were few, and sometimes there was a delay of days and weeks before they took up loads. This they did in their own time. Swahili "boys" drove the donkeys to Kikuyo, but could not be persuaded to go any further. The donkeys had only a pad, and the loads were sewn up in a "gunny" roll, and placed one on each side of the pad. No waterproof covering was provided for the loads, which invariably got wet in crossing rivers. From Kikuyo onwards porters were employed to take on the loads, but these were only obtained with great difficulty, and exhibited a strong preference for bags over boxes or packages. They were usually of the Wakikuyu tribes. The rates per load from Kikuyo to the Ravine (10 to 22 marches) varied from Rs. 25 to Rs. 35. The same rates from the Ravine to Mumias, about the same distance, and slightly higher from Mumias to Kampala. Thus each load cost about Rs. 100 from the railhead alone, or Rs. 150 from time of purchase to that of consumption by the troops.

There were some Government transport carts and mules, hired bullock carts and camels; but quite insufficient for the large number of troops in the country. Rinderpest killed all the bullocks, and camels brought up from the coast could not stand the colder climate of Kikuyu and the Ravine;

while the mules were poisoned by the tse-tse fly. Donkeys appeared to be the least affected, but these cost Rs. 50 or more and were not procurable in large numbers.

The road from railhead at Ndi to Kikuyu passes through varied country, sometimes enclosed with forest, at others passing over wide plateaux and plains. At one portion of the journey after leaving Kibwezi it traverses lava beds, and towards the end the river has to be crossed twice, and in May there were nineteen miles of swamp.

The distance of the daily march depended on the water-supply. At times this was a brackish puddle; at other seasons it had to be dug for in the sandy bed of a *nala*. Sometimes it was not procurable at all.

At Kikuyu Lieutenant Vaughan found 800 loads left by the 27th Bombardment Infantry for want of transport, and he heard from Colonel Broome that he had not been getting supplies at all regularly, only the fifty men at the Ravine were receiving commissariat rations, the others on in front were living on the produce of the country—chiefly black flour and plantains and consequently going sick owing to inferior food. Lieutenant Vaughan had great difficulty in getting contractors to take loads beyond Kikuyu, but was enabled to forward 1,397 loads from that post in seven weeks. His difficulties were increased from the absence of an interpreter, and the fact that he had no cash assignment, while the natives appreciated only beads, cloth, and brass wire as currency.

A medical officer was in charge of the transport arrangements of the Protectorate, with his head-quarters at Mombasa. He had as Assistants junior officers of the Army Service Corps. Former missionaries, traders, etc., held appointments as District Officers; and none of these could understand the peculiar requirements of the natives of India, who they considered should be able to thrive on roots, vegetables and coarse black flour known as *matama*, like the local savages. There was no system of obtaining porters, such as bringing pressure to bear on the heads of villages, and as the local officials were indifferent and apathetic, Lieutenant Vaughan was obliged to depend on his own exertions for the supply of the Indian troops. For this reason it was most essential that each unit of such troops should have its own transport establishment, so as to be independent of the local officials.

In remarking on the packing of stores, the Chief Commissariat Officer wrote that the waterproof bags were not serviceable, and that green rotproof canvas is the best for Africa, where tents were all made of this material, which stands the climate and is proof against white ants. Rice was found to keep well and should be sent in sealed tins, covered with gunny, and

turmeric and fresh onions were good for Indian troops. Potatoes rotted on the way, and gram was all more or less eaten by weevils on arrival.

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CHAPTER XIII.

SOUTH AFRICA, 1899-1901.

FOR a full description of South Africa, and the events which led up to hostilities in 1899 and succeeding years, the reader is referred to the official history of the war produced by the General Staff at the War Office. Nor is it considered desirable to enter here into any account of the campaign. But the history of the despatch of the Indian contingent, which had such a great influence on the progress of events in Natal is of importance as showing the celerity with which a completely equipped force can be despatched overseas from India at the shortest notice.

The Boer ultimatum was presented on October 9th, 1899, the war commencing two days later. But
Despatch of the Indian Contingent. it had for some time been perceived that war was probable, if not inevitable, and it had been decided at a Cabinet Council, held on September 8th, to despatch a force of all arms from India for the protection of Natal from threatened invasion. The Indian Government had already, early in August, been requested to hold in readiness a cavalry and an infantry brigade for service in South Africa. On the 7th September the troops were warned to hold themselves in readiness. On the 8th the embarkation order was received, and arrangements for the charter of transport were quickly made, although shipping had not been taken up prior to that date. The distance by sea from Bombay to Durban was about fifteen days as compared with twenty days from Southampton.

The troops were actually ready at their stations from the 11th to 14th September, three or four days after the receipt of notice. The Marine Department of the Government of India had been notified that it might be necessary to take up shipping. As an example of the celerity with which transports were prepared, although the monsoon was not over, and there were few ships in

port, orders were received by the Director at the Bombay dock-yard at 1 P.M. on the 9th September; the *Secundra*, one of the vessels chartered, was inspected the same day, and having been fitted, coaled, and surveyed, she left on the 17th with a field battery and a veterinary field hospital. In Calcutta the Dockyard received the order on the 9th September, and the *Purnea*, which was then discharging cargo, was moved to the troop jetty, coaled on the 11th, fitted between the 11th and 15th, finally surveyed on the 17th, and embarked the 2nd King's Royal Rifles on the 18th. Altogether twenty-two vessels were taken up, eighteen in Bombay, thirteen of them being horse-ships, and four in Calcutta, two being horse-ships. The ships were sent off in sixteen days. The actual numbers of the first contingent were 259 officers, 1,564 cavalry, 653 artillery, 3,427 infantry. Additional troops were despatched from India as follows:—From the 11th October 1899 to the end of July 1900: 132 officers, 713 cavalry, 376 artillery, 670 infantry and mounted infantry, total 1,891. From the 1st May to 31st December 1901, 108 officers, 1,206 cavalry, 2,543 infantry and mounted infantry, total 3,857.

At different times 469 native soldiers were sent as non-combatants, to help in remount depôts and act as orderlies; 6,602 native non-combatants were also sent. These included a transport corps 500 strong, sent in January 1900, a *bheestie* or water-carrier corps 1,000 strong, despatched in March 1900, a corps of *syces* 1,000 strong, sent in March and May 1900, and a corps of *dhobies* in May 1900.

Six thousand seven hundred and sixty-one remounts were sent up to the 15th June 1900. These were drawn from native cavalry regiments, and given by native states with great loyalty and generosity. The Maharajah Sindhia gave 300 artillery horses, and horses for employment with mounted infantry were provided by native states as follows:—Baroda, 60; Patiala, 100; Nabha, 50; Jhind, 20; Kashmir, 50; Bahawalpur, 20; Kapurthala, 50; Faridkot; 20; Ulwar, 100; Rampur, 50; Bhavnagar, 100; Jamnagar, 35; Junagadh, 15; Gwalior, 90; Bhopal, 50. One thousand two-

Africa in March. It was composed largely of planters and other gentlemen in India, under the personal command of Colonel Lumsden, with the assistance of three officers of the regular army.

Lumsden's Horse¹ served for nearly a year in South Africa, being disbanded on return to India in January 1901. The casualties during the campaign were Major E. Showers and six men killed in action, and two men died of disease.

¹ For full particulars of the services of this corps, see *The History of Lumsden's Horse*, by H. H. S. Pearse (war correspondent).

APPENDIX A.—*contd.*

Strength of the South African contingent despatched September 1899.

| Staff and units. | COMBATANTS. | | | | FOLLOWERS. | | | Chargers or horses. | Ponies. | Pack mules. | Guns. | REMARKS. |
|---|-------------------|------------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|------------------|------------|---------|---------------------|---------|-------------|-------|---|
| | British officers. | British Warrant and N. C. Officers | Hospital Asst-ants. | Native rank and file. | European clerks. | Transport. | Public. | | | | | |
| <i>Brigade Division Field Artillery.</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Staff | 4 | .. | .. | .. | (b)1 | .. | 17 | 9 | .. | .. | .. | (g) As follows— Transport Agent .. 1 Jennifers .. 10 Duffadars .. 20 Drivers .. 183 Salutis .. 2 Shoengsmith .. 1 Saddlers .. 6 Carpenter .. 1 Blacksmiths .. 1 Hammermen .. 2 Belows men .. 2 Agent's establishment .. 2 |
| 21st Field Battery | 5 | 173 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 153 | .. | .. | 6 | .. |
| 42nd Field Battery | 5 | 173 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 153 | .. | .. | 6 | .. |
| 53rd Field Battery | 5 | 173 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 153 | .. | .. | 6 | .. |
| Ammunition column | 3 | 89 | 1 | .. | .. | 23 | .. | 151 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Sections A and B, No. 26, British Field Hospital. | 2 | 11 | .. | 2 | .. | 94 | 15 | 2 | 9 | .. | .. | .. |
| Total | 24 | 619 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 117 | 32 | 621 | 9 | .. | 18 | 232 |
| <i>Miscellaneous Units.</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Sections C and D, No. 69, Native Field Hospital. | 2 | 1 | 4 | 8 | .. | .. | 15 | 2 | 9 | .. | .. | (h) For the British officers. |
| No. 3, Field Medical Store Depot | 1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 5 | 4 | 1 | 1 | .. | .. | (i) As follows—: Officers' syces .. 2 Officers' personal servants .. 2 Servants for subordinates .. 2 Syces for subordinates .. 4 |
| No. 6, Veterinary Field Hospital | 2 | 6 | .. | 2 | .. | 20 | 9 | 6 | 4 | .. | .. | .. |
| Ordnance Field Park | 4 | 16 | .. | .. | .. | (f) 116 | 38 | 4 | 16 | .. | .. | .. |
| With 500 Reserve mules | 1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | (h) 4 | (h) 2 | .. | 500 | .. | (f) For the subordinates. |
| In charge of Reserve supplies | 1 | 4 | .. | .. | .. | .. | (i) 10 | (h) 2 | (f) 4 | .. | .. | .. |
| Total | 11 | 27 | 4 | 10 | .. | 232 | 80 | 17 | 34 | 500 | .. | .. |
| Grand Total | 158 | 5,508 | 5 | 21 | 3 | 232 | 316 | 2,348 | 91 | 1,040 | 18 | .. |

APPENDIX B.

Staff of the South African Contingent, September 1899.

1. Cavalry Brigade.

Lieut.-Colonel C. B. H. Wolseley-Jenkins, Commanding.

19th Hussars.

Major E. C. Bethune, 16th Lancers .. D.A.A.G.

Major C. de C. Hamilton, R.A. D.A.Q.M.G.

Captain A. H. C. Kenney-Herbert, 1st Battalion, Northamptonshire Regiment. D.A.Q.M.G. for Intelligence.

Major J. F. Donegan, R.A.M.C. R. . . Senior Medical Officer.

Captain D. M. Thompson Brigade Commissariat Officer.

Captain C. M. Dixon, 16th Lancers .. Brigade Transport Officer.

2. Infantry Brigade.

Colonel J. H. Yule, 1st Battalion, Devonshire Regiment. Commanding.

Lieut.-Colonel J. Sherston, D.S.O. .. D.A.A.G.

Major H. Mullaly, R.E. D.A.Q.M.G.

Major A. J. Murray, 2nd Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers. D.A.Q.M.G. for Intelligence.

Lieut.-Colonel S. H. Carter, R.A.M.C. .. Senior Medical Officer.

Captain G. L. H. Sanders Brigade Commissariat Officer.

Captain D. Mackworth, 1st Battalion, Royal West Surrey Regiment. Brigade Transport Officer.

3. Brigade Division, Field Artillery.

Lieut.-Colonel J. A. Coxhead, R.A. .. Commanding.

Captain A. L. Walker, R.A. Adjutant.

Major M. W. Kerin, R.A.M.C. Senior Medical Officer.

Colonel J. H. Yule, with the temporary rank of Brigadier-General, commanded the whole Force until it came under the orders of the General Officer Commanding the Expeditionary Force in South Africa.

PART II.

PERSIA AND ARABIA.

PERSIA AND ARABIA.

CHAPTER XIV.

PERSIA.

PERSIA comprises the greater portion of the Iranian plateau rising on the north from the Caspian Sea and Turkistan, on the east and west from the Indus and Tigris valleys and on the south from the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf. The altitude of the plateau varies from four to eight thousand feet above sea level. There are two great deserts, and a great deal of the land is uncultivated. The northern frontier is nearly thirteen hundred miles long, and was fixed by treaty between Russia and Persia. The eastern frontier is nearly one thousand miles in length. The Persia-Afghan boundary was fixed in 1872 by a British Commission, and again in 1871 and 1902. That part of the frontier adjoining Baluchistan was fixed in 1896. The western frontier, seven hundred and fifty miles in length, has never been properly demarcated.

The Elburz range starts in the north-west from Mount Savalan, runs parallel to the southern shore of the Caspian Sea, thence eastwards for five hundred miles to Northern Khorasan. The most important peaks vary from eight to twenty thousand feet in height. The western and southern chains extend from Armenia and run in a south-easterly direction parallel to one another almost to the Persian Gulf and then eastwards towards Baluchistan. Their trend facilitates or hinders communication as the case may be. The culminating point is the Kuh-i-Dinā in Fars—eighteen thousand feet in height. The mountains on the east seldom attain ten thousand feet.

The rivers would not, as a rule, prove a serious obstacle. The principal are the Shatt-al-'Arab, Karun, Aras, Kizil Uzun or Safid Rud, and Hari Rud.

Along the shores of the Persian Gulf great heat prevails except in winter. On the plateau the climate improves and in Fars, Isfahan, Kirman, and Yazd is pleasant. In the higher parts of the north-west it is intensely cold in winter and there are heavy falls of snow. The district between the Elburz mountains and the Caspian is very unhealthy.

The rainfall varies from about three inches at Isfahan to fifty-five at Rasht, but, generally speaking, is very moderate.

Malaria is very prevalent on the Gulf and Caspian. The other prevailing diseases are, generally speaking common to India and Persia.

The provinces of Persia are—

| | | | | | |
|----------------------|------------|----|----|----|------------------|
| Azarbaijan | Chief town | .. | .. | .. | Tabriz. |
| Kurdistan | „ | .. | .. | .. | Senna. |
| Kirmanshah | „ | .. | .. | .. | Kirmanshah. |
| Gilan | „ | .. | .. | .. | Rasht. |
| Mazandaran | „ | .. | .. | .. | Barfarush. |
| Iraq Ajami | „ | .. | .. | .. | Tehran, Isfahan. |
| Khorasan | „ | .. | .. | .. | Meshed. |
| Astarabad | „ | .. | .. | .. | Astarabad. |
| Sistan | „ | .. | .. | .. | Nasratabad. |
| Laristan. | | | | | |
| Arabistan. | | | | | |
| Fars | „ | .. | .. | .. | Shiraz. |
| Yazd. | | | | | |
| Kirman | „ | .. | .. | .. | Kirman. |
| Persian Baluchistan. | | | | | |

The length of the Gulf is about four hundred and sixty and the average breadth one hundred and twenty miles, but it narrows at its entrance to about thirty. The water is deeper on the Persian than on the Arabian side. Supplies are scarce and fresh water is difficult to obtain.

The principal ports are Bandar Abbas, north of the entrance, and Bushire.

There are but few roads suitable for wheeled traffic; such as exist are usually caravan or mule tracks.

Crops. The principal crops are wheat, barley, rice, opium, and cotton. Grapes, dates, apples, pears, pomegranates, melons, nuts, peaches, orange, and limes are plentiful and cheap in the populous areas.

Transport animals. The ordinary means of locomotion are supplied by horses, mules, camels, and donkeys. There are some half-million of the first, small and hardy and comparatively inexpensive to buy. The saddle horses average about fourteen and the pack horses thirteen hands in height. The mules vary between thirteen and fifteen hands, can carry two hundred pounds weight, and are hardy. Camels are chiefly used in the eastern parts of Persia and can carry five maunds. The donkeys are small but enduring and can generally carry a load of two maunds.

Besides the transport animals above enumerated, there is practically an unlimited supply of sheep and goats.

Modern History. The modern history of Persia may be considered to date from the rise of the Sufi dynasty in 1499 A.D. It was founded by Ismail who captured Tabriz and in 1499 A.D. was proclaimed Shah. The greatest ruler of this dynasty was, however, Shah Abbas I, who lived in the beginning of the seventeenth century. From his successors, Turkey gained possession of Georgia, Azarbaijan, and Kurdistan, and the Imams of Masqat became supreme in the Persian Gulf. The Afghans regained Herat and Kandahar and, in 1721, Kirman, and for the eight years following the capture of Isfahan, Persia passed under Afghan rule. Nadir Quli drove out the Afghans in 1736, but was assassinated eleven years later. Then followed a period of anarchy. From 1760 to 1779 Karim Khan, a Zend Kurd, ruled Persia. On his death Agha Muhammad founded the Kajar dynasty. He was murdered and succeeded by his nephew, Fath 'Ali Shah, in 1797. In 1800 he formed an alliance with Great Britain against the French. Defeated by Russia, the treaty of 1813 deprived Persia of certain provinces. In 1814 Britain agreed to assist Persia against invasion under certain conditions. Another fatal war with Russia terminated in 1828, and in 1834 Fath 'Ali died. His grandson, Muhammad Mirza, succeeded him and besieged Herat in 1837, withdrawing on the landing of an Indian force at Bushire. A Persian-Afghan

treaty was effected in 1842. Muhammad Mirza died in 1848 and was succeeded by his son, Nasr-ud-Din, who occupied Herat in 1852. When the Crimean War broke out, Great Britain declined Persia's proffered services; strained relations ensued, and the Persians again occupied Herat. An expedition was sent to Bushire under Sir James Outram, and that place and Muhammareh were captured, the Persians losing heavily. After the treaty of Persia in 1857 the British force was withdrawn.

The population of Persia is now about nine millions. The Tajiks are Persian-speaking lowlanders, and are mostly Shi'ahs. Jews are found in most of the large towns. There are about fifty thousand Armenians, more than eight hundred thousand Turks and Turkomans, the same number of Kurds and Leks, three hundred thousand Arabs, about two hundred thousand Lurs, Baluchis, and Gypsies.

The Turks are found chiefly in the north and north-west. The Kurds inhabit Azarbaijan and the highlands of western Persia. The Leks are generally distributed over Persia, the Arabs dwell on the borders of the Persian Gulf, the Lurs in the mountainous western district the Baluchis in Baluchistan and Sistan; the Gypsies are found in Southern Persia

The prevailing religion is the Shi'ah form of Muhammadanism, though there are nearly one million Sunnis, and some Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians. Babiism, founded in 1844, claims six hundred thousand adherents.

The army numbers less than one hundred thousand badly equipped, badly armed men. The soldier's profession is unpopular, and owing to that and absence of funds, the army has been reduced to a state of comparative insignificance.

Military Operations.

Expedition to the Persian Gulf, 1838.

In November 1837 a Persian army commenced the siege of Herat,¹ and on the 1st May 1838 Lord Auckland wrote to the Bri-

¹ An account of this siege and of the events to which it gave rise will be found in Volume III.

tish Minister at Tehran suggesting that it would aid negotiations were some cruisers and a regiment of Native Infantry despatched to the Persian Gulf to hold themselves in readiness for any service upon which it might be expedient to employ them.

Accordingly the "Semiramis" sailed on the 4th June with eleven officers and three hundred and eighty soldiers. The ship first touched at Masqat and thence proceeded to Bushire and Kharag, where the troops and some marines were landed on the 19th July. No opposition was met with; in fact the Governor placed the island and all it contained at the disposal of the expedition. Some additional troops and stores were afterwards brought to Kharag and it is certain that this demonstration largely contributed to bring the Shah to his senses. On the raising of the siege of Herat in September the ships were withdrawn. A garrison was, however, kept at Kharag until January 1842 when it was removed; a step which met with some criticism.

The Persian war of 1856-57.

The cause of all the differences which have occurred between England and Persia—two powers whose interests are so identical—may be summed up in one word—Herat. The evacuation of this place by the Persians was the main object with which the war of 1856 was undertaken.

Two modes of operation were open to the British Government. One was to march an army *viâ* Afghanistan and expel the Persians; but, in addition to the difficulties and expense which would have been entailed, the proceeding would probably have provoked another Afghanwar.

The other alternative was to send an expedition by sea to the head of the Persian Gulf and seize Bushire; thence operations might be directed against the interior; and a march from Bushire to Tehran would not be more difficult than one from the Indian frontier to Herat.

The main rendezvous for a force intended to invade Persia from India would be Bombay. The distance to the Straits of Hormuz is thirteen hundred and thence to Bushire six hundred miles, and, except during the

south-west monsoon, the sea is usually calm. At a steaming rate of two hundred and fifty miles a day the voyage might be accomplished in little over one week.

Final instructions for the despatch of the expedition reached Bombay on the 9th November. The force got under weigh on the 12th and 13th, using Bombay, Karachi, and two smaller ports, Vingorla and Porebunder. Most of the troops were on board sailing transports towed by steamers. The force was composed as under :—

- H. M.'s 64th Regiment.
- 2nd Bombay Europeans.
- * 4th Native Infantry.
- † 20th Native Infantry.
- ‡ 2 Squadrons, 3rd Native Cavalry.
- § 1 Squadron, Poona Horse.
- 3rd Light Field Battery.
- 5th Light Field Battery.
- || 2 companies, Bombay Sappers and Miners.

The entire number of fighting men was five thousand six hundred and seventy, of whom two thousand two hundred and seventy were Europeans. The followers numbered three thousand seven hundred and fifty, and there were eleven hundred and fifty horses, and four hundred and thirty bullocks.

Eight Indian Navy steamers, seven steam and thirty sailing transports, under Rear-Admiral Sir H. Leeke, Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Navy, conveyed the expedition, which was commanded by Major-General Stalker of the Bombay Army.

On the 21st headquarters reached the straits of Hormuz, and waited four days to reassemble the transports before starting for Bushire. It was resolved to rendezvous twenty miles south of the town, and to reconnoitre the coast. The fleet eventually

Present designations—

* 104th Wellesley's Rifles.

† 120th Rajputana Infantry.


‡ 33rd Q. O. Light Cavalry

§ 34th Prince Albert Victor's Own

Poona Horse.

|| 3rd Sappers and Miners.

226 A



**ROUGH SKETCH
OF THE ATTACK ON
RASHIR**



assembled in view of Bushire on the 30th November. It was decided to land at Halileh Bay, a few miles south of Bushire, where the landing presented no difficulties, and where there was a plentiful supply of water.

At about 7-30 A.M. on the 7th December the boats pulled off for the shore, the gunboats in advance clearing a date grove of the enemy with their fire. The first party to land numbered 600 infantry and a few guns; in two hours nine guns with four horses each, and their wagons, had been landed and an advance was made to the date groves, two miles inland. At 4 P.M. the force advanced to the neighbourhood of Halileh village and bivouacked there. The headquarters of the 3rd Bombay Cavalry joined during the night.

Landing operations were sufficiently advanced during the 8th to allow of plans being formed for the operations of the 9th.

Captain Jones, the Political Officer, was to call upon the Governor of Bushire to surrender the town. To effect its surrender the gunboats were to force the creek to the north-east of the town, to cut off the retreat; the land forces were to assault from the south and south-east, the fleet bombarding when the troops should arrive within two miles of the town walls. These arrangements were not, however, carried out.

At 8 A.M. on the 9th, the advanced guard, 2 companies, 2nd European Light Infantry, 2 troops, 3rd Light Cavalry, and two guns, 3rd Troop Horse Artillery, marched on Bushire. At 9-30 A.M. Imamzadeh was reached and on its left the old Dutch fort of Rishehr (Rashir) was seen to be strongly occupied, of which, till now, the troops were ignorant. The garrison consisted of about five hundred Tangistanis. The advanced troops took up a position in broken ground, about 400 yards from the fort, and the infantry extended with their left on the village of Rishehr (Rashir). Cavalry was posted on the right to cut off retreat to Bushire and the guns unlimbered. The arrival of the main body was awaited before commencing operations, and the enemy, emboldened by the delay, occupied in force the ruins outside the fort, whereupon the artillery opened with case, to which the enemy replied with such an effective musketry fire, that our forces retired

two hundred yards, followed by the Tangistanis who skirmished admirably.

On the arrival of the main body the enemy withdrew into the fort. Both Brigades deployed and opened fire, the 4th Bombay Rifles occupying Rishehr (Rashir) and extending to the coast; the 2nd Brigade storming the left breach, with the Baluchis on the extreme left. Under cover of the fire of the artillery and men-of-war the fort was assaulted and its defenders driven out. Had the fort been in repair, and properly defended, its capture would have been difficult, except by escalade. The Tangistanis fought resolutely to the last.

Brigadier-General Stopford was killed at the head of the Brigade and two other officers were killed and one wounded. The cavalry cut up the fugitives escaping along the beach, and here Colonel Malet was killed by a man to whom he had given quarter.

Casualties.

Leaving the Baluch regiment to hold the fort, the force bivouacked outside, facing Bushire, the right resting on Imamzadeh, which was held by three companies of the 64th.

At 8 A.M. on the 10th the column resumed its march towards Bushire. The fleet, contrary to the arranged programme, began to bombard the town before the column started.

No enemy was seen until the troops arrived within one mile of the town, and the Persians abandoned the outer defences without awaiting their near approach. The beach batteries were occupied by our forces prior to breaching the town walls.

Occupation of Bushire.

The men-of-war now ceased firing, and the column advanced to within 500 yards of the walls, the horse artillery and cavalry taking up a position near the creek to intercept the flight of the enemy, who, in the absence of any gunboats there, were crossing.

Without further operations the town capitulated, the garrison, consisting of 2,000 regulars marching out and delivering up their arms, which bore the Tower-mark and had been presented by the English to the Persian Government in former days with an eye to Russian aggression.

The force now returned to the previous bivouac the wells, and on the 11th headquarters were established at the Kalat tower

where the Daria Begi and Commander-in-Chief were kept prisoners pending their despatch to Bombay.

On the 20th a reconnaissance was pushed to Tulsiah, eighteen miles from Bushire, with the object of showing our troops and guns and to warn the villagers to bring in supplies and information. On December 25th the enemy were reported to have reached Kalimeh, above the Haft Mulleh pass. The Persians had collected about 4,000 men at Shiraz and also supplies of flour and ammunition at Borazjun and Chah Kutah, forty-five and twenty miles from Bushire.

On the 1st January 1857 a party, consisting of the 3rd Cavalry and the Poona Horse with three Horse Artillery guns, marched at 3 A.M. to destroy the depôt at Chah Kutah which was reached at 10-30 A.M. 3,000lb of powder were blown up and the grain partially destroyed, and the party turned to camp at 11 P.M. having marched forty-four miles.

Between the 1st and 15th January, Shif, north-north-east of Bushire, was visited and the creek behind Shaikh Sa'd explored. Shif is a good landing-place at high water but there is no fresh water there.

On January 20th the enemy were reported to have descended the pass to Nanizak and Borazjun, in numbers estimated at about ten thousand with some twelve guns, with the intention of advancing on Bushire. The liberated garrison had taken the road to Shiraz, where they were reorganized and equipped. They formed part of the above named force.

On the 20th January Sir James Outram, with his staff, arrived and assumed chief command. On the 30th and 31st the 78th Highlanders and the 26th Native Infantry arrived.

Supplies of all descriptions were plentiful and good in camp, and the surrounding inhabitants were evidently pleased at the British occupation, the treatment they received from the British troops contrasting favourably with the exactions of the former Persian garrison.

Sir James Outram was armed with full diplomatic powers, Formation of second Division. and reinforcements to form a 2nd Division were placed at his disposal. These additional troops were :—

14th King's Light Dragoons,
1,000 Sind Horse (Jacob's Horse),
78th Highlanders,
23rd Native Light Infantry,¹
26th Native Infantry,²

and a Light Battalion of the ten Light Companies of different native regiments not employed with the Field Force.

The first Division (Major-General Stalker) consisted of :—

Her Majesty's 64th Regiment.
2nd Bombay European Regiment.
4th Regiment Native Infantry.
20th " " "
2nd Baluch Battalion.³
Headquarters and two squadrons, 3rd Regiment.
Bombay Light Cavalry.
2 troops, Poona Irregular Horse.
A troop of Horse Artillery.
2 Companies, European Field and Reserve Artillery.
Headquarters and two companies Bombay Sappers and Miners.

The Second Division was under Brigadier-General Havelock, c.B., with Brigadier Hamilton, 78th Highlanders, and Brigadier Hale, Bombay Army, Commanding the two brigades.

TROOPS.

1st Brigade.

78th Highlanders.
26th Native Infantry.

2nd Brigade.

23rd Native Light Infantry.
The Light Battalions.

Preser. designations—

123r Outram's Rifles.

² 126th Baluchistan Infantry.

³ 129th D. C. O. Baluchia.

Cavalry Brigade. Colonel Steuart, 14th Light Dragoons.
 14th King's Light Dragoons.
 3rd Regiment, Sind Horse.
Artillery Brigade—Brigadier Hill.
 One troop, Horse Artillery.
 Two Field Batteries.

Brigadier-General Jacob, c.B., Sind Horse, commanded the cavalry of both divisions.

The General now decided to attack the Persians at Borazjun and destroy their magazines, under the impression that the force at that place was destined to recapture Bushire. As the reports furnished by the Intelligence Department stated that large reinforcements were joining and their advanced parties of horse had begun to check the supply of provisions to Bushire it was imperative to strike a blow at once.

Accordingly, on the evening of 3rd February, the following force marched from camp. Four hundred cavalry, 18 guns, 120 Sappers, the 1st and 2nd Brigades, 1st Division, and the 1st Brigade, 2nd Division. About two thousand troops were left to guard the camp.

No tents were taken; the men carried two days' cooked rations and the commissariat three days' provisions for the force. At 6-30 A.M. on the 4th Chah Kutah was reached and the troops halted for the day on a fine, open plain. Two good wells furnished an abundance of water.

At 4 P.M. the troops started again in a north-easterly direction. At seven miles from Chah Kutah the village of 'Isavand was reached, a few Persian horsemen galloping out at the same time. At ten miles a halt, in the order of march, was made on rising ground close to the village of Khush Ab. Heavy rain fell for four hours and severely tried the force, which had marched thirty miles. At 7 A.M. on the 5th the march was resumed. At two miles Khush Ab, four miles from Borazjun, was passed; this place was screened from view by date groves, that on the right containing wells of good water; the General occupied this with the intention of attacking the town from the south-east. The groves were found to be unoccupied

Gaining the heights overlooking the town, the enemy were seen to be deserting their camp to the north-east of it and to be moving towards the Haft Mulleh pass and the hills three miles distant. The horse artillery and cavalry moved in pursuit of several large bodies moving to the south-east along the foot of the hills, but desisted.

During the retirement, the enemy's cavalry covering the retreat advanced and opened a sharp skirmish with our cavalry, dashing by and discharging their muskets while at full gallop and wounding three men. Although the ground was very difficult and unsuited to our cavalry, the Persians galloped over it, being driven off by a few shots from our rear-guard. The troops were those of the Ilkhani of the Qashqai irregulars, the stoutest of the Persian forces. The regular troops and guns, under the Shuja'-ul-Mulk, had retired to Daliki. The Ilkhani's cavalry hovered around the rear-guard and killed two dhooly-bearers.

The force bivouacked in the enemy's camp, where was found a large quantity of stores and ammunition.


An alarm on the night of the 6th caused the troops to stand to their arms, but finding them prepared and it being a bright moonlight night, the enemy drew off. Intercourse between the camp and village was encouraged and the villagers became civil, if not friendly, and gave no trouble.

The General, hearing that the enemy was moving with his Orders for return to artillery into the Mulleh pass, and provisions beginning to fail, abandoned the idea of following them up, and issued orders for the return of the force to Bushire. Accordingly at 8 P.M. on the 7th the return march commenced, the enemy's stock of powder, shells and combustibles being destroyed.

Great delay was caused by the difficult *nalas* for the first three miles. At 11-30 P.M., the column passed Khush Ab and halted. Hearing that the rear-guard was attacked the General and staff galloped back, and, the former's horse falling, he was for some hours incapacitated.

SKETCH OF ACTION OF KHUSHAB

Scale 4 inches = 1 mile



The column closed up and moved towards the water, three miles beyond Khush Ab; here, the guide losing his way, the column halted, surrounded by the enemy who kept up a constant fusillade. The night was intensely dark. The enemy's horse showed great boldness, dashing close up to the line and firing; the troops, however, behaved with steadiness, and took up their positions in the dark as if upon parade. A square formation was adopted, with the field guns at intervals and skirmishers connecting and covering all, baggage and followers in the centre. Thus formed, the troops lay down, waiting for daylight in perfect silence.

At 4-30 A.M. on the 8th the enemy's artillery opened on the force with effect; our guns replied, and in half an hour the enemy ceased firing and moved to another position. Our losses were one man killed and two officers and six men wounded; several followers and transport animals were killed.

At daybreak the enemy were discovered to the left rear, drawn up in line, the centre on rising ground, with guns on both flanks and in the centre; the cavalry were on the left flank one mile from the infantry. Their right flank rested on the walled village of Khush Ab and a date grove; their left on a hamlet with round towers at intervals; deep *nalas* lined with skirmishers protected the right front and flank. They numbered about 6,000 infantry and 2,000 horse. Shuja'-ul-Mulk commanded in chief, with the Ilkhani of the Qashqai commanding the cavalry, his tribal levies, in person.

Our guns moved to the front and opened fire; the cavalry swept round the base of the hill, in column of troops, and charged the Persian cavalry and the left of their line, before our infantry was within musket range. Without awaiting the shock the enemy's cavalry moved off to the Haft Mulleh pass. The charge and artillery fire shook the infantry considerably. Meanwhile our infantry deployed; 78th Highlanders and 26th Native Infantry in front, the 64th and 20th Native Infantry in the second line, and the 2nd Brigade and baggage in rear. Skirmishers and cavalry covered the front, flank and rear. The enemy's round shot passed over the second line but their shells struck the second line and artillery. Without awaiting the infantry attack the enemy broke and fled,

throwing away their arms, accoutrements, and even their clothing, our artillery followed and the cavalry formed up for a second charge and pursued for three miles, returning to camp at 10 A.M.

The enemy's horse displayed no courage nor courted an engagement. The Persians left 700 dead upon the field. The British losses were two officers and eighteen men killed and four officers and sixty men wounded. Nothing but the paucity of our cavalry prevented the total destruction of the enemy and the capture of all their guns, two of which they abandoned.

The force bivouacked at midday near the field of action. Rain began to fall and continued incessantly for several days, accompanied by a cold wind.

At 8 P.M. the force commenced its return march, through country which was now a swamp and ankle-deep in mud.

About midnight a broad stream was crossed, which caused some confusion. At 5-30 A.M. Chaghadak was neared; but, the guide losing his way, a halt was made till daybreak. Chaghadak was reached at 7 A.M., and here the artillery, cavalry and Baluch and rifle battalions halted. The European corps, 20th and 26th Native

Infantry resumed the march at 2 P.M. in the midst of heavy rain, reaching Bushire at 9 P.M., tired out but in good spirits; the remainder of the force reached camp on the morning of the 10th February. The whole division was in a deplorable condition. The boots were dragged from the feet by the mud, so that half, at least, of the 78th returned bare-footed. Next day a new pair of boots was issued to each soldier gratis. The troops had marched forty-six miles in forty-one hours to meet the enemy, and on the night after the battle had accomplished a march of twenty miles over nearly impassable country; and after a rest of six hours, twenty-four miles more, the whole, including the fight, having occupied thirty hours.

From information given by the wounded Persian soldiers and the Intelligence Department, it was ascertained that the Shuja'-ul-Mulk received his first information of the advance of the English army on the 4th February, one day after the force marched. The Persian cavalry retired from the field at the very outset of the action and made

straight for the Haft Mulleh pass. After the cavalry charge, the officers of the infantry, who were mounted, abandoned their men. The Shahin-Shah gave his version of the affair in the Tehran

The Shah's account of *Gazette Extraordinary*. Briefly put, his army the engagement. had proved victorious and pursued the enemy within ten miles of Bushire, when the latter received reinforcements and turned back to fight, the Persians, only numbering three thousand, enthusiastically taking up the challenge. They fought heroically for four hours, twice breaking into the English squares. The battle had to be broken off on account of the intensity of the rain, each side abandoning guns which stuck in the mud. The English loss is roughly put at one thousand while the Persian army lost about half that number.

Preparations were now made for the expedition to Muham-
 Preparations for expedi- mareh. Materials for the barracks for
 tion to Muhammareh. one European regiment were provided at
 Bushire. Hospitals were prepared at Kharag, which was
 found remarkably healthy when formerly held. The remainder of
 the month of February was passed in comparative idleness awaiting
 the arrival of the Second Division, which was delayed by heavy
 weather. Strong north-west winds also delayed the embarkation
 of the expedition. The supplies brought
 Supplies. in decreased after the action of the 8th, and
 forage in particular became scarce. Every regiment furnished
 daily three hundred men as a working-party, which duty had a most
 beneficial effect upon the health of the men. Five strong redoubts
 were built and armed with guns of position.
 Defences. The prevailing high winds caused great
 annoyance from the drifting sand, blowing from the north-west
 from 9 A.M. till sun-down.

By the 1st March the 3rd Troop, Horse Artillery, was embarked.

Start of the expedition. On the 5th and 6th the 64th and a detach-
 ment 78th Highlanders sailed for the
 rendezvous off Muhammareh. A troop of the 14th Dragoons,
 arriving unexpectedly, also proceeded with the expedition. The
 duration of the voyage to Muhammareh was only thirty hours.

On the 9th March, a wing of the 26th Native Infantry embarked,
 delayed in the operation by heavy weather.

On the 6th March three more companies of the Light Battalion arrived off Bushire, and shortly after the 4th Troop, Horse Artillery, one troop, 3rd Cavalry, and the remaining company of the Light Battalion, and all passed on towards Muhammareh.

The Turks remonstrated against the movement on Muhammareh, as it necessitated the navigation of the Shatt-al-Arab, the right bank of which is in Turkish territory. They also advanced a claim to the town, and the question arose whether it should be made over to the Pasha of Baghdad when captured. The local tribes objecting to Turkish rule, the claim was kept in abeyance; but the circumstance was considered to be of no moment.

On the 14th March General Stalker shot himself in a moment of mental derangement.¹ He was most popular with all. The senior by service to Sir James Outram, the latter had, with his well known generosity, arranged to allow General Stalker to carry out the capture of Bushire, should it still be holding out when he arrived and proposed to leave him in command of that place, while he himself proceeded to Muhammareh and Shushtar. General Jacob was placed in command at Bushire.

The 4th Troop, Horse Artillery, returned to Bushire from Muhammareh on the 19th March. The Persian attempts to strengthen that place were reported to have been very successful.

On this day the headquarters of the Muhammareh Expeditionary Force left Bushire.

| | Men. |
|--|------|
| No. 2 Light Field Battery, 6 guns.. .. | 176 |
| No. 3 Troop, Horse Artillery, 6 guns | 166 |
| 14th Dragoons (troop) | 166 |
| Sind Horse | 89 |
| 64th Regiment | 704 |
| 78th Highlanders | 830 |
| Light Battalion | 920 |
| 26th Native Infantry | 716 |
| 23rd Native Infantry | 749 |
| Madras Sappers and Miners ² | 124 |
| Bombay Sappers and Miners | 109 |

¹ This suicide was followed three days later by that of Commodore Ethersey, who had a distinguished career in the Indian

Navy.

² Now the 2nd (Q. O.) Sappers and Miners.

The total strength of the expedition was 392 horses ; 1,534 European and 2,385 Native Infantry ; 342 Artillery and 12 guns. Total 4,886 men with 4 armed steamers and 2 sloops of war.

Under the command of General Jacob at Bushire there remained two field batteries and the mountain train, the cavalry of the 1st Division, Garrison of Bushire. and three companies each of H. M.'s 64th, the 4th Rifles, 20th Native Infantry and Baluch Battalion.

Sir James Outram, weighing the advantages of an advance on Shushtar or Shiraz, decided in favour of the former on military, sanitary, and political considerations.

Previous to the sailing of the expedition, a mission proceeded to Muhammareh to secure the friendly co-operation of the Arab tribes to whom it belonged, and to obtain information regarding the strength of the Persian army, the defensive works, the navigation of the Shatt-al-'Arab, etc. Mission to Muhammareh.

Sir James Outram hoped to raise levies among the nomads on the confines of Western Persia. Lord Clarendon's instructions had assumed that there were independent tribes among those with whom the General would come into contact, and, to avoid complications, had restricted him from seeking the aid of others. But whether independent or semi-independent, the sovereignty of the soil on which they lived was a question which could not be disregarded. Outram's idea was that we could avail ourselves of the services of the nomads living, some in Turkish, some on Persian territory, and some migrating periodically from one to the other, provided that at the close of the war, an amnesty were proclaimed to all who befriended us while the war lasted. Organization of levies.

The expedition started six weeks later than had been expected owing to the non-arrival of reinforcements and the unexpected strength of the armaments prepared by the enemy before Bushire. The rendezvous below Muhammareh was reached between the 21st and 23rd. At the anchorage the river was three-quarters of a mile broad, and both banks were covered with date-groves. The reports concerning Delay of the expedition.

the Arabs were reassuring, and they brought off sheep and supplies to the ships.

General Outram resolved to attack the enemy's batteries with the armed ships and, as soon as the fire

Plan of attack.

was nearly silenced, to land the force two miles above the northern point of the Haffar canal, and immediately attack the entrenched camp.

Orders.

The following is a précis of the orders issued for the attack :—

1. The war vessels and transport to move up the Shatt-al-'Arab and anchor four miles below its junction with the Bahman-shir.
2. During the night, after the arrival of sappers and artillerymen, to erect a mortar battery on Dubbar island
3. The mortars to open fire on the enemy's works at dawn ; the war vessels to move to the south-west point of the island and open fire at 800 yards, closing as opportunity offers.
4. The troops to be towed to the left bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab and be landed immediately below Jabis fort.
5. Orders giving details of disembarkation.

Soon after daylight on the 24th March the fleet was ready to start for the second rendezvous at Hartheh.

Rendezvous.

The fleet consisted of 14 steamers and 21 transports, besides smaller craft. The enemy made no attempt at molestation. At noon the Hartheh battery was passed and found

Preliminary arrangements.

to be deserted, it was well placed to rake the river. At 1 P.M. the fleet anchored off Hartheh, within sight of Muhammareh. The Arabs, putting off from the shore, gave information about the enemy. Dubbar island proving too swampy to permit of the erection of a battery, it was decided to construct a raft for four mortars, which would be towed up during the night within range of the batteries. On the 25th the arrangements were completed. The enemy continued to throw up breastworks on either bank of the Haffar.

At daylight on the 26th the mortar battery, placed in position during the previous night, opened fire with effect from the two 8-inch mortars, the

Bombardment.

range being too long for the 5½-inch ones. The enemy soon found

the range, and, had they possessed any enterprise, they might have captured or destroyed it before the arrival of the steamers. The latter started at 6-30 A.M., passed the southern batteries, near the point of Dubbar, and opened fire; two taking station near the mouth of the Bahmanshir within two hundred yards of the batteries. Both sides made excellent practice. The bombardment continued until 8 A.M. At 9-30 the transports advanced, a gun from 'Abbadan opening upon them in succession. The steamer carrying the Highlanders passed within 100 yards of the batteries but, though struck in hull and rigging, the decks escaped. The transports pushed on to the ground above the batteries, which had ceased firing, under the fire of two field-pieces.

The Highlanders and the Grenadiers of the 64th now landed and advanced in skirmishing order; the remainder of the infantry, with a battery and fifty of the Sind Horse, were on shore by 2 P.M. and the rising tide making the ground impassable for the horse artillery and troop of the 14th Dragoons, the General determined to advance with the troops which were already on shore.

As soon as the batteries were silent, musketry fire was opened from them, as well as from the breastworks, and maintained with great spirit for some time, when storming parties from four of the war vessels drove off the enemy, and took possession of the works and guns. The naval casualties were five killed and eighteen wounded. The Sind horse pushed to the front without encountering the enemy.

Our troops now advanced against the enemy's camp in a line of columns with the field battery on the right, then the 78th Highlanders, $\frac{1}{2}$ 26th Native Infantry, His Majesty's 64th Regiment, the Light Battalion, the 23rd Bombay Light Infantry; the whole covered by skirmishers.

Up to the moment of our advance the Persian troops were drawn up in order of battle outside the Shahzadeh's camp, the right of their line far out-flanking our left, whose only protection was the 23rd Native Infantry which was slightly thrown back. When within gun range of the camp the Persians literally vanished.

Report had it that, though at first confident, the size and effect of the 68-pounder shot proved too much for their nerves ; and very early in the day they had lost their most able chief, Sartip Agha Jehan Khan. In the north battery Prince Khanlar Mirza was in command.

Every tent was left standing. The ground was strewn with arms, accoutrements, ammunition, etc. Large quantities of grain and flour and eighteen brass guns and mortars were secured. The want of cavalry prevented an effective pursuit.

The troops bivouacked where they stood in line of battle ; during the night there was a false alarm when two piquets fired into each other, and five men were wounded. The Horse Artillery and 14th Dragoons came up during the night. On the 27th the troops marched back and occupied Muhammareh.

False alarm.

Flight of Persians.

The loss of the enemy was estimated at three hundred ; many of the wounded were butchered by Arabs during their flight. The British casualties were ten men killed and one officer and thirty men wounded.

Casualties.


On inspection the batteries were found to be much damaged. The works were strong and well constructed with parapets ten feet thick at the top and nearly double that at the base. The north battery had embrasures for eighteen guns, and stood on the right bank of the Karun, at its junction with the Shatt-al-'Arab. The southern battery, on the opposite bank, mounted eleven guns. A small fort between the northern battery and the town, and connected with the former by an entrenchment, also mounted eight or nine guns. This entrenchment, crowded with infantry, had kept up heavy musketry fire during the action. Several smaller batteries, of from two to four guns, were on either bank, and, just outside the west face of the town, on the right bank, was a strong, well-made work for ten guns. The total of the Persian force engaged was computed at thirteen thousand.

Persian defences.

Ships of 600 tons can lie in the Haffar channel and smaller vessels can lie close in shore, and at low water, both in the Haffar and Shatt-al-'Arab, north of Muhammareh. The shore is, however, difficult for cavalry

Anchorage at Muhammareh.

SKETCH OF NEIGHBOURHOOD OF AHWAZ



Scale 4 inches = 1 mile

and impossible for artillery. The facilities for landing here are great and, by careful reconnaissance, points along the bank can be found, where creeks do not exist and troops can at once march inland. The vast camping-ground is the high open plain, one and a half miles behind the town and the Haffar supplies drinking water.

To follow up the enemy and destroy his magazines at Ahwaz,

Expedition to Ahwaz. an expedition was organized to ascend the river in three steamers. The troops

told off for the service were 150 men from the flank companies of the 64th Regiment, and a like number of the 78th Highlanders. Each steamer took one hundred men. The force started on the morning of the 28th March, and anchored at sunset near the ruined fort of Kutal-al-'Abd. The Karun is here one hundred yards

The Karun river. wide and two to three fathoms deep, with a strong current. The banks are fringed

with dwarf poplar and willow jungle. Below this point to Muhammareh the river varies in width from ninety to one hundred and eighty yards with, usually, high banks covered with tamarisk and dwarf poplar.

Getting under weigh at daylight on the 30th March, the ruined mosque of Imam Sab'eh, the enemy's second halting ground, was reached early in the afternoon. The river now begins to bend sharply and progress was slow. The expedition anchored for the night off the Arab village of Ismaini, when a report was received that 7 regiments, 2,000 horse and 4 guns of the enemy had passed up the previous day. One gun, with a broken carriage, was towed up. Next morning an early start was made and at 9 A.M. the first straggler was captured. In the evening at Kut-al-Amaireh Arabs brought supplies and information that the enemy had reached Ahwaz on the 30th but had not yet crossed the river. At 3 A.M. on the 1st April the pursuit was resumed, and soon after day-light

Arrival at Ahwaz. Ahwaz was sighted and the Persian army seen drawn up behind a ridge on the right

bank. Four masses of infantry were partially screened by sand-hills; three guns were near a small mosque in the centre, and a fourth below and to the left of it. Their line fronted down the river, making a slight angle with it, and the left rested on the bank.

The flotilla steamed to within three thousand yards, capturing a boat with a gun. Some Arabs from Ahwaz now came on board and gave information that the garrison of the village only numbered about five hundred. It was determined to land on the left bank and reconnoitre Ahwaz, a gun-boat firing on the village to cover the movement, and also the retirement if necessary. The enemy had no means of crossing the river.

At 10 A.M. the landing took place. To deceive the enemy
 Stratagem. three separate detachments were formed,
 each in single rank, to simulate regi-
 ments in brigade, the jungle facilitating the carrying out of the
 ruse.

A single line of skirmishers at ten paces interval issued from the bushes in view of the enemy, followed by supports in single rank at one hundred yards distance. At a similar distance of one hundred yards the main detachments advanced with two hundred yards intervals. Demoralised by his previous experience, the Shahzadeh

retired, leaving the supplies to their fate.
 Flight of Persians. The village Shaikh came out to claim pro-
 tection and tender his submission. The Persians, although the
 range was less than five hundred yards,
 Supineness of Persians. neither replied to the fire of the gun-boat
 nor opened on the town.

About noon a shell was pitched close to a small mosque where the Shahzadeh had his head-quarters, and, taking the detachment for the advanced guard of General Outram's main body, the enemy, numbering ten thousand, retired before three hundred, preferring starvation in a retirement on Shushtar to another engagement.

As much flour and wheat as possible was placed in the steamers
 and the remainder handed over to the Arabs.
 Captured supplies. Fifteen cases of firelocks and bayonets, fifty-
 six mules, a number of pack-saddles, numerous entrenching tools
 and a large number of sheep were also taken.

As the steamers could not be got past the river bunds, the
 Return to Muhammareh. proposal to follow up the starving army
 to Wais, which might then have surren-
 dered, was abandoned. The expedition remained at Ahwaz on

the 2nd April, and next day, running with the stream, reached Muhammareh at 8 P.M.

General Outram's letter
to Court of Directors.

General Outram wrote to the Chairman
of the Court of Directors as follows :—

“ A more daring feat is not on record perhaps than that of a party of three hundred infantry, backed by three small river-boats following up an army of some eight thousand men, braving it by opening fire, deliberately landing and destroying the enemy's magazines, and capturing one of his guns in the face of his entire army, and actually compelling that army to fly before them, and then occupying for three whole days the position they had compelled the enemy to vacate. The effect will be to clear Khuzistan entirely of the Persians ; and the entire province, including Shushtar and Dizful, is now at our command, and the Persians will never make head again in the province, for they have neither troops nor guns, nor stores nor munitions of war, wherewith to reinforce and supply their troops in this quarter.”

The news of the treaty of peace concluded at Paris on the 4th
Treaty of Paris. March was received and promulgated.

The troops were in good health and condition, acclimatized and inured to exposure in all weathers. The *Comet* proceeded to Baghdad to ascertain the conditions of peace.

To insure his army fighting to the last, the Shah had ordered
The Shah and his troops. the hill-tribes to close the passes against them, leaving them no retreat. Five hundred cavalry would therefore have secured for us the whole Persian army. It is a pity that mismanagement should have lost the opportunity.

At the end of April General Outram visited Kharag and Bushire,
Selection of place for gar- with the object of providing healthy shelter
rison. for the force. After securing General Jacob's consent to remain in command on his eventual departure for India, he proceeded to Baghdad to arrange for the despatch of a mission to superintend the evacuation of Herat, finally leaving Persia on June 17th.

Early in May the force at Muhammareh began to disperse ; the Highlanders, horse artillery, mountain train and Madras Sappers and Miners being the first to leave for India.

The troops at Bushire were organized as follows :—

Cavalry Brigade—3rd Regiment Light Cavalry, Sind Horse, Poona Horse, Aden troop, 14th King's Light Dragoons.

Artillery Brigade—4th Troop Horse Artillery, 3rd, 5th, and 8th Light Field Batteries, 3 companies, 2nd Battalion Artillery, 4 companies 4th Battalion Artillery.

Infantry—

1st Brigade, 20th and 26th Native Infantry.

2nd Brigade, 4th Bombay Native Infantry.

23rd Regiment, Light Infantry, and Baluch Battalion.

By the treaty of the 4th March 1857 the Shah engaged to withdraw his troops from Herat, to relinquish all claims to sovereignty over it, and never to demand any marks of obedience from the chiefs. He further agreed to abstain from all interference with the internal affairs of Afghanistan. The British mission was to be received at Tehran with apologies, and the slave trade was to be suppressed in the Persian Gulf.

General Jacob used every endeavour to complete Bushire as a depôt of supply and to stock it with coal, provisions, etc. Smiths, carpenters and tools were requisitioned from India, none being procurable in Persia. The occupation of Bushire lasted until October, when it was handed over to the Persians. A native infantry regiment remained at Kharag, which was evacuated in February 1858.

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CHAPTER XV.

THE ARABIAN PENINSULA AND THE ISLANDS OF PERIM AND SOCOTRA.

THE Arabian Peninsula stretches southward from Edom and the Syrian desert. Its size is about one-third that of Europe. The northern boundary is a line joining the head of the Gulf of 'Aqabah with that of the Persian Gulf—very nearly the parallel of 30° N. On the west, south and east its shores are bathed respectively by the waters of the Gulf of 'Aqabah and the Red Sea, of the Indian Ocean and of the Persian Gulf. The west coast is almost a straight line. It has open roadsteads but no true harbours. Towards the south there are small islands, of which the most important is Perim, at the entrance of the strait of Bab-al-Mandab. The south coast, from the strait to Ras-al-Hadd, has some good harbours. Near Ras-al-Hadd is Lashkharah, the head-quarters of the Bani-bu-'Ali Arabs, Aden, Dafur, and Qishn. The east coast is nearly parallel to the west, and has the almost land locked harbour of Masqat. Close to the entrance to the Gulf lies the island of Qishm. To the west of the Ruus-al-Jibal promontory is Ras-al-Khaimah, for long the stronghold of the Joasmi pirates. West of Qishm is the town of Lingeh, visited by the expedition of 1820. Bahrain, famous for its pearl-fisheries, is about 200 miles due west of Ras-al-Khaimah. Kuwait is at the head of the Gulf. Sur is on the east coast of 'Oman. Aden is almost the most southerly point on the Arabian coast and is a peninsula of an irregular oval form, about fifteen miles in circumference, and connected with the mainland by a narrow, sandy isthmus.

First Expedition to Ras-al-Khaimah, 1809.

Partly to relieve the Imam from the power of the Wahabis, and partly to suppress the Joasmi pirates, the Bombay Government organized an expedition to the Persian Gulf in 1809. The naval portion consisted

Political causes.

of two ships of His Majesty's Royal Navy and nine of the Company's
 Composition of the force. cruisers. The troops, who were embarked on
 four transports, were :—His Majesty's 65th
 Regiment; flank companies of His Majesty's 47th Regiment; a
 detachment of Bombay Artillery, and about one thousand sepoy; the whole under the command of Colonel Smith of the 65th Regiment.

The fleet sailed from Bombay in September and, after a long
 Arrival at Masqat. passage reached Masqat, where it remained
 some days. The Imam regarded an attack
 by so small a force on Ras-al-Khaimah as ill-advised, but the British officers and men were sanguine of success. The fleet sailed and met with a desperate resistance which did not belie the Joasmi reputation for courage.

The ships arrived at Ras-al-Khaimah on the 11th November but,
 Arrival at Ras-al-Khaimah. owing to the shallowness of the water, could
 not approach within four miles; the Company's cruisers, however, anchored as near as two miles from shore.

The narrow, low peninsula on which Ras-al-Khaimah stands, is
 Description of Ras-al- about three-quarters of a mile in length and
 Khaimah. a quarter of a mile broad; across the isthmus
 was a high wall flanked by four towers, and along the shore, in front of the town, were numerous batteries and entrenchments, evidently erected under European supervision. The harbour, formed by the peninsula and mainland, is about half a mile broad. The number of armed men in the place was about five thousand, but within a few days reinforcements could be sent in from the adjacent ports. Towards the outer end of the harbour the houses were so close to the beach that to land seemed impossible. After the ships of the fleet had bombarded the fort it was arranged to land the troops early on the morning of the 13th November.

Two gun-boats and the ship's boats with a few troops pulled
 in towards the mouth of the harbour and at dawn opened a heavy
 fire upon the north end of the town. The enemy gave their whole
 Landing of main body. attention to this party and the main body,
 landing at the other end of the town,
 moved directly against the wall. The enemy came down, sword in

hand, to dispute the landing, and when barely one company had disembarked a desperate attack was threatened on their left. The gun-boats, reserving their fire till the last moment, checked the enemy with a shower of grape and so gave time for the formation of the British advanced guard. These, in their turn, made a successful charge and at sunrise the British flag floated from the towers of Ras-al-Khaimah.

Capture of Ras-al-Khaimah.

The British forces were eager to advance into the heart of the town, but wiser counsels prevailed, and the land-wall with its towers and a few of the buildings in the vicinity were occupied and field-pieces, ammunition and scaling ladders brought up. When prepared to advance into the town, the most commanding buildings, which were flat-roofed and provided with numerous loopholes, were first attacked under cover of the fire of the field-pieces and musketry from adjacent houses, but the obstinate defence showed that progress by this method would be very tedious. The small huts, which were interspersed among the larger buildings, were therefore set on fire, and the Joasmis were gradually smoked out of their positions. The defenders of some of the buildings, however, made a gallant resistance. In one instance a large house was defended even after the British had gained the roof and dropped hand-grenades through holes made by their bayonets, when at last the defenders rushed out and made a gallant, though fruitless, effort to cut their way through the surrounding troops.

Bravery of enemy.

It was two o'clock in the afternoon before the British troops reached the centre of the town, and the enemy were soon dislodged from the Shaikh's palace. The heights of this building gave such a command over the neighbourhood that the enemy found resistance vain; they, however, still defended the northern end of the town while the inhabitants escaped across the harbour in boats.

By four o'clock the seamen had set fire to fifty vessels. Ras-al-Khaimah was found to contain goods of considerable value but no looting was permitted, and only a little treasure and some jewels were taken off to the ships. The town was set on fire and quickly reduced to ashes.

Burning of pirate vessels.

Considering the resistance offered, the British loss was trifling, but at least three hundred Joasmis were killed. The punishment thus meted out was condign and terrible, but the deterrent effects were largely neutralised by the hasty re-embarkation of the troops on the morning of the 14th. This and the advent of a large body of Arabs from the interior reassured the Joasmis, who again opened fire upon the troops, and during the embarkation they assembled on the shore brandishing spears and firing off muskets in all directions.

The expedition now proceeded to Lingeh, a flourishing Joasmi port near the island of Qishm. From this place the people fled to the mountains, and the place was occupied without resistance, and burned. The larger part of the troops was now sent to Barkah, about forty miles to the west of Masqat, to obtain supplies.

After fruitless negotiations for twenty-four hours, the troops were landed at Laft, a Joasmi port on the northern side of Qishm, on the afternoon of the 27th November. A slight skirmish took place on the beach, and the troops advanced towards the fortress, which was strong with only one small entrance. It was intended to blow in this gate with a howitzer and then take the place by storm, but the troops were received with such a brisk fire that a general retreat took place and the howitzer was abandoned, the force seeking cover behind the sandy hillocks below the castle walls. All attempts to rescue the howitzer being frustrated, the troops remained under cover until darkness fell, when they re-embarked without molestation. The fort now suffered much damage from the

fire of the gun-boats, and a second summons to surrender was sent to the commander under threat of a further and heavier bombardment. At dawn a man was seen waving a Union Jack from the walls. Lieutenant Hall, of the Bombay Marine, had gone on shore, alone, during the night and advanced to the gate. The fortress had been already abandoned by most of its defenders and the remainder fled, not supposing

Losses.

Lingeh.

Attack on Laft.

Repulse of the troops.

Re-embarkation.

Daring action by Lieutenant Hall, Indian Navy.

that an individual would advance without support. The town and fortifications were taken possession of and eleven dhows burned.

On the arrival of the expedition at Shanas on the 31st December a summons to surrender was sent to the Wahabi chief to which he replied by a prompt refusal. An ineffective bombardment was thereupon opened. On the following morning the troops were landed and encamped on the shore. The fortress was again heavily bombarded throughout the night of the 2nd January and early on the morning of the 3rd a second summons to surrender was sent, but the Chief answered that he preferred death. He and his followers made a desperate resistance, but when the fortress was about to be stormed the garrison surrendered. The enemy's loss is said to have been one thousand. The expedition returned to Bombay.

Second expedition to Ras-al-Khaimah, 1819.

In 1819 the Bombay Government, resolving to take decisive measures for extinguishing piracy in the Persian Gulf, assembled a powerful armament at Bombay.

The troops numbered one thousand six hundred and forty-five Europeans and one thousand four hundred and twenty-four sepoy, under the command of Major-General Sir W. G. Keir. The force consisted of one company of artillery, His Majesty's 47th and 65th Regiments, the 1st Battalion,¹ 2nd Regiment Native Infantry, the flank companies of the 1st Battalion, 3rd² Native Infantry, the Marine³ Battalion, and half a company of Pioneers. A number of His Majesty's and the Company's ships formed part of the expedition. Eighteen transports conveyed the troops and stores.

The artillery and British regiments embarked on the 30th October and the native troops on the following day. Store and hospital ships were taken up during the next two days, and on the 3rd November,

¹ Now 103rd Light Infantry.

² Now 105th Light Infantry.

³ Now 121st Pioneers.

Sir Grant Keir having embarked, the first division proceeded to sea. The remainder of the expedition sailed for the Gulf a few days later. The expedition was undertaken none too soon, for a pirate fleet of sixty-four sail was reported in October to have been cruising off Kattiawar and Kutch, and thirty-five sail of the Joasmi were off the coasts of Makran and Sind.

By the 17th November the expedition had assembled at Qishm, and the naval and military chiefs interviewed the Imam, who promised his cooperation.

Arrival at Qishm.

As it was considered of importance that a reconnoissance should

Reconnoissance of
Ras-al-Khaimah.

be made of the defences of Ras-al-Khaimah, Sir Grant Keir proceeded thither in the

Liverpool on the 25th December, and the same day met the Company's steamer *Benares* with Dr. Jukes, who had preceded the expedition to obtain the Imam's assistance, and a commissariat officer, who was to arrange for provisioning the force at Qishm.

As it was desirable to blockade Ras-al-Khaimah, the two ships sailed thither in company. Sir Grant Keir and his commanding engineer reconnoitred the town on the 26th and 27th November and came to the conclusion that the force at Qishm would suffice for its reduction, without waiting for the four other transports from Bombay. The *Benares* was accordingly despatched to summon the fleet, and on

Arrival of the troops.

its arrival on the 2nd December arrangements were made immediately to disembark

the troops. During the afternoon the remaining four transports hove in sight, and the Imam arrived with two frigates and six hundred men, considerably less than he had promised, but his zeal appeared unabated and his cooperation was of no little value.

On the following day the disembarkation was effected with sur-

Disembarkation.

prising celerity and good order, considering the distance of the anchorage from the town

and the insufficiency of means of transport. Little resistance was encountered in landing, due in a great measure to a diversion caused by two gunboats which were brought up to the mouth of the creek and opened a heavy fire in that direction.

Assistance of seamen.

To assist in the siege operations five hundred seamen were landed.

The following description of the operations is extracted from Sir W. G. Keir's despatch :—

“The troops were formed across the isthmus, which connects the peninsula, on which the town stands, with the neighbouring country. On the morning of the 4th the light troops were ordered to advance, supported by the piquets, to dislodge the enemy from a bank within 900 yards of the outer fort, which would serve as cover for the men and a depôt for stores.

“The Arabs were driven with great gallantry from a date grove and over this bank, followed by the piquets, which took post at the sand-bank while the light troops skirmished in front. The enemy, during these movements, kept up a sharp fire of cannon and musketry and Major Molesworth was killed at the head of the piquets. The troops maintained their position during the day, and at night effected a lodgement within three hundred yards of the southernmost tower, and erected a battery for four guns with a mortar battery on the right and a trench for the protection of the covering party. On the morning of the 6th three

18-pounders opened on the fort, and with a couple of howitzers and 6-pounders nearly silenced the enemy's fire. The *Liverpool* also opened on the town, but at too great a range to have much effect. The enemy

sallied forth at 8 o'clock this evening along the whole front of our entrenchments, crept unperceived close up to the mortar battery, and, spearing the sentries, entered it. The party which occupied it was obliged to retire, but, reinforced, charged and drove the enemy out with considerable loss. The covering party instantaneously repelled the attack on the left. The enemy renewed his attacks towards morning, but was repulsed.

“During the night of the 7th the remaining guns and mortars were brought up, and placed in battery with two 24-pounders from the *Liverpool*, and in the morning the whole of our ordnance opened on the fort and fired, with scarcely any intermission, till sunset, when the breach on the curtain was reported nearly practicable and the towers

almost untenable. Immediate arrangements were made for the assault, and the troops were ordered to man the trenches at day-break next morning. The breaches were completed by 8 A.M. Orders were issued for the attack and measures taken to guard against possible failure; these precautions were, however, unnecessary. The storming party moved forward about 8 o'clock and entered the fort

Occupation of fort.

without firing a shot; and it soon appeared that the enemy had evacuated the place. The town was taken possession of and found to be almost entirely deserted. Our loss was much less than could have been expected."

After the capture of Ras-al-Khaimah the *Curllew*, *Aurora*, and

Blockade of Rams.

Nautilus were despatched to blockade Rams, six miles to the north-east. The town was found to have been abandoned, but its inhabitants were supposed to have taken shelter in the hill fort of Dhayah, situated at the head of a creek two miles from the coast. This place was held by over four hundred men under a former *vakil* of the famous Wahabi Chief, Shaikh Husain Bin 'Ali, whom it was necessary to subdue, as from his talents and lawless habits, as well as from the strength and advantageous position of his fort, he was likely to revive the piratical system at the first favourable opportunity. The squadron proceeded thither with thirty artillerymen, with two brass 12-pounders, two 8-inch mortars, and four field pieces; His Majesty's 65th Regiment and the flank companies of the 1st battalion, 2nd Regiment Native Infantry; but the General, on his arrival, discovering that the fortifications were more formidable than had been represented ordered up the 47th and the flank companies of the 1st battalion, 3rd Native Infantry. Two 24-pounders were also landed from the *Liverpool*.

The service that ensued, though short, was arduous in the extreme,

Skirmishes.

owing to the difficulties of transporting the guns and stores, and the resolute defence made by the enemy. Desultory firing took place between the 18th and 22nd December, during which an officer was killed. At half-past eight on the 22nd fire was opened from the batteries; one to breach the fort on the north-east side, and the second to destroy the

defences of the Shaikh's house in the town to the westward. In two hours a practicable breach was effected, but, just as the assaulting

Rendition of fort.

column was about to advance, a white flag was displayed, and, after some little delay, the garrison of nearly four hundred fighting men marched out. The British flag was hoisted on the fort and Shaikh's house, and the

Losses.

prisoners were taken on board the squadron, and landed at Ras-al-Khaimah. The British loss was one officer and three men killed and sixteen wounded. The column, after destroying the fortifications, returned to camp at

Return to Ras-al-Khaimah.

Ras-al-Khaimah on the 26th December. Here on the 8th January, 1820, a general treaty of peace was concluded between Sir. W. G. Keir on the part of

Treaties.

the British Government, and nearly all the chiefs of the maritime tribes of Arabs in the Persian Gulf, the scope being the entire suppression of piracy and the adoption of measures of precaution and co-operation as seemed best adapted to attain the end in view. A separate treaty was concluded the same day with the Joasmi Chief of Ras-al-Khaimah, stipulating for the release of all Indian prisoners, the occupation of Ras-al-Khaimah and Mahara, and the surrender of all his vessels, with the exception of those employed in the pearl-fisheries of Bahrein.

In February the fleet proceeded to the island of Kenn to water,

End of expedition.

and here the expeditionary force was broken up. Early in March His Majesty's 47th and 65th Regiments arrived in Bombay and ten days later the remaining five transports reached port. Twenty artillerymen, the 1st battalion, 2nd Regiment Native Infantry, two companies of the Marine Battalion, and the flank companies of the 1st battalion, 3rd Native Infantry, were left to garrison Ras-al-Khaimah. The town was finally abandoned by the British garrison in July 1820.

The Bani-Bu-Ali expedition, 1810.

In 1820 complications arose with the Bani-bu-'Ali Arabs, a

Events leading up to expedition.

fierce and turbulent race inhabiting Ja'alan, a province belonging to the Imam, whose authority they had thrown off in June of this year. Government having heard of some irregular proceedings on the part of the people

of Lashkharah, a small place on the seacoast, near Ras-al-Hadd, belonging to the Bani-bu-'Ali Arabs, Captain Thompson was directed to proceed against them, in the event of the conduct complain-

Murder of pilot.

ed of being piratical. The *Mercury* was accordingly despatched with a letter to the chiefs, and on arrival a pilot was sent ashore in a boat; the surf being high, he swam ashore with the letter, but, on landing, was cut to pieces. The boat's crew opened fire and killed several of the natives. Captain Thompson determined to take measures to punish this act of treachery, and a force consisting of six com-

Start of expedition.

panies of the 1st Battalion, 2nd Native Infantry and Marine Battalion¹ with a party of artillerymen and eight guns, was embarked and sailed for Masqat, which was reached on the 11th October; and quitted on the 22nd after a plan of operations had been arranged

Co-operation of the Imam.

with the Imam, Saiyid Sa'id, by which it was agreed that, as the landing at Lashkharah was nearly impracticable and could not be supported by His Highness' contingent of two thousand men, the expedition should proceed to Sur and there be joined by the Imam's troops. A party of one hundred seamen was landed to accompany the force, but owing to

Disagreement of Naval and Military Commanders.

differences between Captain Thompson and the Senior Naval Officer, the Military Commander declined the aid of the seamen, who re-embarked. This, as will be seen, may be said to have mainly contributed to the subsequent disaster.

On the 1st November the detachment marched from Sur,

March from Sur.

accompanied by the Imam's contingent, commanded by the Prince in person, and taking with them two 6-pounders, two howitzers, and two iron 18-pounders, with nine hundred camels and other draught cattle. After

Arrival at Balad Bani-bu-Hasan.

fatiguing march the force arrived within three miles of Balad Bani-bu-Hasan, the capital of the tribe, on the 8th November. An entrenched camp was

Summons to surrender sent.

formed and a demand was sent for the surrender of their fortifications and town together with the murderers of the pilot. The summons was sent

¹ Now the 121st Pioneers.

in the name of the Imam, but conveyed an intimation from the Political Agent that the British had entered upon hostilities to punish the tribe for acts of piracy and, though they acted in concert, the Imam and British were actuated by quite distinct causes. The Bani-bu-'Ali professed themselves willing to comply, with the exception of the rendering up of their arms. Unhappily Captain Thompson refused to waive the point.¹

Accordingly the force, with the exception of a camp-guard, consisting of three hundred and eighty sepoy and two thousand of the Imam's troops, moved on the following morning against the enemy's town, which was situated with its rear resting on a date grove round which it was necessary to pass to reach the assailable front, which faced the sandy plain, and was protected by ditches. On arrival near the town the light company of the 2nd Native Infantry opened fire and began to fall back, according to orders, and soon after about nine hundred of the enemy appeared in motion on some elevated ground with the apparent design of turning the right flank.

The troops formed column of sections to the right but hesitated to obey the order to fix bayonets. They opened fire, but the enemy continued to press forward and fell upon the wavering ranks, and instantly a terrible scene of confusion and slaughter ensued. The officers

attempted to rally their men, who broke, and, throwing themselves on the Imam's troops in rear, infected them with the same spirit of fear. The broken troops fled, pursued by the enemy, and sought refuge in the entrenched camp. Six out of eight officers

and two hundred and seventy men were killed in this affair. The enemy gave no quarter. The Imam, who displayed great personal courage, was shot through the hand while endeavouring to save an artilleryman. During the night the enemy

attacked the camp but were repulsed, and the British force retired to Masqat, which

¹ The retention of their arms by Arabs is a point of honour on which they will never yield.

was reached on the 17th November. The Imam rendered much assistance and was warmly eulogised by Captain Thompson in his official despatch.

Retreat to Masqat.

The remnant of the force, about four hundred and sixty men of whom half were camp-followers, returned to Deristan. Shortly after their return the 2-12th Native Infantry arrived to relieve them. Fearing an attack upon Deristan, the troops were transported to

The Qishm Garrison.

the island of Qishm. The intense heat was responsible for the death of five of six officers, a large proportion during their eighteen months' stay. During the expedition against the Bani-bu-'Ali, the detachment of the Marine Battalion, consisting of two companies,

Losses of the Marine Battalion.

lost one European and four native officers, and eighty-four non-commissioned officers and men, only twenty men having survived.

As soon as the news of this disastrous expedition reached the Bombay Government they took steps to retrieve it and restore our influence in the Persian Gulf, at the same time recalling Captain Thompson and expressing their disapproval of his proceedings.

Reception of news in Bombay.

Bombay Government they took steps to retrieve it and restore our influence in the

Persian Gulf, at the same time recalling Captain Thompson and expressing their disapproval of his proceedings.

Second Expedition.

His Majesty's 65th Regiment.
Bombay European Regiment.
1st Troop, Bombay Horse Artillery.
5th Company, 2nd Battalion, Bombay Foot Artillery.
1st Battalion, 7th Native Infantry.¹
1st Battalion, 2nd Native Infantry.²
2nd Battalion, 2nd Native Infantry (flank companies).³
1st Battalion, 3rd Native Infantry.
1st Battalion, 4th Native Infantry.
2nd Battalion, 9th Native Infantry.⁵
3rd Company, Pioneer Battalion.⁶

A British force under Major General Lionel Smith, C.B., consisting of the troops detailed in the margin embarked on board fifteen transports and ten *baghlahs*, and the *Teignmouth*, *Prince of Wales*, *Psyche*, and *Vesta*, cruisers of the Company's marine, acted as consorts.

The expedition sailed from Bombay on the 11th January, 1821, and arrived at Sur on the 27th where it disembarked. Owing to a want of caution on the part of the General, the expedition was within an ace of suffering a severe reverse before it started on the march to the

Disembarkation at Sur.

where it disembarked. Owing to a want of

¹ Now 113th.

² Now 103rd Light Infantry.

³ Now 104th Wellesley's Rifles.

⁴ Now 105th Light Infantry.

⁵ Now 107th.

⁶ Now 118th

interior, the Bani-bu-'Ali Arabs making a night attack which was nearly successful. The British camp had been pitched about one and a half miles from the beach, the General, with his staff, and the Bombay European Regiment, taking up their quarters near the shore. The Arabs determined to attack the

Attack on General's camp.

General's camp and kill or capture the entire party. Three hundred of them made a flank march of fifty miles on the night of the 10th February, and attacked the sleeping camp before they were discovered. They were, however, repulsed after some hard fighting, which entailed a loss upon the British force of one officer and sixteen men killed and three officers and twenty-three men wounded. Some of the wounded lost their arms by a single stroke from the Arab sabre. Eleven of the enemy were killed and twelve wounded, including their Chief, who was captured. After this experience the General moved his quarters to the main camp.

Sufficient camels and draught cattle having been obtained from

March on the capital.

the Imam, the division marched for the interior, accompanied by sixty seamen, and the remainder of the ill-fated detachment of the Marine Battalion, and on the 2nd March arrived before the capital of the tribe.

Desperate conflict.

Disdaining the protection of their earth-works, the Bedouins advanced to give battle on the open plain. A short but desperate struggle ensued. The Bani-bu-'Ali, thinking to repeat their former tactics, charged down upon the ranks of bayonets with broad sword and target. With a desperate valour which astonished the veteran officers who had been engaged throughout the Mahratta War, and disregarding the showers of grape from the 12-pounders, they strove, with their swords, to find the weak points in the line, and, with the fanaticism of their religion, threw themselves upon the bayonets with reckless impetuosity. Of less than one thousand

Casualties.

warriors, five hundred were left on the field dead or wounded, and two hundred and thirty-six, of whom ninety-six were wounded, were made prisoners. The main attack was directed on the right brigade, consisting of four hundred men of the 6th and three hundred of the 7th Native Infantry, and of the total loss of twenty-nine killed and one hundred and

seventy-three wounded, the 65th lost four killed and thirty-eight wounded, and the 7th Native Infantry twenty-two killed and one hundred and twenty-six wounded. After the repulse of the main attack the fort was cannonaded and surrendered, and so ended this

Return of expedition.

little war. The troops marched back to Sur, whence the British division embarked

for India. By a General Order, dated the 11th February, 1831, the

Government's recognition
of services.

Company's troops engaged in the expedition were permitted to bear on their colours and appointments the word "Bani-bu-'Ali", and His Majesty's 65th Regiment also bear the word "Arabia" to commemorate their services at Ras-al-Khaimah and in the action of the 2nd March, 1821.

Perim.

To assist in thwarting the French schemes in Egypt the British Government deputed, in 1799, a naval force from England to cruise in the Red Sea.

At the same time orders were sent to the Bombay Government

First occupation.

to secure and fortify the island of Perim, with the intention of commanding the waters of the Red Sea. The European pirates under Avory and Kidd had first occupied the island, but were obliged to evacuate it on account of want of water.

In accordance with their orders the Bombay Government, in April 1799, despatched some of their ships, with three hundred European and native troops, under the command of Colonel (afterwards General Sir John) Murray, who was appointed Political Commissioner for the Red Sea; and on the 3rd May, Perim, not being claimed by any Government, was formally taken possession of by the East India Company.

The island only remained in the occupation of the English until the 1st September following, when it was evacuated owing to want of water, the troops being withdrawn to Aden, whose Chief, Ahmad, offered them an asylum. In the following March the troops were brought back to Bombay.

In 1856 the Home Government issued orders for the re-occupation of Perim and for the construction of a light-house on the most commanding point.

Second occupation.

As a military position it was considered that the island could never be of any real importance owing to the scarcity of water, and, in those days, on account of the impossibility of commanding the strait on the African side by the fire of ordnance from the island. The increased steam navigation of the Red Sea and political considerations necessitated its re-occupation, which was effected none too soon, as contemporaneously the French were bent on the same purpose.

The island was again formally taken possession of in January 1857, fifty Sappers and a party of artillerymen being landed to erect the necessary buildings and occupy the island permanently.

Sokotra.

This island, eighty-two miles in length and twenty in width, is 148 miles from Cape Gardafui on the African mainland. The Indian Government wished to secure it as a coaling station in 1834, and as the Sultan would not come to terms, some native infantry were despatched from Bombay to take possession. The troops, two companies, were withdrawn on the capture of Aden in 1839. Sokotra is politically connected with the Aden Residency, the Sultan being in subsidiary alliance, on the same footing as other Chiefs in the vicinity. The population is about 2,000 and the gross revenues amount to 1,000 dollars.

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CHAPTER XVI.

ADEN.

ADEN was anciently one of the most celebrated cities of Arabia, and owed its riches and importance to being the general *entrepôt* of the great carrying trade which existed between India, Persia, Arabia, and Africa and the various nations of Europe, Egypt, and Phœnicia. Aden was destroyed by the Romans, probably under Claudius Cæsar. It continued to monopolise the Indian trade till the sixteenth century, when the Portuguese opened the route *viâ* the Cape of Good Hope. As late as 1809 it was still of considerable importance from a trading point of view, but it was completely ruined by 1835, when its population was reduced to five or six hundred Jews, Arabs, and Somalis. Since its capture by the British in 1839 it has rapidly grown in importance. The first British vessel to visit Aden was the Honourable Company's ship *Ascension* in April, 1609. The captain was made a prisoner by the Governor, who seized goods to the value of 2,500 dollars. In November of the following year Sir Henry Middleton arrived with three ships, and proceeded with two of them to Mokha where he was captured and imprisoned. An attempt was made by the Turks to capture the Company's ship *Darling*; but after desperate fighting, with the exception of one man, the one hundred and fifty Turks were killed. Sir Henry eventually escaped and forced the Governor to pay an indemnity of 18,000 dollars. In 1614 a Dutch fleet, and in 1708 two French ships visited Aden. In 1762 the Red Sea was visited by a scientific expedition organized by King Frederick V of Denmark. In 1799 a small body of three hundred troops proceeded to Aden from Perim, and were hospitably received by Shaikh Ahmad, who in 1802 concluded a Treaty of Commerce with Sir Home Popham. During the Wahabi war. Aden offered a sturdy resistance to this sect of religious reformers. Ahmad was succeeded by his nephew, who was a very different character. In January, 1837, a Madras ship, sailing under British

History.

Attack on the *Darling*.

colours, went on shore a few miles from Aden and the Arabs plundered her and grossly maltreated her passengers and crew. In December Commander Haines arrived at Aden to endeavour to purchase the vessel and demanded 12,000 dollars as an indemnity for the outrage. A plot was made to capture him, but he evaded the interview arranged with that object, and returned to Bombay. This led to the first expedition.

Expedition to Aden.

In October, 1838, Commander Haines left Bombay with a detachment of the Bombay European Regiment, to take possession of Aden, upon the terms arranged with the Chief. He arrived on the 24th October and demanded of the Sultan the fulfilment of his contract, but his requisition was met with insults. On the 20th November his people committed an act of open aggression by firing upon a reconnoitring party. On the return of the boat it was again despatched to the shore, but was fired upon from the forts. The same evening a small party took possession of an island which commanded the pass, and mounted a 9-pounder. This fort was reinforced on the following morning, and fire opened on the pass, by which a large body of men was driven back. On the following day the gun and party were removed. Up to the 17th December a rigorous blockade was enforced, and on that day the Sultan begged a three days' truce, which he treacherously employed in sending a boat to the African coast, whence supplies were drawn, to bribe the Somalis to murder all the English who landed there. A skirmish took place off Sirah island on the 11th January, 1839, when two seamen were wounded and about thirty Arabs placed *hors de combat*.

During these skirmishes the Bombay European Regiment behaved with much gallantry.

Meanwhile the Bombay Government had despatched a small expedition to take possession of Aden, consisting of two ships of war, four

Reinforcements.

hundred men of the European Regiment, the whole of the 24th¹ Bombay Native Infantry, with the 4th Company, 1st Battalion Artillery, and the 6th Company Artillery. The expedition arrived in Aden Back Bay on 16th January.

Commander Haines, having received an unsatisfactory reply to his summons to surrender, requested the Military and Naval Chiefs to take the necessary steps to occupy the place.

It was decided that the attack should be made on the eastern side and that the ships were first to bombard the island of Sirah and the town, and that then the troops were to be landed for the assault.

On the 17th a reconnaissance was made. An attempt to land some guns and artillerymen that night on a small island on the north side, to act as a diversion, failed, and the following day the expedition sailed round to the Front Bay, or Aden Road, and anchored.

On the following morning, the four ships of war having arrived with the transports, the signal was made to prepare for attack, and for the troops to be held in readiness to land in two divisions.

At 9-30 A.M. two of the ships opened fire on the battery on Sirah island and the enemy replied with spirit from all their batteries, but their shot flew high. At 10 A.M. the other two ships opened fire. In a short time two guns were dismantled, and most of the defenders were driven from the batteries, but kept up an incessant musketry fire from the ruins, and were with difficulty dislodged. The *Mahe* was now taken right up to the work, and after firing a couple of broadsides, the crew boarded the battery, when the enemy fled.

At 11-30 the signal was made to land the troops, which was effected under a musketry fire which caused some loss. Both the divisions formed up steadily, and advanced through the town, the enemy retiring before them, and the Bombay European Regiment seized the Sultan's palace, and planted the British flag. On debouching from the town a flag of truce was hoisted at the principal Muhammadan mosque and a piquet was posted to collect the arms.

¹ Now the 124th Baluchis.

At 1 P.M. the flank companies of the European Regiment proceeded to seize the gateway at the northern pass.

The enemy still kept up a desultory fire from the heights on the right as the column advanced, but without effect. On approaching the defile skirmishers were sent out to dislodge a party of Arabs from the heights. The gate was found to be deserted and, posting a piquet, the detachment returned to the town. About 150 prisoners were disarmed, and while this proceeding was being carried out, through some misunderstanding several of the prisoners attacked their guards.

The total loss in effecting this important conquest was only sixteen killed and wounded, and considering the desperate courage subsequently displayed by these Arab tribes, it was very creditable to the small British force that they were able to defeat over 1,000 well-armed warriors. The enemy's losses were very heavy.

For many years after the capture of Aden, much hard fighting for its defence was necessitated by the repeated attempts of the Arabs to re-take the stronghold. A line of field works was constructed across the isthmus, and a treaty was made with the 'Abdali Sultan who, however, quickly forgot his obligations, and on the 11th November made an attempt to re-take Aden.

Notice of the impending attack having been received, arrangements were made to meet it. The neck of sand, which connects the peninsula with the mainland, is intersected by a wall nearly one mile in length, both extremities of which touch the sea at high water; at either end was a field work, mounting two guns, while single guns were placed in redoubts at 300 yards interval. Early on the morning of the 11th November some men were seen prowling about near the advanced sentries, but, on being challenged they dispersed. Soon after more were seen creeping round the left field-work. At about 4 A.M. the sentry fired, and the Arabs, with a shout, rushed on in three columns of 2,000 each, but were quickly checked by a well-directed fire of grape and musketry, while the Company's brig *Euphrates* enfiladed their columns with great precision. The centre column alone reached

the wall, within which about 250 found their way, later on joined by another 150, who had crawled round the left field work, while the remainder were obliged to retreat. Finding themselves cut off they made a rush at the heights commanding the wall, but in vain. Eventually nearly all were either killed or captured. The enemy now being at a considerable distance, the order was given to cease fire. Immediately the Arabs, thinking the defenders' ammunition supply had given out, rushed on again in five columns with the same result as before. The British suffered no loss.

The subsidy paid to the 'Abdali Chief was now stopped, and on the 21st May 1840 a second
 Second attempt. attack was made upon Aden by the united Arab tribes. A party of about 250 men succeeded in entering the works, but were driven out. On each occasion timely information had been received by the British authorities.

In July, 1840, the garrison was increased by 300 men of Her Majesty's 6th Regiment, and none
 Garrison increased. too soon, for 200 sepoys had been invalidated and three-fourths of the remainder were affected with scurvy. The European portion of the garrison was comparatively healthy.

Before the arrival of the re-inforcements from Bombay, the Arabs made a third attempt to retake Aden.
 Third attempt. This final effort was made at 2-45 A.M. on the 5th July. The enemy, who numbered about 5,000, advanced against the isthmus defences with great impetuosity; but the sudden and unexpected fire from a boat moored within twenty yards of the shore staggered them, while the fire from the line of works completed their discomfiture, and they retreated with a loss of 200. The Arabs retired to Bir Ahmad, where they could intercept communication with the interior. Here they built a fort and began a series of raids.

In September, 1841, the *Auckland* sailed for Aden with troops, and, immediately on their landing, orders
 Attack on Shaikh Mehdi. were given to dislodge the enemy from the position which he held at the tower, called after its owner, Shaikh

Mehdi. A force of 400 Europeans, 200 natives, and a detachment of artillery, was despatched inland for this purpose, which was effected with small loss. The column returned to Aden, having marched forty miles in twenty four hours.

In the early part of 1845 Aden was again threatened with an attack from the Arabs. The garrison and
 Increase of garrison. squadron were, therefore, reinforced, and in March there were 1,200 European and 1,300 native troops in Aden.

In August 1846 a fanatic, Saiyid Ismail, preached a *jehad* and made his way to the vicinity of Aden.
 Attack by Saiyid Ismail. On the 17th about 400 of his troops reconnoitred Aden, but were driven back with loss. On the 26th a body of 2,000 again advanced, but were repulsed by a well-directed fire from the line of works and the boats of the Company's ships of war in the harbour.

Towards the end of 1857 the 'Abdali began to plunder the supplies coming from Bir Ahmad to Aden, and
 Trouble with the 'Abdali. the British Political Agent broke off all communication with him and discontinued the payment of his stipend. 'Ali Mahsin retaliated by prohibiting his tribe from sending supplies into Aden. He then occupied the fort and village of Shaikh Othman, a few miles from the isthmus line of works, and filled up all the wells, except those required for his own people. The Brigadier now decided to have recourse to arms, and on the 18th March, 1858, marched out with two or three companies of Her Majesty's 57th Regiment, a wing of the 29th Bombay Infantry, and a detachment from the *Elphinstone*.

The force was unopposed until within two miles of Shaikh Othman when the Arabs opened fire from
 Capture of Shaikh Othman. some hillocks, but were dislodged by the skirmishers. About 500 Arabs disputed the ground with bravery and considerable skill, but in less than an hour gave way. Shaikh Othman was captured and the Arabs spread themselves over the country to dispute a further advance. Shortly afterwards a parley was demanded, and, satisfied with their good faith, the Brigadier entered on his return march, having first blown up the fort and village.

Operations in the Aden Hinterland 1900.

In the year 1900 trouble occurred on the northern Haushabi boundary between the Turkish tribe of Humar and the Haushabi. The representative of Turkish authority in those regions at that time was an Arab of Humar origin, by name Muhammad Nasir Mukbil, an astute but intriguing and dangerous man, as well as possessing very considerable influence with the Turks, he had come to an understanding with the 'Abdali Sultan, (still, though not openly, on bad terms with the Haushabi), to divert caravan traffic from Haushabi territory by the erection of towers at certain points. This arrangement fell through, but in the early part of 1900 Muhammad Nasir erected a tower at Kafuf, about two miles to the north-west of the village of Ad Daraijah, and well within Haushabi limits, from which he and his Humars were able to cause considerable annoyance to the Haushabi. Representations to the Turkish authorities produced promises of evacuation but no action. Fighting ensued, but the Haushabi were unable to turn out the Humar unaided, and in July, 1901, a British force, consisting of two hundred each Royal West Kent Regiment, and 5th Bombay Light Infantry,¹ a camel battery of 7-pounder guns, some Sappers, and the Aden Troop, were despatched under Major Rowe, of the Royal West Kent Regiment, to eject them.

In the meantime Muhammad Nasir, by misrepresentations to the Turkish authorities at Taiz, that the British force was intended to commit a wanton aggression on Turkish territory, induced them to despatch a force of four hundred men, who proceeded to Kafuf and occupied the tower.

On the arrival of the British force, the heights near the village of Ad Daraijah were found to be occupied by the Humar. They were attacked and put to flight, and the attack was then directed on the tower, which was mainly defended by the Turks. When night fell, the Turks were still in possession of the tower, but they evacuated it during the night.

¹ Now 105th Mahratta Light Infantry.

leaving five dead on the ground and eight prisoners. Their total casualties were estimated at forty. The British force lost four killed and five wounded.

As a consequence of this contretemps, the Porte, who had previously rejected offers of demarcation of the frontier, themselves proposed it.

Frontier delimitation.

The offer was accepted, and in January, 1902, the British Commissioners proceeded to Dhali', the portion of the boundary which seemed to promise the most difficulty. The first meeting with the Turkish Commissioners took place soon after. The history of the early proceedings of the International Commission is out of place here, and it is not proposed to do more than give a short account of the military operations which took place in the ensuing year. A further expedition to Balhaf was necessary and the tower there was destroyed.

Frontier Commission.

During 1902 negotiations with the Turkish Commissioners proceeded but slowly owing to Turkish obstruction, and at the beginning of 1903 matters were little more advanced than they had been a year before. The escort of the British Commission had originally been a double company of native infantry, but owing to the demeanour of the Turks, who were still occupying Jalilah, a village in Amiri territory, within three miles of the town of Dhali' it was found necessary to exert pressure, and in January 1903

Expedition to Dhali'.

a column was despatched to Dhali' consisting of some three hundred British and two hundred Indian soldiers. This was still further strengthened in the ensuing month, till in March there was present a force of seven hundred British infantry, eight hundred and sixty Indian infantry, and eight mountain guns (Abbottabad Mountain Battery, and a section of camel 7-pounders, with details of No. 45 Company, Royal Garrison Artillery), or a total of two thousand two hundred fighting men. No. 6 British Mountain Battery arrived soon after, and two cruisers from the Mediterranean Squadron were despatched to Aden to hold themselves in readiness. A force of four hundred British and Native infantry, two 9-pounder field guns, and two 7-pounder camel guns occupied Dar 'Aqqan, a post commanding the Tiban valley route.

Towards the end of March the Turks received orders to evacuate Jalilah and to retire to Qa'tabah; the British Commission followed them to Sanah, an Amiri village some two miles from Qa'tabah, and in these places they remained until the end of the year.

The only tribes that had shown any disposition to give trouble were the Al Ajud of the Radfan range. In May 1903 the Ahl 'Abdullah attacked a convoy on its way to Dhali', and killed an Arab belonging to it.

It was necessary to teach them a lesson, and a column consisting of two hundred British and Indian infantry, with four guns of No. 6 Mountain Battery, the whole under Major Dowell, Royal Garrison Artillery, was despatched from Dhali' on the 17th May. On the 20th, tribesmen of the Bakri and Mahlai sections collected on the heights round the British camp in the Rabwa valley, and made a hostile demonstration. Some firing ensued, and the Arabs were dispersed by artillery and rifle fire. Two British soldiers were wounded.

The column subsequently proceeded to the village of Dabra belonging to the Ahl 'Abdullah, the original aggressors, where three towers were blown up by gun-cotton and a fourth demolished by artillery fire. This was the first occasion on which the new 10-pounder B. L. mountain gun was fired on field service.

The column returned to Dhali' on the 25th May. The Abbottabad Mountain Battery returned to India in June, leaving their 8-pounder M. L. guns at Aden.

In September a survey party was sent to carry out work in the Shaibi country and in the district of Rubai'atain, with an escort of two hundred British and Indian infantry, a maxim, and a section of No. 6 Mountain Battery, under Major Delamain, 123rd Outram's Rifles. They arrived and encamped at the village of Awabil on the 1st. On the 4th a party of Arabs from Hadara opened fire on the party, killing the surveyor and wounding a sepoy. The fire was returned, and reinforcements being sent from camp, Hadara was shelled and the principal towers blown up. The survey party, with Major Delamain's column, moved on to Rubai' atain on the 9th September, being relieved at Awabil by another column of somewhat similar strength.

Saleh bin 'Umr, who had formerly been in receipt of a stipend from the Turks, which had now been discontinued, was discontented and bent on mischief, and attacked the Attack on Awabil camp. Awabil camp on the 13th September with five hundred Arabs. The action lasted from 7 A.M. till 2 P.M., when the Arabs retired with a loss of twenty killed and more wounded. The British casualties were one killed and five wounded. A reinforcement of three hundred British infantry and two sections No. 6 Mountain Battery, under the General Officer Commanding, now arrived at Awabil, but there were no further hostilities and the force returned to Dhali'.

The Danbari tribe of the Radfan group shortly after this began to rob caravans and murder wayfarers, and finally looted the mail. A column under Lieutenant-Colonel English of 200 British and 100 Indian infantry, with a proportion of guns, was sent against the marauders' village of Nakhlen in the Danbari country. While Punitive expedition to Nakhlen. proceeding up the valley in which the village is situated, the column was sniped. Several towers and some crops were destroyed, and the force retired. The tribesmen following up, a series of rear-guard actions were fought with a loss to the British of one killed and five wounded, and two followers killed.

The Kotaibi tribe having become troublesome, a post had been placed at Sulaiq garrisoned by seventy of the 102nd Grenadiers under Captain Lloyd-Jones. At the end of October the Kotaibi looted the mail at Hardaba and killed the two sowars who were escorting it. They then surrounded the Sulaiq Attack on Sulaiq. post. A force of 300 British and Indian infantry, with two guns, under Colonel Scallon, left Dhali' on the night of the 28th, and on the following Punitive column. morning dislodged the Kotaibi from the nearest hills. During the action Captain Lloyd-Jones was severely wounded. Fighting continued for some days in the vicinity of Sulaiq, and on the 1st November a force of 550 British and Indian infantry advanced and occupied Kariati. Many towers were destroyed, and, reinforced by 200 of the Buffs, an advance was made up the Bujer valley. After occupying some villages and destroying more towers the troops returned to Dhali' on

the 15th November, having strengthened the garrison at Sulaiq. The enemy lost some 200 during these operations, while the British casualties were ten killed and twenty-one (including two British officers) ¹wounded.

At the beginning of February, 1904, the Boundary Commission entered the Subaihi country. As several outrages had been committed by this tribe and their temper was uncertain, a strong supporting column was left at Musaimir, and a further column of 600 British and Indian infantry, with two guns, was despatched to Khatabia.

Some unimportant skirmishes followed, and Captain Warneford, the Political Officer, was murdered by an Arab police naik in Government employ.

During April the British troops returned to Aden, a wing of Return of British troops to Aden. the 94th Russell's Infantry remaining to support the Commission. On the 23rd May the Commission and escort returned to Aden when the former proceeded to Perim to complete matters with the Turkish Commissioners.

A force of British and Indian infantry with a section of guns remained at Dhali' with the Political Officer.

In July the Kotaibi were again reported to be inclined to give trouble, but, although a force was sent from Aden, hostile measures proved unnecessary.

During the operations enumerated the British casualties were:—

Losses in action—

| | |
|-----------------------|-----|
| Killed | 16 |
| Wounded | 39 |
| Invalided— | |
| Officers | 26 |
| British troops.. .. . | 100 |
| Indian | 68 |

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¹ Captains Lloyd-Jones and A. deS. Burton.

PART III.

CEYLON AND THE ISLANDS
OF THE INDIAN OCEAN.

CEYLON AND THE ISLANDS OF THE INDIAN OCEAN.

CHAPTER XVII.

CEYLON.

THE Island of Ceylon* lies between 5° 55' and 9° 51' north latitude and 79° 42' and 81° 55' east longitude, and is separated from the southern extremity of India by Palk's Strait. The total area is 25,365 square miles, the extreme length being 240 miles and extreme breadth 120 miles. The greater part of the island is covered by dense jungles of tropical vegetation, extremely difficult to penetrate, and traversed by paths known to the local inhabitants, but very misleading to anyone not acquainted with them and unaccustomed to forest country. Prior to 1817 there were no roads through the island.

Geographical position.

The chief physical features are the sandy low-lying coconut-fringed coast and adjoining districts on the west side; the high mountain range in the centre; and the bold rocky shores of the south and east. The mountain ranges are confined to a comparatively small area, roughly one-sixth of the island, in the south central portion; these formed the stronghold of the old kings of Kandy, and prior to the existence of roads were very difficult of access. The highest point is Mount Pedro, 8,326 feet; but Adam's Peak (7,358') is the most prominent. The remainder of the country is practically level; this low country occupies the whole northern part, and on the east, south, and west forms a belt of from thirty to eighty miles in width, surrounding the mountainous district.

Description of the island.

* See map on facing page.

The whole of the low country is thickly covered with vegetation and vast tracts of impenetrable jungle, only occasionally broken by the scattered settlements of the natives.

There is no lack of water, and numerous rivers, descending rapidly from the hills, carry large quantities of earthy matter which is deposited along the coast in the form of long bars, the gulf stream meeting the river's mouth preventing the mud from being swept out to sea. The most important river is the Mahaweli Ganga, nearly 200 miles in length, and draining an area of over 4,000 square miles. Rising in the Pidurutalagala mountain, it winds to the west and north of Kandy, and after an easterly descent of nearly 1,000 feet sweeps suddenly to the north, and, traversing a fine well-watered country, flows into the sea by several mouths near Trincomalee.

The coast line is very uniform, and, with the exception of Trincomalee, one of the finest harbours in the world, has no good natural harbours. Colombo, however, has been converted into a fine artificial harbour, and is now the capital of the island and chief port of call for ships. Galle at the southern extremity was the chief seaport before Colombo was made, but is unsafe during the south-west monsoon.

Owing to its position Ceylon possesses a climate of peculiar
 Climate. uniformity in temperature. The lowlands
 or maritime provinces have a tropical
 climate with a temperature ranging from 75° to 85° Fahr., the actual
 mean being 80·7° Fahr. There is, however, a considerable difference
 in the daily temperature of the hill districts, where the mean is consid-
 erably lower; at Diyatalawa the average is 68° 1', and at Nuwara
 Eliya 58° 1'. The chief determinant of the climate is the moun-
 tain range of South Central Ceylon, which lies across the line of
 direction of the two monsoons. The south-west monsoon (April to
 September) brings much rain to the west side of the hills and to the
 south-west plains, but little elsewhere. The north-east monsoon
 (October to March) brings at first rain to all parts, but, later,
 chiefly to the east side of the hills. The principal climatic zones are
 thus: the "wet low country" from Negombo to Matara, with rain
 at all times (least in January to March); the "dry low country"

comprising the rest of the plains, principally in the north and east, with rain chiefly from October to January, while the remaining months are dry; and the mountain zones of various elevations.

The rainfall is so well distributed over the year that it is extremely rare to have more than three dry weeks consecutively. The mean annual rainfall varies from 30 to 40 inches in the north-west and south-east to 200 inches in the interior. There are roughly speaking, these two seasons in Ceylon—the south-west and north-east monsoons—and the prevailing winds blow accordingly.

Generally speaking the climate is very healthy and compares favourably with that of India. Certain localities, however, all of which are well-known, are, after rain, liable to malaria and infested at particular seasons with ague and fever. These pestilential spots are chiefly at the foot of mountains, and, strange to say, in the vicinity of some active rivers, whilst the vast plains of stagnant water and rice fields are seldom productive of disease. Few persons can remain for any time in some of the low jungles without having more or less severe fever. The high grounds at the heads of valleys which terminate in a malarious district are also unsafe, as the draught up the valley brings miasma with it.

In the war of 1803–4 the troops suffered terribly from disease.

Mortality amongst troops
in 1804 and 1818.

Dr. Marshall says that the death rate of the 19th Regiment, partly at Trincomalee and partly at Kandy, was 400 per 1,000, and that the fatal consequences of exposure to an insalubrious climate combined with fatigue and privations, continued for some time after the troops had been removed to another station. In 1804 the rate of mortality of the 19th Regiment at Trincomalee was 200 per 1,000. In 1818 the mortality in the unhealthy districts seems to have been even greater. The 73rd Regiment, which was chiefly engaged in the Kandyan country, lost at the rate of 412 per 1,000; the same after-effects occurred as in 1804; the rate in the year subsequent to the termination of hostilities was 282 per 1,000. It should be noticed that in 1817–18 the ordinary method of marching troops through the disaffected districts was suspended, and an endeavour

made to perform these duties under the obscurity of night, the chilly dews of which were fertile sources of disease. Scarcity of food was also severely felt in many places. It is, therefore, unlikely that such mortality would occur again even if active operations were carried on; but great sickness must be the result of any operations in the notoriously unhealthy districts or in the jungle country in the unhealthy season, during and just after the rains.

The great bulk of the population are Singhalese, a people peculiar to Ceylon. They are an Aryan race, who originally came from the north of India and eventually established themselves as rulers in Ceylon. In the north the Tamils predominate. They are of the Dravidian race, and immigrated to Ceylon from India in two different periods. In past centuries they came as invaders and in more recent times in search of labour on coffee and tea estates. There are also a few pre-Aryan aborigines known as Veddahs who roam about the forests, and some Muhammadans of Malay and Arabic origin. The Eurasians are known as Burghers. By far the greater portion of the people are Buddhists.

The inhabitants are not warlike; the mode of warfare they adopted against the Europeans was as follows:—Owing to the absence of roads, the baggage of any force could only be carried by coolies, who were not only slow but also extremely timid and undisciplined. The Kandyans used to allow a force to penetrate into the mountains with little opposition except the harassing of the line of march by ambuscades or the cutting up of the coolie transport, which could be done with impunity. Then, having allowed the expedition to advance, and even to capture Kandy, they would retire to mountain fastnesses where they would wait until the climate and want of food (supplies being difficult to obtain owing to the difficulty of protecting the line of communications) reduced the numbers and ammunition of the invaders. They would then attack the attenuated force, generally with success.

Little is known of the early history of Ceylon. For centuries the Singhalese were constantly fighting among themselves, and when the Tamils (B.C. 204) first invaded Ceylon they easily over-ran the greater part of the island and were not expelled for 40 years. From that time there were various Tamil invasions, and sometimes the Singhalese and at other times the Tamils had the upper hand. However by A.D. 1410 the Singhalese had completely subdued the Tamils. The Portuguese first visited the island in 1505 and in 1518 built a fort at Colombo. They occupied the lands round the coast, but their conquests never extended very far inland. The Dutch in 1658 finally ousted them, and were in turn supplanted by the English; the Kings of Kandy, however, maintained their control over the interior until they were expelled in 1815.

The English first appeared in Ceylon in 1763, when the Madras Government despatched an embassy to the King of Kandy, which not only failed to produce any satisfactory result but left an unfavourable impression of English power and policy on the minds of the Kandyans.

Military Operations.

In 1782, Great Britain being at war with Holland, the capture of the Dutch settlements in Southern India and Ceylon was decided on. Admiral Sir Edward Hughes and General Sir Hector Munro took command of a combined naval and military expedition. After the capture of Negapatam, the Admiral sailed for Trincomalee with his squadron on January 2nd, 1782, having the following troops on board, under command of Captain Bonnevaux:—

| | | | | | |
|------------------|----|-----------|----|----|-------|
| Madras Artillery | .. | Captain | .. | .. | 1 |
| | | Corporals | .. | .. | 2 |
| | | Matrosses | .. | .. | 6 |
| | | Subadar | .. | .. | 1 |
| | | Naik | .. | .. | 1 |
| | | Privates | .. | .. | 20 |
| | | | | | <hr/> |
| | | Total | .. | .. | 31 |
| | | | | | <hr/> |

| | |
|--|-------|
| Battalion of sepoy Subalterns | 5 |
| (formed by volunteers Sergeants | 4 |
| from 9th, 10th, 13th) Subadars | 7 |
| and 23rd battalions). Jemadars | 7 |
| Havildars | 35 |
| Naiks | 35 |
| Drummers | 6 |
| Fifers | 3 |
| Puckallies | 7 |
| Sepoys | 420 |
| | <hr/> |
| Total | 529 |
| | <hr/> |
| Pioneers under Lieutenant Abbott | 200 |

Major Geils accompanied the force as Chief Engineer.

On the 4th January the squadron anchored in Trincomalee Bay. The next day the marines, with two 16-pounders and the artillery, were landed about three miles to the north of Trincomalee Fort, and by evening the whole force had disembarked.

Trincomalee Fort was taken by surprise and stormed by the marines that night. The principal part of the garrison retired to Fort Ostenburg, on the top of a high hill, which commanded the entrance to the harbour.

On the 7th Sir Edward Hughes directed the formation of a body of pioneers from the Volunteer Battalion. Three companies were formed accordingly, each consisting of 1 sergeant, 1 native officer, 3 havildars, 3 naiks and 44 privates. Lieutenant Abbott was placed in command of the whole, with Ensigns Byrne and Wright as subalterns.

The same day Major Geils reconnoitred the heights near Fort Ostenburg. On the 8th January the whole force moved off towards the fort, and on the 9th, with great labour and fatigue, got possession of a hill not more than 300 paces from it. It was found impracticable, however, to get heavy guns up the hill. As the governor declined to surrender, Fort Ostenburg was assaulted at gun-fire on the 11th and the enemy driven from their guns and posts in a very short time. The British loss was 1 officer and

20 men killed and 2 officers and 40 men wounded. The enemy only lost 13 killed, including 2 officers. The Governor and 425 officers and men were taken prisoners.

Shortly after this the Admiral re-embarked the seamen and marines, leaving the troops under Captain Bonnevaux to garrison the place. On March 26th a reinforcement was embarked at Madras consisting of:—

| | |
|-------|--|
| | 1 Lieutenant. |
| | 2 Sergeants. |
| | 4 Native Officers. |
| | 10 Havildars. |
| | 172 Rank and file. |
| | 52 Artillerymen (European and native). |
| | 62 European invalids (Infantry). |
| | — |
| Total | 303 |
| | — |

During July the garrison was further strengthened by 200 men of His Majesty's 42nd and 78th Regiments under Captain Hay MacDowall who superseded Captain Bonnevaux.

On Captain MacDowall's arrival, he found the two forts, particularly the lower one, in a very weak state of defence, and the stores and ammunition so injudiciously distributed that the greatest part of the powder lay in one fort while the balls were in the other. Captain MacDowall had scarcely begun to remedy this before the French Admiral Suffrien appeared off the place. While at Trincomalee, the troops had also been greatly weakened by sickness. In May, Captain Bonnevaux had reported—"An epidemical disorder is arising among white and black, and by it alone we have lost at least 50 Europeans, with many blacks. It is a cramp and *mal de chien* which seizes those in best health and despatches them to the other world in less than four hours."

Trincomalee captured by the French under Admiral Suffrien. Admiral Suffrien with a considerable force appeared before Trincomalee about August 25th, 1782, and at once laid siege to it with such success that Captain MacDowall was obliged to capitulate on the 30th of the same month.

Intelligence of the incorporation of Holland with France having been received at Madras about June 1795, an expedition was organized against the Dutch settlements in Ceylon. On the 21st July Rear Admiral Rainier, with H. M.'s Ships *Suffolk* and *Centurion*, sailed from Madras Roads, having in charge some transports conveying the troops. On the 23rd H. M. S. *Diomede* and a transport or two joined the fleet off Negapatam. Thus strengthened, the expedition again set sail on the 25th, and on the 1st August cast anchor in Back Bay, Trincomalee, in company with H. M. S. *Heroine*, which had joined the day before.

The troops, under the command of Colonel James Stuart, His Majesty's 72nd Regiment, consisted of:—

Royal Artillery, 42 of all ranks under Captain-Lieutenant Dixon.

Madras Artillery, 136 of all ranks under Captain Carlisle, together with 340 gun lascars.

Flank Companies H. M.'s 71st and 73rd Regiments, 351 of all ranks, under Major Dalrymple.

H. M.'s 72nd Regiment, 743 of all ranks, under Major Fraser.

Native Brigade under Lieut.-Colonel Bonnevaux.

1st Battalion, Captain Fergusson, 14 Europeans and 643 natives.

23rd " " Campbell, 13 " " 643 "

Pioneers, Lieutenant Dowse, 2 Sergeants " 219 "

Staff.

1 Brigade Major.

1 Commissary of Ordnance.

1 Q. M. of Brigade.

1 " " Provisions,
and Judge Advocate.

1 Captain of Engineers.

1 Paymaster, Royal troops.

1 Lieutenant of Engineers.

1 " " Company's troops.

1 Lieutenant R. A., Acting
Engineer.

1 Head Surgeon.

2 Assistant Surgeons.

| | | |
|---------|---------------------|-------|
| Total { | (Europeans) | 1,314 |
| | (Natives) | 1,845 |
| | | 3,159 |

During this expedition no serious resistance was encountered anywhere, as the Dutch were divided into factions, one party favouring the Stadtholder and the other the Jacobins.

On the 3rd August the disembarkation took place unopposed at a spot about four miles to the north of Trincomalee Fort. Owing, however, to extraordinary high surf and the violence of the wind, it took ten days to land the whole of the stores and provisions. On the 18th the troops broke ground and still remained unmolested. On the 23rd the English batteries opened fire on the fort, and by the 26th effected a practicable breach. Preparations were made for an assault, whereupon the Governor capitulated. The garrison consisted of 768 officers and men with 92 guns.

Our loss was small, *viz.*—

| <i>Europeans.</i> | | | <i>Natives.</i> | | |
|---------------------|----------------|-----------------|----------------------|----------------|-----------------|
| | <i>Killed.</i> | <i>Wounded.</i> | | <i>Killed.</i> | <i>Wounded.</i> |
| Royal Artillery .. | 4 | 2 | Madras Artillery .. | 6 | 9 |
| Madras Artillery .. | 3 | 13 | 1st Battalion .. | 1 | 6 |
| 71st and 73rd .. | | 8 | 23rd Battalion | | 1 |
| 72nd .. | | 10 | Pioneers | | 2 |
| Staff .. | | 1 | | | |
| Total .. | <u>7</u> | <u>34</u> | Total .. | <u>7</u> | <u>18</u> |

The neighbouring garrison in Fort Ostenburg, numbering 252 men with 61 guns, was summoned and surrendered on the 31st, on the same terms as Trincomalee.

On the 18th September the fort of Batticaloa surrendered to a detachment under Major Fraser, consisting of the flank companies of the 72nd, two companies of the 1st Battalion, and a party of artillery. On the 24th Colonel Stuart left Trincomalee with the flank companies of the 71st and 73rd, 5 companies of the 1st Battalion, a detachment of artillery, and a party of Pioneers for the reduction of Jaffnapatam, which capitulated on the 28th without resistance. The garrison was very weak, being only 39 Europeans and 98 Natives. One hundred and six guns and much gunpowder were found in the place.

On the 1st October a detachment of the 52nd under Captain Monson took quiet possession of Mullaittivu, and on the 5th the fort and island of Manar surrendered to a detachment under Captain Barbut, whom General Stuart had detached immediately after the capture of Jaffnapatam. From Manar, Captain Bowser was detached against Kalpitiya which surrendered on the 13th August without being summoned.

About the end of December Captain Barbut, with the flank companies of the 73rd and the 7th Battalion, was ordered to Negombo which he took quiet possession of on the 3rd February 1796. On this occasion he reported that, though the requirements of caste could not be attended to on the voyage, the native troops made no complaints. Shortly after the surrender of Jaffnapatam, the flank companies of the 71st returned to Madras, but reinforcements were sent which raised Colonel Stuart's force to 2,298 Europeans and 4,197 natives.¹

| <i>Europeans.</i> | | | <i>Natives.</i> | | |
|---|----|-------|----------------------|----|-------|
| Royal Artillery | .. | 37 | 1st Battalion | .. | 726 |
| Coast Artillery | .. | 179 | 7th Battalion | .. | 797 |
| 52nd Foot | .. | 635 | 9th Battalion | .. | 796 |
| 72nd Foot | .. | 802 | 23rd Battalion | .. | 664 |
| 73rd Foot | .. | 562 | 35th Battalion | .. | 693 |
| Engineers | .. | 7 | Pioneers | .. | 521 |
| Staff | .. | 14 | | | |
| Pioneer and Artificers (1st European Battalion). | | 62 | | | |
| Total | | 2,298 | Total | | 4,197 |

The 1st and 23rd Battalions, with detachments of artillery and European infantry, were left to garrison the places which had been taken, while the rest of the army assembled at Negombo preparatory to an attack on Colombo.

Colonel Stuart's advance arrived within four miles of Colombo on the 8th February and were joined by the main body next day. The march from Negombo was unimpeded although it lay through thick woods and jungle, from behind which an enemy might have been destroyed whilst the assailants were unseen. On the 12th the troops crossed the Kelani river at Mutwal on bamboo rafts without opposition; a battery erected at Grand Pass was abandoned by the Dutch, who fled on the appearance of the British. On approaching Colombo the force was fired upon by a body of Dutch and Malays, who retired immediately on their fire being returned. The town was occupied the same night and the fort capitulated on 15th without waiting to be attacked. The garrison consisted

¹ Return for January 1796.

of 3,125 officers and men, with 260 guns and mortars, besides a large quantity of stores. All the Dutch possessions were included in the surrender, and Ceylon thus passed into British hands practically without opposition.

After the taking of Ceylon, there was a more or less chronic Resumé of events, state of hostility with the Kandyan, until 1796—1817. the final suppression of the rebellion of 1817. Although no expeditions were sent from India until that year, yet some Indian troops forming part of the garrison were employed in the island.¹

The British possessions, when transferred to the Crown in 1798, did not extend much beyond a belt along the sea coast, the remainder of the island continuing under the dominion of the King of Kandy. During 1802, certain inhabitants of the British territories having been plundered in the Kandyan country, compensation was demanded, but though promised was never paid.

This matter became the ground for several demands on the part of the British, accompanied by threats, which were answered by incursions into British territory; whereupon war was declared and troops were sent against Kandy, which was taken on the 21st February 1803. The place was found to be so unhealthy that the force was soon withdrawn, except 300 men of His Majesty's 19th Regiment, 700 Malays, and some Bengal and Madras Artillery, all under Major Davie. By June almost the whole of the 19th Regiment was in hospital, and Europeans were dying at the rate of six a day, many of the Malays were ill or had deserted; and little food remained. This weak party was suddenly attacked on June 24th by the Kandyans in great numbers, and after a defence of 10 hours, Major Davie agreed to capitulate. All military stores were to be given up, but the men were permitted to take their arms, and the Kandyans engaged to take care of the sick till they could be removed.

¹ For further particulars see.—

Eleven years in Ceylon.—*Forbes*.

Precis of information concerning the Island of Ceylon.—*War Office, 1882*.

Account of the Island of Ceylon.—*Percival*.

Description of Ceylon.—*Reverend J. Cor-diner*.

Historical Sketch of the conquest of Ceylon by the British.—*Henry Marshall* (contains the best account of military operations 1803—1834).

Expedition to Kandy.—*Captain Johnston, 1810*.

Tennent's Ceylon.

Major Davie left Kandy accordingly, and marched to the Mahaweli Ganga, which was unfordable. No boats being procurable he was obliged to halt. The next day the officers were enticed to a private interview, at which they were seized. The men were then told that their officers had crossed the river, and that they would be taken to join them provided they laid down their arms. Having done this, they were successively murdered in small parties out of sight of their comrades. This success encouraged the king to attempt the expulsion of the British from the island. The Kandyans were, however, everywhere repulsed and the king himself badly defeated on the 6th September 1803 at Hanwella by a detachment under Captain Pollock. The war continued without any definite result until 1805, when hostilities ceased by mutual consent, but without any final agreement. The chief incident was Captain Johnston's advance from Batticaloa to Kandy with 300 men in 1804, and his retirement thence to Trincomalee. This brilliant achievement was the result of a mistake in orders.

The King of Kandy now showed such indiscriminate cruelty that the whole country became disaffected. Consequently when troops were again sent against Kandy in 1815, they were joined by the principal chiefs and by the people. No opposition was met with, and the capital was taken possession of on the 14th February 1815. The king was captured on the 18th and was deposed, and the Government assumed by the British on March 2nd, with the consent of the chiefs.

The people were at first satisfied, but, after the terror caused by the cruelties of the king had subsided, they began to regret the loss of their national independence. Led by their chiefs, who felt the diminution of their position and power, they broke out into rebellion about the end of 1817.

Troops were sent against the insurgents, but the impenetrable nature of the country and unhealthiness of the climate caused much difficulty and loss, while no compensating advantages were gained. Consequently, on the 21st February, 1818, the Governor informed the Madras Government that his hopes of subduing the rebellion had been disappointed, and that a reinforcement of 2,000 native infantry and 4,000 pioneers was urgently required. Owing to the Mahratta

Rebellion of 1817.

War then in progress some difficulty was experienced in complying with the request of the Ceylon Government, but great exertions having been made, the 1st battalion, 15th Madras Native Infantry, embarked at Madras on the 11th March in H. M. S. *Minden* and the transport *Grant*, and was followed on the 6th and 9th April by the 2nd battalion, 18th Madras Native Infantry. In addition, five companies of 2nd battalion, 7th Madras Native Infantry, marched from Palamcottah to Tuticorin on the 27th March, whence they sailed for Ceylon a few days later.¹

No pioneers being available, orders were issued to entertain 4,000 men of the labouring classes in the districts of Tinnevely, Madura, Tanjore, and Trichinopoly, to serve in Ceylon as pioneers and army followers.

The operations took the form of a guerilla war, in which the troops, traversing damp forests by jungle tracks and mountain passes, were less distressed by the enemy than by exposure, privations, and disease. For a considerable time the issue seemed doubtful, but towards the close of 1818, the Kandyans harassed by the destruction of their villages and cattle, rendered destitute by the devastation of their country, and disheartened by the loss of upwards of 10,000 persons either fallen in the field or destroyed by famine or fever, began to show signs of submission. The rebellious chiefs were captured; the pretender, whom they had set up, fled; "the sacred tooth" of Buddha, which had been stolen and paraded to arouse the fanatical enthusiasm of the people, was recovered and restored to its depository in Kandy; and before the end of the year the whole country returned to tranquillity and order. Though very few fell by the weapons of the Kandyans, the rebellion is estimated to have cost the British one thousand lives.

The Indian troops were at first under the command of Major Limond and subsequently under Lieutenant-Colonel Molesworth. The troops were distributed as follows, and were actively employed until the termination of the rebellion in October.

¹ *1st Battalion, 15th Regiment (29th Madras Native Infantry).*—Major Limond and 8 officers, 1 Surgeon and 2 Dressers, 1 Native officers, 47 Havildars, 832 Rank and file, 20 Drummers, 10 Puckallies, 36 Tents, 20 Tent Lascars.

2nd Battalion, 7th Regiment (36th Madras

Native Infantry).—10 Officers, 1 Surgeon, 2 Dressers, 19 Native Officers, 49 Havildars, 834 Rank and file, 20 Drummers, 10 Puckallies, 36 Tents, 20 Tent Lascars.

2nd Battalion, 7th Regiment (19th Madras Native Infantry).—Five companies under Captain Jackson.

The head-quarters of the 1st battalion, 15th Regiment, were first established at Colombo. During April, 369 men were at Kandy, 158 at Ratnapura, 91 at Ruanwella, 80 at Ammanapura, and 87 at Attaputty. From July to November the head-quarters were at Ruanwella, furnishing detachments to Kandy and other posts. During December the battalion marched to Colombo and embarked for Tuticorin in February 1819.

The 2nd battalion, 18th Regiment, was at Batticaloa in May, furnishing detachments to Badulla, Kattaboa, Taldena, and other posts. The battalion moved to Kandy in June, having first sent 120 men to Colombo. From July to November, headquarters were at Badulla, from whence the battalion marched to Colombo where it embarked for Quilon in December. Detachments were engaged with the enemy on two occasions during June between Kattaboa and Badulla.

The detachment of the 2nd battalion, 7th Regiment, was principally at and in the vicinity of Kurunegala, and was engaged with the enemy on 25th April, and on the 9th, 17th, 23rd, and 24th June.

Since the suppression of this rebellion, there have been no Subsequent History. serious military operations in Ceylon.

In 1823, 1824, 1834, and 1842 disturbances took place with the object of restoring the old régime. But the civil authority had become consolidated, and the conspirators were speedily arrested and punished.

In 1848 a rising took place at Matale and a pretender was proclaimed King. Serious apprehensions were felt by the authorities, and reinforcements from India were applied for. The outbreak was, however, speedily quelled, and no disturbances have since occurred.

CHAPTER XVIII.

MAURITIUS, AND BOURBON OR REUNION.

MAURITIUS,* an island of the Indian Ocean, lies between $57^{\circ} 18'$ and $57^{\circ} 49'$ E. longitude and $19^{\circ} 58'$ and $20^{\circ} 32'$ S. latitude. It is distant 115 miles from Réunion (Bourbon), 934 miles from Seychelles, 1,300 miles from Natal, 2,000 miles from Cape Comorin, 2,300 miles from the Cape of Good Hope, and 500 from Madagascar. It comprises an area of 705 square miles, having an extreme length of 36 miles from north to south, and an extreme breadth of 28 miles from east to west.

The island is volcanic, and is surrounded by coral reefs. The mountain chains, which run generally east and west, average 2,000 feet in altitude, the highest peak, the Piton de la Riviere-Noire, being 2,711 feet and the Pieter Both and Pouce only a few feet lower. The island is watered by numerous streams, commonly flowing in deep ravines, with several fine cascades; none of these rivers are navigable beyond a few hundred yards from the sea.

The hot season is from December to April, it being comparatively cool during the remainder of the year. The temperature on the highlands in the interior is always some degrees lower than in the city of Port Louis and the coast districts. The climate at Curepipe, 1,700 to 1,900 feet above sea-level, resembles that of the south of France. The hurricane season, when the island is sometimes almost devastated, extends from December to the end of April, and the cyclones range from about 8° to 30° S. latitude. The mean annual rainfall ranges from about 48 inches at the observatory to 125 inches at Curepipe. At the time of the

* See map at end of chapter.

expedition to Mauritius in 1810, the water-supply was obtained from the abundant streams.¹

Mauritius was discovered by the Portuguese in 1507 and named by the Dutch, who occupied it first in any great numbers in 1598. The Dutch built a fort at Grand Port, but abandoned the island in 1712. A party of French landed in 1715 and it was formally taken possession of by the French East India Company in 1721, and by the Crown of France in 1767, when the name was changed to Ile de France. The original Dutch name of Mauritius was restored on the British occupation of the island in 1810.

Rodrigues, the most important dependency of Mauritius, is situated in latitude S. 19°41', and longitude E. 63° 23'. It is 344 nautical miles from Mauritius. The island is eighteen miles long by seven miles broad and is surrounded by coral reefs, extending in some places five or six miles from the shore. The island is volcanic, mountainous, rising to 1,760 feet above the sea level, and in some parts well wooded. The temperature differs little from that of Mauritius, although breezes are stronger and hurricanes more frequent and severe. The climate is healthy. The principal industries are fishing, and rearing of cattle and goats for which there is excellent pasturage. The soil is good, sugar-cane, cotton, coffee, rice, maize, and vanilla grow luxuriantly. The ordinary tropical fruits abound. Cultivation has been neglected since the abolition of slavery, owing to the want of labour and of regular communication. At the time of its capture in 1809, the island was almost uninhabited.

¹ A reservoir on the Grande Riviere has during recent years been constructed for the supply of Port Louis. Works have also been completed to supply the chief centres of population with water from the upland springs.

The population in 1901 consisted of :—


| | |
|---|---------|
| Persons of European, African, or mixed descent | 108,847 |
| Indo-Mauritius persons of Indian descent born in the island | 198,958 |
| Other Indians | 62,022 |
| Chinese | 3,509 |
| | 373,337 |

The Europeans are mainly of French extraction.

The Indian population dates from the emancipation of the slaves in 1834-9. The immigration from India commenced in 1834, and has gone on ever since. The descendants of these immigrants are steadily increasing in numbers, and predominate in the domestic, commercial, and agricultural callings, and the amount of land held by them as small planters is rapidly growing.

MAURITIUS,

1887.



I. B. Topo. Dy No 6.968
 Exd. C. J. A., October 1907.

No. 4,184-I., 1907.

The island of Bourbon or Réunion* is situated in the Indian Ocean between 20° 15' and 21° 23' S. latitude and 52° 56' and 53° 34' E. longitude. It was named Ile Bourbon on its occupation by France in 1649, the name being changed to Ile de la Réunion in 1794 at the time of the French Revolution. The original French name was reverted to on the Bourbon restoration in 1815, but in 1848 the republican name Ile de la Réunion was restored. The superficial area of the island is 625,000 acres.

Réunion is of volcanic origin, and surrounded by coral reefs, like the other islands of the group. Its highest point is the Piton des Neiges, an extinct volcano rising to 10,230 feet above sea level; another volcano, the Piton de Fournaise, 8,751 feet, is still active, producing frequent lava-flows.

The island is generally mountainous, the mountains forming two distinct groups rising from the Plaine des Capes, a plateau 5,000 feet in height. There is a harbour at Pointe des Galets, near St. Paul and another at St. Pierre, besides several landing stages and anchorages on the windward side of the island, and two on the leeward side.

There are numerous watercourses, many of them perennial streams, which become torrents during the rainy season. There are now also several canals, of importance for drinking and irrigation purposes.

The climate is generally equable, the maximum temperature being 102° in the shade, reduced about 1° for every 300 feet of rise. There are two seasons, *l'hivernage* from November to April, when heat, rain, and cyclones prevail, and *l'hiver du pays*, the fine and cool season from May to October.

The soil is very fertile, cultivation being, however, principally confined to a strip some six miles broad along the coast. Sugar-cane, rice, corn and spices are the principal products, and the usual tropical fruit abounds.

When discovered, the island was covered with dense forest but so much of this was cleared for the cultivation of sugar-cane that it had to be reafforested.

* See map at end of chapter.

The population now consists of some 170,000, more than one third of whom are Caffres, natives of India, and Malagasies. French is the language of the educated classes and Creole—a debased compound of French, Caffres, Malagash, and Hindustani—that of the mass of the people. The chief town, St. Denis, the seat of government, has a population of 30,000. The town contains many fine buildings, and the roadstead is the most important in the island.

Population.

MILITARY OPERATIONS.

Expedition to St. Paul, Ile de Bourbon.

It is commonly but erroneously supposed that the destruction of the French and Spanish fleets off Cape Trafalgar in 1805 had given us command of the sea all the world over. After that great battle, following on other maritime victories, no French sail could appear in safety in the Mediterranean, or from the coast of Portugal across the broad Atlantic to the Spanish Main; but there still remained French cruisers which, harbouring off the coasts of Bourbon and Mauritius, put out to sea at intervals, and ravaged British commerce in the Indian Ocean. Moreover, in 1798 an expedition was organized and despatched from Mauritius to the aid of Tippu Sultan of Mysore, comprising a small body of French who landed at Mangalore from the frigate *La Preneuse* on April 26th of that year and subsequently took part in the defence of Seringapatam.

Affairs in the Indian Ocean.

Between 1792 and 1809 the trade of the British East India Company suffered severely from the attacks of French men-of-war and of privateers sent from these islands, but the Government were long averse to incur the expense of sending expeditions beyond seas. In 1794 preparations were made for an expedition against the French islands, a force being assembled in Madras, but the enterprise was abandoned. At length the losses became so serious that it was resolved to establish a blockade, and to take possession of the island of Rodrigues as a depôt for stores and provisions and as a station for the squadron.

290 A



Rodrigues was accordingly occupied by a detachment from Bombay, consisting of 200 of the 56th Foot, and an equal number of the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Bombay Native Infantry,¹ under the command of Lieut.-Colonel H. S. Keating of the 56th. During August and the early part of September 1809, ordnance, stores, and provisions were landed, roads were made and the troops were exercised preparatory to an attempt to surprise the town of St. Paul, situated on the west coast of the island of Bourbon. The Bay of St. Paul had long been the rendezvous of French cruisers, and sheltered them and their prizes. Captain Josias Rowley of the *Raisnable*, senior officer of the British squadron cruising off the islands, accordingly concerted with Lieut.-Colonel Keating a plan for the capture of the batteries and shipping at this port.

On the 16th September 1809, a detachment of 368 officers and men embarked at Fort Duncan on board the *Néréide*, 36 guns Captain Robert Corbett, the *Otter*, 18-gun sloop, Captain Willoughby, and the East India Company's schooner *Wasp*, Lieutenant Watkins. On the evening of the 18th these joined the rest of the squadron, off Port Louis, Mauritius, consisting of the *Raisnable* and the frigates *Sirius*, Captain Pym, and *Boadicea*, Captain Hatley.

On the 19th a force of 236 sailors and marines from the *Raisnable* and *Otter* were put on board the *Néréide*; the squadron stood towards Bourbon, and early on the following morning arrived off the east end of the island. On approaching the Bay of St. Paul, the *Néréide*, to prevent suspicion, preceded the other ships, and at daybreak on the 21st, having anchored close to the beach, the troops were disembarked about seven miles from St. Paul. The troops and marines, commanded by Colonel Keating, and the detachment of seamen under Captain Willoughby, immediately advanced with a view to crossing the causeway over the lake before the French could discover their approach. This important object was accomplished, nor had the French time to form in any force until after Colonel Keating and his party had passed the strongest position.

By 7 A.M. the troops were in possession of the first, second and third batteries. Captain Willoughby with his seamen then turned

¹ Now 104th Wellesley's Rifles.

the captured guns on to the shipping, from the fire of which, chiefly grape and within pistol shot of the shore, the force had suffered considerably. The enemy made a stand behind a stone wall near the third battery, but were soon driven back. The French, having been reinforced from the hills, and by a party of 110 soldiers from the frigate *Caroline*, the guns of the first and second batteries were spiked, and the seamen sent to man the third battery, which soon opened its fire upon the *Caroline* and her consorts. The fourth and fifth batteries shared the fate of the others, and by 8-30 A.M., the town batteries, magazines, eight field pieces, 117 new and heavy guns of different calibres, and all the public stores, with several prisoners, were in possession of Colonel Keating and his small force. In the meantime the British squadron, having stood into the Bay, had opened a heavy fire on the French frigate, two captured Indiamen, and other armed vessels in her company, as well as upon some batteries, and then having anchored in the road, close off the town of St. Paul, began taking measures to secure the *Caroline* and the rest of the French ships, all of which had cut their cables and were drifting on shore. The seamen of the squadron, however, soon succeeded in heaving the ships off without any material injury. "Thus was effected," says James (Naval History), "in the course of a few hours, by a British force of inconsiderable amount, the capture of the only safe anchorage at Isle Bourbon, together with its strong defences and shipping, and that with a total loss of fifteen killed, fifty-eight wounded and three missing." By evening the demolition of the different gun and mortar batteries, and of the magazines was complete, and the whole of the troops, seamen, and marines returned on board their ships.

On the 23rd, at daybreak, they were all in the boats, ready again to land, when terms for the delivery of all public property in the town were drawn up and agreed to. General Des Brusleys having shot himself, through chagrin, as alleged, at the success of the British, a prolongation of the armistice was granted for five days. On the 28th the truce expired, and the British force immediately began shipping the provisions, ordnance stores, and small remainder of the cargoes of the captured Indiamen. This done, the squadron set sail with the

Submission of the French.

Indiamen from the Bay of St. Paul. After this brilliant exploit, Colonel Keating returned to Rodrigues, where he arrived on the 25th October, and immediately began to build store-houses, barracks, and houses for the officers.

Expedition to Bourbon, 1810.

On hearing of this success, the Government resolved to attempt

| | | |
|---|----|-------|
| Madras Artillery | .. | 100 |
| Flank Coys. His Majesty's 12th and 33rd regiments | .. | 400 |
| His Majesty's 69th Regiment | .. | 730 |
| „ 86th „ | .. | 420 |
| | | — |
| Total Europeans | .. | 1,650 |
| 1st Battalion, 6th Madras ¹ Native Infantry | .. | 850 |
| 2nd Battalion, 12th Madras ² Native Infantry. | .. | 850 |
| Detachment, 2nd battalion Pioneers | .. | 200 |
| | | — |
| Total natives | .. | 1,900 |

the complete reduction of the French islands. On the 8th May 1810, the force detailed in the margin embarked at Madras for Rodrigues under command of Lieut.-Colonel Hastings Fraser, H. M.'s 86th Regiment.

The troops arrived on the 20th June, and, Colonel Keating having assumed command, the expedition,

which consisted of 14 transports, escorted by the *Boadicea* and *Néréide*, sailed on the 3rd July for St. Denis, the capital of Bourbon, and approached the place of debarkation on the 6th. The regular force at Bourbon at this time amounted to 576 men, but there was a militia force of 2,717 as well. The first brigade, under Lieut.-Colonel Fraser, composed of H. M.'s 86th, the 1st Battalion, 6th Madras Native Infantry, with a party of artillery and pioneers, was ordered to land at the Grande Chaloupe, about six miles west of St. Denis, which is on the northern coast of the island. The remaining three brigades, under command of Colonel Keating, were ordered to land near the Rivier des Pluies, about three miles east of the town, viz. :—The second brigade under Lieut.-Colonel Drummond, composed of a party of Royal Marines and the 2nd Battalion, 12th Madras Native Infantry. The third brigade under Lieut.-Colonel McLeod, consisting of H. M.'s 69th, and a detachment of Bombay Native Infantry. The fourth brigade under Lieut.-Colonel Campbell, composed of the flank companies, H. M.'s 12th and 33rd Regiments, a detachment H. M.'s 56th, and a party of pioneers.

¹ Now the 66th Punjabis.

² Now the 84th Punjabis.

The disembarkation began at 2 P.M. on the 7th, and about 300 men of the third and fourth brigades under Colonel McLeod, together with a few seamen under Captain Willoughby, had landed, when the surf became so heavy that nothing more could be done. Upon this Colonel McLeod moved a short distance to the eastward as far as St. Marie, where he took possession of a battery and remained there during the night.

The first brigade succeeded in landing at Grande Chaloupe without loss*, and Colonel Fraser, pushing on towards the town, occupied the western heights above it with a view to preventing the entrance of any reinforcements from St. Paul. Early on the morning of the 8th the Colonel, leaving the 6th Battalion to protect his rear, descended the hill towards the town with the Europeans, and attacked the enemy, who were drawn up in columns on the plain with two field-pieces, and supported on the flank by a redoubt. They were quickly driven back by the bayonet, broken, and pursued so closely that they retreated into the town, leaving the redoubt in our possession. The guns were then turned upon the place, and the rest of the troops coming up about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, the commandant surrendered and a capitulation was signed by which the whole island, together with all public property, was ceded to the British. The troops became prisoners of war. The British loss amounted to eighteen killed and eighty-four wounded, including five seamen. Of these, eleven killed and fifty-eight wounded belonged to H. M.'s 86th Regiment.

Lieut.-Colonel Campbell was detached with his brigade to St. Paul on the 10th, and took possession of that place, where 1,500 men laid down their arms. One hundred and forty-five pieces of ordnance, 195,000 lbs of gunpowder, and a quantity of small arms and military stores fell into the hands of the victors. On the 24th August an order was issued by the Governor-General in Council in which the officers and men engaged in the expedition were thanked for the zeal, courage and perseverance by which a conquest of so much importance to the national interests had been achieved.

* 950 men, with some howitzers and the necessary ammunition, were landed on open beach in two hours and a half.

Capture of Ile de la Passe.

On the night of the 13th August the Ile de la Passe, a rocky islet situated at the mouth of Grand Port, the harbour at the south-eastern extremity of Mauritius, was taken by a party of seventy-one marines and seamen in the boats of the *Sirius* and *Iphigenia* Lieutenant Norman of the *Sirius* and six men were killed and eighteen men wounded. A garrison of 130 men was placed on the island, and Lieutenant Davis of the Engineers was entrusted with the duty of improving the defences. Captain Willoughby of the *Néréide*, having been placed in charge of the island, made preparations for attacking some of the enemy's posts on the mainland, and leaving Captain Todd, His Majesty's 32nd, in command, he embarked a detachment of 170 officers and men, detailed in the margin, in the

Lieutenant Morlett, 33rd Foot.

„ Needhall, 69th „ 50 men.

„ Pye, Royal Marine.

„ Cox, „ 50 men.

„ Deacon, Royal Navy.

„ Wiess, „ „ 50 men.

boats of the *Néréide* and *Staunch* at 1 A.M. on the 17th, and carried by assault the fort at Point de Diable, which commanded the north-eastern entrance into the Grand Port. Having spiked the guns, destroyed the carriages, and blown up the magazine, Captain Willoughby advanced to the town of Grand Port, distant about twelve miles, after having dispersed a party of the enemy by whom he was opposed on the march. He returned to his ship the same evening. Landing again next day with the same force, he destroyed the signal-house at the port of Grande Riviere, about five miles north of Point de Diable, to which place he returned, and having destroyed the works, went back to the Ile de la Passe.

These successes were quickly followed by a series of disasters

British disasters.

to the squadron. On the 22nd August the *Sirius* and *Néréide* made an attempt

to attack the French vessels in the Grand Port, but the *Sirius* having grounded near the entrance, nothing was effected. The *Iphigenia* and *Magicienne* having arrived next day, the attempt was renewed by the four ships, but two of them having grounded, the other two were unable to cope with the combined fire of the enemy's ships and batteries. The *Néréide* was obliged to strike her flag about 10 P.M., after having had 230 seamen, marines and soldiers killed and wounded, out of a total of 281,

including Lieutenant Morlett (33rd Foot) and Lieutenant Aldwinkle (1st Battalion, Madras Artillery) killed, and Lieutenant Needhall (69th Foot) wounded. The *Magicienne* was abandoned at 7 P.M. on the 24th, and set on fire, and blew up at 11 P.M. On the 25th the *Iphigenia* attempted to get the *Sirius* off, but failing in this, the ship was abandoned and blown up. On the 27th the French were reinforced by four ships of war from Port Louis, and on the same day Captain Lambert of the *Iphigenia* was called upon by the French Captain General Decaen to surrender the officers and crews of the squadron within one hour. The surrender took place at 10 A.M. on the 29th.

The English squadron now being reduced to Commodore Rowley's ship *Boadicea*, the sloop *Otter*, and the gun-brig *Staunch*, the French turned the tables, blockaded the island of Bourbon, and captured some transports carrying troops and provisions for the projected expedition against Mauritius.

This blockade was maintained until the 12th September, on which day the *Africaine* frigate, Captain Corbett, arrived off St. Denis, when the Commodore with the *Boadicea*, *Otter*, and *Staunch* put out from St. Paul to meet it, having received information of its arrival from Colonel Keating. The blockading ships at this time were the *Astree*, the *Iphigenia* (captured at Ile de la Passe), and the brig *Entreprenant*, which last, apparently in consequence of a signal from the others, made sail to the north-east soon after the appearance of the *Africaine*, and was quickly out of sight. Commodore Rowley then endeavoured to come into action with the French, but the *Boadicea* was a bad sailer, and at 2 A.M. on the 13th, when the *Africaine* had got close to the *Astree*, the *Boadicea* was still four or five miles to leeward, and the *Otter* and *Staunch* out of sight.

Captain Corbett, knowing that the frigates were within a few hours' run of Port Louis in Mauritius, and expecting that the *Boadicea* would come up, determined to engage, notwithstanding the disparity of force, but he was over-matched, and the *Africaine* struck her colours about 4-45 A.M., with the loss of 49 killed and 114 wounded. Captain Corbett was mortally wounded at the beginning of the action. Out of a detachment of one officer and twenty-five men of the 86th Foot, which had been taken on

board at St. Denis, five were killed and eighteen wounded, including the officer, Captain Robert Elliot, 5th Native Infantry.

About 7 A.M., the *Boadicea* was joined by her two consorts, and the wind having freshened, the Commodore bore up for the frigates, which were making slow progress owing to the crippled state of the prize, which had been much damaged both in her masts and hull. The French deserted her about 3-30 P.M., and the *Boadicea*, coming up about 5 o'clock, towed her back to St. Paul, where she arrived on the 15th.

On the morning of the 18th, three ships having appeared in the offing, Commodore Rowley made sail after them. They turned out to be the French frigate *Venus* and the corvette *Victor*, the latter having in tow the British frigate *Ceylon* of thirty-two guns, which they had captured on the preceding day. The *Victor* cast off the prize about 3 P.M., and stood off to the eastward. The *Boadicea* came up with the *Venus* about 5 P.M., and compelled her to strike her colours in about ten minutes. She had lost her mizzen, mast and topmasts in the action with the *Ceylon*, and consequently made a poor defence.

Lieut.-General the Honourable John Abercrombie, who had recently been appointed to the command of the troops destined for the expedition to Mauritius, and Major Caldwell of the Madras Engineers, were both on board the *Ceylon*.

Expedition to Mauritius, 1810.

The Indian Government had long seen the necessity of wresting Mauritius from the French, who, as has already been related, made it a centre for their depredations on British commerce in the Indian Ocean. Preparations were accordingly made both at the Cape and in India, and a large force under Lieut.-General the Hon'ble John Abercrombie was despatched in 1810. The troops were assembled at Rodrigues Island, where all arrived by the 21st November, and the naval portion of the force, under Vice-Admiral Bertie, set sail the following morning, arriving off Mauritius on the 28th. The fleet and transports, in all seventy sail, anchored in Grand Bay, twelve miles from Port Louis, on the 29th, and the same day the army landed without opposition, with artillery and stores, a body of marines, and a party of seamen under Captain Montagu.

The force was distributed as follows :—

First Brigade, Lieut.-Colonel Picton, His Majesty's 12th Foot.

His Majesty's 12th and 22nd, and ²right wing Madras Volunteer Battalion.

Second Brigade, Lieut.-Colonel Gibbs, His Majesty's 59th Foot.

His Majesty's 59th ; 300, 89th ; one company, 87th ; left wing Madras Volunteer Battalion.

Third Brigade, Lieut.-Colonel Kelso.

His Majesty's 14th, and 2nd Bengal Volunteers.

Fourth Brigade, Lieut.-Colonel McLeod, His Majesty's 69th.

His Majesty's 69th, Royal Marines 300, flank companies 6th and 12th Madras Native Infantry.

Fifth Brigade, Lieut.-Colonel Smith, His Majesty's 65th.

Troop His Majesty's 25th Dragoons, His Majesty's 65th, and 1st Bengal Volunteers.¹

Reserve Brigade, Lieut.-Colonel Keating.

Flank companies, His Majesty's 12th and 33rd, His Majesty's 84th, and a detachment of Bombay Native Infantry under Captain Melach.

The troops at Fort Malartic near the head of the bay had retired to Port Louis on the appearance of the fleet.

The fifth brigade was left to secure the landing place, with orders to follow next day with the ammunition and stores. The remainder of the force marched at once about five miles along the coast, and bivouacked for the night. During this advance the reserve brigade, which was leading, was fired upon as it emerged from a wood into the plain, and Colonel Keating and Lieutenant Ashe of the 12th were wounded, and two men killed, but the enemy made no stand.

The march was resumed on the morning of the 30th, but the heat was so great that the force was obliged to halt and encamp at Moulin à Poudre, six miles from Port Louis.

During the afternoon a reconnoitring party under the French General Decaen attacked the piquets, and compelled them to retire ; but being reinforced, they advanced and drove back the enemy with some loss. Before daylight on the 1st December Colonel McLeod was

¹ The Madras and Bengal Volunteer Battalions were made up of volunteers from various regiments of those Presidencies.

detached with the fourth brigade to take possession of the batteries at the bays of Tortue and Tombeau, about a couple of miles to the right of the line of march, which service was successfully performed.

About 5 o'clock the main body moved on towards Port Louis for about two miles, when some 300 of the enemy, with 2 field pieces, were found assembled to dispute the passage of the river Tombeau. They were soon driven back, and the troops crossed the bridge, which, having been partially destroyed, would not admit of the passage of the guns. These had to cross by a ford lower down, thus causing some delay. About two miles farther on opposition was met with at the river Seche, but the enemy were driven back with the loss of about a hundred men, and pursued to the river Lataniers, near the outworks of the town. The force was then withdrawn beyond the range of the batteries, and encamped for the night. The total British loss amounted to Lieut.-Colonel Campbell, Major O'Keefe and twenty-six men killed, ninety-four wounded, and forty-five missing.

Next morning General Decaen proposed terms of capitulation, which were ratified on the 3rd December when the whole island was surrendered, together with 209 pieces of heavy ordnance, and a large quantity of ammunition and stores. The garrison consisted of only 1,300 regular troops, although there were upwards of 10,000 militia men who were, however, almost useless. The French troops and seamen were sent to France with their arms and colours and their personal effects at the expense of the British Government. Eight ships of war and 29 merchant vessels were captured in the harbour, as well as 3 British Indiamen which had been taken by the French, and about 2,000 English seamen and soldiers were released from confinement.

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PART IV.

THE MALAY PENINSULA AND ARCHIPELAGO.

THE MALAY PENINSULA AND ARCHIPELAGO.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE MALAY ARCHIPELAGO ; THE COUNTRY AND PEOPLE.

THE group of islands called the Malay Archipelago,* lie between latitude 10° N. and 10° S. and longitude 95° E. and 150° E.

General description of the Archipelago. to the south-east of Asia and north-west of Australia. They include Sumatra, Java, Borneo, Celebes, Banca, the Moluccas or Spice Islands, New Guinea, and the Philippines.

These islands nearly all present bold and picturesque profiles, though, at the same time, the character of the scenery varies from island to island and even from district to district ; from hot, steamy, low-lying swamps on the coast to forest-clad mountains inland. The mountains run for the most part in lines, either north-west and south-east, as in Sumatra, or from west to east, as in Java. The whole region is volcanic, a remarkable feature being the number and distribution of volcanoes both active and extinct. In the form of a rough horse-shoe they run south-east through Sumatra, and east, through Java and the southern isles, to Timor ; thence curving northwards through the Moluccas and again north from the end of Celebes through the whole line of the Philippines. The loftiest volcanic peaks are Indrapura in Sumatra (12,255 feet) and Semeru in Java (12,238 feet). Java, Sumatra, Borneo, and the lesser islands between them and the Asiatic mainland, all rest on a great submerged bank nowhere more than 100 fathoms below the surface of the sea, which may be considered a continuation of the continent. The Philippines, on the other hand, are almost surrounded by deep sea, but are connected with Borneo by two narrow submarine banks.

Produce. Most of the islands belong to the great equatorial forest belt which covers hills and plains with thick forests and luxuriant herbage. The vegetation, whether natural or cultivated, is very varied. In no part of

* See map 18 in pocket.

the world perhaps are the wants of man so easily supplied and with so little agricultural labour. In the lowlands are extensive rice-fields, and a large variety of fruits and vegetables which are obtainable throughout the year. On the mountains are large forests of teak and other trees. Sugar, coffee, and tea are largely cultivated, while various spices formed for a long time the most important articles of commerce. Tobacco, cotton, and indigo also flourish, and in hilly tracts wheat, barley, and oats are grown in small quantities. The only mineral of any importance is tin, which is obtained in Banca; though some coal is found in Sumatra and other places.

The heat of the sun renders some of the low-lying districts near the coast very trying; but the climate as a whole cannot be said to be oppressive or unhealthy. The temperature at sea level is high and subject only to slight variations, averaging about 80° throughout the year. There is, however, considerable variety of climate, as the islands are situated in the tropics, while the altitudes vary from sea level to 12,000 feet.

The north-west monsoon blows from about October to March, the south-east is prevalent during the rest of the year. The principal rainfall is during the north-west monsoon; as much as 28 inches has been recorded at Padang Pandjang in Sumatra, and in most places the annual rainfall is from 100 inches upwards. The climate is comparatively dry and the vegetation less luxurious in the districts reached by the south-east monsoon, after passing over Australia. For instance, the east end of Java has less rainfall (about 58 inches) than the west, and the distribution of rain is quite different on the northern and southern coasts. The fauna, like the flora, are abundant and varied, and in both cases Asiatic and Australasian forms are represented; the Sunda and western islands abounding in the former, while New Guinea and the eastern isles exhibit the latter. The sea yields an abundance of fish.

With regard to ethnology there are at least two main native races, the brown, long-haired Malay and the darker skinned, frizzly-haired Papuan. To these, a third and more thoroughly aboriginal race must be added.

The Malays, who were the last to enter the region, predominate in the Sunda Islands, whence they have spread sporadically over the eastern half of the archipelago. The type, however, is much mixed with Black Papuan in the eastern isles and with a pre-Malay Caucasian element in the west. The Malays of the coast are a maritime people. They were long famous for the daring character of their acts of piracy, but are now peaceful fisher-folk. Inland they live on the banks of rivers and build their houses on piles. Coconut, betel, sugar, and fruit trees and rice-fields, which furnish the staple article of food, surround their dwellings. They are not wanting in courage but prefer fighting behind stockades, which they are very skilful in constructing. The Malays are Sunni Muhammadans, but on the majority of them their religion sits very lightly. Prior to their conversion to Islam, the Malays were subject to a considerable Hindu influence, as indicated by their superstitions.

The Malays are sub-divided into an immense number of tribes, in the most varied stages of civilisation and broadly separated from each other by physical and linguistic characteristics. Of chief note are the Malays proper, the Javanese, the Bugis of Celebes, the Tagalas and Biscayas, the people of the Moluccas, the Dayaks of Borneo, the Battahs of Sumatra, and the Sulu Islanders. Besides these, whose connection with the archipelago dates from before the dawn of history, there is a variety of foreign blood. A Hindu strain is evident in Java and other western islands; Muhammadans of various countries, from Arabia to India, are found more or less amalgamated with many of the Malay peoples; and the Chinese in the more civilised districts are of importance in the community; they established themselves at an early date, and the first Dutch invaders found them at Jacatra; many, in Ternate and elsewhere, have even acquired the Malay speech to the disuse of their native tongue.

The first Europeans to visit the Indian Ocean were the Portuguese. Prior to their appearance off
 History. Sumatra in 1509, a Hindu civilisation, having its chief seat in Java, had flourished and waned, and Muhammadanism had succeeded to a considerable share of its inheritance. When the Portuguese name had become familiar in the islands, the Spaniards under Magellan, in 1521, made their appearance from

the east. Hostilities ensued, which continued until the treaty of 1529 by which the boundary between the Spaniards and Portuguese was fixed. The two powers remained undisturbed, except by an unimportant French expedition, until 1596, when the Dutch reached what was destined to be the scene of their greatest colonial achievements. In that year Cornelis Hautman appeared before Bantam, the chief town of the powerful kingdom of Java, and his expedition was the precursor of many from Holland. The commercial success of these enterprises led, in 1602, to the establishment of the Dutch East India Company, which obtained by government charter the monopoly of the Dutch trade of the countries between the Straits of Magellan and the Cape of Good Hope, with the right of concluding treaties and appointing governors. The first fleet sent out by the new Company under Van der Hagan captured the Portuguese fort of Amboina; and the peace of Treves in 1609 freed the Dutch from the interference of the Spaniards. In the same year the States General appointed a governor of the East Indies, giving the Company the right of appointing his successor, subject to their approval.

The instructions given to Pieter Both, the first governor, struck the key-note of that policy which has brought so much obloquy on the Dutch name, and prevented the better features of their colonial administration from being appreciated. He was to "give all endeavour in order that the commerce of the Moluccas, Amboina, and Banda should belong to the Company and that no other nation in the world should have the least part." When he came into power there were already Dutch forts at Jilolo, Ternate, and Batchian, and the people of Banda had granted the Dutch the monopoly of the nutmeg trade. It was to the fourth governor (J. P. Coen, 1619-1623 and 1627-1629), who founded Batavia in 1620, that the Company was most indebted for territorial aggrandisement. During his rule a treaty was concluded between the English and Dutch companies, but the goodwill which resulted was not of long duration. The governorship of Van Diemen, 1636-1645, was signalised by a series of successes over the Portuguese, and during the latter part of this century Dutch power extended rapidly over the archipelago. Peace was made with Portugal in 1661 and various native kingdoms were

acquired. The Dutch remained supreme until the latter part of the 18th century, when their power was greatly reduced by the rapidly growing predominance of the English in India. On the union of Holland with France in 1795 England declared war, and the Indian Government despatched their first expedition against the Dutch colonies.

CHAPTER XX.

THE EXPEDITION TO MANILA.

THE British East India Company was for a long time merely a trading company, but its rivalry with the French and the outbreak of war compelled it to start raising troops in 1746. These were first employed overseas on the outbreak of war with Spain in 1762.

The declaration of war was read to the garrison of Fort St.

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|--|-------|
| Expedition to Manila, 1 | |
| Composition of the expedition:— | |
| His Majesty's 79th Regiment (Draper's) about | 450 |
| Royal Artillery .. | 60 |
| Madras Artillery .. | 30 |
| 2 companies Foreign deserters 1 .. | 200 |
| 1 company Coffrees 2 .. | 80 |
| 1 company Topasses 3 .. | 80 |
| Pioneers (Europeans) .. | 60 |
| Madras sepoy ⁴ .. | 650 |
| Nawab's European Infantry .. | 60 |
| Total .. | 1,670 |

George in June 1762, and preparations were made for an expedition against Manila*. Brigadier-General Draper was appointed to command the troops detailed in the margin, Colonel Masson being 2nd-in-command and Major Scott, His Majesty's 79th Highland Regiment, Adjutant-General. The naval portion of the expedition, under the command of Admiral Sir Samuel Cornish, consisted of fourteen sail, ten of which carried fifty guns and upwards.

The first division of the fleet sailed from Madras on 21st July and the remainder on August 1st. At Malacca a great quantity of ratoons were shipped for use as gabions. On 23rd September the squadron came to anchor in Manila Bay. Manila, the capital of the Philippines, is in the Isle de Luzon, the largest of the group. The island is 40,885 square miles in extent, having a main range of mountains running north and south. The country to the south-west and in the neighbourhood of Manila is flat, and in the dry season almost bare of vegetation.

Description of Manila.

Manila, the capital of the Philippines, is in the Isle

¹ These were unreliable and nearly the whole had deserted before the island was evacuated in 1764.

² Africans, who were largely employed

in the Madras Army.

³ Portuguese half-castes.

⁴ Composed of details from various battalions.

* See map 18 in pocket.

The town itself is situated on the eastern shore of a bay 120 nautical miles in circumference, and on the south bank of the river Passig, which is navigable as far as a lake some 30 miles east, whence it takes its rise. The climate is healthy, the mean temperature being 82·6 Fahr. The hot weather lasts from March to June, storms being frequent during the rest of the year. The harbour is unsafe during the north-east and south-west monsoons. The original inhabitants were Nigretos, who still exist in limited numbers. They were driven into the more inaccessible parts by successive invasions of Malays, who in different stages of civilisation now form the bulk of the population.

In the neighbourhood of Manila the principal tribe is the Tagalas, a physically well-developed race, rice-eaters, dwelling in houses built on piles.

When the expedition arrived before Manila, the garrison of the town consisted of only about 800 Spanish troops under the Marquis de Villa Medina ; there were, however, a large number of half-castes, and thousands of natives came in to their assistance.

The troops of the garrison were :—

Life Guard of the Governor.

A weak battalion of the King's Regiment, commanded by Don Migue de Valdez.

Some Spanish marines.

A corps of artillery.

A company of cadets.

A company of Irregular Pampangos¹ or natives of the Isle de Luzon.

The Archbishop of the Philippines was at this time the Governor ; from his intrepidity and resolution, a determined resistance was expected, and, as the Spaniards were totally unprepared, it was decided to lose no time in striking an effective blow.

A convenient landing-place having been selected two miles south of Manila, three frigates stood in close to the shore to cover the disembarkation. The troops, with three field-pieces and a mortar fixed in the long-boats,

Landing effected.

¹ Pampango, the name of a district and tribe to the north of Manila, was apparently applied to all the Spanish native auxiliaries.

assembled in boats, and at about 6 P.M. on 23rd September pushed off for the shore under Colonel Draper. The landing was difficult owing to the surf, and the boats in many instances were flung against each other and dashed to pieces. Much ammunition was damaged, and many arms, but fortunately no lives, were lost. The enemy had collected in force to oppose the landing, but under cover of the fire of the frigates this was successfully achieved, and next day a battalion of 632 seamen was landed to co-operate.

On 25th the *Polverista*, a fort which the Spaniards had abandoned, was seized as a place of arms, and a detachment of 200 men, under Colonel Monson, was sent to reconnoitre the approaches to the town, the suburbs of which were now in flames, having been set fire to by the Spaniards. It was found that the town was of great extent, with regular fortifications which were not, however, complete. In many important places the ditch had not been finished, the covered-way was out of repair, the glacis too low, and some of the earthworks were without cannon.

The half-ruined suburbs afforded shelter to the besiegers. The *Hermita Church* and priest's house, some 900 yards from the walls, were occupied by the 79th, for the post was now of consequence as the monsoon had broken and the surf was more dangerous than ever, making communication with the fleet difficult. The artillery and stores were nevertheless landed, though at much risk. The whole country was deluged by rain, compelling the troops to seek shelter anywhere; they frequently occupied scattered houses under fire from the walls and too near the town for safety. On the 26th September, 400 Spaniards with two field-pieces made a sortie, but were driven back by the 79th with the loss of a gun. Operations were now pushed forward with unremitting vigour, and batteries for guns and mortars were raised. The bombardment continued day and night. "The post we were obliged to attack," wrote Colonel Draper, "was defended by the bastions of *St. Diego* and *St. Anrew* with orillons and retired flanks; a ravelin, which covered the *Royal Gate*, a wet ditch, covered way, and glacis. The bastions were in excellent order, and lined with a great number of fine brass cannon." As the force was too small to invest the city, two sides were constantly open to those who brought in provisions

and to the hordes of natives of whose services the commandant availed himself; but the attacks of these molested rather than obstructed the besiegers. On October 1st there was a heavy storm which endangered the fleet and cut off all communication with it; but as the roaring of the waves prevented the Spaniards from hearing, the attackers, who worked all night, availed themselves of it to complete a new battery for 24-pounders and 13-inch mortars. About three hours before daybreak on the 4th, over 1,000 Pampangos, encouraged by the conviction that the incessant rain would render the firearms useless, attacked the seamen. Armed only with bows and spears, they approached unseen along the bed of a rivulet bordered by thick bushes, and completely surprised the sailors, who, however, held their ground until daybreak, when a strong piquet of the 79th attacked the enemy in flank and routed them with a loss of 300. In this affair Captain Porter of the *Norfolk* and many seamen were killed. Simultaneously, the enemy made another sortie at a different point, and the sepoys who held a church, being driven back, the building was occupied by Spanish musketeers of the Royal Regiment. Field-pieces were brought up to dislodge them, and they were driven inside the walls with the loss of seventy men; but not before Captain Strachan and forty men of the 79th were wounded. After the failure of these two sorties the natives lost heart, and all, except 1,800, abandoned the city to its fate.

The fire from the garrison now grew fainter, while the besiegers' fire was stronger than ever. Before long a breach became practicable, which, strange to say, the Spaniards made no attempt to repair; neither did they make preparations to defend it. At daybreak on 6th October the troops were under arms and advanced towards the breach in the bastion of St. Andrew. A large body of Spaniards appeared, but, on some shells exploding among them, they retired. "We took immediate advantage of this," says Colonel Draper, "and by the signal of a general discharge of our artillery and mortars rushed furiously to the assault under cover of a thick smoke that blew directly towards the town." Lieutenant Russell of the 49th with sixty Volunteers, led the way, followed by the grenadiers and the engineers with the pioneers and workmen. Behind them "Colonel Monson and Major More led two grand divisions of the 79th;

the battalion of seamen advanced next, sustained by two other divisions of the 79th; the Company's troops closing the rear." In this order they stormed the breach. Little resistance was offered except at the Royal Gate, where Major More was shot by an arrow, and in the Grand Square, from the houses of which the Royal Regiment d'España fired briskly and inflicted considerable loss. In the guard-house above the Royal Gate 100 Spaniards and natives, who refused all terms, were put to the sword, and 300 more, who endeavoured to escape over the river, were drowned. The Archbishop and principal officers retired to the town house, where, after a time, they capitulated.

The conditions involved the cession of the whole Philippine Archipelago and the payment of 4,000,000 dollars to save Manila from pillage. A vast quantity of munitions of war and 675 cannon of various kinds were taken.

The natives continued hostile after the capture, and it would appear that, excepting the capital, most of the country remained in possession of the enemy. In a report to the Madras Government, dated 25th December 1762, the following occurs: "The small garrison we have at present is but barely sufficient to secure us from attempts even within our own walls. . . ; until your honour can reinforce us we shall be little better than the nominal masters of these new possessions; we therefore most earnestly entreat you will be pleased to send us as soon as possible 2,000 sepoy, with whom, and the Europeans we have, we do not despair of. . . settling the country in due time." In this expedition there is a curious instance of the use of mounted infantry; the report goes on: "To keep the enemy's horse in awe, which are very numerous, General Draper thought proper to mount 50 sepoy upon the horses that were found straggling here; we have already experienced their use, and as cavalry can be kept up at a very small charge in this country, we propose augmenting this troop to 100 men as soon as we have sepoy enough to spare from the walls." The troops were withdrawn from

¹ In the Mahratta War of 1817-18, General Smith employed sepoy as mounted infantry in the same manner for the pursuit of Bajji Rao, Peshwa.

Manila in 1764 ; in this movement, gross mismanagement occurred, which fostered a strong dislike for foreign service among the sepoys. One detachment of 300 sepoys did not reach Madras until the end of August, 1767, by which time their numbers had been reduced to 200 from bad and insufficient food and overcrowding.

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CHAPTER XXI.

MALACCA AND THE SPICE ISLANDS.

IN 1784 a detachment of four companies native infantry was sent from Bengal to reinforce the Company's settlement at Fort Marlborough, Bencoolen, on the south-west coast of Sumatra, where disturbances were threatened ; one object in despatching these troops was to overcome the aversion of the sepoys to service beyond the seas ; the detachment returned in December, having suffered much loss from sickness.

In January 1791, two companies 30th Battalion, Bengal Native Infantry, were detached on service to Prince of Wales Island, Penang, which had in 1785 been ceded by the Raja of Kedah in consideration for an annual payment. In the following April these companies were employed in some operations in Kedah territory on the coast of Malacca. A semi-piratical body of Malays, with 110 boats and a considerable land force, had assembled on the mainland in Province Wellesley. Here they raised stockades at Point Pria and sent a defiance to Penang. Consequently, a force was landed under Captain Glass consisting of :—

- 1 Company, Native Artillery.
- 2 Companies, 30th Bengal Native Infantry under Lieutenant Yromar Williamson.
- 20 Europeans.

This small body at once attacked the enemy's entrenched position, the advance being covered by the fire of four gunboats. The Malays were unprepared for such an assault, and after a feeble resistance were defeated and driven off. Next day the gunboats attacked the Malay *prahus*, and two days later finally defeated and dispersed them. During these operations only four men were killed and twenty wounded, including Lieutenant Williamson.

Intelligence of the union of Holland with France in 1795 was received at Madras about June. Operations were therefore undertaken against the Dutch settlements in the East Indies.

Before narrating the operations against Malacca, Amboyna, the Banda Islands, and Ternate, it will be as well to give a short account of these places.

Malacca (latitude $2^{\circ} 1' N.$ and longitude $102^{\circ} 14' E.$) is situated on the western side of the Malay Peninsula. It was settled by the Portuguese in 1511 and passed into the hands of the Dutch in 1641; its importance as the only foreign entrepot for merchandise in the East was retained until after the founding of Penang (which was in turn eclipsed by Singapore in 1837) in 1785, when its fortunes as a port rapidly declined. The climate is hot and moist, the temperature varying from 72° — 80° Fahr., but is notwithstanding remarkably healthy. The country is undulating, the only mountain being Mount Ophir (4,400 feet). Tin mines were opened in 1793 and worked until comparatively recent times.

Amboyna was at this time the capital and seat of government of the Spice Islands. It is about 60 miles in extent north and south, and was the next settlement to Batavia in wealth and consequence. The fort was founded by the Portuguese and captured from them by the Dutch in 1605. The island is characterised by wooded hills and green valleys enriched with cultivation. When the Dutch by 1627 had obtained possession of the whole of the Spice Islands, they entered on a policy of laying waste all other clove plantations, and confining the cultivation of cloves to Amboyna with a view of securing the monopoly.

The bay on which the town (Lat. $3^{\circ} 40' S.$, Long. $128^{\circ} 15' E.$) is situated stretches about 20 miles inland, nearly separating the island into two parts. The entrance is between two high and steep points six miles apart, and the bay gradually narrows towards the town where it is about two miles across. The principal fort is Fort Victoria on the sea face of the town; redoubts defend other parts. The two principal were Battoo Gantong on the heights west of the town, and Wanetto some 1,500 yards further west, on a small hill.

The Amboynese are Muhammadans; they are taller, less stubborn and more amenable to discipline than most other of the island tribes; they made excellent soldiers and were largely enlisted by the Dutch.

The Banda Isles (Lat. $4^{\circ} 31' S.$, Long. $130^{\circ} E.$) are a group of 10 small islands. The Dutch had exterminated the aborigines and confined the cultivation of nutmegs to the group in the same way as that of cloves to Amboyna. Consequently, nearly the entire surface of the islands was divided into plantations. The Dutch first possessed themselves of Lontor or Great Banda, the largest island, which is about 9 miles long and $2\frac{1}{4}$ broad at its widest part; on this they built Fort Hollandia which was afterwards allowed to go to ruin. A narrow strait separates it on the north from Neira, an island $2\frac{1}{4}$ miles long by $\frac{3}{4}$ mile broad. This was defended by two forts—Nassau, which commanded the passage between the two isles; and Belgica directly above it. Nassau was a square fort entirely commanded by Fort Belgica, which was of stone and in shape a pentagon. The anchorage is abreast of Gonang Apce, a volcanic islet 1,500 feet high, lying to the west of Neira and separated from it by a narrow strait.

Ternate is a small island west of Jilolo. The King of Ternate formerly exercised sovereignty over all the adjacent Molucca Islands including the northern half of Jilolo and Bachian, the fort of the Portuguese who first visited them in 1510. On the Dutch taking possession in 1607, the native princes were forced to submit to the humiliating conditions of their new conquerors; but although the importance of the state declined, the King of Ternate was still at this time the most powerful of the Molucca princes.

The island is of small extent, and the Dutch had spared no pains or expense to render the fortifications as formidable as they could in order to keep off intruders. They had built three forts named Orange, Holland, and Williamstadt. Orange on the east side, the principal fort, was situated by the chief town (Lat. $0^{\circ} 50' N.$, Long. $127^{\circ} 32' E.$) on the shore with a good anchorage close by.

The Malacca expedition,
1795.

43 officers and men, Madras Artillery.

350 officers and men, 1st and 3rd European Battalion.

100 Pioneers.

Fort at Malacca surrendered on 18th August.

On the 23rd July 1795 an expedition against Malacca, composed of the troops detailed in the margin, under command of Major Archibald Brown of the Madras Army, sailed from Madras. No opposition was offered to the landing, and on being summoned, the

At the close of the year a force was organized at Malacca against Amboyna and other possessions of the Dutch in the Eastern Seas. It sailed from Malacca on 6th January 1796 under Rear Admiral Rainier. The Squadron consisted of H. M. Ships *Suffolk* 74, *Centurion* 50, *Resistance* 44, *Orpheus* 32, *Swift* 16 guns; one or two of the East India Company's ships; and three transports.

The troops, under the command of Major Urban Vigors, consisted of —

Detachment, Madras Artillery.

2 Flank Companies, 3rd European Battalion.

2 Battalion Companies, 2nd European Battalion.

7 Companies, 17th Native Infantry, Captain Gordon.

51 Pioneers, Lieutenant Heitland.

On the 16th February the expedition arrived off Amboyna. The troops landed that afternoon and took possession without resistance. One hundred and sixty-four guns, 7 mortars, 51,900lb of gunpowder, 1,118 muskets, and a large quantity of stores were found in the works. Leaving two companies of Europeans and 3 companies of the 17th Native Infantry as a garrison, Rear-Admiral Rainier sailed for the Banda Islands.

The expedition reached Banda-Neira on 7th March and early in the afternoon of the 8th, the troops and marines disembarked under cover of H.M.S.

Orpheus and East India Company's *Harling*.

There was some firing between these two ships and two batteries of two guns each, but the batteries were soon silenced. Banda-Neira surrendered without further fighting. Three hundred and sixty-seven pieces of ordnance and 45,050lb of gunpowder were found on the various islands.

In February two companies of European Infantry left Madras for Malacca, and in July some further reinforcements sailed for Amboyna and Banda under Major Macneile.

In November 1799, the garrison of Malacca, Amboyna, and Banda was fixed at:—

1 Company Artillery.

1 Regiment European Infantry.

1 Battalion Native Infantry.

On August 11th the Bengal Marine Battalion, 747 strong, with 289 followers, including women and children, embarked at Madras for the relief of the Madras native troops at Malacca and Amboyna.

Expedition to Ternate, 1801.

Early in 1801, at the instance of Mr. Farquhar, Resident at Amboyna, Colonel Burr, commanding the troops in the Moluccas, organized an expedition against Ternate.

The troops employed were:—

Madras Artillery—22 Europeans and 8 gun lascars, (Captain Ross).

Madras European Regiment—83 rank and file, (Captain Walker, 4th Madras Native Infantry).

Bombay Marine—40 Europeans, (Lieutenant Hayes, Indian Navy).

Wurtemberg Company—36 Europeans, (Captain Gaupp).

Madras Pioneers—20 men, (Lieutenant Wissett, 9th Madras Native Infantry).

Bengal Marine Battalion—60 men, (Lieutenant Gill).

First Bengal Native Infantry—9 men.

Volunteer Corps—53 men, (Captain Boles, 3rd Madras Native Infantry).

Europeans 178, Natives 170, Total 348.

Although the force was small, it was considered sufficient, as Captain Astlé, the senior naval officer on the station, had promised to cooperate.

The Dutch force was supposed not to exceed 50 Europeans and 2,000 trained natives. The detachment left Amboyna on 22nd January under the escort of H. M. frigate *La Virginie* and the sloop *Hobart*, accompanied by the Company's armed vessels *Ternate* and *Splinter*. The fleet anchored off Ternate on the 10th February, and arrangements were made to attack Fort Orange next day; but as Captain Astlé insisted that a detached work should be taken before any attempt was made on the principal fort, Colonel Burr was obliged to give way.

The boats containing the troops left the ships about 11 A.M. on the 11th, and reached the shore about 1 P.M. The ships kept up a fire all the time, but from such a distance that many of the shot fell short. The jungle at the landing-place was so dense that the detachment was obliged to make a considerable detour. After being led by guides for about an hour along a path so narrow that the men

had to advance in single file, the force came in sight of the fort standing in an open clearing. The troops, after a short halt, advanced to the assault, but were received with so heavy a fire of grape and musketry, aided by that of two field-pieces which opened on their right flank, that they were obliged to retreat with considerable loss. Meanwhile the *Ternate* and *Splinter* engaged the sea face of the fort, but their guns were too light to make any impression.

Colonel Burr, on the 12th, urged Captain Astlé to cooperate with him effectually by anchoring closer to the fort. As he declined, the expedition returned to Amboyna, leaving behind several wounded and two field-pieces, which, owing to the surf, could not be re-embarked. Colonel Burr attributed the failure to want of cooperation on the part of Captain Astlé, who withheld the assistance he had promised in the shape of seamen and marines.

The *Albion* transport, which had sailed for Madras with 150 sepoys, was obliged to put back early in March owing to stress of weather. Colonel Burr and Mr. Farquhar, being anxious to retrieve the failure, took advantage of this to make another attempt. On the 2nd April a detachment of Europeans and natives, amounting to 329 fighting men, sailed for Ternate under the escort of the East India Company's squadron, composed of the *Swift*, commanded by Lieutenant Hayes, the *Star*, the *Splinter*, and the *Resource*. Captain Astlé declined to join the expedition.

The ships anchored off Ternate on the 23rd April; the troops were landed and operations began a few days afterwards. The strong redoubt of Kaya-Meira surrendered on the 8th May, but, being commanded by the hill of Talangnamy, the acquisition was of little immediate use. A few days later, a party detached from camp near the captured redoubt constructed a battery from which fire was opened on Talangnamy on the 17th. The enemy immediately made a vigorous sortie, which was repulsed, but they renewed the attack on the 18th, and were not driven back until after a sharp struggle, in which twelve men were killed and many wounded.

The battery continued to fire on Talangnamy, which was abandoned by the enemy, who carried off their guns on the night of the 22nd. Twice during the month Lieutenant Hayes cannonaded

Fort Orange without producing much effect, though he himself lost several men killed and wounded while the *Swift* sustained some damage.

Slow progress was made during the early part of June owing to the smallness of the force, the obstinate resistance of the enemy, and the number of detached works to be reduced before Fort Orange could be closely invested. This was at length effected, and, several boats laden with provisions having been intercepted by the squadron, the garrison became distressed. On the morning of the 21st June, Fort Orange, with its dependencies, was surrendered. The place was found to be so strong that it could not have been taken by the weak force before it, had it not been destitute of provisions. Captain J. Walker with a small garrison was left in charge of the island and the remainder of the expedition returned to Amboyna.

In 1802 all the foreign settlements which had been captured, Ceylon excepted, were restored.

Amboyna, 1810.

The peace of Amiens in 1802, by which all conquests in the Malay Archipelago were restored, was not of long duration. War soon broke out again, and the British arms in India were speedily triumphant. The security of India being thus ensured, the Indian Government were in a position to direct attention to expeditions beyond the seas, and in October 1809 the frigate *Dover* of 38 guns, the *Cornwallis* of 44 guns, and the sloop *Samarang* of 18 guns, sailed for the Dutch settlements in the Eastern Isles, having on board a detachment of Madras Artillery under Captain Court, and one of the Madras European regiments under Captain Phillips. Captain Tucker of the *Dover* was in command of the whole.

The expedition arrived at Amboyna on the 13th or 14th February 1810, and anchored some little distance from the land in order to reconnoitre the defences. The principal of these was Fort Victoria and the batteries to the right and left of it, mounting altogether 215 cannon, with an extremely strong sea-face. A little further to the right of the fort was the Wagoo battery, mounting nine guns; and, far out in the sea, built upon piles, was a battery of 10 guns. On the heights Wanetto mounted five 12, two 8, and two

6-prs. and two 5½-inch howitzers, and Batto-Gantong had four 12 and one 9-prs. Both these batteries commanded the town of Amboyna as well as Fort Victoria and the anchorage. The garrison consisted of 130 European and 1,000 Javanese and Madurese troops, supplemented by 220 officers and seamen.

The boats left the ships with the troops about 1 A.M., on the 15th, but they missed the landing-place in the dark, and a discharge of rockets from the fort indicating that the enemy were prepared, the attempt at a surprise was abandoned and the boats returned to the squadron.

About 2 P.M. on 16th, after a further reconnoissance, the troops landed under cover of the fire of the ships. The landing party consisted of—

| | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------|
| Detachment Madras Artillery | 46 (Lieutenant Stewart). |
| Madras European Regiment | 130 |
| Seamen and Marines | 225 |
| | --- |
| Total | 401 men. |

A division of 180 men under Captain Phillips immediately advanced against the battery at Wanetto, which was carried after determined opposition. Three of the captured guns were brought to bear upon the retreating enemy, and subsequently upon the position of Batto-Gantong; this battery had opened fire upon the British, the instant they had taken possession of Wanetto. Captain Phillips, leaving a small party in Wanetto, then proceeded to attack Batto-Gantong, but finding the approach barred by an impracticable ravine, he was obliged to desist. The possession of Wanetto also gave the British the command of the Wayoo battery, which the enemy deserted soon after the guns of the former were turned upon it. In the meantime, Captain Court, with the remainder of the force, proceeded along the heights to turn the enemy's position at Batto-Gantong. After a most fatiguing march through thick underwood, this party, a little after sunset, reached an eminence that commanded Batto-Gantong; whereupon the enemy spiked the guns and retreated. Captain Court then took possession of this important post and thereby rendered the Water battery untenable. During the advance of the troops against the batteries on the heights, the fleet had engaged the shore batteries and was itself

exposed to a heavy fire ; the success of the troops, however, now enabled it to anchor in safety in Portuguese Bay. During the night Batto-Gantong was reinforced by forty men and two field-pieces, and the guns abandoned by the enemy were unspiked. Early on 17th fire was opened on the town and Fort Victoria with considerable effect, and the commandant agreed to capitulate for the surrender of the whole island. The British loss amounted to four Europeans killed and one Lieutenant and ten men wounded.

Banda-Neira, 1810.

On the 6th May 1810, two companies of the Madras European Regiment, under Captain Nixon, sailed from Madras for Amboyna in the frigates *Caroline* and *Piedmontaise* of thirty-six and thirty-eight guns respectively, and the 18-gun brig *Barracouta*. Captain Cole of the *Caroline*, who commanded the squadron, having received permission to attempt the second reduction of the Banda Isles *en route* to Amboyna, touched at Penang, where he took in some military stores and scaling ladders. The *Barracouta* was detached to Malacca, where she embarked twenty men of the Madras Artillery and two field-pieces under Lieutenant Yeates. These preparations having been completed, the squadron proceeded on its voyage and arrived off the Banda Isles on August 8th.

Banda-Neira, the principal island, was selected for attack. Great trouble had been taken over the defences of this island since its former capture by the British. It was defended by ten batteries exclusive of Fort Nassau and Fort Belgica ; this last was considered impregnable, and mounted fifty-two guns commanding the rest of the defences. The garrison of Banda-Neira was 700 regular troops and 800 militia.

Captain Cole had determined to attempt a surprise, but at 9 P.M., when still several miles from Banda-Neira, he was fired at from the small island of Rosensgan, showing that the enemy were on the alert. The only chance of a surprise now lay in a boat-attack by night. The squadron was consequently brought to about 9-30 P.M., and the boats were hoisted out and filled with one day's provisions and 50 rounds of ball cartridge for each man. At 10 P.M. the moon set, and the night became dark and squally. At about 11 P.M. the boats started on this long pull, carrying a landing-party of 140 seamen and marines and 40 soldiers of the Madras

European Regiment, under the command of Captain Cole. After a pull of about 4 hours the boats assembled off the island, and made for the point of attack. About 100 yards from the shore and directly opposite the battery of Voerzigtheid, the boats grounded on a coral reef. The storm was so violent however that they were not detected. The men, leaping into the water, launched the boats over the reef and about 1½ hours before day-light the little force landed in a sandy cove. The battery was instantly attacked in rear by a party of seamen armed with pikes under Captain Kenah and Lieutenant Carew. The surprise was so complete that the sentry was killed and an officer and sixty men captured without creating an alarm.

Leaving a small guard in this battery, the detachment rapidly advanced against Fort Belgica and arrived within 100 yards before being discovered. An ineffectual fire of musketry was opened, but the assaulting party rushed forward, and, placing ladders against the walls, was instantly in possession of the outer works. The ladders were then hauled up and placed against the inner wall but proved too short. Fortunately, however, the gate was at this moment opened to admit the commandant, who lived outside. The British at once made a rush and by 5-30 A.M. were in possession of the fort; the Dutch colonel and ten others were killed and forty-four prisoners taken. Shortly after daylight the men-of-war stood into the harbour, and as Fort Belgica commanded the town and fortifications, the enemy surrendered unconditionally together with the dependent islands. This brilliant capture was achieved without the loss of a single man.

Capture of Ternate, 1810.

On the 21st August 1810, a detachment under the command of Captain Forbes, with Lieutenants Forbes and Cursham, all of the Madras European Regiment, embarked on H. M. S. *Dover* at Amboyna on the requisition of Captain Tucker, for an attempt upon Ternate, the last remaining Dutch possession of any consequence in the Moluccas. The garrison consisted of 500 regulars, 203 European inhabitants and seamen, and some 500 of the Raja of Ternate's native troops. It was determined to attack first the detached work—Fort Kayo-Meira. A landing was effected at Sasa,

a village screened by a point of land from Kayo-Meira and its fire, about 7 A.M. on 28th.

The troops commanded by Captain David Forbes consisted of—

| | | | | | |
|------------------|----|----|-------|----|-------|
| Madras Europeans | .. | .. | .. | .. | 74 |
| Amboynese | .. | .. | .. | .. | 32 |
| Marines | .. | .. | .. | .. | 36 |
| Seamen | .. | .. | .. | .. | 32 |
| | | | | | <hr/> |
| | | | Total | .. | 174 |
| | | | | | <hr/> |

Captain Forbes marched inland towards a height which was supposed to command Fort Kayo-Meira and to have been occupied by our troops in the previous expedition in 1801. It was reached about noon, but, owing to thick forest, nothing could be seen from it. Captain Forbes, having determined to storm Kayo-Meira, set out again about 7 P.M., in the direction of the fort. Finding the road rendered impassable by large trees which had been cut down and thrown across it, he turned to the right and advanced, with much difficulty and in total darkness, along the course of a stream. He reached the beach about 10 P.M., and brought his party to within a hundred yards of the fort before being discovered. The enemy then opened fire, but the attacking party, pressing forward, crossed the ditch and speedily escalated and captured the fort. Owing to the darkness and rapidity of the advance, the casualties were only three killed and 14 wounded. At daylight on August 29th the battery of Kota Barro (a fort between Kayo-Meira and Fort Orange) opened a heavy fire. About 2 P.M. Captain Tucker succeeded in laying H.M.S. *Dover* opposite this battery and quickly silenced it. He then passed on towards another shore battery, and, becoming exposed to Fort Orange, was hotly engaged, when the enemy recommenced their fire from Kota Barro. Captain Tucker had to return and had just silenced it a second time when it was taken in rear and captured by Lieutenant Cursham, who had been sent from Kayo-Meira by Captain Forbes for that purpose. Kota Barro being secured, its guns were turned against the town and the *Dover* reopened her fire against the Strand Batteries and Fort Orange. The garrison, having suffered severely from this fire, surrendered about 5 P.M. The British took possession on August 31st and found ninety mounted and twenty-nine dismounted guns in the works.

CHAPTER XXII.

THE CONQUEST OF JAVA AND SUMATRA.

THE practicability of the conquest of Java, which, together with the other settlements of the Dutch in the Eastern seas, had been incorporated with the French Empire, had, for some time, been under consideration; but the undertaking was postponed until after the capture of the Mauritius which was accomplished in December 1810. Preparations were then made both at Madras and in Bengal, and these were completed early in 1811.

This expedition, under the command of Sir Samuel Auchmuty, was composed as follows:—The army of Composition of the expeditionary force. invasion was divided into three parts, namely,

The advance, commanded by Colonel R. R. Gillespie, and consisting of:—

| | | | | |
|--|----|----|----|---------------------|
| Right Flank Battalion | .. | .. | .. | Major Miller. |
| Left Flank Battalion | .. | .. | .. | Major Fraser. |
| Detachment, 89th Regiment | | .. | .. | Major Butler. |
| Royal Marines | .. | .. | .. | Captain Liardet. |
| Bengal Light Infantry Volunteer Battalion ¹ | .. | | .. | Major Dalton. |
| Governor-General's Body-Guard | | .. | .. | Captain Gall. |
| Pioneers | .. | .. | .. | Captain Smithwayte. |
| Horse Artillery | .. | .. | .. | Captain Noble. |
| Detachment, 22nd Dragoons | | .. | .. | Major Travers. |

The line, commanded by Major-General Wetherall, and comprising:—

| | |
|--|--|
| <p><i>Left Brigade.</i>—Lieutenant-Colonel Adams.</p> <p>H. M. 78th Regiment—Major Lindsey.</p> <p>6th Battalion, Bengal Volunteers—Major Raban.</p> <p>H. M. 69th Regiment—Lieutenant-Colonel McLeod.</p> | <p><i>Right Brigade.</i>—Colonel Gibbs.</p> <p>H. M. 59th Regiment—Lieutenant-Colonel McLeod.</p> <p>5th Battalion, Bengal Volunteers—Captain Griffiths.</p> <p>H. M. 14th Regiment—Lieutenant-Colonel Watson.</p> |
|--|--|

¹ Native troops were not formerly enlisted for service overseas; and for such expeditions Volunteers were called for from various regiments, and formed into battalions.

The Reserve, commanded by Colonel Wood, and composed of :—

| | | | |
|--|----|----|----------------------|
| 4th Battalion, Bengal Volunteers | .. | .. | Major Grant. |
| 1st Battalion, 20th or Marine Regiment | .. | .. | Lieut.-Col. Loveday. |
| 3rd Battalion, Bengal Volunteers | .. | .. | .. |
| Flank Battalion | .. | .. | Major Yule. |

There were, in addition, detachments of Pioneers,² Bengal Artillery, Royal Artillery, and Engineers. The whole force amounted to 324 officers, 123 native officers, 5,144 European rank and file, 5,530 native rank and file, 839 pioneers, lascars, etc. : total 11,960 ; but of these 1,200 were left sick at Malacca and 1,500 were sick on landing in Java.

The fleet employed for this expedition was composed of four line-of-battle-ships, fourteen frigates, seven sloops, eight of the Honourable Company's cruisers, fifty-seven transports and several gunboats, amounting in all to one hundred sail.

The first division of the expeditionary force, under command

of Colonel Robert Rollo Gillespie, set sail
 Voyage to Java. from Madras roads on April 18th, 1811,

the remainder following a week later under Major-General Wetherall. During one of the violent hurricanes, to which these seas are subject, several vessels, including H. M. S. *Dover*, were driven on shore and lost, whilst in the second convoy forty horses died of suffocation during a storm. The first rendezvous was at Penang, which was reached on May 18th and 21st. At Malacca, the next port, the force was joined by the Bengal troops, and by Lord Minto, the Governor-General, and Sir Samuel Auchmuty.

On June 11th the expedition sailed for Singapore, and thence, after calling at High Islands and experiencing some very rough weather, passed round the coast of Borneo, and reached Point Sambar on July 20th. The fleet arrived at Bumpkin Island on the 30th, where a halt was made until the arrival of Colonel Mackenzie, who had been detached to reconnoitre for a landing-place, and who returned on August 2nd with the requisite information. It having been decided to effect a landing at Chillingching, ten miles east of Batavia, the fleet again set sail, and having made Cape Carawang on the evening of August 3rd, ran into the mouth of the Marandi river next morning and anchored off the point selected for the descent.

Before proceeding further with the narrative, it is advisable to give some account of the country which
 The island of Java. was to be the scene of the approaching conflict.

This island, one of the most considerable and certainly the most important of Malaysia, had been occupied by the Portuguese but had been taken from them by the Dutch, under whose rule it had formerly attained a condition of great prosperity which had declined with the decay of the Dutch nation.

On the incorporation of Holland with the French republican system, Java passed under the domination of the French, and thus became an object for British conquest, which, owing to our command of the sea, could be carried out with comparative ease. The only difficulties were the fact that available charts were inferior and that the voyage in an equatorial climate would be trying in the small ships available for transports.

The island is crossed from east to west by the great forest-clad Blue Mountain range. On the south the land rises abruptly from the sea, but it slopes gently down on the northern side. In the vicinity of this northern coast, which is the populous district, the country is flat and the forest has been cleared, giving place to open marshland, intersected by numerous streams and canals, and laid out in rice and tobacco fields and coffee plantations.

From Bantam to the eastern extremity of the island, a military road, 700 miles in length, had been constructed by General Daendels, the able predecessor of General Janssens, who was in 1811 Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Java and its dependencies in the neighbouring islands of Sumatra, Borneo, and Madura.

Batavia, the chief town, was surrounded by a nearly stagnant ditch; every street was intersected by canals, and the whole neighbouring country covered with rice-fields. The fortifications had been destroyed and the troops withdrawn to Weltevreden and Cornelis owing to the unhealthiness of the capital. The country was well watered by rivers and canals, some crossed by stone and wooden bridges, and some by bamboo rafts, constructed like flying bridges, on which vehicles and artillery could be conveyed across.

This island, 630 miles in length and 150 in extreme breadth, was inhabited by some five million people. The European colonists and the half-caste descendants of Portuguese and Dutch settlers formed a small proportion of these numbers, and there were 100,000 Chinese. The residue of the population consisted of Javanese and Malays, the latter sub-divided into various tribes which, in the city of Batavia, lived in separate "campongs," each under a chief who was responsible for their behaviour. The great mass of the population consisted of Javanese inhabiting the interior and cultivating the land, a physically fine race, possessed of some warlike qualities.

The force at the disposal of General Janssens amounted to 13,000 regular troops, but no exact information is forthcoming with regard to their composition. There was at least one regiment of *voltigeurs*, lately arrived from Europe. There was also a proportion of cavalry, and a practically unlimited supply of ordnance and military stores. It seems probable, judging by the comparatively feeble resistance they offered, that the greater part of the force consisted of natives, disciplined and officered by Europeans.

Ten thousand of these were in the fortified camp at Cornelis, whilst the remainder formed an advanced post at Weltevreden, between that place and Batavia.

A landing was effected by the British at Chillingching, ten miles to the east of Batavia, on the morning of August 4th, 1811. The landing place was protected by vessels placed in suitable positions, but the disembarkation was unopposed; and Colonel Gillespie's force, which was the first to disembark, took up a position on the road to Cornelis, covering the landing of the remainder of the troops, which occupied the road to Batavia. Before nightfall the advanced posts were pushed on two miles from the landing-place, and the troops were formed in two lines,—one fronting Batavia and one Cornelis.

The horse artillery and cavalry were landed on the 5th, and the position of the army was advanced in the direction of Batavia.

The country here was lowlying, but the position occupied by the British was a strong one, their right resting on the sea; and

their left on a canal which ran parallel with the shore. The village of Chillingching was directly inland from the landing-place and across the canal, over which the enemy had left a bridge; had this been destroyed, the Dutch could have cannonaded the British with impunity; as it was, Colonel Gillespie occupied the ground beyond Chillingching and guarded the road to Cornelis, whilst the reserve halted at the landing-place to support either advance as necessity arose. Stores and provisions for ten days were landed, all private followers, except one to each officer, being taken for the public service, so that all those who did not bear arms were obliged to carry a load.

Information having been received that a column of the enemy had arrived within four miles, the advance was pushed forward about six miles towards Cornelis. The enemy thereupon retreated and the force returned to Chillingching, having suffered severely from the heat.

It was the intention of the Commander-in-Chief to make a feint in the direction of Batavia, thus drawing off the enemy's attention from the Cornelis road, along which the main advance would then be made. But finding his advance unopposed and the enemy inactive, the Commander-in-Chief determined to move direct on Batavia, and on 7th August the infantry of Colonel Gillespie's brigade crossed the Anjole river at 10 P.M. by a bridge-of-boats that had been rowed in after dark for that purpose under the direction of the officers of the *Leda*, *Hesper*, and *Procris*. A part of the horse artillery and the Bengal Light Infantry battalion were drawn up behind the banks to protect the passage.

Although the nature of the country offered great facilities for defence, no opposition was encountered, and by midnight the whole party had crossed, and were posted before dawn among the canals and rivulets within a mile of the town. The "line" was in the meantime moved towards the river. The following morning Batavia was entered without opposition, the enemy's scouts galloping off in the direction of Weltevreden. A number of guns and a quantity of naval and military stores were taken in the castle and in the arsenals on the wharf.

As an attack was expected at night, the troops were fallen in in the grand square in front of the town-house at 11 P.M., just as

a column of the enemy appeared and opened fire on a piquet at the bridge on the Weltevreden road, where the draw-bridge was raised only just in time. Firing now took place all round the town, but Colonel Gillespie moved out with a force on the enemy's flank and obliged them to retire. Several of the enemy were killed, but there were no casualties on the British side, as the troops had been ordered to use the bayonet only, and so did not expose themselves to the fire of the French. Next morning the garrison was joined by some horse artillery and a troop of dragoons. The reason of the abandonment of the capital to the invaders almost without a shot being fired in its defence appears to have been that General Janssens' idea was to allow the invading force to occupy Batavia and the low ground on the coast in the expectation that its unhealthiness would so reduce it in numbers that it would be completely crippled. This design was however frustrated by the result of the combat of Weltevreden.

Whilst the remainder of the British army was crossing the Anjole river on the morning of August 10th,
 Combat of Weltevreden. Colonel Gillespie marched with his brigade towards Weltevreden, where he arrived at daybreak and found the cantonment deserted. The enemy had retreated a mile farther in the direction of Cornelis with their left on the Great River and their right on the Slokan. The road was blockaded and swept by four of the hostile guns, whilst from a wood, which ran along both sides of the road, the enemy's infantry kept up a galling fire. The guns were engaged by three British pieces, and the sharpshooters were extended along the whole front to occupy the enemy's attention whilst his flanks were turned, and the villages he was in possession of were fired. A detachment of the 89th Foot under Major Butler now charged the hostile guns and captured them at the point of the bayonet, and the French troops fled towards Cornelis, pursued up to the very batteries of that place by a squadron of the 22nd Dragoons under Colonel Gillespie.

This action was of importance, as it secured to the invaders the healthy cantonment of Weltevreden and a *point d'appui* within striking distance of Cornelis. The British loss was one officer and sixteen men killed, and seven officers and sixty-six men wounded.

**PLAN of ATTACK
OF THE FORTIFIED LINES OF
CORNELIS.
26th August 1811.**

REFERENCES.

"A" Principal attack Commanded by Colonel R. R. Gillespie.

LEADING COLUMN

- 1 Rifle Company H. M. 14th Regiment. Lieut. Cogan.
- 2 Det. Madras Pioneers. Captain Smythwayte.
- 3 Grenadier Company H. M. 78th Regiment. Captain McLeod.
- 4 Right Flank Battalion. Major Miller, 14th Regiment.
- 5 Left Flank Battalion. Captain Forbes, 78th Regiment.
- 6 Det. H. M. 89th Regiment (6 Cos.) Major Butler.
- 7 Royal Marines. Captain Bunce.
- 8 Det. Dismounted Dragoons, 22nd, Regt. Lieut Dudley.
- 9 Det. Gour General's Bodyguard, Capt Gall.
- 10 One wing Light Infantry Volunteer Battalion. Capt Fraser.
- 11 One wing 4th Bengal Volunteer Battalion. Major P. Grant.
- 12 Det. Royal Artillery. Capt Byers.

COLONEL GIBB'S BRIGADE

- 13 Grenadier Company H. M. 14th Regiment. Capt Kennedy.
- 14 59th do. Capt Olphert.
- 15 69th do. Capt Ross.
- 16 H. M. 59th Regiment Lieut-Colonel A. McLeod.
- 17 One wing Light Infantry Volunteer Battalion. Major Dalton.
- 18 One wing 4th Bengal Volunteer Battalion. Capt Knight.
- 19 Det Royal Artillery.


"B" Attack on the enemy's left commanded by Lieut-Colonel W. McLeod at the head of H. M. 69th Regiment.

"C" Attack on the Enemy's rear at Campong Malayo by the Column under Major Yule.

- 1 Detachment Pioneers.
- 2 Grenadiers 20th Regiment Bengal N. I.
- 3 Two Guns Madras Horse Artillery.
- 4 A Troop H. M. 22nd Dragoons.
- 5 Two Cos. H. M. 69th Regiment.
- 6 Flank Battalion of the Reserve.

"D" British Batteries and Entrenchments the remainder of the Army stationed here under Major-General Wetherall joined by a Column of seamen under Capt Sayer R. N. threatened the front of Enemy's position.

"E" Corps in Reserve occupying the lines at Struiswick. The Fortified lines of Cornelis comprise about five miles in Circumference defended by 280 pieces of cannon.



The enemy's loss amounted to some 500 men and four guns, whilst a large quantity of stores and over 300 pieces of ordnance were found abandoned in the cantonment.

After this action a position was taken up within 800 yards of the enemy's outworks at Cornelis. General Janssens had here concentrated his whole force in a strongly entrenched camp, defended by 280 pieces of cannon, between the river Jacatra and the Slokan, both of which were unfordable. "This position was shut up by a deep trench, strongly palisaded; seven redoubts and many batteries, mounted with heavy cannon, occupied the most commanding ground within the lines; the fort of Cornelis was in the centre; and the whole of the works were defended by a numerous and well-organized artillery."—(*Sir S. Auchmuty's Despatch.*)

Some time was occupied by the invaders in landing a battering train, and it was not until the night of the 20th August that ground was broken within 600 yards of the enemy's works. Three batteries of guns, howitzers, and mortars were constructed for the bombardment, and guns were placed in position on the morning of the 22nd August. The enemy, seeing the progress that was being made by the besiegers, now made a sortie, attacking the batteries in front, whilst a column with four horse artillery guns made a detour to attack the British left. They gained temporary possession of one of the batteries, but were immediately expelled by a part of the 59th and 78th Regiments, and the hostile column retired after firing a few rounds from their guns, not awaiting the attack of the 69th which advanced against them. In this action six officers were killed and four wounded, and about eighty men killed and wounded, whilst the enemy suffered heavy loss.

The artillery duel was now continued, and a heavy cannonade proceeded throughout the 24th and 25th, causing considerable loss on both sides. On the British side five hundred seamen assisted at the batteries. It became evident to Sir Samuel Auchmuty that a frontal attack could not be carried out, and it was therefore determined to surprise the enemy's right and enter his position by the narrow bridge over the Slokan on that flank, which was defended by a redoubt, whilst the auxiliary attacks were made simultaneously on his front and rear. Both the plan and the

execution of the main attack were entrusted to Colonel Gillespie.

Before daybreak on August 26th Colonel Gillespie's column, supported by a second body under Colonel Gibbs, and guided by a sergeant who had deserted from the enemy, crossed the Slokan and proceeded by a path through the jungle in the direction of the enemy's lines. The distance to be traversed was some 2,000 yards, and shortly before sunrise the head of the column arrived near the enemy's works, when it was discovered that they had lost touch with the support. It was nearly dawn, and the success of the enterprise demanded instant action. Colonel Gillespie accordingly decided to attack the redoubt with his handful of men. He was entirely successful, and, driving the enemy from their defences, seized the passage over the Slokan which formed the key to the hostile position.

At this moment Colonel Gibbs arrived at the head of the grenadiers of the 14th, 59th and 69th Regiments, and wheeling to the right captured another redoubt, where the enemy fired a powder-magazine.

All the hostile batteries were now captured in succession, and the enemy's park and reserve were taken by a charge of the 59th, a party of whom also repulsed the cavalry who were threatening to charge. A last rally was made at Fort Cornelis, but nothing could withstand the onslaught of the British bayonets, and the enemy broke and fled in all directions.

In the meantime two other attacks were being carried out—one on the opposite side of the Great River by the column under Major Yule at Campong Malayo, which, finding the bridge in flames, could only fire with their artillery on the retreating enemy; the other under Colonel William McLeod, who carried a redoubt, but himself fell at the moment of victory.

The dragoons now came up, and Colonel Gillespie, mounting a horse which he cut from one of the enemy's guns, headed the cavalry, and by a fine charge dispersed the remnant of the defenders. He then pursued them for over fifteen miles, nearly half-way to the strong post of Buitenzorg.

The flying foe attempted to rally at Campong Macassar, but the cavalry, led by Colonel Gillespie, charged in sections through the

different avenues and bore down all opposition. Over 6,000 prisoners were taken in the pursuit, including 3 general officers, and many thousands were killed and wounded. Two hundred and eighty pieces of ordnance and several stand of colours were taken in the works at Cornelis. The British loss in this and the preceding actions is shown in the subjoined table :—

| Date. | KILLED. | | | WOUNDED. | | | MISSING. | | | REMARKS. |
|----------------|--------------------|---------------|----------|--------------------|---------------|----------|-----------|----------|--------|--|
| | European officers. | European men. | Natives. | European officers. | European men. | Natives. | European. | Natives. | Total. | |
| 1811. | | | | | | | | | | |
| August 10th .. | 1 | 16 | .. | 8 | 70 | 3 | .. | 1 | 99 | Of the officers wounded, 13 subsequently died of their wounds. |
| .. 12th .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 3 | .. | .. | .. | 3 | |
| .. 15th .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 | .. | .. | .. | 1 | |
| .. 20th .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 | .. | .. | .. | 1 | In addition 11 seamen and 4 marines were killed; 6 naval and marine officers, 29 seamen and 20 marines were wounded; 3 seamen missing. |
| .. 22nd .. | 2 | 17 | 7 | 8 | 39 | 22 | 1 | .. | 96 | |
| .. 24th .. | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 4 | .. | .. | 17 | |
| .. 25th .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 | .. | .. | 1 | |
| .. 26th .. | 11 | 65 | 20 | 44 | 426 | 93 | 10 | 1 | 670 | |
| Total .. | 15 | 100 | 28 | 61 | 548 | 123 | 11 | 2 | 888 | |

After the defeat of his army General Janssens fled in an easterly direction. A detachment was at once sent Pursuit of General Janssens. by sea to intercept him at Cheribon, which place surrendered at the first summons. General Janssens had passed through two days previously, but his second-in-command, General Jumel, arriving with other officers after the occupation of the fort by British troops, was taken prisoner.

The remnant of the army from Cornelis, consisting of about 50 officers, 200 Europeans and 500 natives, principally cavalry, finding themselves cut off, surrendered, and thus the whole country west

of Cheribon was cleared of the enemy, whilst the Raja of Madura took the British side, and captured such hostile garrisons as were within his territory.

In the meantime General Janssens had continued his flight to Samarang, which was invested by Sir Samuel Auchmuty and evacuated by the enemy on the night of 12th September.

The French Général now retired to a position on some steep and rugged hills at Jatty in the vicinity of Samarang, and collected a force, principally from the native princes, of some 7,000 pikemen, 1,000 muskets, and a few field-pieces. The British amounting to 1,600 men, advanced against this position, and the enemy fled at their approach. General Janssens escaped to the fort of Salatiga, but capitulated a few days later, and formally surrendered Java with its dependencies to the British.

Surrender of Java.

The island and its dependencies had, under Dutch rule, been in a somewhat turbulent state, and several of the native princes took advantage of the conflict between the European powers to declare their independence. Among these were the Sultan of Palembang in Sumatra, who massacred the European colonists, and the Sultan of Mataram, Java, whilst a fanatical mullah raised the standard of rebellion in the vicinity of Batavia. The forces of the latter, amounting to over 2,000 musketeers, were easily dispersed by a bayonet charge of a detachment of the 59th Regiment, but the two Sultans required more serious attention, especially as any success on their part would in all probability be followed by a general rising of the Malays and Javanese.

Immediately on receipt of the news of the massacre of the European and native inhabitants of the Dutch factory at Palembang, an expedition was fitted out at Batavia and despatched under Colonel Gillespie on the 20th March 1812. This force consisted of three companies, 59th Regiment, five companies, 89th Regiment, and some details of Madras and Bengal artillery and infantry, conveyed in four transports and escorted by seven ships of war and gunboats.

Expedition to Palembang.

The passage up the Palembang river was made in boats, and after great difficulties, including the capture of the enemy's batteries

at Borang, the force arrived on the 24th April within 20 miles of the Sultan's capital. The latter fled on hearing of the approach of the British, abandoning his city to massacre and plunder. The following morning Colonel Gillespie, accompanied only by a few officers and 17 grenadiers of the 59th, left the main body and travelling in canoes and boats, arrived at Palembang after nightfall, the remaining force under Lieutenant-Colonel McLeod having orders to follow as quickly as possible.

Colonel Gillespie barricaded all the entrances of the palace but one, and stationed a guard of grenadiers at the principal gateway. At midnight sixty men of the 89th Regiment arrived, and the remainder of the force joined in the early morning.

By these proceedings the fort, armed with 242 pieces of cannon, was occupied without loss, the people being overawed by the bearing of the British commander. The Sultan's adherents fled, and the British flag was hoisted on the Sultan's bastion on April 28th. After protracted negotiations, the younger brother of the Sultan was placed on the throne under the auspices of the British Government. The island of Banca was ceded to the British, and formally taken possession of and named Duke of York's Island by Colonel Gillespie on the 20th May 1812.

This expedition having been brought to a successful issue, the British commander sailed for Batavia, arriving there on June 1st, but left at once for Samarang, where fresh work awaited him.

The Sultan of Mataram, who had his fort at Jogjakarta, stood at the head of a general confederacy of the native princes of Java, whom he proposed to combine for the destruction of all the Europeans in the island.

On the 17th June the Lieutenant-Governor and Colonel Gillespie arrived at the fort, and attempted to come to amicable terms with the Sultan. The latter, however, would not listen to reason, but sent out strong bodies of horse to intercept the communications by burning and destroying the bridges and laying waste the country. The British force at this time consisted only of detachments of the 14th Foot, the Bengal Light Infantry, and the 3rd Volunteer Battalion, with a few guns and two troops of the 22nd Dragoons.

Colonel Gillespie at once went out with fifty dragoons to reconnoitre the country, but was careful to avoid hostilities, in spite of the threatening attitude of the people.

Towards evening the Sultan sent out a large body of troops with a flag of truce to demand the surrender of the British, and during the night the outposts in the Dutch town were attacked, as well as the piquets posted to keep the communications open on the road by which reinforcements were expected.

On the morning of the 19th June Lieutenant-Colonel McLeod arrived with a detachment, Royal Artillery, the grenadiers of the 59th Regiment, the flank companies and rifle company of the 78th, a small party of Hussars, and a detachment of Madras Horse Artillery. Preparation was then made by firing the campongs for an assault on the Crattan. In the evening all troops were assembled, and just before dawn on 20th June three columns escalated the walls, and after a severe conflict which lasted three hours, the place was captured and the Sultan taken prisoner. The British loss amounted to twenty-three rank and file killed, nine officers (one mortally) and sixty-seven men wounded.

The success of this enterprise ensured the safety of the islands. The natives at Bantam, Cheribon, Surabaya, and other places were ready to rise at the first signal, and had already attempted to do so at the latter town. But the capture of Jogjakarta and its Sultan put an end to all fear of insurrection, and peace was now established on a firm basis throughout Java and its dependencies.

In 1812 an expedition was undertaken against the Sultan of Sambas, in Borneo, a town situated forty miles up the south branch of the river of that name.

Sambas, 1812-13.

The piratical enterprises of the Sultan had rendered it unsafe for trading vessels to venture near any port of the island, particularly the north-west portion. So great was the terror inspired by this chieftain among both traders and neighbouring states, that the Sultan of Pontianak applied to Java for a British garrison.

Accordingly the Lieutenant-Governor of Java, in October 1812, despatched up the Sambas H. M. Ships *Procris*, *Barracouta*, and *Phoenix* with some gunboats and 100 men of the 78th Highlanders, but, being unable to force the defences, the expedition had to return.

After this, a blockade of the river was maintained until a sufficient force could be collected to punish the Sultan.

In June 1813 a second expedition consisting of the following troops proceeded to Sambas:—

14th Regiment, Colonel Watson; who commanded the force.

A company of Bengal Artillery.

3rd Bengal Volunteer Battalion.

Captain G. Sayer commanded the naval portion of the expedition, consisting of fourteen ships (including five gunboats) of His Majesty's and the Company's service.

The squadron arrived off Sambas on the 22nd June, and, having entered the river in boats on the 25th, anchored off the branch leading to Sambas on the night of 26th. From here two parties were detached to attack the fort and town in rear. The first detachment under Lieutenant Bolton, consisting of part of the 14th Foot and some seamen, was to penetrate inland from the main river. The other, consisting of seamen and marines and 100 sepoy under Captain Brooke, was to pass through a cut higher up leading into the Sambas river, down which they were to come in rear of the town. The remainder of the force proceeded up the river, and on the night of the 27th anchored below and beyond the range of the batteries.

At three on the following morning, a column under Captain Watson, consisting of 100 men of the 14th Foot, 80 men of 3rd Bengal Volunteers, a detachment of artillery, and some seamen and marines, landed to attack the works, and after surmounting many natural obstacles came in sight of the defences at 9-30 A.M. These were immediately assaulted, and in half an hour the two principal batteries and three redoubts in their rear were carried. A battery and five redoubts on the other side of the river were then evacuated by the enemy. The entire piratical fleet was captured and the force returned to Java.

Soon after, another expedition was sent against Raja Boni of Macassar, in Celebes, who was guilty of frequent acts of hostility towards the British. In April 1814, a combined military and naval force was fitted out at Java under Major-General Nightingall, and arrived at Macassar on June 7th prepared to attack the Raja, who had refused to make the reparation demanded. The ships having bat-

tered the defences of the town, the troops under Lieutenant-Colonel McLeod assaulted at dawn and carried all the barriers in succession, though not without some loss. Within an hour the town and palace were in possession of the British. The Raja had escaped during the night, but in his residence, which was committed to the flames, were found five guns, and a large quantity of gunpowder and arms. The enemy, whose strength was 3,000, suffered considerable loss. The Raja was deposed and, it being considered that the arrangements made by General Nightingall would assure the tranquillity of the island, the expedition returned.

In June 1816, however, the Raja of Boni had again become aggressive and had taken up a position about eight miles from Macassar, at the entrance of the Baliangan pass. This pass led to a hill, where he had entrenched his force in fifteen strong redoubts flanked on both sides by nearly precipitous rocks containing caverns which were used as magazines or for shelter from artillery fire.

A force under Major Dalton advanced to dislodge him, consisting of:—

A detachment of Bengal Artillery.

4th Bengal Volunteer Battalion.

340 European Regiment.

115 Seamen and Marines.

Two 18-pounders, two howitzers, and one 6-pounder were attached to the force.

The attack commenced at daylight on the 8th June and continued until four in the afternoon. At that hour, the enemy, after a most desperate resistance, was driven with great loss from the whole of his entrenchments. In this action 11 men were killed and 63 wounded, of whom 8 died. The enemy's force was estimated at 2,000, and their loss was computed at 500 men, including the Raja himself.

In August 1814, all their former possessions in the Eastern Islands were restored to the Dutch, and on the 19th August 1816, Java and its dependencies were handed over to them.

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE MALAY PENINSULA.

IN 1824 Fort Marlborough and all the British possessions in the island of Sumatra were ceded to the Netherlands in exchange for Malacca and its dependencies. From this date, therefore, the Malay Peninsula naturally came under the protection of the British Government.

General description.

The peninsula is generally mountainous, being destitute of extensive plains or valleys. The greater part is covered with primeval forest, in the midst of which the seats of the different states and principalities appear as scattered and inconsiderable patches of cultivation, usually situated at the mouths of rivers.

Malacca, Singapore, and Penang (including Province Wellesley), known as the Straits Settlements, are directly under British rule.

The rest of the peninsula is divided into several small native states. On the west coast are Kedah, Perakh, Negri Sembilan, and Selangor. At the extremity of the peninsula is Johore, and northwards along the east coast are Pahang, Tringganu, Kalantan, and Patani. Patani is tributary to Siam, but the rest of the peninsula is now under British protection, with the title of the Federated Malay States.

Operations against Chief Nanning.

In 1828 Dool Syed, the Panghooloo Chief of Nanning, refused to obey a summons to Malacca or to acknowledge British authority. The matter was referred to the East India Company's Court of Directors, and in 1831 orders were received in Malacca to reduce the refractory chief to obedience by force of arms. The population of Nanning in 1831 was estimated at about 6,000, of whom 1,500 were capable of bearing arms. The state comprised about 400 square miles, the village of Taboo, 22 miles north-west from the town of Malacca, being the capital. The surface of the country is undulating, interspersed with high knolls and thickly clothed with jungle. The level ground between these undulations, where the

water lodges in the rainy season, averages seventy to eighty yards in width, and forms either swamps or paddy fields according to the industry or otherwise of the natives in the vicinity.

The Malacca river is formed by two branches which unite near Sabang in Nanning; thence it flows in a westerly direction, and quitting Nanning near Soongei Patty, thirteen miles from Malacca, falls into the sea at the latter place. It is navigable for boats as far as Ching, about six miles from Malacca, and thence for sampans (Malayan canoes) as far as Sabang.

The native roads are mere footpaths cut by the Malays with their parangs (knives) as they go along; they run over the *bunds* of the paddy fields, which frequently break down, and over which the natives throw a bamboo or two as a bridge; similarly the streams are bridged by nothing better than felled trees. These paths are particularly liable to obstruction from felled trees, a fact of which the Nanningites took full advantage during the operations.

In open ground the Malays as an enemy are not of much account. The plan they adopt is one of incessantly harassing the communications, building stockades, and retreating; and when they retreat they plant *ranjows*¹ in their rear. This system is well suited to a country covered with forest, where every tree is a stronghold and every road a defile.

The garrison of Malacca at this time consisted of 4 companies of the 29th Madras Native Infantry and half a company of Madras Artillery. The expedition now undertaken 1st expedition, 1831. comprised 2 subalterns and 150 men of the 29th Native Infantry and a detachment of artillery with two 6-prs. drawn by buffaloes, the whole commanded by Captain Wyllie of the 29th.

Meanwhile the Panghooloo of Nanning had induced the Raja of Rambow and two or three other chiefs to make common cause with him.

The expedition started on the 5th August, the supplies having been sent off under a guard in boats the day before to Soongei Patty. On arrival at Malin, five miles from Malacca, the force learnt that, owing to insufficient water, the supplies were stopped at Ching. The guard was therefore increased, and orders were sent

¹ Vide page 342.

to bring on the supplies by coolies. On the 6th the column reached Soongei Pattye, and next day, though the supplies had not arrived, the advance was continued, as the men had two days' provisions with them. Opposition was first experienced on entering Nanning territory; the advance continued through dense jungle, the enemy keeping up a sniping fire from the flanks which was, however, soon silenced by grape. At 1-30 P.M., Alu Gaja, only two miles from Soongei Pattye was reached. Here one day's supply of rice was obtained. On the 8th the expedition took $7\frac{3}{4}$ hours to march $1\frac{3}{4}$ miles, the Malays sniping as usual. On the 9th after a few hundred yards, the troops reached the foot of Bukit Seboosa, or Seboosa Hill. Here the enemy had built a stockade on the brow of the hill, and felled trees across the road. The leading gun opened with grape and the stockade was evacuated, whereupon the column, clearing away the obstructions as it advanced, crossed over the hill and, descending into the plain, camped at Mullikee only five miles from Taboo. On this day and the morning of the 10th small parties were sent back to bring up the supplies, but were unable to get through. As there was therefore no longer any prospect of reaching Taboo, the camp baggage was destroyed and the retreat commenced at 11 A.M. The enemy harassed the retreat at every step by pouring in a fire from the flanks and rear, and inflicted some casualties. Though the column had been permitted to advance comparatively unobstructed through eighteen miles of dense forest, the path had been closed behind it, by trees felled across it every twenty or thirty yards. All these it was necessary to cut through to enable the guns to pass. At Kalana the head of the column was brought to a standstill by fire from the front. A party of the 29th, however, succeeded in clearing the way, and the force reached Soongei Pattye at 7 P.M., bringing with it seventeen wounded. Here the supplies were found.

The havildar ¹ (Pir Muhammed) in charge had been attacked the night before, but after a defence of ten hours had repulsed his assailants.

The 11th and 12th August were employed in building a stockade round the government bungalow at Soongei Pattye, and in clearing

¹ This havildar was promoted to Native Officer by the Commander-in-Chief for his gallant conduct.

the neighbouring jungle. The Malays meanwhile erected stockades round it and blocked the road through the Roombiyah forest to Malacca with felled trees. By this time a universal panic pervaded Malacca, so Captain Wyllie returned to consult with the authorities. On his arrival he despatched a reinforcement, and a day or two later, a subadar's party with ammunition. Both these parties suffered severely from the enemy's fire and *ranjows*. These last are made of the spiny processes of the sago palm, or of sharpened bamboo. They are planted in the grass and inflict wounds more difficult to cure than gunshot wounds; in these operations they were much used and caused many casualties.

The force in the stockade now consisted of 100 men including wounded, who bore a high proportion to the whole. Between 1 A.M. and daybreak of the 19th, the enemy made three assaults but were each time driven back into the jungle. On the 20th, the garrison was reduced to one barrel of ammunition and there were so many casualties that every wounded man who could pull a trigger had to assist in the defence. However, about 3 P.M. on this day they were relieved by the light company of the 29th from Singapore, which fought its way in, having amongst other casualties Lieutenant White mortally wounded. This company, taking with it the most severely wounded, returned to Malacca on the 22nd August, leaving sixty men and a plentiful supply of ammunition in the stockade. Meanwhile, the authorities bought off the Raja of Rambow's adherents, and having received a promise that the retreat would be unmolested, sent a detachment of forty men, under Lieutenant Hurlock, to the stockade. He brought imperative orders for the retreat of the detachment, with the guns, the carriages and limbers of which were to be destroyed. The detachment was ordered to leave at 8 P.M. on the 25th, and troops from Malacca were to move out to their assistance.

When the detachment was well clear of the stockade, the enemy at once appeared in swarms, firing on the retreating column and harassing it in its tedious progress through the Roombiyah forest. The guns, swung on bamboos, had to be lifted over a succession of felled trees, and, eventually, owing to the breakdown of the coolies, had to be abandoned. At 4 A.M. Malin, at the edge of the forest, was reached, the troops having taken eight

hours to march as many miles. All opposition now ceased, the column resumed its march after half an hour's rest, and arrived at Malacca at 6 A.M. A chain of piquets was maintained round the town for the remainder of the year and the country abandoned to the enemy.

It was now determined to send a larger force, and reinforcements from Madras were despatched to Malacca. The force consisted of the 5th Madras Native Infantry, five companies of the 29th Madras Infantry, two companies of Sappers and Miners, and a proportion of European and Native Artillery, with a good park. Cattle for the Ordnance and Commissariat Departments were also obtained.

The staff was as follows :—

Lieutenant-Colonel C. Herbert, Commanding.

Captain J. S. Wyllie, 29th Native Infantry, Brigade-Major.

Lieutenant J. H. Bell, Superintending Engineer.

Captain F. Bond, Commanding the Artillery.

Lieutenant Milnes, Commissariat Officer.

Major P. Farquharson, Commanding 5th Native Infantry.

By the end of January 1832 nearly the whole force had arrived, and preparations were now made for an immediate advance into the interior. In the interval that had elapsed since the termination of the first expedition, the local authorities at Malacca had employed, for months together, coolies in cutting down the jungle on the road to Nanning as far as Roombiyah, to the width of eighty yards on each side. Timber had also been cut and collected at Roombiyah for the purpose of constructing a stockade, as it was intended to form a depôt there. In order to protect these cutters, a body of Malays was raised, and armed with muskets, to which was given the name of the Malay Contingent. On the 7th February, the advanced guard marched for Roombiyah; though the enemy were heard in the vicinity, no hostilities took place, as they had selected Soongei Pattye as a fortunate spot for reopening the campaign. The plan adopted in this expedition was to cut a road through the jungle to Taboo, and the forest was cleared to a width of eighty yards on each side, so that the communications could not be interrupted. The expedition was carried on by detachments; parties varying in strength from one to two companies going out

daily as covering parties to the Sappers and Miners ; the senior officer present with the covering parties carried on the operations for the day.

The troops were gradually brought up in detachments. On 22nd February a reconnoitring party fell in with nine stockades erected during the first expedition, and destroyed them. Colonel Herbert joined the advance on the 2nd March ; all this time progress was very slow, as the road was being cut through the Roombiyah forest. On the 17th the enemy, becoming emboldened by the inactivity of the troops, fired some shots into the working-party ; whereupon the covering party moved forward and captured five stockades. The casualties were one man wounded by musketry and eight by *ranjows*. From this day constant skirmishing occurred, accompanied by occasional casualties. On March 22nd the advance reached Soongie Pattye, and on the 25th five stockades at Kalama were carried with the loss of one killed and three wounded.

Two more in a lateral direction were destroyed the same day, and on the 27th five stockades were destroyed at Malacca Pinda, across the river. On the 29th August Lieutenant Harding was killed, and a subadar and two or three others of the 29th Madras Native Infantry were severely wounded in taking a strong stockade at Ayer Mangis ; next day some more stockades at Loondoo and Pangkallang Nanning were destroyed.

The whole force advanced to Dattoo Membangin, about 100 yards beyond Alu Gaja, distant two miles and five furlongs from Soongie Pattye, on April 3rd. Here another defensive post was established and named Bell's Stockade, subsequently known as Fort Lismore.

On the 10th a party escorting two 18-pounder carronades from Malacca was attacked at Roombiyah, but drove off the enemy.

On the 12th the covering party in advance was fired on from a stockade across some paddy and lost one man killed and five wounded ; Lieutenant Wright, calling on his men to follow, rushed forward to assault it, but was only followed by his orderly, as the rest of the company were demoralised by the sudden fire. Lieutenant Wright fell in the paddy field, his thigh being broken by a musket ball, but was saved by his orderly, who knelt over him and kept the Malays at bay till the men of the company recovered themselves

and came to the rescue. In consequence of this mishap, artillery was after this attached to the covering parties.

On the 17th April, owing to a mistake in conveying orders another more serious reverse occurred. Colonel Herbert had received information that some strong stockades had been erected half a mile in advance at Priggi-to-Datus, near a clearing. He therefore ordered the covering party to attack the stockades if on the near side of the clearing, and this was construed into a positive order to destroy them. The stockades were found to be occupied in force beyond a paddy field. The enemy opened fire, inflicting some casualties. The artillery shelled the stockades for some time but the hostile fire being unsubdued, a party under Ensign Thomson was directed to make a detour across the paddy field and take the stockades in reverse. This party, however, came unexpectedly upon another stockade on the right rear of the covering party. At the first volley from it Ensign Thomson was wounded and six men fell. The remainder with their officer had to retreat to the main body. After two and a half hours' fighting, by which time the casualties amounted to twenty-seven out of an original strength of fifty-four, the party fell back to the edge of the cleared jungle. Emboldened by this success, the enemy the same day attacked the rear of the camp, but a few discharges of canister quickly repulsed them.

On the 20th offensive operations were discontinued owing to about 300 of the force being in hospital. On the 25th April stockades thrown up by the enemy at Soongei Pattye and Roombiyah in rear of the camps were destroyed; as was also a third on the Sebang road on the 27th.

The piquets in front of the camp were attacked and driven in on May 3rd, but on the supports coming up, the enemy were compelled to retire to a hill on the left front, called Bukit Lanjoot, which was crowned by a strong stockade. Fire was opened on this with a 12-pr. howitzer and a party sent to take it in reverse. The stockade was captured with the loss of Ensign Walker killed, and two or three wounded. On the 13th a reinforcement of one company of the 46th Native Infantry from Penang was received, and another company arrived on the 17th. Hardly a night passed without the piquets being attacked. On the 21st fifteen stockades

in advance were destroyed, eight being at Bukit Seboosa and seven others between Bell's stockade and Priggi-to-Datus.

The advance was resumed on May 25th when Bukit Seboosa, which had been again stockaded, was carried, one officer and eighteen men being wounded. The hill was now occupied and guns were mounted, Captain Wallace being left in command. Having heard that the strong stockades at Bukit Pur-Ling, a mile in advance, which overlooked the Mullikee plain and were practically the key to Taboo, were temporarily unoccupied, this officer pushed rapidly forward on the 27th, and seized the position on his own responsibility. The enemy, who hitherto had always had timely notice of the approach of the British as they leisurely cut their way through the forest, did not expect this change of tactics; when too late, they made a rush to regain the stockades, but were driven back with loss and defeated in every subsequent attempt to recapture them. This success was important, as it opened the way to Taboo and also marked the end of the forest; beyond Bukit Pur-Ling the thick jungle ended and gave place to extensive paddy fields interspersed with clumps of fruit trees. It was not until June 8th, however, that the main body of the force left Bell's Stockade and, moving past Bukit Pur-Ling, descended into the Mullikee plain. On the 14th the covering party reconnoitred to the edge of a paddy field on the far side of which a line of strong stockades was observed, which proved to be the Bangkall Munji stockades forming the right flank defences of Taboo.

The Taboo defences consisted of a line of stockades defended in front by paddy fields knee deep in water, intersected by a deep *nala* only fordable in a few places. The right flank was defended by the Bangkall Munji defences and the left by some stockades on a hill known as Execution Hill, which Colonel Herbert decided to carry on the 15th June. Accordingly two companies of the 5th Madras Native Infantry, the Sappers and Miners, a 12-pr. howitzer, and a 5-inch mortar, advanced against the Bangkall Munji defences. The enemy at once opened fire, to which the guns replied. This party being reinforced by another company about 11 A.M., it was decided to assault the stockades, and a turning party moved off to the left to make a flank attack; before this could be delivered, however, the fire of the artillery caused the enemy to evacuate the

nearest stockade ; thereupon some men advanced across the paddy and seized it ; the flanking party now arrived and pushed on past the first stockade to take the Taboo lines proper. Meanwhile, the stockades on Execution Hill on the other flank had been carried ; whereupon, as the howitzer could not be brought up further owing to felled trees, the remainder of the infantry advanced into the paddy fields to attack the lines in front. The enemy opened fire with the 6-pr. guns captured in the first expedition, but finding their flank turned by the troops advancing from the Bangkall Munji stockades, fled with precipitation. The sun was setting as the defences, two breastworks and eight stockades, were carried. The casualties were only one subadar and four men wounded.

His capital being now taken, the Panghooloo could make no further opposition. Several military posts were established and maintained until March 1834, when the Panghooloo surrendered to Government.

Perak, 1875.

Perak is one of the little states of the Malay Peninsula adjoining the southern boundary of Province Wellesley. The coast line is about a hundred miles long, and the State extends about fifty miles into the interior. The Perak river, the great waterway of the country, intersects the central plain from north to south. On the west are fertile lands reaching to the sea, and on the east the country rises to the great central range of the Peninsula. The northern district of Perak, which is known as Laroot, is rich in tin.

In October 1871 the Chinese miners in Laroot, who numbered about 20,000, quarrelled amongst themselves. The Muntri, or Malay Chief of Laroot, was powerless to restore order, and all trade came to a standstill. In addition there was trouble as to the succession to the Sultanate of Perak. The result was a chronic state of disorder. With a view of bringing this state of affairs to an end, the leading Malay Chiefs were induced to sign an agreement, known as the Pangkore Treaty, on 20th January 1874. By this a Resident and Assistant Resident were appointed and the general administration of the country virtually placed in British hands. The chiefs, however, immediately began to regret their agreement. At length on the 1st November 1875 an attack was made on a man who was posting up an obnoxious proclamation at the village of Passir Sala, and in the

ensuing scuffle the British Resident was killed. A party sent up the river against Passir Sala a few days later were repulsed with some loss. The Governor of the Straits Settlements, being apprehensive of a general rising, now telegraphed to India for 1,500 men. Such fighting as there was practically came to an end before the arrival of the Indian contingent, but the expedition is noteworthy for the rapidity with which the troops were despatched; the first portion reaching Penang on the 27th November.

The force was designed for jungle fighting and consisted of:—

Head-Quarters and 600 men, H. M. 3rd Regiment (The Buffs)—Colonel Cox, C. B.

Head-Quarters and 400 men, 1st Gurkhas.

3-5th Royal Artillery, with 4 Mountain Guns (7-pr. M.L.R. steel, 150lb).

Two 5½-inch Mortars, with 500 rounds per piece and 200 rockets.

A Field telegraph of 100 miles of wire, one superintendent and ten signallers.

One company, Madras Sappers and Miners.

Medical Officers, doolies, and doolie-bearers.

The whole was despatched with sea provisions for six weeks and shore provisions for ten days, camp equipage, light tents, and "lascars' pals." Brigadier-General Ross was in command with staff as follows:—

Major Mark Heathcote, A.Q.M.G.

Major K. J. Hawkins, Major of Brigade.

Lieutenant Preston, Rifle Brigade, A.D.C.

Captain Badcock, D.A.A.G.

Major Tarigg ..)

Captain Crawford .. } R. E., Field Engineers.

Lieutenant North ..)

The Indian column was detailed to occupy the upper portion of the country and had to march through Laroot to Kuala Kangsa on the upper portion of the Perak river. This was accomplished without opposition, detachments being left at Bukit Gantong and Campong Boyah.

By their presence in Upper Perak the troops kept the disaffected chiefs in check and prevented them from joining in the disturbances lower down the river.

From Kuala Kangsa, a small force was sent up stream on the 4th January 1875 to attack Kotah Lamah, a noted resort of freebooters and bad characters. The party met with no opposition, and a quantity of arms were captured. Whilst searching the houses of the village, however, the detachment was suddenly attacked by fifty or sixty Malays with spears, who rushed out from the jungle. The search party had to fall back to the river, and Major Hawkins, who had unfortunately got separated from his men, and three men were killed. Soon after this the Kotah Lamah people began to erect stockades, so a further expedition was sent against them. The Malays after offering slight opposition were easily driven out of their villages at Kotah Lamah, Enggar, and Perak. The power of the Kotah Lamah Chief was completely broken and the troops returned to Kuala Kangsa.

Meanwhile another column under General Colborne, composed of troops from Singapore and other places in the Far East had ascended the river in boats to Blanja whence they had marched to Kinta; some slight opposition was met with but was easily overcome.

The country was now completely in British hands. Simultaneously with these operations a detachment of 250 Gurkhas and half a battery, Royal Artillery, were sent under Colonel Clay to assist in some minor operations in Sungei Ujong near Malacca. On the arrival of this detachment it was determined to drive the Malays from their stronghold, a narrow defile between two jungle-covered hills, called the Bukit Patus pass.

The attacking force was divided into two parts, one making a turning movement so as to get in rear, while the main body, 280 strong, attacked in front.

On December 20th 1875, the main body reached the foot of the pass and an officer and twenty-five Gurkhas were sent ahead to reconnoitre. Advancing cautiously through the dense jungle, they got within a few yards of the defences without being seen. Seizing their opportunity, they rushed into the nearest stockade, and in a few minutes cleared it of its defenders with the loss of one killed and one wounded. The stockade thus captured was found to command a considerable part of the position, and after half an hour's steady

firing, the Malays were dislodged from their remaining defences and put to flight. No further resistance was met with.


This brought the campaign to an end and the Indian troops in Perak, being no longer required, were withdrawn after about a year's occupation of the country.

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PART V.

CHINA.

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CHAPTER XXIV.

THE COUNTRY AND PEOPLE.

CHINA Proper is about 1,474 miles in length and its breadth is about 1,355 miles. The coast line measures some 2,500 miles and the land frontier is described as being 4,400 miles in length. Several ranges of high mountains, in connection with the mountain system of Central Asia, enter the western provinces, and, after traversing the western and southern parts in various directions, descend to low hills as they approach the sea coast. The exception to this, and one of the most noticeable features of the surface of China, is the immense delta plain in the north-eastern portion of the empire. This plain, curving round the mountainous districts of Shan-tung, extends about 700 miles in a southerly direction from the neighbourhood of Peking, and varies from 150 to 500 miles in breadth.

The rivers are very numerous, and, with the canals, form some of the most frequented highways in the empire. The two largest rivers are the Huang-ho and Yang-tse Kiang, but the former, owing to its shifting bed and shoals at the mouth, is of little value for navigation. The Yang-tse Kiang, which after a course of 2,900 miles, empties itself into the Yellow Sea about 31° latitude, is navigable for steamers as far as I-chang, upwards of 1,200 miles from its mouth. The tide is felt as far as Nan-king, the principal city of mid-China, 200 miles from the sea. The principal artificial waterway is the Grand Canal running from Hang-Chou Fu on the Yang-tse Kiang to Tien-tsin on the Pei-ho, and connecting Peking, the capital, with Nan-king.

China proper is divided into nineteen provinces, each presided over by a viceroy who is supreme within his jurisdiction, and is answerable to the Emperor at Peking.

System of government.

The principal religions of China are Buddhism and Taoism,¹ to which must be added Muhammadanism, and the cult of the system of philosophy

Religion.

¹ Laou-tsze the founder of the Taoist sect, was a contemporary of Confucius. His philosophy resembles that of the Manichæists.

taught by Confucius. Buddhism was introduced from India during the first century of the Christian era and now claims most adherents. But, while Buddhism and Taoism find their adherents among the common people, the real religion is ancestral worship.

In daily life the Chinese are frugal, sober, and industrious, but exceedingly grasping and avaricious. Their wants are few and easily satisfied. The poorer classes live almost entirely on rice¹ and vegetables, to which they sometimes add small pieces of fish or meat. Their clothes are of the cheapest;² and they are so accustomed to crowded apartments that house rent forms an insignificant item in a Chinaman's expenditure.

The climate and products of such a vast empire naturally differ widely in various parts. The climate of the theatre of operations and its effects on the troops will be described in the succeeding narrative.

With a view to defence the empire was divided into two portions, North and South; North China, consisting of the provinces of Chili, Shan-tung, and all territory to the north and eastward of them; South China, comprising the rest of this vast empire. Such an unequal sub-division points to the preponderating importance given to the province in which lies the Imperial City of Peking. Each division was under a Chief Commissioner, who was also Commander-in-Chief of all its naval and military forces.

The military government of each province had the command of its local land and sea forces. Each general had his headquarters, where he collected the bulk of his command; the rest he distributed between the different posts under his orders: the troops were quartered in camps, generally on commanding sites outside the towns; each regiment, from 500 to 600 strong, built, as a rule, its own fort or camp, and the necessary interior huts for its own accommodation.

¹ In North China millet is cheaper and more abundant than rice, and together with corn forms the staple food of the poorer classes.

² Nankeen or blue cotton blouse with straw hat in summer; the same quilted or padded with cotton in winter; shoes with thick, stiff, papier mâché soles.

Besides these camps, the various fortresses of the empire were occupied by Tartar troops, commanded by a Chiang-Chun, who obeyed no one but the Emperor, and whose business it was to watch over and keep in respect the high civil authorities who might be meditating revolt.

Each provincial government raised its own local forces under the nominal direction of the Peking Board and the Chief Commissioner for Defence, and was alone responsible for their efficiency, a fact which led to great military weakness.

The Chinese made little difference between the land and sea forces ; their chief officers were interchangeable as favouritism or policy dictated.

The Chinese have been settled in China from a remote period and early attained a high degree of civilisation. The teachings of Confucius inculcate the doctrine that the past was best and should be imitated as far as possible. This, combined with freedom from contact with outside influences, has caused China not only to stagnate in civilisation for many centuries, but to fall into decay. The Tartars are first heard of as making incursions into Chinese territory about 936 B.C. but it was not until 1644 that the present Manchu dynasty treacherously overthrew the Ming dynasty, and established itself as the reigning house.

The British East India Company early established a profitable and increasing trade, but all kinds of unjust exactions were demanded from merchants, and many acts of injustice were committed on the persons of Englishmen. So notorious at length did these become that in 1793 Lord Macartney was sent on a mission to Peking. He was graciously received by and had an interview with the Emperor, but the concessions he sought for his countrymen were not accorded. As the condition of the merchants at Canton did not improve, in 1816 a second embassy under Lord Amherst was sent to Peking. As, however, the Chinese demanded that he should *kowtow* to the Emperor, which he declined to do, Lord Amherst left Peking on the day of his arrival. Consequently the mission was barren of result.

The earliest direct interference of the British in China was in 1808, when an expedition,¹ accompanied by six vessels of war, was sent to Macao to prevent that island from falling into the hands of the French. The Chinese, however, took offence and stopped all trade. The troops were re-embarked on 23rd December 1808, and returned to India in February 1809.

¹ Two Companies, Her Majesty's 30th Regiment ; two Companies, Bengal Europeans, 600 sepoys.

CHAPTER XXV.

EVENTS LEADING UP TO HOSTILITIES IN CHINA 1840.

OUR relations with the Chinese Empire during the continuance of the chartered privileges of the East India Company were generally maintained on a fairly satisfactory footing by the prudence of the Company's agents ; nevertheless disputes and difficulties and occasional stoppages of trade did arise. In 1834 a Superintendent of British Trade was appointed from England. The consequent change from the East India Company's submissive style to the assertion of commercial rights, made by the representative of the British Government, was, therefore, not understood by the Chinese.

From 1820¹ an extensive trade in opium had been carried on between India and Canton, the vessels containing the drug anchoring at Whampoa. In 1830, 15 to 20 opium vessels lying off Lintin, below Whampoa, were expelled from Whampoa by imperial edict and the sale of the drug was prohibited. With the exception occasionally of a fierce edict, no other steps were taken to prevent the traffic, as it was a source of great profit to every one of the Canton officials and was connived at by them.

Between the years 1830 and 1835 numerous onerous restrictions were placed upon foreign trade generally by the Chinese officials. Lord Napier, sent out from England to be Superintendent of British Trade, was treated by them with the utmost indignity, and his death was primarily occasioned by the mental vexation caused by being compelled to submit to the daily insults of the Chinese authorities in his attempts to carry out the orders of his Government.

In 1837, from the frequent piracies in and about Canton, it was necessary to have one or more of Her Majesty's ships-of-war convenient to that city and in communication with the Superintendent. Opium

was made by the authorities the excuse for justifying many questionable acts with reference to foreigners, with a view to their humiliation and expulsion from the country. On the 2nd December 1837, the British flag was struck at Canton, and the Principal Superintendent of Trade, Captain Elliot, withdrew to Macao.

In 1838 Her Majesty's ship *Wellesley* arrived off Canton, and the Chinese were informed that, as trade was open, British war-ships would frequently visit China with peaceful intentions.

There is believed to have been in Peking at this time a reform party, favourable to foreign intercourse, struggling to show its head and guided by the Empress, a woman of great personal attractions and extraordinary force of character.

Memorials favourable to both views—*i.e.*, to the opening of China to trade, and to its total exclusion—were presented to the Throne ; the one based on its importance to China, the impossibility of prohibiting it, and the virtue of bowing to necessity ; the other founded on patriotism, national pride, and adherence to the maxims of former Emperors, as well as on the ill-effects caused by the use of opium on the health of the people and the drain of silver from the country in order to pay for it. The death of the Emperor's son from the effects of an over-dose of opium decided the Emperor Taokuang to favour the party advocating the exclusion of the foreigner and all trade.

In February, 1839, a Chinese, accused of dealing in opium, was strangled in front of the foreign factories. Captain Elliot, Chief Superintendent of Trade, remonstrated to the Governor of Canton against this insult.

On the 10th March Commissioner Lin reached Canton with imperial authority to crush the opium traffic.

On the 18th March two edicts were issued, requiring all the opium on the store ships to be surrendered, and bonds to be given by the owners that they would never bring any more, on penalty of death. Three days were given for a reply.

On the 21st March, all foreigners were forbidden to go to Macao ; communication with Whampoa was cut off, and the foreign factories were surrounded by soldiers.

On the 24th March, Captain Elliot demanded passports. Provisions were stopped, and a triple cordon of boats placed in front of the factories. At this time, Her Majesty's sloop *Larne* having been despatched to Calcutta, there was not a single British ship-of-war in Chinese waters. The Superintendent was both helpless to protect others, and was himself a prisoner under his country's flag, whilst opposed to an overbearing Commissioner armed with unlimited powers.

On the 26th March Captain Elliot received commands from the Chief Commissioner Lin to deliver over all opium in the possession of British subjects; this he consented to do, *viz.*, 20,283 chests.

On the 5th May the cordon of observation was withdrawn, and trade nominally resumed, whilst the Chinese took measures to fortify the river and place booms across it.

On the 24th May Captain Elliot, in consequence of an edict of death being published against all introducers of opium into the empire, retired from Canton leaving not more than twenty-seven foreigners behind him, and pointing out to them that Canton was a place in which they could no longer reside with either safety or honour. Captain Elliot had promised to use all his influence to prevent ships entering Cantonese waters, yet, on the other hand, Commissioner Lin was in reality most desirous that vessels should enter, provided their owners would sign a bond never again to bring opium. The foreign trade was fully recognised by Lin to be essential to the imperial revenue, amounting as it did to £10,000,000.

Most of the British community now abandoned Canton and removed to Macao.

On the 1st June the edict to destroy the opium arrived. The Prefect of Canton gave a receipt for the 20,383 chests above referred to and burnt them.

Lin appeared to have reached the pinnacle of his power, to have expelled the British, and to have made the Portuguese submissive to his will. His fertile brain now schemed to gain possession of the Macao forts and to poison the English at Hong-Kong.

¹ Hong-Kong, where supplies of live stock and vegetables were readily obtainable, even in seasons of difficulty, now became the

¹Oohterlony.

resort of foreign vessels in Chinese waters. The hostility of Commissioner Lin against the English showed itself in his occupation of the Kowloon promontory, on the mainland opposite the harbour, by considerable bodies of troops.

At Macao measures were also taken by the Chinese authorities to distress and annoy the British refugees, by intercepting the supplies of food from the mainland, upon which the Portuguese settlement there exclusively depended, and by compelling all the Chinese servants in the employ of the British to quit their houses, and forbidding all sale of provisions to them.

On the 31st August all villagers were incited by proclamation to fire upon and destroy or drive back the English whenever they were seen to approach their shores in search of food or water. On receipt of this document, Captain Elliot called upon Captain

Blockade of Canton.

Smith to establish a blockade of the port of Canton ; a public notice of the blockade was issued on the 11th September, but it was never rigidly enforced. A few days previous to this declaration the harbour of Kowloon had been made the scene of the first hostilities, Captain Douglas having successfully dispersed some war junks, whose presence before the town of Kowloon prevented the supply of provisions.

Early in September, Her Majesty's ship *Hyacinth* had joined the *Volage*. These corvettes, Captain Elliot on board the *Volage*, proceeded on the 28th October to the Bogue, where a communication was sent on shore threatening active measures of retaliation should British shipping be molested. On the following morning, the corvettes in the meanwhile having dropped two or

War junks dispersed.

three miles down the river, the despatch was returned unopened, and shortly afterwards twenty-nine war junks approached. A sharp action ensued, resulting in the rout of the Chinese with the loss of three junks sunk and three disabled.

Subsequently the British ships were for the most part moved from Kowloon bay to Urmston harbour, also known as Toang-ku roads, below the Bogue, at the mouth of the river, the anchorage at the former place being rendered unsafe by the erection of batteries commanding it, and the frequent drifting of fire junks upon the shipping.

¹ During the early part of 1840 the majority of the British community resided on board merchant ships at the anchorage of Toang-ku near the island of Lin-tin. Early in January the Emperor issued an edict expressing his satisfaction at the stoppage of all British trade. The tone now adopted by Lin became undisguisedly hostile, and large bounties were set upon the heads of the British.

Every means having failed to arrange matters with the Chinese authorities, there was no alternative but to awaken the Emperor and his ministers to a sense of justice.² The whole tenor of Lord Palmerston's instructions was to demand reparation for past injuries and some security for the future; and the critical state of affairs at last engaged the serious attention of Her Majesty's Government.

Early in the year orders were received from England by the Governor-General of India to organize a small, but efficient, force for service in China, to start from Calcutta and Madras. Reprisals were directed to be made in the China seas, and an embargo placed on Chinese vessels.

The object of the British Government was to limit the operations to the simple occupation of an advantageous insular position to serve as a depôt; and from there to establish a close blockade of all the more important seaports. This measure, it was thought, would cause great distress to the numerous traders of the coast and to the exporting manufacturers, and thereby would induce the Chinese Government to accede to our conditions. The utter fallacy of this notion was subsequently established. At first the operations were confined to the capture and occupation of various ports, but eventually the war was terminated by the occupation of Nanking, which brought pressure to bear on Peking by cutting off supplies from the south.

¹ Ochterlony.

² Martin, Volume II, page 39.

CHAPTER XXVI.

THE THEATRE OF WAR, 1840-41-42.

THE opening scene of hostilities in 1840 was in the neighbourhood of the Chusan Archipelago, a large assemblage of islands lying at the mouth of Hang-chou bay, of which Chusan is the principal.

Chusan island is fifty-one miles in circumference; its extreme length in a north-west and south-east direction being twenty-one miles, and its greatest breadth $10\frac{1}{2}$ miles. From the beach at Ting-hai, on the south side of the island, to the northern shore, the distance across is seven miles; towards the eastern end it becomes narrower. Of the numerous small streams which run from the mountains, the most considerable is the Tung Kiang, which falls into Ting-hai harbour. The products are rice, millet, wheat, sweet potatoes, and yams; cotton is largely cultivated near the sea. Besides the principal harbour of Ting-hai there are three commercial ports,—viz., Chinkeamun at the south-east end of the island, Ching-kiang or Singkong on the north-west side, and Shaaon at the north end.

The town of Ting-hai was $1\frac{3}{4}$ miles in circumference, and surrounded by a wall $14\frac{3}{4}$ feet high and thirteen feet wide, surmounted by a parapet $14\frac{1}{2}$ feet high. A canal, thirty-three feet wide and three feet deep, nearly encircle the city, entering it near the south gate, which was about half a mile from the shore of the harbour. Canals formed the principal means of transport, the roads being merely foot-paths on the stone embankments, which prevented the encroachment of the sea on the rice-fields. Every large field had its canal for the purpose of carrying away the produce. The swampy nature of the country caused the first occupation of the island to be attended with considerable sickness. This sickness was unknown during the second occupation by the British—an immunity due to good food, good water, and avoiding the rising ground, the summit of which was at night wreathed in a cold damp fog.

Che-kiang is the smallest of the eighteen provinces of China, its area being computed at 39,000 square miles, and occupies the southern or terminal portion of the great central delta plain, of which the adjacent province of Kiang-su, bordering Che-kiang on the north, constitutes the rich and productive centre. On the east the frontier is formed by the Eastern Sea, on the west by Kiang-si and An-hui, and on the south by the mountains of Fu-kien.

All the most celebrated staples of China are produced in the province of Che-kiang, and its internal waterways are numerous and good.

The capital of Che-Kiang is Hang-chau Fu, on a plain about two miles from the north bank of the river Tsien-tang, twenty miles above its entrance and eighty miles from the sea. It was the metropolis of China under the Lung dynasty. The southern termination of the Grand Canal is at Hang-chau Fu, but it has no opening into the river; there is also continuous water communication with Shanghai and with Ningpo.

The Chinese city of Ningpo is situated on the River Yung, immediately above the junction of its two branches, its walls extending along the river side, up both of them, in latitude $29^{\circ} 55' 12''$ north and longitude $121^{\circ} 22'$ east.

Amoy island occupies the northern portion of the great bight between Chen-hai and Hu-i-tau points. The city of Amoy stands on the south-west part of the island, abreast the island of Ku-lang-su, which affords protection to the inner harbour, one of the best and most easy of access on the coast of China. Ku-lang-su island has a circumference of four miles; it is principally of granite, and fresh-water from wells is plentiful. There are two distinct ridges the summit of which is 300 feet high.

Canton,* or Kuang-chou Fu, is the capital of Kwang-tung, one of the wealthiest provinces and the most important city in south China. Nature has afforded it unparalleled facilities for navigation. To an inland position, with its agricultural and defensive facilities are

* See map facing page—(at beginning of Chapter 25)

added the advantages of communication by means of three great rivers and their feeders. These are the Si Kiang or West River (also called the Blue river), the Pe Kiang or North River, and the Tung-Kiang or East River. The Si Kiang falls into the sea nine miles south-south-west from Macao, after receiving at San-shui, seventy five miles from the sea, where its course turns from east to south, the waters of the Pe Kiang. The Tung Kiang empties itself into the estuary of the Chu Kiang¹ or Canton river, above the second bar. The delta of these rivers forms a large tract of alluvial land between Macao, San-Shui, and Canton.

Canton itself stands on the north bank of the Chu Kiang about 70 miles from the sea. The Chu Kiang rises about 100 miles from the sea in two streams which unite ten miles above the city. At this junction a long narrow stream connects it with the Pe Kiang by two branches, one of which is at Sanshui. The entrance of the Canton river, formed by the islands of Chuen-pi (left bank) and Tai-kok-tau (right bank), is divided by North and South Wan-tung islands into two channels, the eastern of which, the Bocca Tigris, is generally used by vessels of large draught; the western is called the Bremer channel.

From the mouth, the first defences were Chuen-pi fort on the left bank and Tai-kok-tau on the right bank. The former was some 150 feet above the river, on the island of that name. The latter was a strong work close to the river bank on a low spit of land on the south-west of Tai-kok-tau island. Higher up the Anung-hai island, 1,500 feet high, forms the east or left bank of the Bocca Tigris; the works on it formed the principal defences of the Bogue. North and South Wan-tung are two rocky islands lying nearly in mid-channel, abreast of Anung-hoi, forming the western side of the Bocca Tigris. They are about 600 yards apart, surrounded by a bank which extends $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles south-east by south. They were both fortified. Tiger island lies $1\frac{3}{4}$ miles north of North Wan-tung; there was a low open battery on it. These works were known collectively as the Bogue Forts.

Above Tiger island the banks cease to be barren and rocky, the hills recede, and the immediate banks become well defined and assume the character of low-lying rice fields. Above Tiger

¹ Pearl-river.

island the defences were the first bar battery and the barrier forts, all in the Whampoa passage. Five and a half miles above second bar the river divides into two main branches, the Whampoa and Blenheim passages, which meet again at Ho-nan point just above Canton City and opposite the foreign settlement. The distances by the respective passages are fourteen and sixteen and a half miles, respectively. Whampoa, the anchorage for foreign vessels, is eight miles below the city.

The city of Canton is surrounded by a wall about six miles in circumference, varying from twenty to thirty-five feet in height and from twenty-five to thirty feet in thickness. The city proper, the walled enclosure, is nearly square in form and lies between the river and the low hills $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles distant on the north. The southern suburb, the most populous part of the city, lies between the south wall and the river, and the Tartar quarter is the north-western portion. To the west, the country lying between the city and Li-Min-Kuan arsenal on Sulphur creek is practically roadless; but narrow paved roads, three feet wide, exist here and there; the country is highly cultivated and irrigated. To the northward of this cultivated district stretches a dry undulating country, passable by all arms, with bare, broad-topped rugged slopes. West of this and north of the city lie the lower spurs of the White Cloud range. Blue Jacket Fort, Gough Fort, and Marine Fort occupy the crests of steep hill-sides. These hills command the city. An offshoot known as Magazine Hill is included within the walls to the east of the north gate and rises to a height of over 200 feet; the city wall crosses the ridge to the northwards some sixty feet below. This position is the key of the city and was held by the troops during the occupation of Canton. To the north-east of the city is a wide cultivated valley, beyond which are the White Cloud mountains, whence low, barren, grave-covered undulations stretch in a south-easterly direction to Tai-shu-tsun and the Sha-ho creek. Between them and the river lie a succession of irrigated gardens and rice-fields.

The climate is tropical and very trying from May to October, when the thermometer stands high and the atmosphere is damp. The south-west monsoon lasts from about April to September and the north-east from

Canton city.


Climate of Canton.

October to March. The changes of the monsoon are particularly trying seasons. May to August are the rainy months, and the cold weather does not fairly set in before December. Winter is most favourable for land operations, as from April to October the rice-fields are impassable. For water operations, however, summer and autumn are best, the creeks being then full and accessible to vessels of considerable draught.

Returning to the northern theatre, the province of Kiang-su lies immediately to the north of Chekiang and is bounded on the east by the sea. It has an area of 45,000 square miles and forms part of the great northern plain. It is watered as no other Chinese province is. The Grand Canal runs through it from north to south and the Yang-tse Kiang crosses its southern portion from west to east.

The Yang-tse Kiang is the most important river in China. It is subject to great periodic changes of level and its essential features, as regards navigation, alter so rapidly that a chart cannot be considered a safe guide after six months or a year. In the months of September and October the river is not difficult to navigate if proper care and caution be employed, the water being then many feet higher than its winter level. In September it begins to fall, and in November and December sinks very rapidly, on which account these two months are considered the most difficult for navigation. The estuary is seventy miles broad and the tide is felt as far as Nanking, the former capital of China, 200 miles inland. The river falls into the sea by three channels, of which the southern is the recognised entrance.

Chin-kiang Fu, a walled city about four miles in circumference, accessible to sea-going vessels of the heaviest burden, is situated on the right bank of the river 170 miles from the sea. It is one of the most important points in the empire, being situated where sea navigation may be said to end and the difficulties of river navigation to begin, at the junction of the Grand Canal with the Yang-tse Kiang. It is in water communication with Shanghai, Hang-chau, and Ningpo on the south, and to the north with the Yellow River, the Pei-ho, Tientsin, and Peking. Thus a great part of the waterways of the Empire meet at



I. B. Topo. Dy. No 8,097
Exd. C. J. A. May 1909

Scale 1 inch = 1 mile

No. 4,854-I., 1909.

REFERENCES.

- | | | |
|----------------------------|---------------------------------|---|
| 1 Cultivated—fairly dry. | 5 Causeway, 5' wide. | 9 Firm, shelving banks. |
| 2 Barren and rugged hills. | 6 Dry, low, rugged undulations. | 10 Allied Landing Place. 1857. |
| 3 Low, dry undulations. | 7 Irrigation; impassable. | 11 More or less open. |
| 4 Causeway, 8'—10' wide. | 8 Firm banks. | 12 Under view of the Five-storied Pagoda. |

NOTE.—See Admiralty Charts 1,739 and 2,562, Canton River.

Chin-kiang Fu, and in 1842 its capture did more to hasten the conclusion of a treaty than the fall of numerous other places occupying a less important position.

In climate and temperature there is little difference between Chin-kiang Fu and Shanghai. In Shanghai the annual range of the thermometer is from 25° to 96° , and in spring and autumn a change of temperature of 20° in 24 hours is not infrequent. The annual mean is 62.5° Farh., and the mean rainfall about fifty inches. The south-west monsoon is barely felt at Shanghai. During autumn, winter, and spring, north-easterly winds prevail. From January to April it is often damp and rainy; the winter months are, however, salubrious. Snow usually falls in December and January. April and May are genial months. The sickly season extends from June to September, at which period the prevailing winds are southerly and the absence of a tempering breeze is acutely felt.

CHAPTER XXVII.

MILITARY OPERATIONS, 1840.

The Eastern Expeditionary Force.

A COMPACT and serviceable body of troops, mustering about 3,600 bayonets, with a due proportion of artillery and ordnance stores from India, and a squadron of three men-of-war and two steamers, assembled at Singapore early in May, 1840. Later on in May, Captain Sir Gordon Bremer took command of the squadron, then consisting of the *Wellesley*, 74; *Conway*, 28; *Alligator*, 28; *Cruiser*, 18; *Larne*, 20; *Algerine*, 10; *Rattlesnake*, 6; and the *Atalanta* and the *Madagascar*, steamers of the Indian service. With these were twenty-six transports and store-ships, having on board Her Majesty's 18th, 26th, and 49th Regiments of Foot; 1 battalion of Bengal Sepoys, volunteers collected from 10 regiments of the line; 2 batteries of Royal Artillery with 9-pounder field-pieces and 12-pounder howitzers; 2 companies of Sappers and Miners, and a large Engineer establishment from Madras. Colonel Burrell, 18th Regiment, commanded the troops at the rendezvous; Colonel Cameron, of the Cameronians, was second in command. After a detention of three weeks at Singapore, the squadron arrived off the Ladrões, near Macao, on the 21st June.

The Commodore Sir Gordon Bremer, and Captain Elliot, the Superintendent of Trade, met to concert measures at Macao. A notice was issued establishing a blockade of the river and port of Canton from the 28th June, 1840. A circular was also issued to the forces, reminding them that the object of the war was to obtain satisfaction, not from the people, but from the Government, and exhorting them to adopt, in their intercourse with the former, all the means in their power to conciliate their good-will.

On the 24th June the fleet proceeded northward, a small force only being left at the Bogue to maintain the blockade.

On the 4th July the *Wellesley* and other ships of the squadron entered the harbour of Ting-hai, the capital of Chusan, and, without the slightest attempt being made to prevent them, dropped their anchors close in shore.

On the morning of the 5th July all the transports entered the harbour. The Chinese, who were altogether unprepared for this hostile visit, nevertheless made a show of resistance. The British men-of-war anchored in a line at a distance of 200 yards from the wharf. They consisted of the *Wellesley*, 74; *Conway* and *Alligator*, 28; *Cruiser* and *Algerine*, 18; and ten gun-brigs. The bombardment of Ting-hai began at 2 P.M., and lasted but a few minutes, when the fire of the enemy ceased, and the soldiers on the wharves dispersed.

The grenadiers of the 18th Royal Irish and a detachment of Royal Marines landed and occupied Joss-house Hill, to the right of the suburb of Ting-hai. Some guns of the Madras Artillery, the Cameronians, and a detachment of Sappers also landed, and, defiling through the narrow streets near the water's edge, gained a partially cultivated plain within 500 yards of the city rampart, whence fire was opened against it. The fire of the Chinese had but little effect, but the continued din of gongs and display of banners within the city indicated that a serious resistance might be expected. No attack was made that night, the troops bivouacking in the suburb. When morning dawned, Colonel Burrell advanced with a party of the 18th Regiment, only to find the city abandoned and the gates blocked by a few grain-bags. Regulations were now drawn up for the government of the island, Colonel Burrell being appointed Military Commandant and Civil Commissioner.

A messenger was despatched in a steamer to Chen-hai, at the mouth of the Ningpo river, to deliver to the authorities there a copy of Lord Palmerston's letter to the chief advisers of the Emperor. The letter was returned with an intimation that its contents and style were not such as could be exposed to the glance of the imperial eye.

Captain Bouchier, of the *Blonde* frigate, 42, was charged with a similar commission to Amoy, where, on the refusal of the mandarins to receive the letter or to hold any communication with the ship, and on their firing treacherously on an unarmed boat, the frigate opened her broadside upon the fort and town walls. No troops were landed, there being none available for land service. The Chinese made the most of the frigate quitting the harbour without landing troops, ascribed it to fear, and reported to Peking that a victory had been gained, and the barbarians beaten off.

A blockade of the Ningpo river and of the coast northward, as far as the Yang-tse Kiang, being proclaimed, and the *Conway* left to explore the mouth of the latter river, a squadron, consisting of the *Wellesley*, 74; the *Blonde*, 42; the *Modeste*, 20; the *Pylades*, 20; the *Volage*, 28; and *Madagascar* steamer and two or three transports, sailed for the Pei-ho.

Colonel Burrell did not permit any of the public buildings or temples in the city of Ting-hai to be occupied, with the exception of that crowning Joss-house Hill, held by the 18th Regiment; the rest of the force occupied tents, exposed by day to the sun and by night to the unwholesome exhalations which arose from the damp irrigated soil and paddy-fields. Fever and dysentery in consequence soon made fatal ravages amongst the men, but an application made for the use of an unemployed transport as a hospital ship was refused.¹

Proceeding northward, the Pi-chih-li expedition passed the promontory of Shan-tung on the 5th August, and on the 9th anchored off the mouth of the Pei-ho, in six fathoms at low tide, at a considerable distance (eight or nine miles) from the low mud banks which gird it.

¹ Table of admissions into hospital and deaths which occurred in the European Regiments at Chusan from 13th July to 31st December 1840:—

| | | | Admissions. | Deaths. |
|------------------|-----------|-----------|--------------|------------|
| Madras Artillery | .. | .. | 575 | 16 |
| 18th Regiment | .. | .. | 1,341 | 52 |
| 28th Regiment | .. | .. | 1,545 | 238 |
| 49th Regiment | .. | .. | 1,868 | 142 |
| TOTAL | .. | .. | 5,329 | 448 |

spit of land connecting the Portuguese and Chinese possessions. Their fire was speedily answered by the Chinese from a battery of seventeen guns constructed on the beach, north of the barrier. A brisk fire was kept up for an hour on both sides, when, a single gun being landed on the beach, the Chinese guns were soon silenced; and about 300 troops, composed of marines, the small-arm men of the *Druid*, and two companies, Bengal Volunteers, having landed, the Chinese were driven from every position, although 5,000 strong. All was over in four hours, and the vessels retired to their usual anchorage. Four men were wounded on the British side. The Chinese withdrew to a fort near Casa Bianca, which they repaired and occupied, removing thither their spiked guns.

No further active operations took place during the year 1840. By the end of the year the force at the mouth of the Canton river had been reinforced by the *Calliope* and *Samarang* and the 37th Regiment, Madras Native Infantry.

The policy of Keeshen¹ was pacific; but the state of the public mind in Canton and the activity displayed by the military authorities at the Bogue tended to create a belief that hostilities were but dormant. Towards the close of the year the arrival of convalescents who had been sent from Chusan to Hong-Kong to recuperate, and of seven companies of the 37th Madras Native Infantry² from India, who were landed on an island near Lintin, south of the Bogue, placed at the disposal of Captain Elliot a complete and effective force.

¹ The Chinese High Commissioner.

² The four transports which conveyed the 37th Madras Native Infantry ex-

perienced a terrific typhoon in which the *Golconda*, having on board the Regimental Head Quarters and Staff, foundered.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

MILITARY OPERATIONS, 1841.

WHEN it became evident that the object of prolonging negotiations was to gain time for the completion of the arrangements for defence, Captain Elliot determined on active hostilities, and on the morning of the 7th January, 1841, the troops (about 1,400 strong) destined for the land attack on the Chuen-pi fort, having been put on board the *Nemesis*, *Enterprise*, and *Madagascar* steamers, were landed, at 8-30 A.M., two miles to the southward of the point of attack. At the same time the eastern squadron, consisting of the *Calliope*, *Larne*, *Hyacinth*, and *Queen* and *Nemesis* steamers, stood in until abreast of the Chinese batteries, when they dropped their anchors and began the action.

The total naval force consisted of the *Wellesley*, 74 ; *Blenheim*, 74 ; *Melville*, 74 ; *Calliope* ; *Samarang*, 28 ; *Druid*, 44 ; *Sulphur* ; *Larne*, 18 ; *Hyacinth*, 18 ; *Modeste*, 18 ; *Columbine*, 18 ; *Starling* ; and steamers *Queen*, *Nemesis*, *Madagascar*, and *Enterprise*.

The troops mentioned above consisted of a battalion of the Royal Marines, convalescents of the 18th, 26th, and 49th Regiments, the regiment of Bengal Volunteers, the 37th Regiment, Madras Native Infantry, and a detachment of Royal Artillery and Madras Artillery. Major Pratt of the 26th Regiment in command, formed them into two columns and pushed on immediately for the fort.

The ships-of-war ceased to fire upon the fort as soon as the heads of the land columns came under fire of its ramparts. The fort was carried at a rush, the boats of the squadron at the same time pushing on shore and their crews entering the position from the sea side. The Chinese made but a show of resistance, and, the loss of the British amounted to only thirty-eight men wounded, many of them slightly.

During the operations at Chuen-pi, on the northern bank of the river, Captain Scott, R.N., with the western squadron, consisting of the *Samarang* (26), *Druid* (44), *Modeste* (18), and *Columbine* (16), proceeded a short distance higher up towards Tai-kok-tau fort, a powerful battery built upon the water's edge, and, anchoring abreast of it, bombarded it for the space of an hour, when, the fire of the Chinese slackening, marines and troops were landed, who, climbing over the shattered parapet, soon drove the enemy from their works after a hand-to-hand combat.

In the meantime, the 74-gun ships proceeded higher up the river, to prepare for the attack upon the defences of the Bogue, as soon as the troops and squadron engaged in the reduction of Chuen-pi and Tai-kok-tau had been withdrawn from the forts.

During the 7th and 8th January the captured works were dismantled, the guns (97 in number) disabled, and all buildings and stores destroyed. Many of the guns were not mounted, many were only 6-pounders; the majority corresponded to our 12-pounders. On our side forty men were wounded and none killed, showing that the Chinese were most inefficiently armed.

On the 8th the troops re-embarked, and the fleet, in the wake of the *Blenheim*, under sail, gradually closed upon the great Anung-hoi battery, which formed the main defence of the Bogue. A flag of truce was then sent on board the *Wellesley*, with a request that hostilities might be suspended pending a further discussion of the terms for a treaty to be entered into at once. An armistice was accordingly agreed to with a view to giving the High Commissioner time to consider the terms offered for his acceptance. The preliminary peace arrangements involved the following conditions:—

- 1st—The cession of the island and harbour of Hong-Kong, in perpetuity, to the British Crown.
- 2nd—An indemnity of six millions of dollars.
- 3rd—Direct official intercourse between the two countries upon an equal footing.
- 4th—The trade of Canton to be opened within ten days after the Chinese new year.

Hong-Kong was taken formal possession of on the 26th January, and shortly afterwards proclamations were issued relating to the

government of the island, while the evacuation of Chusan by the British was at once ordered.

A written ratification of the Chuen-pi treaty not being accorded, Captain Elliot reluctantly ordered the resumption of hostilities. On the 20th February Sir G. Bremer proceeded to the vicinity of Anung-hoi with the fleet, the light division of which consisted of the *Calliope*, *Samarang*, *Herald*, *Alligator*, *Sulphur*, and *Nemesis*. On the 23rd Captain Herbert, with the *Nemesis* and four pin-naces, attacked a Chinese force engaged in obstructing the river channel at the back of Anung-hoi. The enemy's works, comprising a masked battery and field-works, were carried by the seamen and marines without the loss of a man; about thirty Chinese were killed and eighty guns spiked and untrunnioned.

On the 25th the fleet assembled near the island of South Wan-tung. Two channels exist by which vessels of considerable burden can enter the Canton river, one on either side of North and South Wan-tung islands. The western passage was imperfectly

The Bogue defences. known, the eastern being the ordinary passage taken. No pains had been spared to make the western passage as difficult and dangerous as possible by bringing the fire of two formidable batteries, of 45 and 40 guns, respectively, to bear upon it,—one constructed on the western extremity of North Wan-tung, the other on the right bank of the river. From Anung-hoi a strong chain had been carried right across the eastern passage, to a rocky point near a formidable battery, which had for years existed on the eastern tongue of North Wan-tung, where its end was made fast, the chain being held up to within a few feet of the surface of the water by means of a line of rafts.

South Wan-tung island was unoccupied, and advantage was taken of this neglect to establish there a battery which enfiladed the batteries on North Wan-tung.

On the 25th a working party of Royal and Madras Artillery, covered by 150 men of the 37th Madras Native Infantry and the

Attack on the Bogue defences. *Nemesis*, erected a sandbag battery on a saddle in the centre of South Wan-tung, and on the morning of the 26th, two 8-inch iron and one 24-pounder brass howitzers were in position. The working party

suffered no loss, although heavily fired upon during the night. At daybreak the howitzers opened fire, and effectively shelled the low batteries at the extremities of North Wan-tung, as well as the camp formed along its southern slope, protected in front by a sand-bag parapet connecting the masonry batteries, and having at intervals guns mounted behind embrasures cut in commanding situations. A calm and a strong ebb-tide prevented the co-operation of the fleet till 11 A.M. Yet, notwithstanding this, and that many guns in the southern horns of the half-moon batteries on North Wan-tung bore upon the South Wan-tung battery, no casualty occurred.

The *Blenheim* and *Queen* anchored close abreast of the great Anung-hoi battery, and the *Melville* off the extremity of the fort, with her larboard bow guns bearing on the eastern half-moon battery of Wan-tung, and by noon the action here became general.

The *Wellesley*, *Druid*, and *Modeste* entered the western channel, and anchored abreast of the battery on North Wan-tung, which they engaged with starboard broadsides, while shot and shell were thrown from their larboard 68-pounders against a fort on the right bank, behind which was an extensive encampment of troops.

The advanced squadron, consisting of the *Calliope*, *Herald*, *Samarang*, *Alligator*, &c., passed on to the northward of the Chinese defences, firing their starboard broadsides into the lower Wan-tung battery as they passed. After the cannonade had lasted an hour Sir LeF. Senhouse landed under Anung-hoi with 300 seamen and marines and carried the work with little resistance. North Wan-tung was carried in like manner, the Chinese troops, 1,500 in number, flying in disorder when the British troops were seen nearing the shore.

The *Nemesis*, with some boats of the *Wellesley*, at 4 P.M., proceeded to attack the Tai-kok-tau fort and camp. Upon the marines landing from the boats, and entering by the embrasures of the forts, the Chinese abandoned their works and dispersed over the hills.

The tents, stores, houses, &c., were fired. The British loss was 5 men slightly wounded. Of the Chinese some 500 must have fallen, the proportion of mandarins being very small. Amongst them fell the valiant Admiral Kuan. Thirteen hundred prisoners were taken and set at liberty. Many were shot down

by the Indian troops in consequence of their not understanding the command of the British naval officers to cease firing.

Some 400 pieces of cannon were captured, some 68-pounders and a good many 42, 32, 24, and 18-pounders; the majority however of less calibre. The enemy's magazines furnished an ample supply of powder whereby the imposing granite fortifications were soon reduced to ruins. The works of North Wantung were left untouched, and were occupied on the 28th by a detachment of troops with some guns. The greater part of the ordnance taken, being next to useless, was destroyed.

Leaving the 74-gun ships and the transports at the Bogue, the advanced squadron under Captain Herbert of the *Calliope*, with the *Alligator*, *Herald*, *Sulphur*, *Modeste*, and *Madagascar* and *Nemesis* steamers, proceeded up the river to attack a formidable position which the enemy had taken up at the second bar, where a strong raft had been constructed from bank to bank, flanked on one side by the guns of an extensive earthwork, in which were 2,000 troops, and on the other by the battery of the *Cambridge*, a ship which had been purchased by the Chinese for warlike purposes before the arrival of the expedition. The attack on this position made on the 27th February resulted in the carrying of the entrenchments, the cutting of the raft, and the capture and destruction of the *Cambridge*. The *Cambridge* was heavily armed, but was moored head and stern in a manner to prohibit the use of her guns. The Chinese were not sufficiently acquainted with naval tactics to enable them to make the best use of the resources at their command.

Captain Herbert's squadron anchored at Whampoa reach, and on the 2nd March the *Sulphur*, with a division of boats, carried the river defences to Napier's island—the *Herald*, *Alligator*, *Modeste* and *Sulphur* anchoring off the island. The advantage of light draught steamers during these operations was most marked.

The fall of the Bogue defences, considered to be impregnable by the Chinese, created a degree of alarm in the public mind without parallel since the Tartar conquest. On the 3rd March a suspension of hostilities was agreed to. This was a conciliatory piece of leniency on the part of the British, its negotiator, the Prefect of Canton, having no powers.

Hostilities were resumed on the 7th March, and by the 18th, with a loss on the British side of one officer and six men wounded, the Dutch Folly¹ was occupied, and all the river defences destroyed, including those of the Macao passage, without loss on the British side.

On the 20th March an armistice was agreed to, and Canton was re-opened to all who might proceed there for lawful trade.

On the 12th and 13th March the *Nemesis*, with a small flotilla of boats (three) in tow, threaded the shallow and narrow passages leading from the Broadway to the Canton river, carrying all the batteries met with in her course and destroying nine war junks and 105 pieces of cannon.

After the armistice was concluded, a few of the light craft of
 Dispersion of the force. Captain Herbert's squadron anchored off Canton, and the transports of the garrison of North Wan-tung remained at the Bogue; the rest of the force, together with the Chusan garrison, assembled at Hong-Kong, where Sir H. Gough, who had arrived from India on the 2nd March, lost no time in remodelling and reorganizing it. The regiment of Bengal Volunteers proceeded to Singapore, and all invalids were despatched to India and to Europe. The *Melville* sailed for England, and the *Samarang*, the *Queen*, and *Madagascar* to Calcutta.

Early in April an edict was received from Peking, annulling
 War preparations. all the concessions made by the imperial agents. Measures of defence were actively pushed on in Chusan, and at Chen-hai and Amoy. Captain Stead, landing on Chusan island after its evacuation, was murdered, and all redress refused by the governor of Che-kiang. Towards the middle of April large bodies of troops poured into Canton.

On the 20th May the main portion of the British force again
 Hostilities resumed. passed the Bogue, and on the 21st the *Blenheim* anchored in the Macao passage, six miles below Canton.

On the night of the 21st, without warning, numerous fire-rafts were sent adrift against the *Louisa* cutter and schooner *Aurora* lying off the factories, and at the same time fire was opened from

¹ An island S. W. of Canton city.

guns mounted in temporary batteries along the wharves. The rafts were ingeniously constructed, being composed of boats chained together by twos and threes, so that, drifting down with the tide, they might hang across the bows of a ship. Little damage, however, was done, as the boats of the squadron invariably towed them clear.

The main fleet assembled near Whampoa on the 23rd May, having sailed from Hong-Kong on the 18th. On the 24th May the force was divided into two columns, the right being directed to land and occupy the factories (near the new Shamien site) the left to proceed up the Sulphur creek, by way of Blenheim, reach, previously reconnoitred on the 23rd May, and to land at the village of Tsing-pu, being conveyed in Chinese decked passage boats collected during the reconnaissance.

On the 25th the left column, about 1,800 strong, landed under the command of Major-General Burrell, and marched against the heights to the north of Canton. Four forts crowned these heights, mounting some forty-two guns of various calibre. Two 6-pounder guns and two 12-pounder howitzers having been brought up and placed in position within 300 or 400 yards of the forts, a heavy fire was opened upon them at 8 A.M. after which they were carried at the point of the bayonet.

The Chinese opened a heavy fire on the forts from their rampart guns and *jingals*, causing considerable losses to their successful assailants. They also detached a party of some 500 Tartars to attack the landing-place at Tsing-pu; these were, however, defeated by details hastily collected by Captain Hall of the *Nemesis*.

The weather was extremely sultry during the whole of the 25th, and about mid-day of the 26th rain fell in torrents—a circumstance which tended greatly to the fatigue of the attacking columns. By the night of the 26th, by the strenuous exertions of the artillery, fifteen pieces were in position along the chain of heights which commanded the city on the north-east face, and a plentiful supply of shot and shell was collected. The country intervening between the British position and the landing-place was broken and difficult for artillery, much cut up by swampy paddy-fields, and covered with knolls used by the Chinese as burial-grounds.¹

¹ N.B.—A better line of advance would be found to the north of that taken over a more undulating and less swampy country.

Whilst our troops were thus engaged, the *Calliope*, *Conway*, *Herald*, and *Alligator* pushed up the Whampoa passage with the flood-tide, to secure the naval arsenal opposite the city, and to act as circumstances directed. At the same time the *Hyacinth*, *Modeste*, *Cruiser*, and *Columbine* took up a position near the factories and secured the Dutch and French forts. These ships gained possession of the whole of the river frontage of Canton, capturing many forts and war junks in a gallant style.

With the city thus at our mercy an armistice was again agreed to. A ransom of six millions of dollars was accepted, the Tartar troops being allowed to march out without banners or music. The considerations that influenced Captain Elliot in acceding to an armistice were :—

- (1) The strength of the force under arms before Canton on the 27th May did not exceed 2,200 men, whilst within the city were not less than 20,000.
- (2) Sickness from the inclemency of the weather at this season of the year, the temptations of plunder, and the likelihood of the troops obtaining intoxicating liquors, were greatly to be feared.
- (3) The sacking and firing of the city by a vindictive and rancorous populace were to be dreaded.

After the lapse of five days, the ransom being paid, the troops were re-embarked, and the whole of the force, including the North Wan-tung garrison, was conveyed to the general rendezvous at Hong-Kong.

Before, however, the British troops had evacuated their position on the heights, and after the conclusion of the armistice, it became necessary on the 30th of May to act against armed bands of villagers, who assembled in large numbers upon a range of low hills to the west of the city.

The total loss of the British during this series of operations in killed, wounded, and missing, fell short of 130 (15 killed).

At this period Captain Elliot was recalled, his treaty disapproved, and Colonel Sir H. Pottinger appointed in his place. Rear-Admiral Sir W. Parker was appointed to the command of the expedition about to proceed to the north.

The season of midsummer is always the most trying in the southern latitudes of China, and was rendered more fatal to the health of the men from exposure during the latter part of May before Canton. Sickness seriously delayed the preparations for the advance of the small force upon Amoy and Chusan, eleven per cent. being on the sick list; two severe typhoons towards the end of July also caused such extensive damage to the transports that it was found impossible to move the force, as proposed, early in August.

On the 3rd August Sir W. Parker and Sir H. Pottinger arrived. The first act of the latter was to refuse to negotiate with his inferior in rank, the Prefect of Canton—a circumstance which exalted his rank greatly in Chinese eyes.

On the 20th August the *Wellesley*, *Blenheim*, *Druid*, *Blonde*, *Modeste*, *Pylades*, *Columbine*, *Cruiser*, and *Algerrine*, *Sesostris*, and *Queen* steam frigates, and *Nemesis* and *Phlegethon*, iron steamers, with twenty-one transports, sailed northwards. The transports conveyed the 18th Royal Irish, four companies of the 26th Cameronians, the 49th and 55th Regiments, detachments of the Royal and Madras Artillery, two companies of Madras Sappers and Miners, a rifle company of the 36th Regiment Madras Native Infantry—in all 2,700 fighting men, with a numerous train of light field artillery and a rocket brigade. The general rendezvous was to be Chapel Island near Amoy.

The garrison left at Hong-Kong under the command of Colonel Burrell consisted of five companies of the 26th Regiment, a detachment of the 18th, two companies of Bengal Volunteers, the 37th Madras Native Infantry, and a few Madras Artillery and Sappers and Miners. A fort was constructed on Kellett's island to overawe Kowloon, and other defensive measures were taken.

The fleet anchored off Amoy, after a favourable passage, on the 24th August. Some strong and well designed batteries had been constructed on the island of Ku-lang-su, mounting some seventy-six guns, and also along the shore contiguous to the island of Amoy. The two seventy-fours were laid alongside the great shore batteries, whilst the *Druid*, *Blonde*, and light-draught vessels engaged the batteries of Ku-lang-su, and the steamers were employed in landing the troops and destroying the war-junks and gun-boat flotilla.

Hostilities resumed.

Attack on Amoy.

The bombardment lasted two hours, the batteries suffering but slight damage, not a gun being dismounted; the troops then landed and carried the works, the Chinese making a trifling resistance. The heat during the day was very great and fatiguing. The troops bivouacked on some heights near the city of Amoy; the Chinese evacuating it during the night, it was entered next morning without opposition.

The troops operating against Amoy were:—

| | Officers. | Men. |
|------------------------|-----------|-------|
| Artillery | 9 | 240 |
| 18th Regiment | 30 | 648 |
| 26th „ | 8 | 153 |
| 49th „ | 24 | 460 |
| 55th „ | 26 | 731 |
| Madras Sappers | 6 | 184 |
| | TOTAL | 103 |
| | | 2,416 |

The ships were the *Wellesley*, 74; *Blenheim*, 74; *Blonde*, 44; *Druid*, 44; *Modeste*, 18; *Cruiser*, 18; *Pylades*, 18; *Columbine*, 16; *Bentinck*, 10; *Algerine*, 10; *Sesostris*, 4; *Phlegethon*, 4; *Nemesis*, 4; *Queen*, 4;—the four last named being steamers.

A garrison, consisting of the four companies of the Cameronians, the left wing of the 18th Regiment, with a detachment of Artillery and Sappers, was left in the island of Ku-lang-su, to overawe the fort and town of Amoy. The *Druid*, *Pylades*, and *Algerine* remained to blockade the port and protect Ku-lang-su from attacks by water. No fewer than 500 cannon were taken, together with large stores of ammunition, saltpetre, and sulphur, and an attempt was made to destroy the various works of defence.

On the 4th September the fleet sailed for the Chusan Archipelago; owing to baffling winds and thick fogs many of the transports separated, and did not re-unite near Chusan till the close of the month. During the passage the *Nemesis* visited the harbour of Sheipu, destroying its forts and many war-junks lying there for shelter.

The fortifications that had been raised by the Chinese at Ting-hai since its evacuation by the British, along the eastern shore of the island, the sea-front, and Joss-house Hill, were of a formidable

type, save that, according to their usual custom, the embrasures had no splay and allowed of a range of fire of about 10° only. The Chinese had, moreover, entirely overlooked the necessity of protecting their flanks from being turned.

Attack on Ting-hai.

The hill to the right of the valley, the key of the enemy's position, was unoccupied. This point was selected for the attack, whilst the howitzer battery (one 68-pounder gun and two 24-pounder howitzers) constructed on Trumball island, on the eastern side of the inner harbour, within good range, occupied the attention of the batteries.

On the 1st October, the 55th, 49th, 26th, and 18th Regiments, with the Rifles (Madras Native Infantry), Artillery, and Sappers, disembarked under the brow of the hill above mentioned, which the enemy had now occupied in considerable force, and attacked it. Several of the men-of-war brought their guns to bear on the right flank of the long battery, mounting 150 to 200 guns, which stretched across the mouth of the valley. The 55th carried the heights in front of them, suffering some loss in their ascent up the slope of the hill, the enemy abandoning everything and flying across the low ground which separated their position from the city.

The force was now divided, the 18th Regiment being directed to advance against the long battery and Joss-house Hill, the remainder to pursue the enemy and effect an entrance into the city. This latter column achieved its object without loss, the rapidity of the advance not permitting the Chinese to recover from their panic. On the right, the 18th Regiment and Royal Marines had some sharp encounters with the enemy, who rallied from time to time, and they suffered some loss before the Joss-house Hill was gained. The loss of the Chinese was considerable. On the British side two were killed and nineteen wounded.

The Chinese army melted away after their rout, and large supplies of iron, shot, musket balls, and powder fell into the hands of the victors.

The inhabitants of the island proved a hardy and independent race, and up to the end of the war it was dangerous for the garrison to leave the town. Several camp-followers and private soldiers were kidnapped, men being sent over from the mainland expressly for this purpose.

Leaving detachments of the 18th and 55th, Artillery, and Sappers to garrison Joss-house Hill and Ting-hai, the combined force, on the 9th October, anchored off Just-in-the-way Rock, in mid-channel of the entrance to the Ningpo river.

A reconnaissance showed the heights on either side of the river to be crowded with troops, and bristling with batteries and intrenchments, while the entrance to the river was impeded by a double row of piles, extending nearly the whole way across its mouth and defended by a row of war junks. The citadel, which occupied the summit of a sharp and craggy hill to the right of the river's mouth, had been strengthened, and at every bay or point where facility or landing was afforded, strong earthen batteries had been thrown up.

Early on the morning of the 10th October, a strong column
 Attack on Chen-hai. (left column of attack) of infantry and artillery was landed upon a sandy beach on the southern side of the river, far to the eastward of the Chinese position, and made a circuit round the base of the hills on which the main body of the enemy were posted, so as to get well in their rear. At the same time their attention was diverted by another column (centre column) which landed near the mouth of the river, and by the fire of the men-of-war and steamers, anchored as close inshore as the shoaling of the water would allow, in order to demolish the defences of the citadel, and to throw shells into the batteries and entrenchments on the heights.

A small detachment of Sappers and Miners having been attached to Sir W. Parker's column, the duty of carrying all the enemy's works on the left, or west, bank of the river was assigned to the naval portion of the force, consisting of the seamen battalion, 400 men; Royal Marines, 276 men; Royal Artillery, 23 men; Madras Sappers, 30 men with two 5½ inch mortars; and some 9-and 12-pounder rockets.

After an effective cannonade of the citadel, a portion of this latter force landed, and, scaling the rocky height, entered by a gateway already partially ruined, and gained the position, from which the Chinese fled as they approached. The city ramparts were then escaladed, and the city occupied without resistance.

On the right bank of the river the centre column, consisting of the 49th Regiment, detachments of Artillery and Sappers, two 12-pounder howitzers and two 9-pounder field guns—in all 440 men and forty shot-carriers—landed near the mouth of the river, and drove before it the Chinese, who retired towards a bridge of boats thrown across the river up-stream. The left column (5 companies of the 55th Regiment, a wing of the 18th, a company of Madras Artillery, and some Sappers,—in all 1,040 men,—with 4 light howitzers, two 5½-inch mortars, and 100 shot-carriers), having overcome all opposition, debouched upon the bank of the river in time to intercept the retreat of this dense mass of the enemy, who, overwhelmed by the fire of a complete semi-circle of musketry, lost heavily.

Many prisoners were captured, as well as a large amount of military stores, together with brass cannon, junks, and armed boats. The prisoners were liberated, deprived of their arms, and many of them of their pig tails; the latter degradation an outrage on Chinese feelings, and likely to have intensified their hatred of the invaders. The British loss was 3 killed and 16 wounded.

A garrison, consisting of the 55th Regiment and detachments of Artillery and Sappers was left at Chen-hai, with the *Blonde* in support, to hold the fortifications there; and on the 13th October the steamers, with the *Modeste*, *Cruiser*, *Bentinck*, and *Columbine* as a light squadron, advanced

Attack on Ningpo. up the river toward Ningpo, a passage having been first opened through the barrier of piles and bridge of boats. The land force on board consisted of some 750 bayonets besides Artillery and Sappers.

The lesson taught the Chinese on the 10th had been too severe to allow of a rally at so early a period, and the city was found deserted. Vast stores of rice and other grain were taken. The ponies captured were found most useful for the transport of ammunition boxes and the other necessary appendages of a field train hitherto chiefly carried by "shot-carriers."

Had the troops been able to advance on Chaa-pu, and Hang-chau Fu, the provincial capital of Che-kiang, it is not improbable that the campaign would have been brought to an end; they were, however, not in sufficient numbers.

No further hostilities being contemplated, the troops at Ningpo employed themselves in adopting all the measures of precaution required to meet cold weather. Some joss-houses and mandarins' quarters near the north-western angle of the ramparts were taken possession of as a cantonment.

Billets.

The *Nemesis* and other light draught steamers were found most useful in keeping up communication between Chusan and Ningpo, in beating up the quarters of war junks, searching for fire-rafts, dispersing troops, reconnoitring the islands and rivers, and in rapidly conveying troops from point to point. By their means operations were carried out against Yü-yao, on the north-west branch of the Ningpo river and Tzü K'i, as well as Fung-wah, the results of which were most effective, creating alarm and enabling the British to show good feeling and forbearance to the people when in their power and abandoned by their own authorities. During the progress of these successful operations in the north, towards the end of September it became necessary to destroy the fortifications of North Wan-tung in consequence of the Hong-Kong force being too weak to detach 200 men to hold them.

At the close of 1841, peace seemed far distant, and the confident and determined tone of the Emperor's edicts, combined with an absence of all indications of anxiety to treat with us on any terms, seemed to offer the prospect of a protracted war.

CHAPTER XXIX.

MILITARY OPERATIONS, 1842.

THE garrison in the island of Hong-Kong, early in 1842, consisted of the 26th Cameronians, the 37th Regiment, Madras Native Infantry, 2 companies Bengal Volunteers, and detachments of the 18th and 49th Regiments, Artillery, and Madras Sappers and Miners. The Indian troops were accommodated in temporary barracks on shore, the European regiments remaining in their transport ships. Early in the year the Cameronians joined the head-quarters of the army; and the 37th Madras Native Infantry, which had suffered severely through shipwreck, fever and dysentery, was sent back to India.

The Chinese, in the meantime, from experience gained in May 1841 had constructed formidable works blocking all the main river approaches to Canton, the Macao passage, etc., and also near the two creeks called Junk river and Fiddler's reach, showing a skill in their construction and in the selection of sites much in advance of former years. Dams, formed of huge crates or cradles of stout timber, firmly bound with iron, floated into position, and then weighted and sunk in lines, were constructed across all navigable branches of the main river. By removing the packing of these crates the navigation of the river could be readily restored.

The Portuguese from Macao carried on a lucrative and extensive traffic in cannon, small-arms, and ammunition with Canton. Some 500 to 600 pieces of cannon had been passed up the Broadway in spite of all the efforts of our men-of-war's boats to intercept the junks in which they were transported as soon as they emerged from the Portuguese inner harbour.

During the winter, at Ningpo, Chusan, and the other towns occupied, the Chinese still carried on a daring system of kidnapping, which was not lessened until summary executions had taken place. The inhabi-

tants, however, were friendly to the troops and supplied them with abundance of fresh provisions.

On the early morning of the 10th March, large columns of Chinese troops made a sudden attack upon Ningpo, held by small detachments of troops only, chiefly attacking the west and south gates. After a sharp fight the enemy succeeded in forcing entrance through the latter gate, but were quickly expelled by a company of the 49th Regiment.

A sortie from the west gate, aided by an artillery detachment working a howitzer, caused immense slaughter amongst the Chinese troops occupying in dense masses the narrow streets and alleys of the suburbs. On our side not a single man was killed, but the enemy's casualties amounted to 400.

Simultaneously with this attack on Ningpo, an attempt was made to surprise the gates of Chen-hai, but without success. Fire-vessels were there also sent adrift against the shipping, but were driven on shore by the boats of the *Blonde* and *Hyacinth*.

Sir W. Parker arrived off Ningpo on the 14th March with the *Queen*, *Nemesis*, and *Phlegethon*, and formed a detachment of 900 men of all arms with 4 light field-pieces (8-pounders) for operations against Tsü K'i, where the enemy were reported to be in force.

On the morning of the 15th the whole embarked on board the *Queen*, *Nemesis*, and *Phlegethon* steamers, and proceeding up the river in a north-east direction, disembarked four miles from Tsü K'i, and pushed forward towards a high range of hills, on which the enemy had taken up a position.

The troops advanced in three columns,—the right column, consisting of the 18th Regiment and rifle company, 36th Madras Native Infantry, making towards the left of the enemy's position, in a direction to cut off their retreat.

The 49th Regiment in the centre, and the seamen and marines on the left, speedily gained the summit of the heights, and at the point of the bayonet drove the enemy out of their entrenchments, following them in pursuit down the reverse slope. The loss of the British was 3 killed, 15 wounded; that of the Chinese exceeded 500 killed and wounded. The British bivouacked on the heights.

The enemy's force was estimated at between 7,000 and 8,000, composed chiefly of Northern men, more hardy and warlike than the ordinary troops of the central and maritime provinces, and who had never previously encountered British troops.

On the 16th March the wounded were embarked on board the steamers, the camp fired, and the troops advanced towards the Chang-ki pass, distant six or seven miles from Tsü K'i, but were too late to capture the military chest and main magazine of the Che-kiang army, which the Chinese carried off. On the 17th the force returned to their base, a party traversing the land route to Chen-hai, which was found practicable by the branches of the canal.

Early in 1842 the 26th Regiment and the *Cornwallis* joined the force. During April and May a fresh corps of Bengal Volunteers¹ (Rajputs), the 2nd and 41st Regiments, Madras Native Infantry, with some artillery and horses, reinforced it; several steamers and ships-of-war—the *Vixen*, *Tenasserim*, *Auckland*, *Ariadne*, *Medusa*, and others from Bombay and Calcutta (Hooghly steamers), well armed and adapted for river navigation, also joined.

Difficulties of tides and currents, and supply and transport, had prevented operations being carried out against the important and strongly garrisoned town of Hang-chau; it was, therefore, determined that the town of Cha-pu, thirty to thirty-five miles distant from it, should now be attacked. The transports occupied nine days in reaching Cha-pu from Chen-hai, a distance of sixty miles only.

Ningpo was evacuated on the 7th May, and the troops embarked on board the *Queen*, *Sesostris*, and *Phlegethon* steamers. This was represented to the Emperor as a great victory gained.

The position of Cha-pu is exposed, and the adjoining coast offers facilities for landing troops at many points, the town itself being commanded by heights within short range. The Tartar

¹ Note 1.—Composed of one company from each of the following regiments:—3rd, 15th, 17th, 23rd, 32nd, 41st, 52nd, 56th Bengal Native Infantry.

Note 2.—During the Yang-tee operations the Rajputs, whose caste preju-

dices prevented them cooking except on shore, suffered many privations. They landed at Nanking 750 strong, having arrived 900 strong. On return to Calcutta early in 1843 they did not muster 400 men.

garrison of Cha-pu, contrary to custom, quitted their quarters in the north-western angle of the city, and entrenched themselves on the hills commanding the shore where the British force would be landed.

On the 18th May, the anchorage and landing-place having been previously surveyed, the troops landed, and, supported by seamen and marines, formed two columns; the right, consisting of the 26th and 55th Regiments, with the Artillery and Rifles, to turn the left of the enemy's position, which was parallel to the shore, and to advance round its rear towards the town; the left, the 18th and 49th Regiments, to advance up the heights, take the Chinese entrenchments in flank, and drive their defenders into the plain, towards the right column. The steamers co-operated by shelling the position.

About one in ten of the Chinese had firearms, the rest having only spears, swords, bows and arrows. They made no effectual resistance, but, abandoning their positions, fled in confusion. The right column of attack, gaining Cha-pu, escaladed the walls at the north-east angle and occupied the ramparts, leaving to their rear a band of 300 Tartar troops in occupation of a joss-house, who, finding their retreat cut off, offered a desperate resistance to the left column and the naval brigade, which had landed on the rocky point facing the harbour battery.

Chinese joss-houses and dwelling-houses are well built for isolated defence, having generally but a single entrance in an outer enclosure wall, which is otherwise entire. In their interior there is generally a square paved court, surrounded by ranges of halls or rooms, their fronts, towards the court, being composed of wooden trellis-work, from behind which a most effective musketry fire can be brought to bear upon anybody forcing the entrance gates.

To reduce the building, it was necessary to bring up artillery and blow in the outer walls by powder, and eventually to fire the building (roof timbers are generally of an inflammable pine). Some four hours were expended in reducing this place.

Of the British force engaged on the 18th May, 2 officers were killed and 6 wounded; and of non-commissioned officers, rank and file, of all arms, 8 were killed and 44 wounded. The enemy

left some 500 or 600 men dead, or dieing on the field. The Chinese wounded were well treated, and the kindness they received at Cha-pu produced important results in inducing their countrymen to treat our prisoners well.

It was now decided not to attack Hang-chau. On the 28th May the troops re-embarked, and after a voyage of fifteen days the transports and fleet anchored off Wu-sung, about 100 miles distant from Cha-pu.

Shanghai, on account of the importance of its trade, was the first point north of Hang-chau bay selected for attack. On the 15th June the surveying boats, without molestation, buoyed off a line of anchorage in front of the long battery covering the approach into the Wu-sung river. The defences consisted of a line of ramparts, pierced with embrasures, and extending along the river-bank towards Pao-shan. Not a single flanking defence had been constructed. After a short bombardment the works fell to a few boats' crews and marines. Our loss amounted to two killed and twenty wounded, the enemy losing some thirty only.

On the 16th June the force was strengthened by the arrival of the *Dido*, 20 guns, convoying a large division of transports containing 2,500 reinforcements from India.

No resistance being expected at Shanghai, only the 2nd Regiment of Madras Native Infantry and detachments of Sappers and Miners and Artillery were landed. The land force, consisting of 1,000 men, including the 18th and 49th Regiments, with detachments of Royal Artillery, Madras Horse Artillery, and Sappers and Miners, marched along the left bank of the river. The men-of-war, the *North Star*, *Modeste*, *Clio*, and *Columbine*, each in tow of a steamer, with the rest of the troops on board, proceeded up the river to Shanghai without accident, a few broadsides from the fleet sufficing to put the gunners in the enemy's batteries to flight.

The land force occupied the town, almost without mobestation, and at once took measures to preserve it from mob violence, by constantly patrolling the streets in all directions.

On the 23rd June Shanghai was evacuated, one division embarking on board the steamers in the river, the other marching by land with the guns to Wu-sung. The force now collected at Wu-sung num-

bered 9,000, exclusive of marines. Of the Indian reinforcements, the 39th Madras Native Infantry remained in garrison at Hong-Kong, and the 41st at Chusan. The apprehension of our advance on Peking by way of the River Peiho was now so great that Chinese troops destined for Su-chou Fu were directed to Tientsin.

The whole of the land force under Sir H. Gough was divided into three brigades: the first, under Lord Saltoun, C.B., consisted of the 26th Cameronians, the 98th Regiment, the battalion of Bengal Volunteers, and the flank companies of the 41st Madras Native Infantry—total 83 officers, 2,235 other ranks; the second, of the 55th Regiment, the 36th Madras Rifles, with the 2nd and 6th Regiments, Madras Native Infantry—total 60 officers, 1,772 other ranks; and the third, of the 18th and 49th Regiments and the 14th Madras Native Infantry—total 68 officers, 2,087 other ranks. The Royal and Madras Artillery formed a separate brigade, which was composed of one troop of horse and $4\frac{1}{2}$ companies of foot artillery—total 32 officers, 318 Europeans, and 252 natives; and 4 companies of gun lascars, natives of Madras, entertained to assist in dragging the pieces where horses could not be employed, and to carry ammunition ("shot-carriers"). The Engineer department and three companies of Madras Sappers formed a distinct command, detachments of them being attached to each brigade, when moving against the enemy.

The fleet consisted of—

- H. M. Ships *Cornwallis*, *Blonde*, *Calliope*, *North Star*, *Dido*, *Modeste*,
Endymion, *Clio*, *Columbine*, and *Algerine*—men-of-war;
 „ *Belle Isle*, *Apollo*, *Sapphire*, *Jupiter*, and *Rattlesnake*—
 armed troop-ships;
 „ *Plover* and *Starling*—armed surveying vessels;
 „ *Vixen* and the E. I. Co.'s *Sesostris*, *Auckland*, *Queen*,
 and *Tenasserim*—steam frigates;
 E. I. Co.'s *Nemesis*, *Phlegethon*, *Pluto*, *Proserpine*, and *Medusa*—
 iron steamers;

and 40 transports totalling 30,000 tons. The transports were formed into five divisions, each conducted by a man-of-war, and to each division a steamer was attached to render assistance. Surveying ships preceded the convoy and signalled dangers and soundings. The fleet weighed anchor on the 6th July, and on

the 19th, after experiencing slight resistance, although points favourable to defence were numerous, reached Chin-kiang Fu.

The expectations entertained that the Chinese would here make a most desperate resistance were disappointed, for the fleet was allowed to ride quietly at anchor within short range of the city ramparts; the place appeared to have been entirely deserted.

The Chinese appear to have defended the lines to the capital and Shanghai only, and to have entirely neglected that of the Yangtse, which indicated the weakness of the Government and the insignificance of their military resources, for, during a period of forty days, two batteries only had been erected between Wu-sung and Chin-kiang Fu, on the banks of a river which afforded many admirable positions, each of which could only have been carried by the disembarkation of troops.

On the 21st July orders were issued for the whole of the land

force to be disembarked at daybreak.
Attack on Chin-kiang Fu. Major-General Schoedde's brigade (2nd) was

directed to land to the east of the town, drawing the attention of the enemy to that quarter, whilst Major-General Bartley's column (3rd brigade) landed to the west of it and carried out the direct attack. Lord Saltoun's (1st) brigade, detailed for the attack of entrenched position on a low range of hills to the south, five or six miles distant, also landed to the west of the town opposite Golden Island. The landing was carried out in a most irregular manner, owing to the strength of the tide and the distance apart of the transports; the majority of the troops, however, were on shore by 7 A.M. The landing, notwithstanding its difficulty, was unopposed. The day was intensely hot.

Lord Saltoun's brigade advanced over the undulating country
Right attack. against the Chinese entrenched position in

two columns; the one directed its march to turn the enemy's left, the other so as to press upon their right; but the Chinese gave way before their retreat could be intercepted. Thirteen men of the 98th Regiment died from sunstroke this day.

The brigade of Major-General Schoedde landed without
Left attack. opposition, and the 55th Regiment occupied a commanding slope within 300 yards

of the walls. . .

Seeing the enemy retreat before Lord Saltoun's column, and hearing heavy firing in the direction of the attack of the 3rd brigade, General Schoedde determined to escalade the city walls, which was done without loss. The progress of the force towards the west gate was, however, hotly opposed, the Tartars fighting with great bravery.

Meanwhile the 3rd brigade moved through the suburb towards the west gate, and, occupying the houses lining the canal, brought a heavy fire of musketry, shot, and shell to bear upon the ramparts manned by the Tartars.

About noon, three powder-bags (containing about 160-lb) were placed in position against the gates, and a heavy fire being brought to bear upon the defenders of the ramparts, the brigade formed in close column of sections in the streets of the suburb, in readiness to charge through the gateway. The explosion was successful, and the storming party rushed through the west gate.

About the same time a party of marines who, by the line of the Grand Canal, had reached the scene of action in the boats of the *Cornwallis*, escaladed the wall near a small postern, landing for the purpose close under the right flank of the gateway bastion.

The 2nd and 3rd brigades now took post at the various gates of the town, and proceeded to occupy such quarters as were available for the night.

The Tartars, having stabbed their wives and children, made a final rally in the vicinity of their barracks, and during the night continued to make desperate rushes upon sentries and guards. Encounters took place even inside houses occupied as billets, in which Tartars were concealed.

Our loss during the day was three officers and thirty-one other ranks, killed; fourteen officers, ninety-two other ranks, wounded. Of the marines, one officer and two privates were killed, while five officers and fifteen men of the navy were wounded.

With the capture of Chin-kiang Fu the great object of the Yang-tse Kiang campaign had been accomplished, the empire severed in two, and the utter incapacity of the Government to defend its people exemplified.

General Schoedde's brigade was now told off to occupy Chin-kiang Fu. Two regiments took up a position on the hills overlooking

the city, a breach thirty yards wide in the walls being made near their camp to enable troops to enter it if necessary. The remaining battalion occupied buildings near the southern mouth of the Grand Canal. Many strong, hardy northern ponies had been found in the cavalry stables of the city, which enabled a half troop of Mounted infantry to be formed, who performed many useful duties,—scouring the country, collecting supplies, etc.

Before the troops embarked for Nanking, much desultory fighting took place, and, it being found impossible to restrain the mob, Chin-kiang Fu was left more or less a ruin.

Ilipu¹ now treated for peace, and endeavoured by promises to delay the movements of the fleet. As the conditions of peace were already well known, a cessation of hostilities was refused, until, under the seal of the Emperor, authority to conclude a treaty of peace based upon them should be produced.

The *Cornwallis* and several of the men-of-war, with the transports, leaving Chin-kiang on the 1st and 2nd August, arrived off Nanking on the 8th. The *Cornwallis* moved on the 10th August into a position from which the northern angle of the wall could be battered, and the *Blonde* frigate was towed down the creek to co-operate. Deducting the garrison at Chin-kiang Fu and the sick, the troops for the attack of the city amounted to 3,400 men, exclusive of officers—a force sufficient to capture it, but insufficient to maintain itself there. On the evening of the 10th, Lord Saltoun's brigade disembarked at the lower extremity of the creek and occupied buildings in the vicinity. The artillery landed at the same point, and every preparation was made to move by the paved road, which commenced at the landing-place, five miles distant from the Tartar city, where the gateways, being situated in tunnels without bastion defence, could be readily blown in.

Lord Saltoun's brigade advanced by the paved road and bivouacked at the village of Makur-keou (Mucou); the 3rd brigade then disembarked. During the 11th and 12th, the artillery were engaged in getting some 9-pounders and howitzers (10-inch) on shore, and by the 13th every preparation had been made for the

¹ Imperial High Commissioner.

attack, and the force collected about Makurkeou, which provided excellent billets and stabling, and abundance of forage and litter.

The promptness of these movements had the effect of causing Ilipu to produce an authority sufficient to justify a suspension of hostilities. After several preliminary meetings, a treaty of peace was signed on board the *Cornwallis* by the plenipotentiaries, Sir Henry Pottinger and Ilipu, on the 29th August 1842, of which the following were the articles—

Treaty of peace.

- 1.—Lasting peace and friendship between the two nations.
- 2.—China to pay 21 millions of dollars within three years.
- 3.—The ports of Canton, Amoy, Fu-chou, Ningpo, and Shanghai to be thrown open to British merchants. Consular officers to be appointed to reside at them, and regular and just tariff of imports and exports to be established.
- 4.—Hong-Kong to be ceded in perpetuity to Great Britain.
- 5.—All subjects of Her Britannic Majesty to be at once unconditionally released.
- 6.—An amnesty to be granted to all Chinese subjects who had held intercourse with the British.
- 7.—Correspondence to be conducted on terms of perfect equality amongst the officers of both Governments.
- 8.—On the Emperor's assent being received to the treaty and six million of dollars paid, the British forces to retire from the Yang-tse, holding Ku-lang-su and Chusan until the money payments and arrangements for opening the ports were completed.

Ilipu was most anxious that the fleet should leave the Yang-tse prior to the ratification of the treaty by the Emperor; this our Commissioner wisely declined to do; for so long as the Chinese could shift the scene of the drama from one point to another, they were less likely to yield to the necessity of making peace, short of our dictating terms at Peking itself. The stoppage of the Yang-tse trade had been the heaviest blow yet struck, but many still thought that nothing short of the capture of Peking itself, at some future date, would compel the Chinese to hold intercourse with us and keep faith.

The troops suffered greatly from the intense heat on the Yang-tse, and one regiment (the 98th) before embarking for India had lost 130 men, while 430 more were in hospital.

On the 15th September the Emperor's assent to the treaty signed on the 29th August was received at Nanking.

Break-up of the expedition.

All the transports were on their way down the river by the 20th September, and, after a rendezvous at Chusan on the 12th and 14th October, they left in divisions for Hong-Kong, assembling there about the 18th November.

Lord Saltoun was left in command of the forces in China, which consisted of the wreck of the 98th Regiment, the left wing of the 55th, the right wing of the 41st Madras Native Infantry, one company, Royal Artillery, one company gun lascars, and one company Madras Sappers and Miners, a force of about 1,250 effectives. On the 20th December 1842 the rest of the expeditionary force was withdrawn from China.

Force left in China.

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APPENDIX A.

*British and Chinese losses during the War, from 5th July 1840 to 21st July 1842
(including camp-followers).*

| Date. | Name of Action. | Ord- nance cap- tured. | BRITISH AND INDIAN FORCES. | | | CHINESE. | | | |
|------------------|---|---------------------------------|-------------------------------|----------|--------|----------------------------------|----------|---------|--|
| | | | Killed. | Wounded. | Total. | Killed. | Wounded. | Total. | |
| 1840. | | | | | | | | | |
| 5th July .. | Tinghai-Chusan | 91 | .. | .. | .. | Unknown. | | | |
| 1841. | Chuen-pi Fort | 66 | } | .. | 38 | 38 | Many. | | |
| | War junks | 82 | | | | | | | |
| | Tai-kok-tau Forts | 25 | | | | | | | |
| 25th February .. | Anung-hoi batteries and N. Wan-tung Forts } | 300 | .. | 5 | 5 | 500 | Many. | | |
| 27th February .. | Cambridge and war junks .. | 98 | 1 | 8 | 9 | 300 | .. | | |
| 18th March .. | Defences of Canton | 123 | .. | 6 | 6 | 400 | .. | | |
| 25th May .. | City and heights of Canton .. | 106 | 14 | 112 | 126 | 1,500 | 5,000 | 6,500 . | |
| 26th August .. | Amoy and defences | 550 | .. | 9 | 9 | Severe | | | |
| 1st October .. | Chusan | 136 | 2 | 27 | 29 | 400 to 500 | | | |
| 10th October .. | Chen-hai Citadel | 150 | 3 | 16 | 19 | 150 | Many. | | |
| 1842. | | | | | | | | | |
| 9th March .. | Ning-po—night attack | .. | 1 | 5 | 6 | 500 | Great. | | |
| 10th „ .. | Chen-hai „ „ .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 32 | Many. | | |
| 15th „ .. | Tsie-kie | .. | 3 | 22 | 25 | 800 to 1,000 | | | |
| 18th „ .. | Cha-pu | 92 | 13 | 52 | 65 | 1,000 to 1,500 | | | |
| 16th June .. | Wusung | 250 | 2 | 25 | 27 | 200 to 250 | | | |
| 19th „ .. | Shanghai | 49 | .. | .. | .. | Unknown. | | | |
| 21st July .. | Chin-kiang Fu | .. | 30 | 126 | 156 | Great. | | | |
| | Total .. | 2,118 | 69 | 451 | 520 | Estimated at 18,000 to 20,000 | | | |

APPENDIX B.

List of Troops despatched from India, 1840-1842.

| | | |
|-----------------------------|---------|--|
| <i>Original force</i> | .. | H. M.'s 18th Regiment. |
| | | ,, 26th ,, |
| | | ,, 49th ,, |
| | | 1 Battalion Bengal Volunteers. |
| | | 2 Batteries R.A. |
| | | 2 Companies Madras Sappers and Miners. |
| <i>Reinforcements, 1840</i> | .. | 37th Madras Native Infantry. |
| ,, | 1841 .. | H. M.'s 55th Regiment. |
| | | 36th Madras Native Infantry. |
| ,, | 1842 .. | H. M.'s 98th Regiment. |
| | | 1 Battalion Bengal Volunteers. |
| | | 2nd Madras Native Infantry. |
| | | 6th ,, ,, ,, |
| | | 14th ,, ,, ,, |
| | | 39th ,, ,, ,, |
| | | 41st ,, ,, ,, |
| | | Detachments of Royal and Madras Artillery and Madras Sappers and Miners at differ- ent times |

CHAPTER XXX.

EVENTS FROM 1842 TO 1860.

IN Peking almost every Chinese of rank and influence was opposed to the fulfilment of the treaty, which was alone made possible by China's financial exhaustion. In Canton adverse feeling ran strongest, for here the prestige of the rulers had been destroyed. An association of patriots was formed, in which the malcontents of the neighbouring villages enrolled themselves. It was countenanced by the authorities, and its members were supplied with arms, a policy which sowed the seeds of rebellion and many difficulties.

In 1846 the populace of Canton* had reached the culminating point of misrule. Several cases of violence, insult, and unprovoked attack on foreigners took place, and it became necessary in 1847 to send a naval and military expedition to that part. The resisting batteries were taken, and 827 pieces of cannon disabled, Canton being reached in thirty-six hours from Hong-Kong. An excellent account of this expedition, the object of which was fully attained, is given in the Annual Register for 1847.

In July 1850 a rebellion broke out in Kuang-si, which assumed vast proportions and spread widely in the south under the *soi-disant* Emperor Tientih, who proclaimed the rule of "celestial virtue," and displayed banners inscribed with "Extermination of the Tartars, and restoration of the Ming dynasty."

It was the policy of the Chinese at this time studiously to endeavour to force the British to reside at Hong-Kong, and, on the plea of the inadvisability of arousing the mob, to close Canton to them. This unsatis-

* See map facing page — (at beginning of Chapter 25.)

factory state of affairs lasted till 1857, when, during the viceroyalty of Yeh, a man of restless energy and great obstinacy of character, and an advocate of the exclusion of foreigners from the empire, matters were brought to a climax by indignities offered by him to the British flag.

On the 8th October 1856 the lorcha *Arrow* was boarded, while at anchor at Canton, by a party of Chinese, who seized 12 of her crew and hauled down the British flag. All apology being pointedly avoided, retaliatory measures were taken and the Canton river defences seized by the Navy with trifling loss. The High Commissioner Yeh still refusing all redress, it was determined to collect at Hong-Kong a force sufficient to occupy the city of Canton, without declaring war against the Empire, treating the dispute as a local one. The state of affairs in India for a time drew aside the force sent from England to effect this purpose, and it was not till late in 1857 that sufficient troops arrived. In the meantime the fleet held the river approaches to Canton, and destroyed some Chinese war junks in two engagements at Escape Creek and Fatshan Creek on 25th May and 1st June 1857, in which fourteen men were killed and seventy wounded.

On the 28th October, 500 marines arrived at Hong-Kong from England, and were disembarked at Wantung. A commissariat depôt was formed on Tiger island, and the 59th Regiment garrisoned Hong-Kong. A transport department of 750 Chinese coolies, ("Hakkas," or men drawn from a mountain district, and having little respect for mandarin authority), was organized to act as general transport and gun-carriers, sixteen being told off to carry each gun. A corps of engineers and sappers and miners was formed from troops of the line.

Early in December, reinforcements, numbering about 1,000 bayonets arrived, bringing up the total of troops between Canton and Hong-Kong to 7,000 men, of whom 4,000 could be used for field operations. The French force co-operating consisted of 3 frigates, 2 corvettes, 4 gunboats, and about 1,000 men, out of which 600 could be landed.

The ships-of-war on the China station at this time were as below:—

AT HONG-KONG.

British.

| | |
|---------------------------------------|---|
| The <i>Algerine</i> , gunboat (3). | The <i>Hercules</i> , hospital ship (10). |
| The <i>Bittern</i> , sloop (12). | The <i>Janus</i> , gunboat (2). |
| The <i>Bustard</i> , gunboat (2). | The <i>Kestrel</i> , gunboat (2). |
| The <i>Clown</i> , gunboat (2). | The <i>Minden</i> , store ship (4). |
| The <i>Coromandel</i> , steamer (3). | The <i>Opossum</i> , gunboat (2). |
| The <i>Dove</i> , gunboat (2). | The <i>Stirling</i> , gunboat (2). |
| The <i>Drake</i> , gunboat (3). | The <i>Surprise</i> , despatch steamer (4). |
| The <i>Emperor</i> , steam yacht (4). | The <i>Syville</i> , ship (44). |
| The <i>Furious</i> , steamer (16). | The <i>Tribune</i> , steamer (31). |
| The <i>Haughty</i> , gunboat (2). | The <i>Volcano</i> , steamer (3). |

American—1 sloop (18). 1 steamer (50), 1 steamer (15).

French—1 steamer (12).

Dutch—1 steamer (18).

Spanish—1 steamer (6).

AT MACAO.

Portuguese—1 lorcha (6) ; 1 brig (20).

American—1 sloop (16).

Russian—1 steamer (6).

AT THE BROTHERS.

French.

1 steamer (50), 4 gunboats (6), 1 steamer (6), 1 frigate (50), 2 steamers (8)

IN THE CANTON RIVER.

British.

| | |
|--|------------------------------------|
| The <i>Acorn</i> , sloop (12). | The <i>Lee</i> , gunboat (3). |
| The <i>Actæon</i> , surveying ship (26). | The <i>Severn</i> , gunboat (3). |
| The <i>Banterer</i> , gunboat (3). | The <i>Nankin</i> , ship (50). |
| The <i>Calcutta</i> , ship (80). | The <i>Niger</i> , steamer (14). |
| The <i>Cruiser</i> , steamer (17). | The <i>Plover</i> , gunboat (2). |
| The <i>Elk</i> , sloop (12). | The <i>Racehorse</i> , sloop (14). |
| The <i>Estk</i> , steamer (21). | The <i>Sampson</i> , steamer (6). |
| The <i>Forester</i> , gunboat (2). | The <i>Staney</i> , gunboat (3). |
| The <i>Highflyer</i> , steamer (21). | The <i>Staunch</i> , gunboat (2). |
| The <i>Hesper</i> , steamer (2). | The <i>Watchful</i> , gunboat (2). |
| The <i>Hornet</i> , steamer (17). | The <i>Woodcock</i> , gunboat (2). |
| The <i>Inflexible</i> , steamer (6). | |

AT AMOY.

British.—The *Comus*, ship (14).

AT FUCHOW.

British.—The *Camilla*, sloop (16).

AT NINGPO.

British.—The *Nimrod*, steamer (6).

AT SHANGHAI.

British.—The *Cormorant*, gunboat (14) ; the *Pique*, ship (36).

French.—1 frigate (40), 1 steamer (12).

On the 12th December 1857, the Earl of Elgin again opened negotiations with Commissioner Yeh, pointing out that acts of incendiarism and assassination had been promoted, treaty, obligations disregarded, and redress of grievances denied, and calling upon him to concede the following demands, *viz.*, the complete execution at Canton of all treaty engagements, including the free admission of British subjects to the city ; and compensation to British subjects and persons entitled to British protection for losses incurred in the late disturbances. Failing this, operations would be prosecuted with renewed vigour against Canton.

Yeh not acceding to these moderate demands, a joint British and French force under Rear-Admiral Sir M. Seymour, Commander-in-Chief, moved on Canton. The attacking force, exclusive of vessels-of-war, consisted of—

| | | | | | |
|---|----|----|----|----|-------|
| Troops from the garrison of Hong-Kong, <i>i.e.</i> , 59th | | | | | |
| Regiment Artillery, Engineers, and a portion of the | | | | | |
| Madras troops | .. | .. | .. | .. | 800 |
| Marines | .. | .. | .. | .. | 2,500 |
| Naval Brigade | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1,500 |
| French troops and sailors | .. | .. | .. | .. | 900 |
| | | | | | 5,700 |
| Coolies— | | | | | |
| Chinese | .. | .. | .. | .. | 671 |
| Attached to Medical Staff | .. | .. | .. | .. | 85 |
| Commissariat.. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 48 |
| Malays | .. | .. | .. | .. | 183 |
| | | | | | 987 |

On the 16th December the island of Honan was occupied by a battalion of marines and 150 French sailors. On the 23rd the forts on the north of the city were reconnoitred from Tsing-pu on the Sulphur creek. On the 24th the eastern side of the city was reconnoitred; the party landed in the Sha-ho creek, and reached a point about 800 yards from the eastern gate of the city, and the same distance from Fort Lin. On the 26th December the following General Order was issued, dated from head-quarters, Honan :—

1. The troops under command of Major-General Van Straubenzee
 Organization of the land force C.B., will be formed into brigades as follows :—
 to attack Canton. 1st, or Colonel Holloway's Brigade—1st Battalion,
 Royal Marine Light Infantry; 2nd Battalion, ditto.

2nd, or Colonel Graham's Brigade—Royal Engineers and Volunteer company of Sappers; Royal Artillery and Royal Marine Artillery; Provisional Battalion, Royal Marine Light Infantry; 59th Regiment; 38th Madras Native Infantry.

The whole of the artillery will be placed under the orders of Colonel Dunlop R.A.

General Order directing
 operations.

The General Order published by the
 Admiral was as follows :—

Dated before Canton, December 26.

The naval and military Commanders-in-Chief of the Allied Forces before Canton have agreed to the following order of operations against the city. First bombardment to commence at daybreak on Monday morning, the 28th December :—

The *Actæon*, *Phlegethon* and gunboats, on the signal hereafter indicated being made, will open fire on the south-west angles of the city walls, with a view to breach them and impede the communication of the Chinese troops along their parapets to the eastward.

The *Mitraille*, *Fusée*, *Cruiser*, *Hornet*, gunboats *Niger* and *Avalanche*, and the Dutch Folly fort, with a similar object, will breach the city walls opposite the Vicreoy's residence, the mortars in the Dutch Folly likewise shelling the city and Gough heights.

The *Nimrod*, *Surprise*, *Dragonne*, *Marceau*, gunboats, between the Dutch Folly and the French Folly forts, will open fire on the south-east angles of the new and old city walls, and the walls forming the east side of the city.

These three several attacks will commence simultaneously, when a white ensign shall be hoisted at the fore of the *Actæon*, and a yellow flag as a corresponding signal at the same time hoisted at the fore of the *Phlegethon*.

The *Hornet* and the *Avalanche* will repeat these signals at their fore so long as the flags remain flying on the above-mentioned ships.

The bombardment is to be in very slow time, and continued day and night, not to exceed 60 rounds per each gun employed (except the *Nimrod*, *Surprise*, *Dragonne*, *Marceau*, which will fire 100 rounds) during the first 24 hours.

Immediately the bombardment opens, the landing of the allied troops will take place at the creek in Kuper (where the British and French flags will be planted) in the following order, commencing at daylight:—

1. Sappers and Miners, 59th Regiment, Royal Artillery, stores, ammunition, etc.
2. The French Naval Brigade, stores, etc.
3. The Naval Brigade under the orders of Commodore the Honourable C. Elliot.
4. The Naval Brigade from Canton.
5. Lieutenant-Colonel Lemon's battalion of Royal Marines.
6. Colonel Holloway's, etc., etc.

The following will be the disposition of the united forces after landing:—
British Naval Brigade on the right.

Centre brigade, composed of Lieutenant-Colonel Lemon's battalion of Royal Marines, 59th Regiment, Royal Artillery, Sappers.

French brigade on the left.

Colonel Holloway's brigade in reserve with Royal Marine Artillery.

After getting into position, the allied forces will remain in line of contiguous columns of brigade until further orders for an advance, which will be made to a position for the night, preparatory to active service in the morning.

The British naval brigade consisted of three divisions—

| | | | | |
|--------------|----|----|-----------------------|-------|
| 1st division | .. | .. | 584 officers and men. | |
| 2nd „ | .. | .. | 474 „ | |
| 3rd „ | .. | .. | 446 „ | |
| Total | | | .. | 1,504 |

The bombardment and landing was carried out as directed, the landing being effected in Kuper (or Sha-ho) creek, which falls into the river about one mile to the east of the south-east corner of the city. After a short battering from the 9-pounder field-pieces, Fort Lin was assaulted

and carried, and shortly afterwards the Magazine heights and Gough's Fort were captured from the enemy after only a slight resistance.

The allied losses in killed and wounded were—British 96, French 34. The Chinese lost about 200 killed; the number of their wounded is unknown.

The troops bivouacked in the open or occupied buildings on Magazine hill. During the action the coolie corps did excellent service, carrying ammunition close up to the rear of the columns.

Notwithstanding the occupation of the Magazine heights, Yeh made no offers of submission or prayers for protection. On the 5th January 1858 the troops entered the city, secured the treasure, and captured Yeh and the chief officials, together with the Tartar General.

Viceroy Yeh was sent to Calcutta as a political prisoner in February 1858. The four great powers, England, France, America, and Russia, were now in accord, and determined to send a general statement of grievances and demands to Peking, proceeding to Shanghai to negotiate. To the communication made by the plenipotentiaries of the four Powers to Peking, that a minister possessing full powers should be sent to Shanghai before the end of March to treat on the several points of disagreement and to place our relations with China on a safer and more satisfactory basis, an unsatisfactory and evasive answer was received, whereupon Lord Elgin announced his intention, of which the Imperial Court had been previously informed in the above-mentioned communication, of proceeding at once to the north in order to place himself in more direct communication with the high officers of the Imperial Government at the capital.

On the 1st April, no imperial commissioner having arrived at Shanghai, it was decided to move northwards. On the 6th April, Lord Elgin accompanied by a small squadron composed of the *Pique*, the *Cormorant*, and the *Slaney*, together with the *Amerika* (Russian), *Audacieuse* (French), and *Minnesota* (American), left Shanghai, and, arriving off the Pei-ho on the 15th, awaited the arrival of the light-draught gunboats from Hong-Kong. On the 24th of April a further communication was transmitted to Peking demanding

that a properly accredited minister should be sent to Taku to negotiate before the expiry of six days, failing which the British plenipotentiary expressed his intention of adopting such further measures for enforcing the just claims of his Government on that of China as he might think expedient.

A sufficient squadron to enable our demands to be enforced was not assembled off the Pei-ho till the middle of May—a delay which caused the Chinese to gain confidence, and enabled them greatly to strengthen their works guarding the entrance into the river, which consisted in the first instance of little more than a line of mud batteries.

On the other hand, the delay was advantageous, inasmuch as the scattering of the flower of the Chinese army by a handful of our own men, and the destruction of the defences in which they trusted, would break down all further resistance, both moral and material.

The following men-of-war were at this time anchored in the Gulf and off the mouth of the Pei-ho river,¹

| ENGLISH. | | | | | Guns. | Men. |
|--|----|----|----|----|-------|------|
| <i>Calcutta</i> | .. | .. | .. | .. | 84 | 700 |
| <i>Pique</i> | .. | .. | .. | .. | 40 | 270 |
| <i>Furious</i> , paddle steamer | | | .. | .. | 8 | 220 |
| <i>Nimrod</i> , despatch Government vessel | | | | .. | 6 | 120 |
| <i>Cormorant</i> | .. | .. | .. | .. | 6 | 98 |
| <i>Surprise</i> | .. | .. | .. | .. | 6 | 98 |
| <i>Fury</i> | .. | .. | .. | .. | 8 | 160 |
| <i>Slaney</i> , gunboat | | .. | .. | .. | 5 | 48 |
| <i>Severn</i> | .. | .. | .. | .. | 5 | 48 |
| <i>Bustard</i> | .. | .. | .. | .. | 3 | 48 |
| <i>Opossum</i> | .. | .. | .. | .. | 3 | 48 |
| <i>Staunch</i> | .. | .. | .. | .. | 3 | 48 |
| <i>Firm</i> | .. | .. | .. | .. | 3 | 48 |
| <i>Coromandel</i> , paddle steamer | | | .. | .. | 5 | 44 |
| <i>Hesper</i> , store-ship | | .. | .. | .. | 0 | 54 |

2,052

¹ Oliphant.

FRENCH.

| | |
|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| <i>Nemesis</i> , frigate. | <i>Mitraille</i> , gunboat. |
| <i>Audacieuse</i> , frigate. | <i>Fusée</i> , gunboat. |
| <i>Primanquet</i> , steam corvette. | <i>Avalanche</i> , gunboat. |
| <i>Durance</i> , store-ship. | <i>Dragonne</i> . |
| <i>Meurthe</i> . | <i>Renny</i> , store steamer. |
| <i>Phlegethon</i> , steam corvette. | |

AMERICAN.

| | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------------|
| <i>Minnesota</i> , steam frigate. | <i>Antelope</i> , steamer. |
| <i>Mississippi</i> „ „ | |

RUSSIAN.

Amerika, paddle steamer.

It was decided by the powers to make “ a movement up the river of a mixed hostile and diplomatic character,” *i.e.*, to capture the forts if they should not be delivered up peacefully, and to advance pacifically up the river, even to Peking if necessary, with a view to meeting a plenipotentiary.

On the Taku garrison refusing to evacuate their works, the *Cormorant*, *Mitraille*, and *Fusée* attacked the two northern forts, whilst the *Nimrod*, *Avalanche*, and *Dragonne* engaged the three forts on the southern bank, together with their long connecting line of sandbag batteries. The *Cormorant*, running the gauntlet of the fire of the forts, burst the river barrier, composed of five 7-inch bamboo cables buoyed across the river, and engaging the northern forts from above and taking them in reverse, silenced them in eighteen minutes. A like fate attended the southern forts.

The storming parties landed close in under the embrasures of the forts, and entering by them, completely surprised the Chinese, whose attention was concentrated on the gunboats, and who were apparently ignorant of our practice of taking batteries by assault.

The gunboats, advancing up the river, aided by the assaulting parties on land, carried the river defences to Taku, where a barrier of junks, flanked by a battery of eighteen field-pieces, barred further progress. The chief pieces of cannon taken consisted of brass

By November the extreme heat had passed. The country was now quiet, notwithstanding that camps of braves still existed in the neighbourhood of Mong-kong and Shek-tsin.

The braves having taken up their position about Shek-tsin, it became necessary early in 1859 to dislodge them, they being under no official control and their operations directed by the patriotic committee. Between Shek-tsin and Canton lies a plain of paddy, dotted over with villages, backed by groves of trees and thickets of bamboo, and slightly broken by a chain of low hills, which rendered Shek-tsin invisible from the plain. Shek-tsin is situated on a low ridge, about 100 feet high, at the foot of which runs a river, 60 yards wide and 5 or 6 feet deep; its importance arises from the fine stone bridge which here spans the river, and over which the roads north of Canton lead, that to Fayuen being one. The neighbourhood of Shek-tsin is much intersected by watercourses. The bridge was strongly held and flanked by batteries; the river was staked down-stream, and protected by the direct fire of cannon.

On the 8th January, the gunboats moved up the river to the attack, the land force advancing against the village in two columns by narrow roads. The enemy evacuated the village after firing a few shots. In the village was found correspondence showing that the Emperor had no intention of carrying out the treaty of Tientsin, and that secret orders had been issued to prevent our again entering the Pei-ho river or trading on the Yang-tse. It became evident, too, that the Viceroy of Canton, the imperial commissioner, acting under secret instructions, was the upholder of the patriotic bands. The village was destroyed, a retaliatory measure which had a good effect, no further annoyance being attempted by the patriots.

Towards the end of January reconnaissances were pushed to Fatshan, Tai-liek, Fayuen, Shaon-hing, and Shuntutuk.

The British garrison holding Canton towards the close of 1859 consisted, speaking generally, of a division, one brigade of which was composed of British and one of Bengal troops. The British troops were the 2nd Battalion Royal Regiment¹; 1st Battalion, 3rd Buffs; 67th Regiment. The

¹ Now the Royal Scots.

divisional troops consisted of a battalion of Royal Marines; the 8th and 10th Companies, Royal Engineers; 6th Battery, 12th Brigade, Royal Artillery; Rotton's Battery, Royal Artillery; a detachment of Military -Train and departments. The Bengal brigade consisted of the 47th, 65th, and 70th Regiments, Bengal Native Infantry.

The force at the beginning of April 1860 was reduced to the strength of a brigade, the Bengal brigade returning to India on relief by the 3rd and 5th Regiments, Bombay Native Infantry; and the Royal Regiment, Buffs, 67th Regiment, Marines, the 10th Company, Royal Engineers, Rotton's Battery, and details proceeding to the north to join the field force being organized to operate against Peking. The 21st Regiment, Madras Native Infantry, arrived to do duty at Hong-Kong on the 2nd April.

An expedition to the north, undertaken for the purpose of ratifying the treaty of June 1858, sailed from Hong-Kong on the 26th May 1859, and visited Amoy, Fu-chou, Ningpo, and Shanghai *en route*, the Chinese Commissioners endeavouring by every means in their power to protract negotiations. The existence of the Emperor's secret edict, already alluded to, led to the belief that it would be necessary again to force the entrance to the Pei-ho. Admiral Hope therefore, took all the necessary measures for reinforcing the naval squadron by one battalion of Marines and a company of Engineer from Canton. On the 12th June the Expedition sailed from the Yang-tse Kiang, reaching the rendezvous at Sha-lui-tien island on the 16th June. On the 17th a reconnaissance showed the passage of the river to be barred by a line of stakes, a cable floated across it, and a boom. On the 21st the French and American squadrons arrived at the anchorage.

To the communication made requesting permission for Mr. Bruce to proceed to Peking, an answer was received that the road *viâ* Pehtang] should be taken. This suggestion was rejected, and, on the 25th June Admiral Hope proceeded to attempt to carry out his instructions to open a passage by the Pei-ho. Measures were accordingly taken to remove the obstructions at the river's mouth; at which a heavy fire was at once opened from the hitherto masked forts. The ships of the fleet, thereupon, engaged the forts, and an

Unsuccessful attack on the Taku forts.

attacking party was landed but failed to take the works. Our loss was considerable in killed and wounded ; the *Kestrel*, and *Lee* had sunk in deep water, and the *Plover* and *Cormorant* had grounded. The means at the disposal of Admiral Hope being considered unequal to the task of forcing a passage to Peking, or even of the forts and barriers closing the Pei-ho at Taku, the squadron sailed southward on the 11th July.

To atone for the outrage of firing upon the British flag, Demands of British Gov- the British Government required an ample ernment refused. apology and the restoration of the guns, material, and ships abandoned on that occasion ; that the ratification of the treaty of Peking should be exchanged at once at Peking, and full effect given to that treaty ; failing acceptance, the Emperor was informed that means would be taken to compel him to observe his engagements. With these demands the Chinese authorities in April 1860 refused compliance.

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I. B. Topo. Dy. No. 8,074.
Ed. C. J. A. June 1909.

Scale 1:14 or 1:014 Inches to 48 Miles



Scale on 39° Lat.

No. 4,869.-I., 1909.

CHAPTER XXXI.

SCENE OF OPERATIONS, 1860.

THE province of Chih-li, in which is situated Peking, the capital of the empire, occupies an area of 58,949 square miles. It forms part of the great delta plain of China, with the exception of the mountain ranges, which define its northern and western frontiers. It may be described generally as an alluvial plain, extending some 300 miles from Shan-hai-kuan (where the mountain barrier approaches the sea) in a south-westerly direction, with a width varying from 50 to 100 miles. In this plain are Peking and the other great cities of the province.

To the north are vast mountain ranges, traversing which the Great Wall of China, marks the ancient boundary of the empire. The coast is at most points unapproachable for shipping. The principal rivers are the Pei-ho, Pei-tang-ho, and Luan-ho, of which, in a mercantile sense, the Pei-ho is by far the most important, serving to supply the capital from the coast, and to transport the tributary grain thither from all parts of the empire. All these rivers and their tributaries from time to time inundate parts of the plain to a great extent, and, like all rivers in a flat country, run in deep loops and bends, continually changing their direction.

The roads in the province of Chih-li are, notwithstanding their bad state of repair, passable by artillery and the carts of the country. In the summer the whole of the flat country is liable to inundation, and the roads become very heavy, and many quite impracticable.

Generally cart tracks are so numerous that transport as well as troops of all arms can move in all directions. These cart tracks are to be preferred to the high roads, for, all roads being unmetalled, the less traffic that takes place over them the better. Cavalry can move in all directions in the spring; when the autumnal crops

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are well grown, both view and movements are more restricted; after the autumnal crops are cut, the millet fields are difficult to cross in consequence of the stout stumps of its stalks which are left standing to a height of six inches above the ground. These are, after a time, grubbed up for fuel. The spring¹ is the season of all others that a military commander would choose for a campaign, and at this time, after the dry autumn and the frosts of winter, the roads are hard and firm.

The plain to the south of the mountains, forming the northern boundary of Chih-li, is marvellously fertile, and consequently is thickly populated. The country inland is, as a rule, flat or gently undulating.

The villages are rarely more than 4 miles apart in barren districts; usually much closer (from $\frac{1}{2}$ to 1 mile apart), in fertile districts; and as roads lead from every village to every other it may be assumed that when the country is not flooded or crossed by one of the three great rivers—the Pei-ho, the Pei-tang-ho and the Luan-ho,—an army would find no difficulty in moving in a tolerably straight line from any one point to another. But the case becomes very different when the mountains are reached. Here it would be dangerous to count on any road of which tolerably accurate information had not previously been obtained. The best of the roads are bad; often they merely follow the bed of a stream, and many are quite impracticable for wheeled traffic of any description.

The alluvial plain that forms the major portion of the province is perfectly flat, and very little raised above the level of the sea. Peking itself, at the foot of the mountains, and 115 miles inland by road, is but 100 feet above sea level. There are plenty of trees in the country, each village being surrounded by many; these are mostly willows; and there is no lack of fresh water in the villages. The part near the coast is comparatively barren; the coast line is, for the most part, a desert waste; further northwards the country is fertile, and agriculture thrives; under ordinary circumstances, crops of millet, wheat, and Indian corn abound.

¹ From March onward.

The climate is, on the whole, healthy. Although the heat in summer is excessive, it is only of some two months' duration. The spring is dry, pleasant, and invigorating, in spite of the dust-storms which usually prevail. In winter, the vicinity of Peking is colder than countries of the same latitude in Europe, and the rivers become frozen about the middle of December. The autumn is liable to a recurrence of the rains, but the abundance of the crops at this season is a great advantage, and the tall millet, rising seven and eight feet high, would take the place of woods in affording concealment for the movements of troops.

The winter lasts from the middle of November to the middle of March, and during these four months the country is generally covered with snow and the cold at night is intense. The hottest months are June, July, and August, when the thermometer often rises to 90° and sometimes to 105° , but it is not as relaxing as in tropical countries and in the Gulf. The range of temperature in the twenty-four hours is great. The rainy season begins as a rule at the end of May or early in June, and lasts some six weeks. From the middle of December to the middle of March communication by water is stopped owing to the ice, and no port in the province is then open.

Millet and Indian corn are the principal crops, but the produce of the country is insufficient for the people, and a considerable amount of grain is imported. No hay or grass is procurable, but in spring the young wheat is available as green food for animals. The usual fodder of the country is, however, the chopped straw of Indian corn and millet.

Peking* lies in a sandy plain 13 miles north-west of the Pei-ho and 120 miles west-north-west of its mouth, in $39^{\circ} 54' 11''$ north latitude and $116^{\circ} 27'$ east longitude. A canal runs from under the south-east corner of the Tartar city wall to Tung-chou where it communicates with the Pei-ho. The town is divided into two parts, the Tartar city and the Chinese city. The former lies to

* See map facing page 486.

the north, and is the most important, as it contains the imperial city, the palace, and nowadays the foreign legations.

Its general shape may be represented by a square (the Tartar city) placed upon an oblong (the Chinese city). The whole of the capital is walled, the wall round the Tartar city, complete in itself, being of an average height of 50 feet. Portions of the north wall reach the height of 60 feet; the average width is 40 feet, with variations from 22 to 57 feet. The breadth varies in different places. The outer face is nearly perpendicular, and the inner slopes are in places considerable. Parapets are erected on both the inner and outer faces of the wall, that on the latter being loopholed and crenelated. Buttresses occur externally at every 50 or 60 yards, generally 15 feet to 20 feet square, and parapeted. The walls are constructed of stone and brick. The space between the facings is filled up with horizontal layers of concrete and earth alternately, each some 10 feet thick. The terreplein is paved with large slabs of granite. The concrete below the terreplein is of good quality, and to be removed only by blasting. The faces of the walls are free of vegetation. On the terrepleins, however, shrubs in places flourish in great luxuriance.

The wall surrounding the Chinese city is about 30 feet high, 25 feet thick at the base, with a terreplein 15 feet wide: it is provided with parapet and buttresses.

Entrance to the two cities is obtained through the following gates:—Tartar city.—To the north 2 gates, south 3, east 2, west 2. Chinese city.—To the north (outside Tartar city) 2 gates, south 3 gates, east 1, west 1. One gate from each point of the compass leads from the Tartar into the Imperial city.

The Tartar city consists of three enclosures, each surrounded by its own wall: the innermost contains the Imperial palace and its surrounding buildings enclosed by a wall 2 miles in circumference, with 4 gates and internally divided into three portions by walls. The second enclosure is chiefly occupied by Tartar officials and Manchus, and contains many private residences, besides temples, lakes, parks, and enclosures, the hill of coal (said to be reserved to meet the con-

The military forces residing in the Tartar city are exclusively Tartar or Manchus soldiers.

tingencies of a siege), etc. The outer enclosure is occupied by private residences and shops. The Imperial city has a circumference of about 6 miles: its wall is nearly as solid as that round the city. There is a tower at each corner, and one over each gateway. These and other buildings bordering the walls afford accommodation to the troops, military stores, and workshops. Entrance is strictly prohibited.

The wall round the official city is 15 to 20 feet high and 3 to 6 feet thick. It has no rampart or ditch. It is skirted on the west side by a canal flowing from the south wall. This canal is dry in summer, and is crossed by three bridges within a short distance of each other and to the south-west of the palace (Yu-ho-chiaos); it is 66 feet wide, and during heavy rains is a broad stream. The ditch round the city is fed from the Tung-hwu river; sluices regulate the supply.

Flagstaffs in pairs denote all official residences. The city is laid out in wide avenues, and contains many handsome temples and shops. The whole city, however, has an air of decay, and little attention is paid to sanitation.

The Tartar city is some 15 miles in circumference. From east to west its total length is $4\frac{1}{3}$ miles, and from north to south $3\frac{2}{3}$ miles.

Excellent billets are to be found within the Tartar city for a large force in the various temples, enclosures and foreign legation buildings. These are surrounded by substantial brick walls. All important buildings are of brick and stone; roofs are generally tiled. Stabling and picketing ground are sufficient to meet the requirements of a large force.

The circumference of the wall surrounding the Chinese city is about fourteen miles, or ten miles from its points of junction with the east and west ends of the Tartar city wall. Outside the walls, good billets, and stabling, can be obtained in the various suburbs, temples, and villages. These are most numerous to the north and east of Peking.

The Chinese estimate the population of the city to be 1,300,000, of whom 900,000 reside in the Tartar city and 400,000 in the Chinese city; these numbers are probably over-estimated.

There is no direct foreign trade with Peking. Tientsin may be said to be its port. It is noted for no special manufactures, and the only trade is the supply of its inhabitants with food and the necessaries and luxuries of life. These are to be obtained in Peking, and along the river line to Tientsin. Beef and mutton come from Mongolia; coal from the hills to the north-west; grain and salt from Tientsin.

The port of Tientsin is the natural inlet and outlet of eastern Mongolia, the provinces of Chih-li and Tientsin. Shansi, and the northern portions of the provinces of Shan-tung and Ho-nan. It is both strategically and commercially the key of Peking, its port as well as its granary, and a city of great commercial importance, occupying a space round and including the point of junction between the imperial canal and the Pei-ho. It is 80 miles from Peking by river and 50 from Taku. Its streets and houses resemble those of all Chinese cities, being narrow¹ and low respectively. The walled portion is small compared with the suburbs, the circumference of the walls being a little over three miles. The principal trade is carried on in the suburbs. The city proper is ill-drained and very dirty. The rate of mortality is high.

Generally between Tientsin and Taku lies a dreary flat country, Adjacent country. liable to be flooded, and intersected in various directions by roads raised several feet above the dead-level of the surrounding country. Here and there the country is intersected by irrigation canals, the water from which (but slightly below the surface of the ground) is raised on to the fields by means of baskets worked rapidly by hand. Trees are few, and these of small size (elms, willows, and poplars). There is little cultivation, except along the main Taku-Tientsin road. The detached cottages bordering it stand in orchards. Vineyards are frequent, especially about and north of Tientsin. Villages are of small size and slightly raised, with a few trees of moderate size growing round them. Huts of mud; roofs of mud or thatch and mud. Soil, alluvial and dry, often covered with a saline efflorescence (chloride of sodium) and there are numerous salt pans in the vicinity of Taku.

¹ Carts traverse the streets, but can only pass each other here and there.

The Taku forts at the mouth of the Pei-ho are situated on a wide stretch of mud flats on both banks, preventing large ships from approaching nearer than from six to eight miles, and rendering attack by landing parties difficult.

Taku forts.

The Pei-ho is the largest river between the Yellow river and Shan-hai-kuan, the terminus of the Great Wall. It is the great waterway to Peking.

The Pei-ho.

Tientsin is situated at its junction with the Yü-ho (Grand Canal). The Pei-ho is very tortuous. The distance from Taku to Tientsin by river is fifty miles, and by land thirty miles. It is deep off the steep banks; below high water the mud is very soft; vessels drawing ten feet find no difficulty in navigating it at high tide; if fortunate, vessels crossing the bar on a rising tide, can run up the river on the flood; if too heavily laden, and they run aground, two or three days may be taken in the passage. If the vessel draws over eight feet there are two places that must be passed at high tide, three and nine miles below Tientsin respectively.

At Tientsin the river is 200 to 300 feet wide; above, it contracts and shallows very rapidly; 6 miles above the city reaches are met carrying only 5 and 6 feet at high tide.

Trading junks of all sizes ascend to Tientsin. From May to October they crowd the river, and leave but a narrow fairway. Above Tientsin large junks ascend to Tunchou, whence goods are transhipped and conveyed by the Yuliang-ho canal to Peking (twelve miles).

From the entrance to the Pei-ho, a low impassable shore fronted by an extensive flat runs north six miles to the entrance of the Pei-tang-ho.

The Pei-tang-ho.

The Pei-tang, though a smaller river than the Pei-ho, has a deeper channel easier of approach. It has from 12 to 15 feet of water as far as Lu-tai, which is capable of being made into a good port; but the depth eight miles off shore from the river's mouth is only $4\frac{1}{2}$ fathoms. The village and fort of Pei-tang are at the mouth of the river.

CHAPTER XXII.

CHINA CAMPAIGN OF 1860.¹

THE British and French Governments having entered into an alliance for the purpose of enforcing, if necessary by arms, the stipulations of their respective treaties made at Tientsin on the 26th June 1858 with the Imperial Government of China, it was agreed that a British army of about 10,000 men and a French force of 7,000 should be despatched to China. The latter went direct from France; the British from England, the Cape of Good Hope (1st battalion, 2nd Queen's), and India, the bulk from the latter country.² The French collected their force at Shanghai; the British, at Hong-Kong.

The force began to rendezvous at Hong-Kong in March, and the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Hope Grant, and staff, the latter nominated by the Commander-in-Chief in India, arrived on the 13th of that month.

Nothing was known of the resources of North-East China; consequently every requisite for an army

Preparations.

in the field had to accompany the force.

Hay and forage for the horses were brought from Bombay.

Transport was another great difficulty. Very good ponies were procurable in Japan, Manila, and in Shan-tung and other parts of China, but in insufficient numbers. The Indian mules and bullocks proved to be the most efficient. To supplement local transport and organize the animals bought through native dealers, at from twenty to forty dollars apiece, a battalion of the Military Train was sent from England.

A coolie corps was, under the direction of Major Temple, raised at Canton and Hong-Kong, and these, notwithstanding that they were recruited from the scum of the population, did willing and

¹ Chiefly compiled from the account of the campaign by Lieutenant-Colonel Wolseley with notes from the works of Swinhoe and McGhee, supplemented by extracts

from the Journal of the Quarter Master-General's Department and General Orders.

² See Appendix A. & B.

excellent service. Each man received nine dollars a month, two suits of clothes, and rations. The corps, which numbered 5,000 men, was chiefly officered by the Royal Marines. A number of Manila men and bullock-drivers from Madras and Bombay were also enlisted as mule drivers.

The heterogeneous composition of the army added immensely to the difficulties of the commissariat.

On the 8th March 1860 a despatch was forwarded by Mr. Bruce, the British Minister in China, to the Imperial Government of Peking, stating the very moderate terms upon which we were prepared to condone the insult offered to our flag in 1859 at the Taku forts, and to reopen friendly intercourse. They were—

Negotiations.

1. An ample apology for the act of the troops firing on Her Britannic Majesty's ships from the forts at Taku in June 1859.
2. That the ratification of the treaty of Tientsin be exchanged at Peking, Her Britannic Majesty's Minister proceeding there for that purpose by the Pei-ho river.
3. That full effect be given to the treaty, and the indemnity of 4,000,000 taels promptly paid, as well as a contribution towards the expense of the present expedition.

On receiving an unsatisfactory answer to these demands, it was determined at once to occupy Chusan and blockade all the forts north of the Yang-tse Kiang. On further consideration, the latter measure, directed by the Home Government, was not given effect to, the objects hoped for appearing illusory.

Occupation of Chusan.

To occupy Ting-hai, a force consisting of the 67th and 99th Regiments, 4 companies of Royal Marines, Major Rotton's battery of Royal Artillery, a company of Royal Engineers (10th), and 300 of the Chinese coolie corps, with a due proportion of commissariat and medical staffs, under the command of Brigadier-General Reeves, was embarked at Hong-Kong on the 1st April, and directed to rendezvous at the island of Kingtang, opposite Chen-hai and the mouth of the Ningpo river. The French contingent accompanying it consisted of a couple of hundred marines from Canton. Ting-hai was peacefully entered on the 21st of April, a guard

of fifty men of each nation landing and occupying the custom house and Joss-house Hill.

Towards the latter end of May all preparations for the campaign in the north were completed, and the troops embarked, the army being organized as shown in Appendix C.

The total force amounted to 14,000 of all ranks, conveyed in 120 transports with a naval escort of 70 ships of war.

The sailing transports left Hong-Kong about the middle of May ; the cavalry and horse batteries of artillery, towed by steamers, leaving the harbour in June.

Owing to the capture of Su-chou by the Taipings, a battalion of marines, the Ludhiana Regiment of Sikhs, and the 11th Punjab Regiment occupied the approaches to Shanghai, the north gate, a Joss-house on the Su-chou creek, and the Ningpo guild-house.

The plan of operations agreed upon was, that the French should rendezvous at Chi-Fu. The Shan-tung province is rich in cattle, of which (and of draught animals in particular) they were much in want. During the operations a depôt was to be left there.

The British were to rendezvous at Ta-lien-wan Bay, where they disembarked on the 28th June.

Ta-lien-wan Bay is about eight miles from north to south, and thirteen miles from east to west, having within it a series of smaller bays, known as Victoria Bay, Hand Bay, Pearl Bay, Odin Bay, and Bustard Cove, where the shelter is good. The shores are everywhere enclosed with barren hills averaging 200 to 700 feet in height ; trees are rare and of small size. Running streams afford a water-supply sufficient for a small force ; there are also wells in all the villages, and water in most places is near the surface. It is colonised by emigrants from Shan-tung and Shan-si. Odin Bay can be easily defended, and was, on this account, selected as the position for the depôt. Kin-chou, the chief city in the vicinity, shut its gates, and entry was not insisted upon, or the collection of supplies would have been facilitated.

The 1st Division encamped (in bell tents) to the west of Victoria Bay ; the 2nd Division at Hand Bay ; the cavalry and artillery at

Odin Bay; the Military Train at Bustard Creek and at a small stream falling into Victoria Bay. Markets were established in each bay, and agents were sent round to the villages inviting supplies, which came in plentifully.

Leaving behind depôts of stores at their respective places of rendezvous, and sailing northward on the same day, the French were to effect a landing at Chi-K'ou, the English at Pei-tang, and a simultaneous advance was to be made against the Pei-ho forts. It was hoped that with their capture the Court of Peking would agree to the terms offered. A peculiarity of this war was that the invaders were compelled to be careful of the true interests of the Imperial Government lest a severe defeat might endanger the entire fabric of the Empire. The successes of the Taiping rebels and their occupation of Nanking, the southern capital, made a defeat all the more likely to prove fatal to the Chinese Emperor.

The French, after a reconnoissance of the coast, not finding sufficient water for their ships off Chi-K'ou, desired to land with the British at Pei-tang, and the delay at Ta-lien-wan was due to the backwardness of the preparations of our allies. On the 21st July the final re-embarkation commenced, on the 25th the ships got into the positions assigned to them, and on the 26th all weighed anchor.

The depôt left at Odin Bay consisted of 4 companies of the 99th Regiment, 417 men of the 19th Punjab Infantry, 100 men of the Royal Artillery, with 6 guns, besides 200 European and 100 Indian soldiers in hospital.

By the 28th July the fleet had arrived at the rendezvous off the Pei-ho. The gunboats towed a number of Chinese junks, with ten days' provisions and fuel for the whole army on board. On the 30th July, the fleet bore in-shore, and anchored about nine miles off.

Orders were issued for the force¹ to land on the 31st, but the day proving too boisterous, it was postponed till the 1st August. Rain fell during the morning of the 1st. The tide was full at 4 P.M., and gunboats drawing six feet were able to cross the bar at 1 P.M.

¹ See Appendix D.

The 2nd Brigade of the 1st Division, with a rocket battery, and one of 9-pounders, forming the landing party, were towed in flat-bottomed troop-boats, thirty feet long, constructed at Canton, by the small gun-vessels, each toying six launches and each boat containing fifty men.

At half-past four 200 of the 2nd Queen's and an equal number of French put off in boats; but, the tide being unusually high and kept up by the wind, they could not get within about 100 yards of the shore. After a delay of half an hour the troops landed about one mile seaward of the South fort, in water and mud knee-deep, which continued so for the first half mile, beyond which, after traversing 400 or 500 yards of deep, sticky mud, a hard surface of mud was reached.

By 6 p.m. the brigade had landed, the Rifles forming on the right, the 15th Punjabis in the centre, and the Queen's on the left. The French force consisted of the 101st and 102nd Regiments, the Chasseurs, a few troopers mounted on Japanese ponies, and some rifled cannon,—in all some 5,000 men. The troops pushed on towards the causeway leading to Hsin-ho, on which they bivouacked for the night, it not being yet ascertained whether the village of Pei-tang, close at hand, was occupied or not, and it being desirable to save the town the horrors of a sack.

The landing was altogether unopposed; not a shot was fired from the forts. During the night it was ascertained that the village and forts were unoccupied. Under cover of darkness a party of the enemy's cavalry came close up to the piquets and caused an alarm.

On the morning of the 2nd August, the landing was continued and the troops moved into Pei-tang, the French occupying the river-side half of the town, the British the land-side. The guns of the fort had been removed to Taku. Considerable quantities of hay, with forage sufficient for the requirements of the force during its stay at Pei-tang, were found; water was the great difficulty. Wharves and piers (four) were constructed, and the landing of stores rapidly pushed on, the gun boats in this service proving invaluable, although the shallowness of the water over the bar was such that they could often make but one trip a tide, the fleet

lying some eight miles off shore. The coolie corps, numbering about 2,500, was of the greatest use.

On the 3rd and the 9th reconnaissances were pushed in the direction of Hsin-ho, whereby it was ascertained that firm ground existed to the right of the causeway leading to that place, which was entrenched. Owing to the rain, which fell almost daily, the streets of Pei-tang were ankle-deep in mud. It rained both on the 10th and 11th August; on the 12th the advance was made from Pei-tang.

The 2nd Division with the cavalry brigade was to move by the right of the causeway, and turn the left of the enemy's position at Hsin-ho, whilst the 1st Division and French advanced by the causeway against its front. At 4 A.M. the 2nd Division began to file across the only bridge leading out of Pei-tang. The mud, on account of the recent rain, was very deep, and the artillery experienced the utmost difficulty in reaching the higher and firmer ground. Three ammunition wagons stuck immovably and had to be abandoned. Owing to the slow progress of the cavalry over the heavy ground, the 1st Division did not begin to file over the bridge till a quarter past seven o'clock; the whole force had not crossed till some minutes after ten, the main body of the French being even then in the town. The 99th and baggage parties from each regiment held the village.

When the 2nd Division had marched three miles to the right of the causeway, line of battle was formed, the cavalry taking position on the right in échelon. The Tartar cavalry attacked bravely, being chiefly repulsed by artillery fire (fifteen Armstrong field-guns), those coming to close quarters being met by the Sikh cavalry, who scattered and pursued them; but their horses not having galloped for months, the hardy Tartar ponies kept ahead of them. Stirling's half battery, being unable to follow the movements of the cavalry on such heavy ground, had been left in rear with an escort of 30 of Fane's Horse. Seeing their opportunity, 100 Tartars charged the guns, but were put to flight by the escort, whose commanding officer, Lieutenant Macgregor, was severely wounded.

The 1st Division, having arrived within 1,400 yards of the Hsin-ho position, deployed, the French to the left, our troops to the right. The guns of both nations opened fire at a distance

of 1,000 yards on the numerous bodies of cavalry in and around the works. After a rapid discharge of matchlocks and jingalls, the enemy abandoned their entrenchments and fled.

The Tartar cavalry, 6,000 or 7,000 strong, armed for the most part with bows and arrows and spears, and only a small proportion with matchlocks behaved on this, as well as on subsequent occasions, with courage. The loss of the enemy was variously estimated at from 100 to 500 men. Our casualties amounted to three officers of the Irregulars wounded, two sowars killed and about twenty wounded.

The armies halted at Hsin-ho; the cavalry and 2nd Division to the south-west with a fine open plain in their front, and their left resting on two tidal canals running to the south of the village; the French and 1st Division to the south and east of the village. Large stacks of forage were found on the ground, and plenty of corn in the town.

A ditched causeway led from Hsin-ho to Tang-ku, the next fortified village towards Taku. Round Tang-ku there was a castellated mud wall, about 10 feet high and $3\frac{1}{2}$ feet wide at the top, provided with a banquette. There were five Tartar camps, all walled in and ditched round, within the space between the earthwork and the village. Along the faces of the work, facing Hsin-ho and Taku, were numerous barbettes for guns and jingalls. These faces were about 1,300 yards long; the river face was of the same length, but open. The northern face, 800 yards long, mounted no guns, being fronted and protected by swampy ground. Two gateways, facing the west, gave access to the causeways from Hsin-ho and Pei-tang, and one on the eastern face, to the road leading to the bridge of boats connecting Tang-ku and Taku.

On the 13th, reconnaissances showed that the enemy's field troops had retired beyond the river. On the night of that day a trench was dug at 480 yards from the works, extending from the Pei-ho for a distance of some 200 yards along its front. Several canals were bridged during the day to facilitate the attack on Tang-ku.

On the 14th, the 1st Division led the attack against the works, with the 2nd Division in reserve. The British right flank rested on the Pei-ho, the south bank of which was marshy and covered by a belt of reeds for some

hundreds of yards, giving cover from view. An annoying, but harmless, fire was opened from a small battery and some tombs on that bank, which was, however, soon silenced by artillery.

The French advanced on the British left, their left resting on the Tang-ku causeway: the whole of the artillery (the French having 12 and we 24 guns in line,) opened fire at 900 yards, the enemy replying from their guns, 14 in number, and numerous jingalls. The 60th Rifles having occupied the trench dug during the previous night, the artillery advanced to within 450 yards of the work. A fire of rockets was opened against the attacking force from the opposite bank, without inflicting any loss. The work was stormed by the men of the 60th, followed by the Queen's and the 31st Regiment, at its extreme left flank. The number of the Chinese within the works was estimated at from 2,000 to 6,000 men. Our loss amounted to 3 wounded, while the French had some 12 men wounded.

The 2nd Division occupied the entrenchments, the 1st Division returning to camp between Hsin-ho and the Pei-ho. Detachments occupied posts on the Pei-tang road, and the cavalry the post at Chah-pung. The cavalry brigade encamped to the west of Hsin-ho; the French in and around the south side of Hsin-ho.

The troops remained in these positions till the 20th, awaiting the collection of ten days' provisions and the arrival of the engineers' park and heavy guns at Tang-ku, where a dépôt was formed. The engineers of both armies began the construction of a bridge across the Pei-ho, close to the camp of the 1st Division, at a spot where the river was about 270 yards wide.

From Tang-ku to the nearest fort on the north bank is under two miles. This fort overlooked the similar one on the south bank, enfiladed the whole length of the great southern one, and took all the sea defences of the large northern one in reverse. The Commander-in-Chief and Sir Robert Napier both considered it to be the true point of attack. The French desired to contain the northern and to attack the southern forts in force, at the same time cutting off the retreat of their garrisons from Tientsin. Sir Hope Grant, with the small force at his command, considered such an enterprise to be too hazardous, and feared to leave his line of communications with Pei-tang open to the large force of Tartar

cavalry in the field, with the northern forts as *points d'appui*. On the 18th the French established a post on the opposite bank (right) to protect the construction of the bridge. By the night of the 20th August a road had been made towards the north fort; and the necessary bridges and causeways and batteries for the guns constructed. The British had sixteen guns and three mortars in battery, the French four guns, all of which opened fire on the 21st, the enemy responding from all available guns.

Four of our gun-boats, the *Janus*, *Drake*, *Clown*, and *Woodcock*, and two of the French, took up positions outside range of the forts, and shelled them. No other gunboats co-operated. The river entrance had been closed by rows of booms, hawsers, piles, and sharp-pointed stakes of iron, each several tons in weight. Rows of stakes protected the sea-front of the forts, rendering their attack from this side next to impossible.

The attacking force mustered 2,500 men, and consisted of a wing of the 44th, a wing of the 67th, supported by the other wings of those regiments; the Royal Marines, Graham's Company of Engineers, 200 Madras Sappers,—the whole under Brigadier Reeves. The French had 1,000 infantry and six 12-pounder rifled cannon.

The artillery was disposed as follows:—A French 24-pounder battery of 6 pieces, one English 8-inch gun, and 2 Armstrongs, were planted to play on the inner south fort. Two Armstrong guns and two 9-pounders were to fire from Tang-ku at an entrenchment across the river. Three 8-inch mortars, an Armstrong battery, two 32-pounder guns, two 8-inch howitzers, two 9-pounder guns, four 24-pounder howitzers, and a rocket battery, at close ranges, 600 to 800 yards, played on the inner north fort. The Chinese returned a heavy fire, but at too great an elevation.

About 6 A.M. one of the magazines exploded in the fort attacked; by 7 A.M. all its heavy artillery was silenced, and the columns of attack formed, the French assaulting the angle of the work resting on the river, the 44th and 67th Regiments advancing straight to their front against the gate of the work.

The pontoon bridge required to bridge the ditch could not be got into position, and the storming party waded across the muddy ditch, having water nearly up to their arm-pits. Two wet ditches

ran along the face of the work, with the intervening space of twenty feet planted thickly with sharp bamboo stakes; stakes were also planted beyond the inner ditch along the berm. To cross these obstacles under fire was a most arduous and dangerous task. Missiles of all sorts, from pots filled with lime to round shot thrown by hand, were showered from the work. The flanking fire from the upper south fort was very effective, and it was during this period of the assault that the greatest loss was incurred. It was some time before a sufficient number of men had collected under the walls of the fort to risk an assault. The French got three or four ladders across the ditches, but at first failed in their attempts to raise them, the Tartars being most active in their close defence. Eventually the French by escalade, and a party of the 67th by assault, reached the top of the parapet about the same time; others entered by the gate, in which a hole had been blown by our howitzers. The garrison had no means of retreat, and lost heavily.

Preparations were at once made to assault the large (lower) northern fort, the 3rd Buffs and 8th Punjab Infantry being sent forward for that purpose from Tang-ku. The heavy guns (two 8-inch howitzers) were advanced to the left of the captured work, and those in its cavalier turned upon it. The forts were 1,000 yards apart, a raised causeway running between them, with wet ditches on either side.

A party sent out to reconnoitre the fort was fired upon, when suddenly a white flag was hoisted in the large southern fort and immediately afterwards in the others.

All firing ceased about 9 A.M. The terms of capitulation offered not being acceded to, our troops, 3rd Buffs and 8th Punjab Infantry, at 2 P.M. advanced and occupied the lower north fort, its garrison of 2,000 men surrendering without firing a shot, and, after having thrown away their arms and disencumbered themselves of their uniform, by which means a Chinese soldier can readily convert himself into a peaceful citizen, they were liberated and dispersed.

This fort commanded the large south fort, and was very strong on the sea side. Heavy rain now began to fall, so that it was found impossible to remove the heavy guns, and the return march to the flooded camp was most tedious. The mud, however, rapidly

hardens under the influence of a hot sun, if not previously worked up into slush.

On the British side, 22 officers were wounded, 22 men killed and 156 wounded. The French had 150 casualties. The enemy lost about 2,000 men, amongst them being the general commanding the upper north fort.

Before nightfall Governor-General Hung had signed a capitulation, surrendering all the country and strong positions up the river, as far as Tientsin, including that city itself. On the 21st the gunboats removed the river obstructions, and in a few hours opened a passage for themselves.

In the Taku defences some 500 pieces of cannon were found. The village contained a forge and shot factory, besides large stores of powder, shot, sulphur, etc. Admiral Hope, with some French and English gunboats, pushed on to Tientsin on the 23rd, and on the 25th Lord Elgin and the Commander-in-Chief followed, whilst

Advance on Tientsin.

the 1st Royals, the 67th Regiment, and a battery of artillery were conveyed there in gunboats. The cavalry began their march on the 25th, and, moving up the left bank of the river, passed through Cheun-leang-ching, over open plains of grass, and reached Tientsin in two days. The 1st Division moved along the right bank, the French marching by the other; and 2nd Division followed the 1st; the 3rd Regiment was left to occupy Taku and the Rifles to protect the Hsin-ho bridge.

The siege guns and ammunition were re-embarked, and all spare baggage collected in the south fort. The three batteries of Royal Artillery, and the Madras Artillery attached to the siege train, took up their quarters in this fort; baggage and stores were, as required, forwarded to the front by the naval authorities.

The roads traversed were good cart-tracks, over hardened mud; there was no good ground found for encampments.

At Pei-tang-k'ou were four forts sweeping a reach of the stream. This position was intended as a second line of defence and the works round Tientsin as a third, but the rapid advance of the gunboats prevented the army reorganizing there for resistance. The Indian corn and millet, averaging six feet to ten feet in height, prohibited all distant view. Supplies of all sorts were sold to the troops

at a moderate cost, and there was an abundance of grain for the horses. Junks filled with commissariat stores were towed up the river.

Shortly after the arrival of the force at Tientsin, Commissioners were appointed for the arrangement of affairs, Messrs. Wade and Parkes acting for the allies. After wasting eight days of most valuable time it was found that the Chinese Commissioners were not armed with the necessary powers to treat, and that their only object was to cause delay, in order that winter might overtake us during the operations.

Orders were now given for the allies to concentrate, with a view to advancing on Peking. Odin bay in Ta-lien-wan was abandoned, as, from the abundance of supplies available on the spot, it was no longer required as a commissariat depôt, and the 19th Punjabis and the Royal Artillery were ordered to the front.

The means of land transport were limited; and as no information existed as to the supplies to be procured *en route*, it was determined that the troops should advance by detachments.

Brigadier Reeves, with the 99th Regiment, 200 Marines, Barry's and Stirling's Batteries, the King's Dragoon Guards, and Fane's Horse, were directed to start on the 8th September; the French, about 3,000 men, on the 10th; Sir John Michel with the 2nd Brigade, Desborough's Battery, and Probyn's Horse, on the 12th. The 2nd Division were to remain temporarily at Tientsin. The first march was to Huk'ou, the second to Yang-tsun.

Taking advantage of a violent thunderstorm, the Chinese drivers, frightened by the threats of Government underlings, deserted during the night of the 10th, rendering an advance on the 11th impossible. No other land carriage being available, several junks were seized and the baggage transported by water.

On the 13th September the British reached Ho-hsi-wu, the largest village between Tientsin and Tung-chou, and about equidistant from both places (forty miles). Here a supply depôt and a large field hospital were established. The inhabitants, who hitherto had been friendly along the route and remained in their villages, now deserted them on our approach and shunned all communication, with us.

Ho-hsi-wu, like other villages, was deserted, but grapes, vegetables, yams, and sweet potatoes were found in abundance. The water of the river, here scarcely fifty yards wide, was clear and good, and there were numerous wells in the neighbourhood.

On account of the difficulties of land transport, Admiral Hope organized flotillas of from sixty to seventy junks; an English sailor lived on board each junk, and each flotilla was under a commander, aided by a due proportion of naval officers. The siege train was floated up the Pei-ho on pontoons.

In order to collect the troops, a halt at Ho-hsi-wu was indispensable. On the 13th September, Messrs. Wade and Parkes, with an escort of twenty cavalry, proceeded to Tung-chou to deliberate with the Chinese Commissioners, when it was finally settled that the allied forces were to advance to within five *li* ($1\frac{2}{3}$ miles) of Chang-kia-wan, and halt there, Lord Elgin, with an escort of 1,000 men, proceeding to Tung-chou, where the convention was to be signed, and thence to Peking with the same escort, for the purpose of ratifying the old treaty.

On the 16th September, Sir J. Michel's force arrived at Ho-hsi-wu, and on the 17th the army and 1,000 French marched to Matou, leaving at Ho-hsi-wu the 2nd Foot, 3 guns, and 25 cavalry, together with Lord Elgin's escort of 1,000 irregular cavalry.

A detachment of cavalry occupied Yang-tsun. On the 18th September, the 2nd Foot, having been relieved by the 60th Rifles, joined head-quarters. Early on the 18th, Messrs. Loch and Parkes,¹ Lieutenant-Colonel Walker, Assistant Quartermaster General to the Cavalry, Assistant Commissary-General Thompson, Mr.

Envoy and escort, captured by treachery. Bowlby, the *Times*' correspondent, Mr. de Norman, an Attaché to our Minister at Shanghai, Lieutenant Anderson, five men of the King's Dragoon Guards, twenty-one sowars of Fane's Horse and one of Probyn's, proceeded to Tung-chou to meet the Commissioners to arrange for the reception of Lord Elgin and the camping of the force. *En*

¹ Afterwards Lord Loch and Sir H. Parkes.

route they saw unmistakable evidence of the presence of a large force. Notwithstanding these indications that treachery was to be expected, Mr. Parkes, after his meeting with the Chinese Commissioners, divided his small party, Mr. Bowlby, Mr. de Norman, Lieutenant Anderson, and seventeen sowars remaining at Tung-chou, whilst he, Mr. Loch, Colonel Walker, Assistant Commissary-General Thompson, five men of the King's Dragoon Guards, and four sowars returned towards Ma-tou. Arrived there, and seeing a large force of the enemy in occupation of a strong position, he returned with Trooper Phipps, King's Dragoon Guards, to Tung-chou to remonstrate. Meanwhile Mr. Loch and three sowars galloped back to the column which had left Ho-hsi-wu later in the morning, to announce that all points had been satisfactorily arranged with the Imperial Commissioners, and to report at the same time the presence of a large army in the immediate vicinity. Colonel Walker with the escort remained on the ground to examine the enemy's position.

The force that marched from Ho-hsi-wu on the morning of the 18th consisted of the cavalry brigade, with Stirling's half battery, two field batteries, the 2nd Foot, the 15th Punjab Infantry, Royal Marines, the 99th Regiment, and detachments of Engineers and Military Train. One French regiment and one field battery followed.

The allied force, on approaching the village of Li-erh-tse, halted on finding itself in the presence of a large army. It was here that Mr. Loch rode in to report the state of affairs. The presence of Mr. Parkes and his party in the hands of the enemy at Tung-chou and of Colonel Walker and his party within the enemy's lines, was a great drag on the allied movements. Mr. Loch and Captain Brabazon, Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master General to the Artillery, volunteered to go back to Tung-chou, in order to direct their return, and started at 8 A.M., accompanied by two sowars carrying a flag of truce, while the cavalry moved to the flanks to observe the enemy, who were attempting a surrounding movement.

Meanwhile, Colonel Walker and his party, acting with great caution, refused to dismount, and on indignities being offered to him he charged through the enemy's force with a loss of only two men wounded and one horse shot.

The Chinese intention was to induce the allies to encamp, and then to fall upon them with their whole force and butcher them, but the action of Colonel Walker, which occurred between 10 and 11 A.M., precipitated matters.

The right of the Chinese position rested on the old walled town of Chang-kia-wan, and its left upon the Pei-ho, a distance of three or four miles; in its rear was the Siaou-ho stream, fordable everywhere. Batteries had been thrown up at the village of Li-erh-tse, about 1,000 yards from the Pei-ho, along the raised Tung-chou causeway, and at other points, the whole being flanked by a battery constructed at right angles to the general front about one mile distant from the suburb of Chang-kia-wan; another work was on the left flank, mounting about 60 pieces of cannon, besides which were field-pieces drawn by ponies.

The French, numbering 1,000 men, with a battery of artillery and a squadron of Fane's Horse, were on the right of the allied attack, the cavalry sweeping round to protect the flank and doing excellent service. The villages on this flank rendered it very strong, and the Tartars made an obstinate resistance. Sir Hope Grant disposed a 9-pounder battery on some high ground to the right of his line of attack, with Fane's Horse and a squadron of the King's Dragoon Guards in support; the 99th Regiment was directed to advance up the road against the village in front, supported by two 9-pounders; the 15th Punjab Infantry, with two Armstrong guns, took ground to the left; the 2nd Regiment (Queen's) with Stirling's 6-pounder battery and the cavalry, were to make a wide flank movement to our left; the remaining regiments in reserve; the 99th in the right centre.

The 15th Punjab Infantry carried the batteries flanking the enemy's line, whereupon the two Armstrong guns with it were sent to aid the movement being made to turn the enemy's right, the force carrying out which, under Sir J. Michel, swept round to the south of Chang-kia-wan, the 15th Punjab Infantry and 99th Regiment advancing through that village. The enemy gave way at all points, and suffered severely, leaving some 80 guns in our hands. Their force was estimated at 30,000 men. The British loss was 1 killed and 19 wounded; the French loss, 2 killed and 14 wounded.

The village of Chang-kia-wan was given over to loot, and the troops occupied camps in its vicinity and the houses of the town.

The following day, Mr. Wade, under a flag of truce, proceeded to Tung-chou, and ascertained that the captured envoy and escort had been removed inland.

On the 20th September a cavalry reconnaissance showed the enemy to be in force about Pa-li-chiao. On the 21st their position was attacked, the baggage being previously parked in a village close by. The French, 3,000 strong, advanced against Pa-li-chiao (bridge over the U-liang-ho, at a point where the paved road from Tung-chou crosses it), the British attacking to their left, and the cavalry making a wide turning movement still further to the left, so as to drive the enemy's right upon their centre, and force them to cross the canal at the points against which the allied advance was being made. The enemy displayed a large force, and with their cavalry endeavoured to turn the left flank of the allies, their infantry occupying the numerous clumps of trees and enclosures which bordered the canal, but they gave way at all points.

Our cavalry did great execution (over a most difficult country cut up by hollow roads) in this, as in all other actions of the war: the artillery also fired with good effect. The pursuit ceased about six miles from Peking, our force returning to the U-liang-ho. The British loss during the day was only 2 killed and 29 wounded; the loss of the French was also slight. The enemy are supposed to have numbered 50,000 men, chiefly cavalry. It was now decided to remain at the U-liang-ho till the siege guns and reinforcements arrived, as it was realised that it would be useless to advance on Peking until the allied force was strong enough to enforce its demands.

On the 29th September the siege guns arrived, and by the 3rd October all reinforcements had come up, the regiments advancing by double marches from Tientsin. The garrison at Tientsin consisted of a wing of the Buffs, 500 marines landed from the fleet, 2 batteries of Royal Artillery, Madras Artillery, and 25 irregular cavalry. A battalion of Marines and 400 French soldiers were posted at Tung-chou, the north gate of which was held, and between which point and Tientsin a regular flotilla service of country boats was

established. Tung-chou soon became a large store depôt, from whence ten days' supplies were forwarded to the front in carts and wagons. At Chang-kia-wan a post of 100 French, 1 officer, and 10 sowars was established. In consequence of armed villagers firing upon orderlies carrying mails and despatches, Ma-tou was burnt—an example which had the effect of putting a stop to such practices.

The paved road which runs from Tung-chou to Peking was in such bad order that an unpaved one running all the way on the north side of the canal was selected for the advance.

During the halt on the U-liang-ho many diplomatic notes passed between Prince Kung, the Emperor's brother, who had been appointed High Commissioner, and our camp; but Lord Elgin, refusing to recognise Mr. Parkes and his party as prisoners of war, made their surrender a *sine qua non* before he would even suspend hostilities.

On the 3rd October, Prince Kung having failed to comply with our demands, the allied force, over 10,000 strong, crossed the canal by a bridge of boats, and advanced towards Peking. The march was continued on the 5th, on the evening of which day the force halted in a strong position to the North-east of the capital. On the 6th the advance continued, the men's knapsacks being left under the protection of a small guard in a strong post formed by some high brick-kilns. The advance was made across a very close country, to the old entrenchment, which was entered at its north-east angle, our cavalry taking up a position on the main road which led out from the Tesheng-mên gate towards Jehol. The enemy observed the advance with numerous bodies of cavalry, and later in the day they retired without offering any resistance.

The British bivouacked in the city suburb and along the road leading to the An-ting gate, around a large Lhama temple, close to the Tartar parade ground, while the French proceeded to the gardens of the Summer Palace.

On the 9th October the French joined our forces facing the An-ting gate, and an ultimatum was forwarded to Prince Kung, requiring the surrender, by noon on the 13th, of one of the gates of the city if he wished to save it from bombardment. At noon

on the 13th October the An-ting gate was thrown open and our troops, entering the city, occupied the Peking occupied. walls extending thence to the Tê-sheng-mên and the south-east corner of the city.

Of the 26 English and 13 French subjects who were captured at Tung-chou, 13 English and six French had been sent back by the 14th October; the remainder had been tortured to death with the exception of Mr. Parkes, Mr. Lock, and a Frenchman, who were lodged in prison in Peking.

On the 18th October the Summer Palace, within the precincts of which several of the British captives had been subjected to the grossest indignities, was destroyed.

Lord Elgin entered Peking in great state on the 24th October to sign the treaty of peace, the occasion being seized to make an impressive military spectacle.

Peace.

On the 22nd October the siege train was sent to Tientsin; the sick and wounded were sent by cart to Tung-chou, and thence by boat to Tientsin. The French army, with the exception of one battalion left for Baron Gros' protection, left Peking on the 1st November. On the 7th November the 2nd Division left the capital, being followed by the 1st Division on the 8th. Our army had all re-embarked at Tientsin by the end of November. The cavalry embarked at Taku. During the march and the after-exposure on the gunboats, fifteen of the horses of Probyn's Regiment died from the effects of severe cold.

The garrison left at Tientsin (until the indemnity should be paid) consisted of the 2nd Battalion, 60th Garrison of Tien-tsin. Rifles; the 67th Regiment; one wing, 31st Regiment; a battery of Royal Artillery, one company of Royal Engineers, Fane's Horse, and a battalion of the Military Train, with a due proportion of medical and commissariat staff,—Brigadier Staveley, C.B., in command. The force billeted in the town. The French force, consisting of the 101st and 102nd Regiments and some artillery, occupied the left bank of the river; one wing of the 31st Regiment garrisoned Taku.

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APPENDIX A.

CHINA EXPEDITION, 1860.

Extracts from correspondence relating to the despatch of a Force from India to China.

Dated War Office, the 26th November 1859.

From—The RIGHT HONOURABLE SIDNEY HERBERT, Esq., M.P.,
To—The RIGHT HONOURABLE SIR CHARLES WOOD, Bart., M.P.,
G.C.B., etc.

The amount of force to be sent from India to China being finally agreed upon, I have the honour to request that you will give the necessary directions to the Governor General of India to despatch to the China waters the force which, in accordance with private communications, there is reason to believe is being prepared, in addition to that which has already been sent to reinforce the troops at Hong-Kong and Canton under the command of Major-General Sir C. Van Straubenzee.

Her Majesty's Government have despatched from the Cape of Good Hope one battalion of Infantry, namely, the First Battalion of the Second Foot, made up to 1,200 strong, rank and file.

There is also gone from England *viâ* the Cape one battalion of the Military Train, consisting of 289, all ranks.

We are further about to send, *viâ* Suez and the Red Sea, two batteries of Field Artillery of 214 men each, rank and file.

The force which Her Majesty's Government have decided on sending from
Strength of the expedi- India will consist of three battalions of British infantry, in addition to the two stated to be already gone
tion, etc. to Hong-Kong, or five battalions in all; and three batteries of Artillery, namely, one battery of Horse Artillery and two of Field Artillery, and a company of Royal Engineers, two squadrons of British cavalry, with some native irregular cavalry and infantry, and a company of Madras Sappers making up the whole force, including that which proceeds from England and the Cape, to about 10,000 men of all ranks, of whom about 8,100 would be from India.

Orders were given to Sir C. Van Straubenzee on the 10th of October last to collect mules and horses for the use of the expedition, but it will be necessary that the horses of the British cavalry, and of some portion of the artillery at least, should be sent from India.

These troops should be despatched as soon as possible, and, as the passage from Singapore northward while the monsoon is blowing is very difficult, and the season during which operations are possible in the north of China is very short, whatever steam tonnage is available for these troops should be engaged.

It is important that Admiral Hope and Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant should be kept informed of the probable date of departure of every vessel, in order that they may make arrangements for the reception of the troops, and send to Singapore orders as to their destination on the coast of China.

Instructions will be given by this mail to Admiral Hope to send down orders to Singapore, as to the destination to which the vessels carrying these troops should proceed, and also to send any steamers that he may have available for the purpose of assisting the sailing vessels in facing the monsoon from Singapore northwards.

I enclose a memorandum, furnished by the Admiralty, as to the dates at which the sailing vessels should leave and should reach the various points on the voyage.

P.S.—It has further been decided to despatch forthwith a siege train composed of ten 8-inch guns of 52 cwt., ten 24-pounder guns of 50 cwt., five 8-inch mortars, and five 5½-inch mortars, with a proportionate amount of ammunition.

APPENDIX B.

List of Troops that sailed for China from Calcutta in 1859 and 1860.

| Dates of departure. | Ships. | Regiments. | Officers. | Non-Com- missioned Officers and Men. | Native troops. |
|---------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------|--|-------------------|
| 1859. | | | | | |
| 23rd September .. | <i>Australian</i> .. | 67th Regiment .. | 19 | 284 | .. |
| " " .. | <i>Indomitable</i> .. | Do .. | 16 | 488 | 9 |
| 13th October .. | <i>Armenian</i> .. | 1st Battalion, 3rd Regiment .. | 10 | 417 | 1 |
| 26th " .. | <i>Lightning</i> .. | 23rd Company, Royal Engineers | 6 | 95 | .. |
| 15th November .. | <i>Coromandel</i> .. | 1st Battalion, 3rd Regiment .. | 8 | 220 | 11 |
| " " .. | <i>Tasmania</i> .. | Do. .. | 12 | 473 | .. |
| " " .. | <i>Do.</i> .. | 67th Regiment .. | .. | 10 | .. |
| " " .. | <i>Do.</i> .. | Royal Engineers .. | .. | 4 | .. |
| 1860. | | | | | |
| 15th January .. | <i>Adventure</i> .. | 1st Battalion, 1st Regiment .. | .. | 6 | .. |
| " " .. | <i>Do.</i> .. | 1st Battalion, 3rd Regiment .. | 1 | 13 | .. |
| " " .. | <i>Do.</i> .. | 67th Regiment .. | .. | 221 | .. |
| " " .. | <i>Do.</i> .. | 99th Regiment .. | 7 | 145 | .. |
| " " .. | <i>Do.</i> .. | Royal Engineers .. | .. | 93 | .. |
| " " .. | <i>Do.</i> .. | Staff .. | 2 | .. | .. |
| 3rd February .. | <i>Octavia</i> .. | 99th Regiment .. | 9 | 306 | .. |
| " " .. | <i>Walmer Castle</i> .. | Do. .. | 11 | 312 | .. |
| 4th " .. | <i>Mars</i> .. | Do. .. | 7 | 267 | .. |
| 19th " .. | <i>Bosphorus</i> .. | 10th Punjab Infantry .. | 8 | .. | 465 |
| " " .. | <i>Burlington</i> .. | Do. .. | 5 | .. | 209 |
| 8th " .. | <i>Elizabeth</i> .. | 7-14th Brigade Royal Artillery | 2 | 74 | .. |
| " " .. | <i>Zuleika</i> .. | Do. .. | 3 | 79 | .. |
| 29th " .. | <i>Alfred</i> .. | 2nd Battalion, 60th Rifles .. | 14 | 383 | .. |
| " " .. | <i>Indomitable</i> .. | Do. .. | 10 | 288 | .. |
| " " .. | <i>Hougoumont</i> .. | Do. .. | 8 | 233 | .. |
| 2nd March .. | <i>Wimira</i> .. | Loodiana Regiment .. | 6 | .. | 463 |
| " " .. | <i>Ishander Shah</i> .. | Do. .. | 5 | .. | 198 |
| " " .. | <i>City of Poona</i> .. | 7-14th Brigade, Royal Artillery. | 5 | 74 | .. |
| 6th " .. | <i>Minden</i> .. | 8th Regiment, Punjab Infantry | 5 | .. | 259 |
| " " .. | <i>Punjab</i> .. | Do. .. | 6 | .. | 269 |

| Date of departure. | Ships. | Regiment. | Officers. | Non-Com- missioned Officers and Men. | Native troops. |
|---------------------|-------------------------|---|-----------|--|-------------------|
| 1860— <i>contd.</i> | | | | | |
| 29th | Lord Dalhousie | Do. | 4 | .. | 256 |
| " | Merchantman | 8-14th Brigade. Royal Artillery. with Volunteers | 5 | 213 | .. |
| 19th | Sydney | 87th Regiment | 9 | 199 | .. |
| " | Erdnes | 1st S. Cavalry | 2 | .. | 50 |
| " | Lady Anne | Do. | 2 | 1 | 50 |
| 20th | Australian | 87th Regiment | 6 | 242 | .. |
| " | Mathilda Atheling | 1st S. Cavalry | 1 | .. | 58 |
| " | Brandon | Do. | 2 | .. | 53 |
| 22nd | Lightning | 15th Punjab Infantry | 2 | .. | 101 |
| " | Ocean Home | 1st L. Infantry | 2 | .. | 70 |
| 23rd | Arracan | 87th Regiment | 6 | 185 | .. |
| " | Queen of England | 1st S. Cavalry | 5 | .. | 74 |
| 24th | Carthage | 87th Regiment | 5 | 172 | .. |
| " | Vortigern | Fane's Horse | 2 | .. | 76 |
| " | F. Feroze | Do. | .. | .. | .. |
| 18th | Edith Moore | Do. | 3 | .. | 97 |
| " | Dartmouth | Do. | 2 | .. | 64 |
| 29th | Viscount Canning | 15th Punjab Infantry | 6 | .. | 217 |
| " | S. F. Nimrod | 1st Cavalry | 2 | .. | 59 |
| 31st | { Zenobia Cambodia } | Do. | 2 | .. | .. |
| " | Bentinsk | 15th Punjab Infantry | 8 | .. | 65 |
| 4th April | Daniel Rankin | Fane's Horse | 2 | .. | 72 |
| " | Clarendon | Do. | 2 | .. | 68 |
| " | Armenian | 87th Regiment | 7 | 295 | .. |
| | | | 272 | 5,790 | 3,97 |

The troops arrived at Hong-Kong as below :—

23rd March 1860.—The Commander-in-Chief, Sir Hope Grant, and Staff

27th March 1860.—99th Regiment.

27th March 1860.—44th „

27th March 1860.—31st(Wing)

27th March 1860.—Battalion of Military Train.

25th April 1860.—Major Mowbray's Battery, R.A.

25th April 1860.—Detachments of the Loodiana Regiment, Sikh Cavalry,
and the Madras Mountain Train, 36 small pieces of artillery, and 39 ponies.

25th April 1860.—2nd Battalion, 60th Regiment.

26th April 1860.—15th Punjab Infantry (Detachment).

26th April.—1st Sikh Cavalry.

26th April 1860.—8th Punjab Infantry.

27th April 1860.—19th " "

22nd May 1860.—Govan's Battery, R.A.

And so on at intervals.

2nd July 1860.—The 11th Punjab Infantry disembarked at Canton—
1 Captain, 9 Subalterns, 4 Staff Officers, 740 Native Rank and
File.

Vessels from Bombay arriving at Hong-Kong towards the end of June made the passage in from forty to fifty days.

Horses only suffered on those transports imperfectly ventilated; where ventilation was good, they invariably arrived in fair condition.

CAMPAIGN, 1860.

Despatch of troops from Madras.

The troops proceeding from Madras consisted of—

Captain Desborough's battery of Royal Artillery, No. 4 battery, 13th brigade, with a half battery in reserve consisting of one 24 pounder howitzer and two 9-pounder guns with limbers, wagons, and harness complete. Horses and mules fit for artillery not being procurable in China, the battery was sent fully equipped.

Two squadrons and head-quarters, 1st King's Dragoon Guards.

Her Majesty's 44th Regiment.

The Madras mountain train, comprising twelve 12-pounder howitzers, six 5½" mortars, with ammunition and harness.

To meet further requirements, twelve 12-pounder howitzers, twelve 5½" mortars, and twelve 4¾" mortars, *i.e.*, 6 batteries, were held in readiness. The train was placed in temporary charge of the Madras Native Artillery. Forty ponies accompanied it, in charge of 1 havildar, 1 naik, and 20 drivers (Native Horse battery).

A. and K. Cos., Madras Sappers and Miners.

Two companies of Golundauze (Madras Native Artillery).

21st Regiment, Madras Infantry (armed with the percussion musket).

APPENDIX C.

ORGANIZATION OF THE CHINA EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, 1860.

Head Quarters, Hong-Kong, 20th April 1860.

The following will be the distribution of the Expeditionary Force to take effect from this date :—

1ST DIVISION.

Major-General Sir J. Michel, K.C.B.

Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Elkington, 6th Foot, A.-D.-C.

Captain Green, 77th Regiment, D. A. A. G.

Lieutenant Allgood, Bengal Army, D.A.Q.M.G.

Royal Artillery.

Desborough's Battery.

Barry's Battery (Armstrong).

Royal Engineers.

10th (Fisher's) Company.

1st Brigade.

Colonel Staveley, C.B., with rank of Brigadier.

Captain R. Brook, 60th Rifles, Brigade Major.

1st "The Royal" Regiment.

2nd Battalion 31st Regiment.

Ludhiana Regiment.

2nd Brigade.

Colonel Sutton, with rank of Brigadier.

Captain B. Van Straubenzee, 9th Foot, Brigade-Major.

2nd Queen's Regiment, 1st Battalion.

60th Rifles, 2nd Battalion.

15th Punjab Native Infantry.

2ND DIVISION.

Major-General Sir Robert Napier, K.C.B.

Captain H. F. Brooke, 48th Regiment, A.-D.-C.

Brevet-Major W. Greathed, Bengal Engineers, A.-D.-C., Extra.

Brevet-Major M. Dillon, Rifle Brigade, D. A. A. G.

Captain W. Hammer, 87th Regiment, D.A.Q.M.G.

Royal Artillery.

Mowbray's Battery.

Govan's Battery.

Royal Engineers.

23rd (Graham's) Company.

3rd Brigade.

Colonel Jephson, with rank of Brigadier.

* * * * * Brigade-Major.

3rd Regiment (The Buffs), 1st Battalion.

44th Regiment.

8th Punjab Native Infantry.

4th Brigade.

Colonel Reeves, with rank of Brigadier.

Brevet Major M. Walker, v.c., 3rd Regiment, Brigade-Major.

67th Regiment.

99th Regiment.

11th Punjab Infantry.

19th Punjab Native Infantry.

Cavalry Brigade.

Lieutenant-Colonel Pattle, with rank of Brigadier.

Lieutenant-Colonel C. Walker, 2nd Dragoon Guards, A.Q.M.G.

1st King's Dragoon Guards (2 Squadrons).

Probyn's Horse.

Fane's Horse.

Royal Artillery.

Milward's Battery (Armstrong).

Artillery Reserve.

Rotton's, Bedingfield's, and Pennycuick's Batteries, Royal Artillery.

2 Batteries, Madras Artillery.

Engineer Reserve.

Head-Quarters and one-half of 8th (Papillon's) Company, R.E.

2 companies, Madras Sappers.

APPENDIX D.

Return of the Force at Pei-tang on the 1st August 1860.

| Corps. | Officers. | Men. | Total. |
|---------------------------------------|-----------|-------|--------|
| 1st Dragoon Guards | 17 | 310 | 327 |
| Royal Artillery | 1 | 1,572 | 1,621 |
| Royal Marine Artillery | 1 | 9 | 10 |
| Royal Engineers | 12 | 231 | 243 |
| Military Train, 1st Battalion | 495 | 196 | 211 |
| 1st Foot, 2nd Battalion | 30 | 574 | 604 |
| 2nd „ 1st „ | 30 | 670 | 700 |
| 3rd „ 1st „ | 29 | 826 | 855 |
| 31st Regiment | 30 | 1,019 | 1,049 |
| 44th „ | 22 | 996 | 1,026 |
| Royal Marine Light Infantry | 30 | 479 | 501 |
| 60th Rifles, 2nd Battalion | 30 | 789 | 819 |
| 67th Regiment | 31 | 876 | 907 |
| 77th „ | .. | 1 | 1 |
| 99th „ | 21 | 631 | 652 |
| Army Hospital Corps | .. | 137 | 137 |
| Commissariat Staff Corps | .. | 24 | 24 |
| War Department | .. | 23 | 23 |
| Probyn's Cavalry | 18 | 454 | 472 |
| Fane's Horse | 14 | 350 | 364 |
| Carried over | .. | .. | .. |

| Corps. | | | | | Officers | Men. | Total. |
|---------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|----------|--------|--------|
| Brought forward ... | | | | | ... | ... | ... |
| Madras Artillery | ... | ... | ... | ... | 7 | 177 | 184 |
| Madras Sappers | ... | ... | ... | ... | 7 | 247 | 254 |
| 8th Punjab Infantry | ... | ... | ... | ... | 14 | 763 | 777 |
| 15th " " | ... | ... | .. | ... | 15 | 884 | 899 |
| 19th " " | ... | ... | ... | ... | 8 | 459 | 467 |
| GENERAL TOTAL... | | | | | 430 | 12,697 | 13,127 |

CHAPTER XXXIII.

THE CHINESE ARMY BETWEEN 1860 AND 1900.

CHINA has for centuries possessed a standing army composed as follows :—

- (a) Troops of the Green Standard (Lu Ying).
- (b) The "Eight Banners."
- (c) Special Troops (Hwai Chun).

The troops of the Green Standard have existed from time immemorial, with a strength which appears to have fluctuated between 60,000 and 1,000,000. They were composed almost

The Green Standard. exclusively of Chinese of the lowest classes and were nominally a sort of militia, under the command of provincial governors, for the maintenance of public order. For military purposes they were useless, and when any real fighting had to be done, so-called "Braves" (Yung Ying) were enlisted, and discharged when no longer required.

Under one or other of the "Eight Banners" were enrolled all *The Eight Banners.* Manchus, and all descendants of the Mongolian or Chinese soldiers of the conquest. The "Eight Banners" formed, in fact, a sort of military caste, the military spirit of which had, however, long disappeared. They numbered roughly some 230,000, and were under the command of high Manchu officials, who corresponded direct with the Court. Their function was to keep an eye on the provincial governors and to maintain Manchu supremacy. These troops formed the garrisons of the Tartar quarters of the principal cities of the empire.

For active service the Bannermen were formed into various Yings or divisions, the most important of which the "Shen-Chi-Ying" or Peking Field Force, was organized in 1862 as a result of the campaign of 1860.

The victories gained by England in 1842, 1857, and 1860 disclosed *The Special or Foreign-drilled Troops.* the uselessness of the Chinese military forces, which was further emphasised by the success of the Taiping insurgents.

To suppress the rebellion a special force was raised and officered

by Europeans. Co-operating with this was a purely Chinese force, organized by Li-hung Chang; while a similar force was raised by Tso-tsung Tang to deal with the Muhammadan rebellion in the north-west (1868-1878). Li-hung Chang's troops, called the "Huai Chun," were the first of what are now known as the foreign-drilled troops and formed the nucleus of the modern army.

The China-Japanese war of 1894-95 gave a great impetus to the organization of troops on the foreign system, and when the Boxer troubles of 1900 finally demonstrated the comparative helplessness of the Chinese when opposed to modern troops, the Government developed a feverish anxiety to raise a large army of foreign-drilled troops. Frequent imperial edicts were issued exhorting the viceroys and Governors to spare no efforts to organize numerous and efficient forces. In Chih-li, Viceroy Yuan-shi Kai made a determined effort to organize an efficient army on German and Japanese lines, and in 1903 he had some 20,000 men well-trained and well armed, known as the "Chang-pei Chun."

In 1903 the idea was conceived of amalgamating the military strength of the empire and reducing the organization to one uniform system, and with this object the "Lien-ping Chu" or Board of Military Administration was instituted on the 4th December of that year. The Board proposed a programme of reform, the basis of which was the organization of 36 Divisions (360,000 men). The organization of the Chang-pei Chun was taken as a model and the programme was to be completed by 1922.

¹ Subsequently known as the "Pei-yang Lu Chun".

CHAPTER XXXIV.

EVENTS WHICH LED UP TO THE WAR OF 1900, AND HOSTILITIES PRIOR TO THE ARRIVAL OF THE TROOPS FROM INDIA.

BEFORE proceeding to describe the series of military events which culminated in the relief of the foreign legations in Peking and the occupation of the capital of China by the contingents of the allied powers, it may be of interest to give some account of the rise and spread of the Boxer movement.

The real origin of the *I-ho-ch'uan*, or "Fists of Patriotic Union," commonly known under the title of "Boxers," is difficult to trace, for whereas some authorities assert that it was the outcome of the cession of Kiao-chou to the Germans, and had for its object the defence of the province of Shan-tung against the invasion of the foreigner, others maintain that it is really an old society, which the general state of unrest had brought to life again. Whatever its origin, it is now a matter of history that the obscure society, which in the beginning might have been easily suppressed, grew rapidly into a vast and dangerous association of brigands, which the Government soon found beyond its powers to control.

The Boxers rapidly increased in numbers. The mysterious powers, which their teachers professed to confer on their followers, appealed to the imagination of the young men and boys of the country, who flocked to join their ranks, while the prospect of rapine and loot attracted all the ruffians within a wide radius.

The rising was further helped by natural causes. For two years past there had been great scarcity of rain, resulting in the failure of crops, and, as has been already said, the Boxers proclaimed that this state of things was due to the influence of the foreigner, and that until he was removed the rain would be withheld. In the Shan-si province, where the foreigners had made surveys and opened mines, the outlook was particularly bad, and great scarcity prevailed, resulting in famine and suffering. The Boxer teaching

was, therefore, readily believed by the superstitious Chinese. Boxer professors appeared everywhere, and each village had its bands of youths, who practised the Boxer exercises and rites whereby they were to become invulnerable to foreign bullets, donned the Boxer uniform, and armed themselves with swords and spears. Firearms and all such devices were at first discarded as of foreign invention, and therefore contrary to their beliefs.

The early attacks of the Boxers were directed against the Catholic converts, many of whom had their houses burnt and possessions confiscated, while a few were killed. From being unchecked, the desire for violence grew, and very soon the Protestant converts shared the same fate as the Catholics; all were "secondary devils," and only less obnoxious than the pure foreigners.

At first the Boxers confined their operations to Shan-tung, but towards the end of 1899 they spread into the southern part of Chih-li, where the persecution of the Christians also began.

Yuan-shih Kai, the Governor of Shan-tung, while remaining loyal to the Government, maintained order in his province throughout the troubles. Very different, however, was the state of affairs in the neighbouring provinces of Chih-li and Shan-si. The officials had been informed that the Government was favourably disposed towards the Boxers, who were not to be treated harshly. Compelled, therefore, at first to tolerate the society, they soon found themselves powerless to restrain it, and a reign of terror began. With unchecked power to do harm, and free indulgence in lawlessness, the desire for looting and violence increased, and terrible tales of outrage, committed on Protestant and Catholic converts alike, began to arrive at Peking from the south, and these reports showed that the Boxer movement was spreading steadily northwards towards the capital, till it was certain that Boxers were training and recruiting close to its walls.

Gaining courage as their numbers increased, the Boxers openly defied and terrorised the provincial officials, and spread devastation through the land. They professed to be able to "smell out" converts or others who had foreign sympathies, and any who offended them or whose wealth they coveted, were straightway accused on one or other of these

grounds and promptly murdered. Thus, a commander in Tung Fu-Hsiang's army who attempted to argue with a band of Boxers in one of the main streets of Peking was at once accused of being a friend of foreigners, and was dragged off his horse and butchered. It was only natural, therefore, that the officials avoided all interference with the Boxers, who had thus unrestrained liberty to commit any outrage they pleased.

Meanwhile the foreign ministers were vainly demanding the suppression of the Boxers. The Tsung-li Yamen professed to be taking all means in their power to suppress the rising, and assured the ministers that the safety of the legations would be the especial care of the Chinese Government, who regarded the Boxers as rebels and outlaws.

While, however, the Tsung-li Yamen was giving these assurances to the foreign ministers, the Manchu party, notably Kang-yi, was doing all in its power to encourage the Boxers and assure them of the favour of the Empress Dowager.

On the 28th May the Boxers burnt Feng-tai railway station, and tore up part of the line, which, however, was quickly repaired. The ministers now considered that the situation in Peking had become critical and telegraphed to Tientsin for armed guards for the legations. These were forthwith despatched, and, to the number of 337 men, reached the capital without opposition on the 31st May.

The Boxers had also begun to destroy the railway at Pao-ting Fu, and the European railway employés left that place on the 29th May by river for Tientsin. They were, however, pursued and attacked by Boxers, and four of their number were killed.

Meanwhile Tung Fu-hsiang's Kan-suh troops, wild, undisciplined, anti-foreign Muhammadans, who had been removed from the neighbourhood of Peking at the instance of the foreign ministers during the winter of 1898-99, were ordered back to the capital and immediately fraternised with the Boxers.

On the 7th June General Nieh's troops, which had been protecting the railway line from Tientsin to Peking, were ordered to return to their camps at Lu-tai, but they remained in the neighbourhood of Yang-tsun for several days.

All communication between the legations and the outside world was by this time cut off, and the Boxers were soon openly drilling in Peking itself. On the 9th, Tung Fu-hsiang's troops entered the capital and with them came hosts of Boxers, who, in the uniform of their society, and armed with swords and spears, boldly paraded the streets, declaring that their mission was to exterminate the foreigners.

On the 11th June the Japanese Chancellor, Mr. Sugiyama, was murdered by Tung Fu-hsiang's troops at the Yung-ting-mên, or south gate of the Chinese city.

On the 13th June the Boxers first attacked the legations, and on the same day began their wholesale massacre of Chinese Christians.

While the situation at Peking was becoming critical, the state of affairs in other parts of Chih-li was causing great uneasiness. Much anxiety was felt as to what was to be the outcome of the Boxer rising. The demeanour of the natives was also unsatisfactory, and there was a general feeling of unrest and insecurity. On 5th and 6th May 1900, detachments of the Chinese regiments escorting the boundary commission at Wei-hai-wei were fiercely attacked, but the assailants were driven off with heavy loss.

In the meantime the anxiety at Tientsin was increasing, and it was reported that the anti-foreign movement was spreading and steadily drawing nearer to the settlement. Constant rumours of Boxer outrages arrived, while the railway was reported to be damaged at several points. This was the general situation until the night of June 9th, when Admiral Sir E. Seymour, Naval Commander-in-Chief on the China station, received a telegram from the British Minister at Peking, informing him that unless the Europeans in Peking were at once enabled to withdraw to the coast, their retirement at a later date would be impossible.

A mixed naval brigade of British, Austrians, Italians, French, Germans, Japanese, Americans, and Russians, amounting to 2,066 in all, was at once formed, and on the 10th left Tientsin for Peking under Admiral Seymour. After 15th June the communications of this force with Tientsin were interrupted.

On the departure of Admiral Seymour with the relief force Capture of the Taku forts. the command devolved on Rear-Admiral Bruce. It becoming imperative to secure the communications with Tientsin, the allied naval forces attacked and captured the Taku forts on 17th June.

Meanwhile the position at Tientsin was grave. After the de- Tientsin attacked and iso- parture of the relief column under Admiral Seymour, the garrison left there was approximately 2,536. On the 16th the Boxers attacked the place, and by the 18th communication with Taku was cut off. The Chinese regiment from Wei-hai-wei and reinforcements from Hong-Kong and Singapore were being hurriedly brought up to Taku, the first detachment arriving there on 21st. The other powers were also forwarding troops as fast as possible.

On June 23rd Tientsin was relieved by a mixed force from Relief of Tientsin. Taku. Meanwhile news had reached Tientsin that Admiral Seymour's relief column had been unable to reach Peking, and was holding the Hsi-Ku armoury a few miles north of Tientsin but Retirement of Peking Re- relief Column to Tientsin. required assistance to bring in his sick and wounded. A mixed Russian and British force was organized for its relief and by 9 A.M. on the 26th the retirement to Tientsin was successfully accomplished.

After this the allied forces acted for some time strictly on the defensive, the troops being fully occupied in guarding Taku Tang-ku and Tientsin, and the lines of communication between these places. On the 13th and 14th July, however, after severe fighting, the native city of Tientsin was captured and the Chinese severely defeated and put to flight. After this the country in the vicinity of Tientsin remained quiet and reinforcements from India began to arrive on 18th July.

CHAPTER XXXV.

DESPATCH OF THE BRITISH CONTINGENT, CHINA EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, FROM INDIA.

THE outbreak of the anti-foreigner movement in North China, and the spread of the Boxers towards Peking, as reported by telegram, had been watched with great interest in India.

On the 14th June all the available troops at Hong-Kong had been despatched to Taku at the request of Sir E. Seymour, and on the 16th the Secretary of State telegraphed to the Viceroy asking for the immediate despatch of troops to Singapore and Hong-Kong to replace those withdrawn. The 7th Regiment of Bengal Infantry and 1st Regiment of Sikh Infantry were in consequence ordered to be in readiness to proceed to China.

On the 18th June the Secretary of State again wired that the position of affairs at Peking and Tientsin was now very grave, and requested that the Government of India would take up the necessary steamer transport and arrange for the immediate despatch of an expeditionary force to China, consisting of one battery of horse or field artillery, one regiment of native cavalry, three battalions of native infantry, and one company of sappers and miners, with land transport. This force to be in addition to the two native infantry battalions already ordered to proceed on garrison duty to Singapore and Hong-Kong.

Brigadier-General Sir Alfred Gaselee, K.C.B., A.D.C., was selected to command the expedition, and Colonel E. G. Barrow, C.B., was appointed second-in-command, and infantry brigadier.

On the 22nd June Lord Curzon telegraphed to the Secretary of State for India, asking to be informed if there was any probability of more troops being required for China. On the same day Lord George Hamilton replied that as the situation in Chih-li was becoming more and more serious, Her Majesty's Government

considered it desirable to increase the force from India to a strength of 10,000 native soldiers, including another cavalry regiment, more sappers and miners, and, if possible, another battery.

In view of the increased strength of the force, the temporary rank of Major-General, with the local rank of Lieutenant-General, was conferred on Sir Alfred Gaselee, and Brigadier-General E. G. Barrow was appointed Chief of the Staff, with the local rank of Major-General, it being intended that, if the necessity arose, he should succeed General Gaselee in chief command.

Sir Alfred Gaselee was also appointed to the chief command of all Imperial British troops in North China, and orders were received from England that, as the cost of the expedition was to be borne by the Imperial Treasury, the direction of operations would be undertaken by the Home Government, which would issue instructions to the Secretary of State for India.

The force was organized in two brigades with divisional troops, details of which are given in Appendix A.

Wei-hai-wei had been selected by the War Office as the base for the troops in North China, and Colonel Lorne Campbell was appointed Commandant of the base, with the local rank of Brigadier-General.

Five British officers were attached to the force for duty with Chinese transport, to be organized locally, and a number of special service officers were appointed later for duty at the treaty ports.

The despatch of the expedition was pressed forward with all haste, and the first detachment to leave India for North China was the left wing of the 7th Bengal Infantry, which sailed from Calcutta in the British India s.s. *Nerbudda*, on the 25th June, and arrived at Taku on the 17th July. It was followed on the 29th June by the right wing of the regiment, in the s.s. *Palamcotta*, and after that date an almost continuous stream of transports carried away troops and stores from Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, Karachi, and Rangoon, up to the middle of September. On the 3rd July Sir Alfred Gaselee with his staff embarked at Calcutta on board the s.s. *Zebenghla*, and arrived at Hong-Kong on the 15th July.

General Gaselee remained at Hong-Kong three days. On the 17th July the Viceroy Li Hung-chang arrived at Hong-Kong

from Canton on his way to Shanghai, and had an interview with the Governor, at which Generals Gaselee, Gascoigne, and Barrow were present. On the 18th the *Zebenghla* left Hong-Kong for the north, but on the 21st was stopped at sea by H. M. S. *Bona-venture*, which took off Sir Alfred Gaselee and General Barrow to Shanghai, to confer with the local authorities on measures for the proper defence of the port. As Garrison of Shanghai. a result of his visit General Gaselee gave his opinion that the minimum garrison, which would suffice for the defence of Shanghai, would be 3,000 men, and considered that a suitable force for the purpose would consist of a battery of artillery, a native cavalry regiment, a brigade of native infantry and a company of sappers and miners. The Second Brigade of the China Expeditionary Force was consequently diverted to Shanghai, where it remained throughout the subsequent operations in North China. Generals Gaselee and Barrow rejoined the *Zebenghla* at Wei-hai-wei on the 24th July, and reached Taku the following day.

In the meantime, on the 5th July, the Secretary of State for India telegraphed to the Viceroy that Troops from South Africa. four 6-inch breech-loading howitzers, two 9·45-inch howitzers, and four 4·7-inch quick-firing guns, on travelling carriages, with *personnel* and 500 rounds per piece, would shortly be despatched to North China from South Africa. This heavy ordnance with 15 officers and 305 men of the Royal Garrison Artillery, under command of Colonel Perrott, R.A., left Capetown for Hong-Kong on the 23rd July. To draw these guns 1,304 siege-train bullocks were sent to Wei-hai-wei from India, but long before the guns arrived, Peking had been captured by the allies and the fighting was practically at an end. The guns remained at Wei-hai-wei, and the siege train bullocks were sold by auction.

On the 7th July it was decided to send a cavalry brigade to China and orders for its mobilization were now issued. Khan Bahadur Dhanjibhoy, of Rawal Pindi, provided Cavalry Brigade formed. nine ambulance tongas with twenty horses, the necessary *personnel*, and twelve months' supply of repairing material, for service with this brigade

On the 12th July it was announced from England that a balloon section would be sent to China.

On the 19th July the Maharaja Scindia of Gwalior offered to equip and maintain a hospital ship, at a cost of twenty lakhs, and present it to the British Government for the use of the China Expeditionary Force; his offer was accepted by Her Majesty and acknowledged in terms of high appreciation. The Maharaja eventually selected the S. S. *Zayathla* for the purpose, and after being refitted and renamed the *Gwalior*, it sailed on its first trip from Calcutta on the 23rd September, and subsequently rendered most valuable service to the Expeditionary Force.

On the 16th July Sir Alfred Gaselee and General Gascoigne had recommended that the Hong-Kong Regiment should be employed in North China, its place at Hong-Kong being taken by a third native infantry battalion from India, and the 34th Pioneers were detailed for this duty. On the 20th July orders were issued for the despatch of a survey party to China, and the following day a detachment of mounted sappers was sanctioned for the force.

On the 25th the American hospital ship *Maine*, which had been working in connection with the British forces in South Africa, was placed at the disposal of the Indian Government, for service in China, by the Atlantic Transport Company and the Committee of American ladies. As the British contingent was already provided with two hospital ships, the *Gwalior* and the *Carthage*, which were ample for its requirements, the *Maine* was principally used by the United States contingent of the allied force.

On the 2nd and 6th August orders for a third and fourth infantry brigade for China were issued. Details of the composition of these brigades are given in Appendix A. The troops forming the 4th Brigade were all to be armed with .303-inch Lee-Metford weapons, as in the case of the other brigades. Two special signalling units, one British and one native, were attached to both the 3rd and 4th brigades.

On the 29th August the Government of India gave orders for the organization, equipment and despatch of a remount depôt of 250 horses from Calcutta to Hong-Kong, for the supply of remounts to the artillery and cavalry of the British force.

The embarkation of the whole of the troops belonging to the British contingent of the China Expeditionary Force was completed by the departure of the Ulwar Infantry from Calcutta in the s. s. *Ludhiana* and *Landaura* on the 14th September 1900; and on the 9th October the movement of the three additional batteries of Royal Field Artillery and the four British infantry battalions, which had been warned for service in China in the middle of July, was finally countermanded.

On the 8th August Australia sent a naval brigade, consisting of 200 men from Victoria and 300 from New South Wales. The brigade embarked at Sydney in the transport *Falamos*, and arrived at Taku on 9th September. The men were employed on shore, part at Tientsin and part (the New South Wales contingent) formed the garrison of Peking after the 8th October. Besides the naval brigade, the South Australian cruiser *Protector* was employed for some time in the Gulf of Chih-li, where her services were most useful. She returned to Australia on the 2nd November.

APPENDIX.

Extract from Amalgamated Scheme for the Despatch of an Expeditionary Force to China, as finally approved by the Government of India, 1900.

PART I.—TROOPS.

1. At the request of the Imperial Government, a Force of all Arms to be entitled "The China Expeditionary Force," as detailed below, will be mobilized at once and despatched to China :—

2. *Composition of the force—*

Cavalry Brigade—

" B " Battery, Royal Horse Artillery.

R-2 Ammunition Column Unit.

1st Bengal Lancers.

3rd Bombay Cavalry.

16th Bengal Lancers.

Section A, No. 22 British Field Hospital.

Section C, No. 62 Native Field Hospital.

Sections A and B, No. 57 Native Field Hospital.

No. 1 Brigade Supply Column.

1st Infantry Brigade—

7th Bengal Infantry.

26th Bombay Infantry.

1st Sikh Infantry.

24th Punjab Infantry.

No. 39 Native Field Hospital.

No. 43 Native Field Hospital.

No. 2 Brigade Supply Column.

2nd Infantry Brigade—

2nd Bengal Infantry.

14th Sikhs.

1-4th Gurkha Rifles.

30th Bombay Infantry.

No. 63 Native Field Hospital.

No. 66 Native Field Hospital.

No. 3 Brigade Supply Column.

3rd Infantry Brigade—

- 6th Bengal Infantry.
- 4th Punjab Infantry.
- 20th Punjab Infantry.
- 34th Pioneers.
- No. 51 Native Field Hospital.
- No. 61 Native Field Hospital.
- No. 5 Brigade Supply Column.

4th Infantry Brigade—

- 28th Madras Infantry.
- 31st Madras Infantry (6th Burma Battalion).
- Alwar Infantry (Imperial Service Troops).
- Bikaner Infantry (Imperial Service Troops).
- No. 53 Native Field Hospital.
- No. 58 Native Field Hospital.
- No. 6 Brigade Supply Column.

Divisional Troops—

- 12th Battery, Royal Field Artillery.
- R-7 Ammunition Column Unit.
- 1st Regiment of Sardar Resslera Jodhpur Lancers (Imperial Service Troops).
- 1st Madras Pioneers.
- Mounted Detachment, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
- No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
- No. 3 Company, Madras Sappers and Miners.
- No. 2 Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners.
- The Maler Kotla Sappers (Imperial Service Troops).
- 1 Photo-Litho Section, Bombay Sappers and Miners.
- 1 Photo-Litho Section, Madras Sappers and Miners.
- 1 Printing Section, Bombay Sappers and Miners.
- 1 Printing Section, Madras Sappers and Miners.
- 10 Special Signalling Units (British Infantry).
- 2 Special Signalling Units (Native Infantry).
- Section B, No. 22 British Field Hospital.
- Section D, No. 62 Native Field Hospital.
- No. 42 Native Field Hospital.
- No. 4 Brigade Supply Column.

Line of Communication troops—

- 22nd Bombay Infantry.
 - 3rd Madras Infantry.
 - 5th Infantry, Hyderabad Contingent.
- } Garrison troops at Hong-Kong.

- 1 Telegraph Section, Madras Sappers and Miners.
 1 Telegraph Section, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
 1 Railway Section.
 1 Ordnance Field Park.
 2 Engineer Field Parks.
 Sections A and B, No. 15 British Field Hospital.
 Sections A and B, No. 16 British Field Hospital.
 No. 47 Native Field Hospital.
 Sections C and D, No. 69 Native Field Hospital.
 Sections A and B, No. 38 Native
 Field Hospital. }
 No. 41 Native Field Hospital. } For sick and wounded returning
 Sections C and D, No. 57 Na- } from the field.
 tive Field Hospital. }
 Section B, No. 5 Field Veterinary Hospital.
 Nos. 3 and 4, Field Medical Store Depôt.
 1 Base Depôt of Medical Stores in Hong-Kong.
 1 Base Veterinary Store Depôt.
 1 British General Hospital in which Sections A and B, No. 25
 British Field Hospital will be merged.
 3 Native General Hospitals (500 beds each).
 1 Native General Hospital (ditto).
 1 Native Military Base Depôt.
 2 Base Supply Depôts.
 1 Base Stationery Depôt.

3. (a) *Staff of the Force*—

| | |
|---|---|
| Commanding (with temporary rank of Major-General and local rank of Lieutenant-General). | Brigadier-General Sir A. Gaselee, A.D.C., K.C.B., I.S.C. |
| Aide-de-Camp... .. | Captain B. T. Pell, the Queen's (Royal West Surrey) Regiment. |
| Aide-de-Camp... .. | Lieutenant R. A. Steel, 17th Bengal Cavalry. |
| Deputy Adjutant-General (with the local rank of Major-General). | Brigadier-General E. G. Barrow, C.B., I.S.C. |
| Assistant Adjutant and Quarter-Master General. | Lieutenant-Colonel G. H. W. O'Sullivan, R.E. |
| Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quarter-Master General. | Captain I. Philipps, 5th Gurkha Rifles. |
| Marine Transport Officer | Commander F. H. Elderton, Royal Indian Marine. |

| | | |
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| | | Lieutenant S. D. Vale, Royal Indian Marine. |
| | | Lieutenant A. Rowand, Royal Indian Marine. |
| Assistant Marine Transport Officers | | Lieutenant A. A. Harold, Royal Indian Marine. |
| | | Lieutenant E. Stocken, Royal Indian Marine. |
| | | Lieutenant E. T. Headlam, Royal Indian Marine. |
| Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master General for Intelligence. | | Captain E. W. M. Norie, Middlesex Regiment. |
| Field Intelligence Officer | | Captain MacC. R. E. Ray, 7th (D.C.O.), Bengal Infantry. |
| Colonel on the Staff, Royal Artillery | | Brigadier-General H. Pipon, C.B., R.A. |
| Colonel on the Staff, Royal Engineers | | Colonel W. T. Shone, C.B., D.S.O., R.E. |
| Chief Ballooning Officer | | Major and Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel J. R. L. Macdonald, R.E. |
| Principal Medical Officer | | Colonel J. T. B. Bookey, V.H.S., I.M.S. |
| | | Lieutenant A. Rolland, R.E. |
| Superintendent, Army Signalling .. | | Captain G. C. Rigby, 1st Battalion, Wiltshire Regiment. |
| Principal Ordnance Officer | | Major A. L. M. Turner, R.A. |
| Chief Survey Officer | | Major T. F. B. Renny-Tailyour, R.E. |
| Survey Officer | | Captain C. H. D. Ryder, R.E. |
| Chief Commissariat and Transport Officer. | | Major W. J. Bond, Assistant Commissary-General. |
| Senior Veterinary Officer and Veterinary Inspector. | | Veterinary Captain E. H. Hazelton, A.V.D. |
| <i>(b) Cavalry Brigade Staff—</i> | | |
| Commanding (with local rank of Major-General). | | Colonel G. L. R. Richardson, C.B., C.I.E., I.S.C. |
| Orderly Officer | | Captain S. B. Grimston, 18th Bengal Lancers. |
| Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General | | Major F. W. P. Angelo, 9th Bengal Lancers. |
| Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master General. | | Captain V. B. Fane, 1st Punjab Cavalry. |
| Brigade Signalling Officer.. .. | | Lieutenant C. A. F. Hocken, 5th Bombay Cavalry. |

(c) 1st Infantry Brigade Staff—

| | |
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| General Officer Commanding (with local rank of Major-General). | Brigadier-General Sir Norman R. Stewart, Bart., I.S.C. |
| Orderly Officer | Major A. W. Leonard, 5th Infantry, Hyderabad Contingent. |
| Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General | Captain T. Jermyn, 2nd Sikh Infantry. |
| Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master General. | Captain H. T. Brooking, 21st Madras Pioneers. |
| Brigade Signalling Officer | Lieutenant C. R. Scott-Elliot, 4th Madras Pioneers. |

(d) 2nd Infantry Brigade Staff—

| | |
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| General Officer Commanding (with local rank of Major-General). | Brigadier-General O'M. Creagh, v.o., I.S.C. |
| Orderly Officer | Major W. A. Watson, 2nd Central India Horse. |
| Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General.. | Captain J. M. Stewart, 2-5th Gurkhas. |
| Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master General. | Captain J. A. Houison-Craufurd, 7th Bombay Infantry. |
| Brigade Signalling Officer | Captain J. Gaisford, 25th Punjab Infantry. |

(e) 3rd Infantry Brigade Staff—

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| General Officer Commanding (with local rank of Major-General). | Brigadier General A. J. F. Reid, c.B., I.S.C. |
| Orderly Officer | Captain J. S. Kemball, 29th Punjab Infantry. |
| Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General.. | Captain A. Nicholls, 2nd Punjab Infantry. |
| Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master General. | Captain H. Hudson, 19th Bengal Lancers. |
| Brigade Signalling Officer | Captain H. W. Cruddas, 38th Dogras. |

(f) 4th Infantry Brigade Staff—

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| General Officer Commanding (with local rank of Major-General). | Brigadier-General J. T. Cummins, D.S.O., I.S.C. |
| Orderly Officer | Captain C. T. Swan, 4th Madras Pioneers. |
| Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General | Captain F. C. Colomb, 42nd Gurkha Rifles. |
| Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master General. | Captain F. T. Williams. 26th Madras Infantry. |

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|---|---|
| Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General for Imperial Service Troops. | Captain H. D. Watson, 2-2nd Gurkha Rifles. |
| Brigade Signalling Officer | .. Captain W. R. Walker, 15th Madras Infantry. |
| <i>(g) Line of Communications and Base Staff—</i> | |
| Base Commandant and in charge of Line of Communications (with local rank of Major-General). | Colonel L. R. H. D. Campbell, I.S.O. |
| Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quarter-Master General, Base and Communications. | Lieutenant-Colonel J. C. Swann, 1st Bombay Grenadiers. |
| Commanding Royal Engineers (with local rank of Lieutenant-Colonel). | Major G. K. Scott-Moncrieff, R.E. |
| Principal Medical Officer, Line of Communications. | Lieutenant-Colonel H. F. P. F. Esmond-White, I.M.S. |
| Principal Medical Officer, Shanghai | Lieutenant-Colonel P. F. O'Connor, I.M.S. |
| Commandant, Native Military Base Depôt. | Major W. S. Delamain, 23rd Bombay Rifles. |
| Base Ordnance Officer | Captain M. S. C. Campbell, R.A. |
| In charge, Veterinary Store Depôt | Veterinary Lieutenant W. R. Wright, A.V.D. |

CHAPTER XXXVI.

ADVANCE OF THE ALLIES FROM TIENTSIN ; RELIEF OF THE LEGATIONS AND OCCUPATION OF PEKING.

BEFORE proceeding from Taku to Tientsin, General Gaselee and his Chief of the Staff attended a conference of the admirals and senior naval officers of the allied powers, on board H.M.S. *Barfleur*, on the forenoon of the 26th July. He immediately afterwards proceeded to Sinho, about three miles above Tang-ku, on the left bank of the river, which had been selected as the landing-place for the British troops and stores. This place was connected by a branch line with the railway from Tang-ku to Tientsin, and arrangements had been made with the Russian railway officials to run two trains, of fifteen vehicles each, daily from Sinho to Tientsin, one starting in the morning and the other in the evening. By filling the trucks three-quarters full with kit and stores and allowing the men to sit on the top, the troops were quickly transferred to Tientsin with all their baggage complete, as they arrived from the transports. The largest trucks were capable of carrying nineteen horses or twenty-four mules. Having inspected the arrangements at Sinho and given such orders as were necessary, General Gaselee proceeded to Tientsin by river, and arrived there at 8-30 A.M. on the 27th.

Since the capture of the native city on the 14th July, every-
thing in and around Tientsin had been com-
paratively quiet. The French Concession was

Affairs at Tientsin.
in ruins, but the British Concession had not suffered nearly so much, though most of the houses were more or less damaged by shell fire, and, owing to the flight of the Chinese employed in the settlements, the place was extremely insanitary. To prevent an outbreak of sickness among the troops immediate steps had to be taken to improve matters.

The all-important business now was the immediate relief of the legations in Peking, though this view was not shared by all the allies. On the 10th August the Russian Minister of War stated that the advance of the allied forces on Peking was impracticable

for two or three weeks, though four days earlier, on the 6th, effective opposition to the advance of the troops on the part of the Chinese had been finally crushed at the battle of Yang-tsun.

The latest news from Peking was more than three weeks old, and caused the gravest anxiety, as the British Minister then stated that, under favourable circumstances, he did not consider that the hard-pressed garrison could hold out more than two or three weeks. It was therefore possible that the catastrophe had already happened, and it was certain that any attempt at rescue must be made at once.

There were two other reasons for an early advance. The rainy season, which had so far held off, might at any time set in, and a few heavy storms would render the country impassable. Secondly, the Chinese forces, which, after the capture of Tientsin, had scattered in a demoralised condition, were now beginning to collect again, and a considerable body was known to be in position barring the road to the capital. They had cut the river banks with a view to flooding the low-lying country, and every day the inundations were spreading; while their defensive works were increasing in strength, and fresh reinforcements were arriving to oppose the allies.

At first the allied commanders were disinclined to agree with General Gaselee's arguments for an early advance. They considered that the march on Peking could not begin before the middle of August at the earliest. Major-General Chaffee, commanding the troops of the United States, wished to await the arrival of his artillery, which was shortly expected; while Lieut.-General Yamaguchi, commanding the Japanese troops, considered the force too small for the attempt. The allies had expected General Gaselee to arrive with a force of some 10,000 men, whereas, owing to the 2nd Brigade having been deflected to Shanghai, he had less than 4,000 available for the advance, and could expect no increase to his strength for some weeks. The Russian General Stessel appeared to be chiefly concerned with the progress of affairs in Manchuria, and consequently averse to withdrawing Russian troops from the neighbourhood of the coast.

On the 1st August Lieut.-General Liniévitch arrived in Tientsin and took over command of the Russian forces from General Stessel. He at first opposed the forward move, on the

plea that the troops then available were insufficient to make success a certainty, and that a reverse would do incalculable harm and could not be risked. He asked for two days to consider the situation, and then agreed to co-operate.

In the expectation that the British contingent would number 10,000 troops, the Japanese had arranged that their own force should consist of about 6,000 men, and had made all their plans on this basis. Their junks could only carry about nine days' supplies for this number, and their small land supply column was only capable of carrying one extra day's rations. With three days in regimental charge, this gave supplies for 6,000 men for thirteen days. Much credit is due to them, that when it was found that the British could only furnish about 3,000 men, the deficit was made up from the Japanese forces, who responded most loyally to the call, though at great inconvenience. With transport sufficient only for the requirements of 6,000 men, the Japanese undertook to advance with double that number to Peking, and to attempt to make up the deficiencies in food and transport from the country as they advanced. By capturing several junks at Yang-tsun they were able to reorganize their river transport, but the land supply column could not be increased, with the result that a great deal of extra work was thrown upon it, and in spite of daily double journeys, the troops had occasionally to go without food, picking up what they could in the villages. When Tung-chou was reached immense quantities of rice were captured in the town, and no further difficulty in feeding their troops was experienced.

At the beginning of August the northernmost outpost of the allies was in the Hsi-ku armoury, which was held by the Russians. From this point a considerable force of Chinese could be seen busily entrenching about a mile to the north, between the river and the railway, the bridges of which had been destroyed. Their principal camp was visible near the village of Pei-ts'ang, about five miles from Hsi-ku, and they seemed to be particularly active on the railway embankment, just north of the broken fifth bridge from the Tientsin railway station.

It was, however, impossible to determine the exact form or extent of their position, on account of the high crops, which com-

pletely covered the flat plain, and prevented observation, even by mounted men. The horses of the 1st Bengal Lancers had just come off board ship, and as yet were hardly fit for reconnaissance work, so were given a rest preparatory to the forward movement on Peking. Russian and Japanese patrols had been searching the country on both banks of the river, and had frequently been fired on from villages, or by riflemen concealed in the crops, without, however, being able to ascertain much of the enemy's dispositions or strength.

With a view to clearing up the situation and obtaining further information on these points, the Japanese Reconnaissance in force. undertook a reconnaissance in force on the morning of the 30th July. The Japanese force, which was accompanied by Lieutenant-General Yamaguchi and his staff, consisted of one brigade of six battalions, one battery of six 7-pr. mountain guns, firing black powder, and one squadron of cavalry. General Gaselee, Major-General Norman Stewart, commanding the 1st Brigade, and some officers of their respective staff watched the operation.

The Japanese rendezvoused at 4 A.M. at the Hung-ch'iao or Red Bridge, north of Tientsin city, and, leaving two battalions in reserve near the bridge, advanced parallel to the river, along the right bank, to the village of Ting-tzu-ku, just north of the Hsi-ku armoury. A short distance beyond this point, at about 6 A.M., they came in contact with the Chinese, who were holding a small house on the main road. From this the Japanese expelled them, and then found that the main Chinese position was in the village of Mun-chia-chuang, on the opposite bank of the river, from which a heavy fire opened.

About 7 A.M., the Japanese passed a company across the river at Ting-tzu-ku, which occupied the village of Tien-chih, but then found their further progress barred by a deep unfordable water-cut, extending east from the Pei-ho to the broken fifth bridge on the railway, the opposite bank being strongly held by the Chinese, protected by entrenchments.

It was now evidently impossible to get nearer the Chinese, and the reconnaissance resolved itself into an action in which the Japanese suffered severely, their white uniforms and close

formations rendering them conspicuous. It was accordingly decided to withdraw the troops, and the retirement began about twelve noon. The object of the reconnaissance, which was to uncover the Chinese right and ascertain if they had bodies of troops on the right bank, had only been partially successful.

The apex of their position, covered by the river and the unfordable cut mentioned above, had been disclosed, and the cavalry had penetrated some distance up the right bank, but had failed to discover the entrenched position, which the Chinese had prepared some distance further back. On the extreme left the Japanese had advanced to a powder magazine, about three miles west of the river, and had cleared out a few of the enemy, but found no other troops in that direction.

It was now quite certain that the Chinese were in strong force in the neighbourhood of Pei-ts'ang, and, at a conference of the general officers, held on the 3rd August, it was decided to drive them out of their position on the 5th August, and to advance as far as Yang-tsun, where the railway, river, and road routes to Peking converge. Pending the success of the preliminary operations the question of a further advance towards the capital was left in abeyance.

The strength of the allied force available for the march on Peking, was, in round numbers, as follows:—

| | | | | | | Men. | Guns. |
|-----------|----|----|----|----|-------|--------|-------|
| Japanese | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 10,000 | 24 |
| Russians | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 4,000 | 16 |
| British | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 3,000 | 12 |
| Americans | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 2,000 | 6 |
| French | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 800 | 12 |
| Germans | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 200 | .. |
| Austrians | | | | | | | |
| Italians | .. | . | .. | .. | .. | 100 | .. |
| | | | | | TOTAL | 20,100 | 70 |

The first objective was the Chinese position at Pei-ts'ang, which it was intended to attack on the morning of the 5th August. From native

Plan of operations.

information it had been ascertained that considerable reinforcements of troops and stores had been arriving from the direction of the Grand Canal, while the powder magazine, discovered by the Japanese on the 30th July, was now reported to be strongly held by the enemy, and connected with Pei-ts'ang by a line of entrenchments.

The plan agreed upon was that the Japanese, British, and United States troops should operate on the right bank of the Pei-ho, so as to turn the Chinese right flank, while the remainder of the allies threatened their left on the left bank of the river. It was further agreed with the Japanese and American generals that the attack on the right bank should take the form of a turning movement from the embankment, which runs from Hsi-ku village towards the powder magazine, the Japanese leading, with the British and Americans following in succession.

The British force, composed of the troops named in the margin, moved out of the settlement on the afternoon of the 4th, and bivou-

| | | |
|------------------------|-----------|-------------|
| 4 guns Naval Brigade. | | |
| 12th Battery, R. F. A. | | |
| Hong Kong | 2 guns. | |
| Artillery | 4 Maxims. | |
| Detachment, R. E. | | |
| R. M. L. I. | .. | .. 300 Men. |
| R. Welsh Fusiliers | .. | .. 300 " |
| 1st Bengal Lancers | .. | .. 400 " |
| 7th Bengal Infantry | .. | .. 500 " |
| 24th Punjab Infantry | .. | .. 300 " |
| 1st Sikhs | .. | .. 500 " |
| Hong Kong Regiment | .. | .. 100 " |
| Chinese Regiment | .. | .. 100 " |

acked to the south of the embankment, a short distance west of Hsi-ku village. The British were followed by the Americans, who bivouacked on their right rear in the direction of the armoury. During the night the Japanese marched past the British bivouac, and moved straight to their assigned

position on the extreme left, so as to be in readiness to attack the powder magazine before dawn.

Before describing the forward march of the relieving force on

Climatic conditions.

Peking, it is necessary, for the proper appreciation of the operations, to refer to the abnormal climatic conditions of the year 1900. Both it and the previous year had been exceedingly dry—in fact, years of famine in which the rains had failed; and it was greatly due to this circumstance that the rapid advance was possible. Had the ordinary

conditions prevailed, it is impossible to say to what extent the progress of the column would have been affected, but it is quite certain that the difficulties of the allies would have been infinitely greater than they were.

It is of interest to notice that the year 1860 was also a dry year.

In an average year the rains in July and August are very heavy, especially in the hills to the north and west of the Chih-li plain, and the water, pouring into the rivers from countless tributaries, causes them to overflow their banks and inundate the whole of the flat country between Peking and the coast. The Hun-ho, in particular, discharges a flood of water through its left bank, which transforms the country south of the Hunting Park, as far east as Ma-tou and Ho-hsi-wu, into a vast swamp, out of which the railway, the village, and the embankments alone stand high and dry.

The country east of the Pei-ho is in a similar condition in time of flood. The surplus water is carried off in the direction of the Pei-tang-ho by canals, and these, overflowing their banks, also inundate large tracts. All communication, except by boat or along the few raised roads and the railway, becomes impossible, for, even where the water is shallow, the low-lying unmetalled roads are quickly churned into deep mud, and become unfit for traffic. Under these conditions the only line of advance for the relieving force would have been by boats on the river, and along the narrow raised roads on its banks, which, however, were out of repair and breached in several places, and much time would have been lost in making them passable. The advantages to the Chinese in opposing an advance on such a narrow front are too obvious to require comment. The railway had been destroyed, and its sixty-five bridges between Tientsin and Peking had been broken, so it could have been of little use as an alternative line.

By great good fortune the actual conditions were entirely different. The country, with the exception of a small tract on the left bank of the Pei-ho noted below, was not inundated; the actions of Pei-tsang and Yang-tsun were fought over ground which, in an ordinary year, would have been covered with water; the columns throughout the advance marched on a broad front and the transport moved freely by the cross-country roads, seldom using the embankments.

The Chinese were fully alive to the advantages which a flooded country would have conferred upon them, and made one attempt to flood the country by cutting the river bank in front of the Pei-ts'ang position, as has been already mentioned. The water from this cut spread out to the east of the railway into a very extensive inundation, which effectually checked the progress of the Russian and French infantry on the 5th August, and prevented them from taking any part in the battle of Pei-ts'ang. It also afforded an idea of what the difficulties would have been if the whole country had been under water.

Surprise was expressed that the Chinese had not tried flooding the country on a large scale, but there were at least two reasons why this was not done. The Chinese themselves were largely dependent on boat transport for carrying their supplies, and the drawing off of the water to any great extent would have rendered the river unnavigable. Secondly, though the military might wish to flood the country the peasants objected to it, on account of the damage to their crops, and, in the absence of a commander strong enough to enforce his orders, they would probably have prevented its being done.


After their defeat at Yang-tsun the flight of the Chinese was so disorganized, and the advance of the allies in pursuit so rapid, that it prevented any further attempt to cut the river banks, though something of the sort was undoubtedly contemplated at Ho-hsi-wu.

To return to the battle of Pei-ts'ang. By 1 A.M. on the 5th August the Japanese troops had assembled at their rendezvous, and the right wing, consisting of the 41st regiment of infantry, two batteries of artillery, and a squadron of cavalry, moved forward on the villages of Ting-tzu-ku and Tang-chia-wan.


About 1-30 A.M., the left wing, consisting of the 21st brigade of infantry, four batteries of artillery, and the rest of the 5th Cavalry Regiment, with a company of Engineers, began to advance along the embankment towards the powder magazine, and came in contact with the Chinese about 2 A.M. The enemy were very strongly entrenched, and supported by artillery fire, and so stubborn was their defence that the powder magazine was not captured until about 4-30 A.M. The Japanese fought chiefly with the bayonet, and the losses were heavy on both sides.

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SKETCH OF ACTION
AT
PEI-TS'ANG,
5th August 1900.



- REFERENCE
- British —————→
 - Americans→
 - Japanese→
 - Chinese [wavy]→



In the meantime a battalion of Japanese infantry had worked round the west of the magazine and captured Kan-chia-ju after a sharp fight. Liu-chia-pei, about a mile west of the magazine, was also occupied and held by a battalion, to protect the left flank from attack from the west and south, while the Japanese and British cavalry watched the country to the north-west.

About 4 A.M. dawn began to break, and soon afterwards the two batteries of the Japanese right wing came into action on the embankment and opened fire on Tang-chia-wan. The Chinese, however, had got the range of the embankment accurately, and several casualties occurred from their shell and rifle fire.

About the same time the infantry of the Japanese right wing became engaged with the enemy, who were entrenched in a wood to the south-west of Tang-chia-wan, where sharp fighting had occurred in the reconraissance of the 30th July. The fighting was very fierce, but the Japanese gradually gained ground, and by about 5-30 A.M. had occupied both Tang-chia-wan and Hsin-chuang, a village lying a little further to the north.

Meanwhile the British troops were moving north between the two wings of the Japanese; and the Americans, further to the east, were supporting the Japanese in Tang-chia-wan along the main road. The British naval guns were also bombarding the enemy's position from a point on the right bank of the Pei-ho, just north of the Hsi-ku armoury, but, as it was extremely difficult to follow the movements of the troops in the high crops, their fire was confined to the Chinese entrenchments along the railway embankment, and in the neighbourhood of Pei-ts'ang. The French and Russian batteries also shelled the enemy from the left bank.

About 5 A.M., the batteries of the Japanese left wing came into action against Ma-chang from a point about half a mile north of the magazine, and soon afterwards the Japanese artillery of the right wing and the British field battery joined in from the west of Tang-chia-wan.

The Chinese now fell back to their second entrenched position, which ran west from the river bank, to the south of Pei-ts'ang, in the direction of Kan-chia-ju, but from this they were soon expelled, and Wang-chuang was captured by the Japanese about 8-30 A.M., the enemy falling back on Pei-ts'ang, while many fled to the north

up the right bank. About 10-30 A.M. the boat bridge at Pei-ts'ang was captured, and the Chinese, finding their right flank turned, began to withdraw towards Yang-tsun by the left bank, between the river and the railway, being shelled in their retirement by the 12th Battery R.F.A. with some effect.

As it was impossible to transport the guns and troops rapidly across the boat bridge, an attempt was made to advance on Yang-tsun by the right bank, but after proceeding about half a mile a deep swamp was met with, stretching far to the west, in which the horses sank to their girths. Farther on, to the north of the village of Niu-chuang, was a deep unfordable stream, and, as advance in this direction was proved to be impossible until the road had been repaired, the attempt was abandoned, and it was decided to halt at Pei-ts'ang for the night, outposts being thrown out to the north. The heat had been intense and the troops had been on the move for about twelve hours.

On the left bank the Russians and French had been stopped by the inundations and had taken no part in the fighting.

During the day the Japanese casualties amounted to over 300 killed and wounded. The British lost 26
 Losses. killed and wounded, while the other allies reported no casualties. It was impossible to estimate the Chinese losses accurately, but they left over 300 dead on the field, and it was reported by spies that more than 500 wounded had been removed up-stream in junks. As a result of their defeat large numbers deserted, and the "yings," or camps, were reported to have dwindled from 500 to about 200 men each.

As will be seen from the above account the Japanese monopolised all the fighting, and carried the enemy's positions in succession with the greatest gallantry. It was, however, almost impossible to get a very clear idea of the various phases of the fight, as the high crops and the morning mist greatly restricted the view in every direction.

The march on Yang-tsun was resumed at 6 A.M. on the 6th
 Advance on Yang-tsun. August. The main body of the Japanese advanced by the right bank of the river, while the rest of the allies and a detachment of Japanese marched on the left bank. The British were the last to start, but owing

to the somewhat slow progress of the Russians and the French, and to taking a shorter route, they soon passed the two last-named, and the order of march arranged itself into the British on the left next the river, with the Americans on the right between them and the railway, while the Japanese detachment was still farther to the east beyond the railway. The Russians and French were some distance in rear of the British.

At about 10 A.M. the head of the column reached the village of Hsin-chuang, about three miles south of the railway bridge over the Pei-ho, near Yang-tsun, and from two small sandhills, immediately to the north of the village, an excellent view of the enemy's position was obtained. It stretched along the high railway embankment, with its right resting on the village of Chu-chuang, south-east of the big railway bridge, while the extreme left was in some villages considerably to the east of the railway line. It was afterwards found that they had also constructed lines of entrenchments on the low ground in front of the embankment, but these could not at first be seen on account of the crops.

Before the action, a body of Cossacks came in contact with the Chinese near Chu-chuang, and drew a heavy fire. They were dismounted in a dry water course near the village, and there they remained, unwilling to advance or retire, until the position was captured.

The attack was begun by the British and Americans about 11 A.M., without waiting for the Russians and French, who had not yet arrived.

The British extended to the right of the road leading straight from the sandhills to Chu-chuang, with the Americans on their right towards the railway embankment. The left of the road was intended for the Russians and French, who, however, never came into line. The British cavalry moved out to the right flank, as did the American artillery, which came into action to the east of the railway. The British and Russian guns occupied positions on the left flank, the latter echeloned in rear of the former.

The British advance was in widely extended lines of skirmishers, the 1st Sikhs leading, supported by the Royal Welsh Fusiliers and the 24th Punjab Infantry, and it was noticeable how quickly

the khaki uniforms blended with the crops and became difficult to distinguish. The blue shirts of the Americans, who kept in much closer formation, and often in groups, were, on the other hand, very conspicuous, and this fact no doubt accounted for their numerous casualties, as, though the British carried the position, their casualties in killed and wounded only amounted to about half those among the United States troops.

About 2,000 yards from the enemy's entrenchments the troops came under a very heavy shell and rifle fire, but the attack was pressed steadily forward, and the position was carried without a check. The Chinese, who were well covered by their earthworks, had probably not suffered very heavily, and effected their retreat on the town of Yang-tsun, which lay about a mile and a half further to the north. This place was afterwards found to be very strongly entrenched, but the enemy made no attempt to hold it. The bulk of their forces crossed by two boat bridges to the right bank of the river and retired, utterly demoralised, towards Peking, while a considerable number fled north along the left bank. They managed to withdraw most of their guns, which had been kept well retired and out of reach of the advancing allies.

During the attack the rifle fire of the Chinese, though heavy, had been wild, but their guns had got the range accurately, and dropped their shells right among the advancing infantry, without, however, inflicting much loss.

The British casualties amounted to six men killed ; one died of sunstroke ; Lieutenant Costello, 1st Sikhs, and 37 men were wounded. The Americans had about 80 casualties, including many cases of sunstroke.

The British and American troops halted at the railway. The heat was intense, and the troops suffered much in consequence,

The Russians arrived at the embankment near the railway bridge about an hour later, and shortly afterwards moved forward towards the town, and took up their quarters to the north of it. The French remained with the British and Americans on the river bank near the railway bridge.

In the meantime the Japanese on the extreme right, who, owing to their position, had taken no part in the assault, marched straight on to Yang-tsun, and occupied the town at about 2-30 P.M.

without meeting with any opposition. Their main body, in its advance along the right bank of the river, had been delayed by having to construct bridges over the streams and cuts in the road, and did not reach Yang-tsun till about 6 P.M.

The railway all the way from Tientsin had been wrecked; the rails, sleepers, fish-plates, etc., had all been torn up and removed. The railway station was a total ruin, but the large girder bridge over the Pei-ho had suffered little damage, the girders at the shore end, on the right bank, only having been slightly displaced. Had the Chinese succeeded in destroying the bridge, the girders, lying in the stream below, would have rendered the onward progress of the junks carrying our supplies almost impossible.

On the 7th August the whole force halted for the day at Yang-tsun. The Japanese sent forward a covering party of one regiment of infantry, a squadron of cavalry, two batteries of artillery, and a company of engineers up the right bank of the river to Nan-tsai-tsun, which they occupied after a skirmish with the enemy.

A conference of the allied generals was held during the day, and it was decided that, as the resistance of the Chinese had apparently been broken, the advance on Peking should at once be vigorously pushed on, without giving the enemy time to recover. They were now thoroughly demoralised, and said to be suffering greatly from the heat. Yu-lu, the Viceroy of Chih-li province, was said to have committed suicide the previous day, after witnessing the defeat of his troops, though another report stated that he had been killed by a fragment of one of our shells.

It was further arranged at the conference that in the onward march the troops would move in the following order: Japanese, Russians, Americans, British. The French, having no transport, were to remain for the present and garrison Yang-tsun, being supported by detachments of 150 men each from the British, Japanese, and American forces. The Japanese and Russians were to take it in turns to supply one battalion as a right flank guard on the left bank of the Pei-ho, and the British, Russian, and Japanese cavalry were to act together in covering the front of the whole force, under the orders of the commander of the Japanese cavalry.

It had been found that the water in the wells, contrary to expectation, was excellent, cold and clear, while that from the Pei-ho was full of sand and mud, and took a long time to settle. The troops generally used well-water throughout the advance and no ill-effects were experienced.

On the 7th the water in the Pei-ho had suddenly fallen about 18 inches. This had delayed the arrival of the junks carrying the Russian supplies, and in consequence they were not ready to start next morning.

At 4 A.M. on the 8th the Japanese moved off, followed by the Americans. The British marched at 7 A.M., and reached their bivouac on the bank of the river at Nan-tsai-tsun about 11 A.M. The heat was intense, and marching through the high crops exceedingly trying. The Japanese occupied the villages, as they continued to do throughout the march on the capital, and the Americans bivouacked alongside the British. Most of the junks came up in the course of the day, and the Russians arrived in the evening.

In the afternoon a native Christian arrived in the Japanese camp with letters from the legations in Peking, which stated that the Europeans there were still holding out successfully, and had provisions up to the 16th. He also brought a cypher message to General Gaselee from Sir Claude MacDonald, recommending him to attack Peking from the south and to endeavour to effect an entrance into the Tartar City by the sluice gate under the wall, to the south of the Legation Quarter.

On the 9th the advance was continued to Ho-hsi-wu, the British marching again at 7 A.M. in rear of the other contingents. The distance is only eleven miles, but the march was an extremely trying one on account of the intense heat and stifling dust. The progress was also very slow from continual checks in front. Many of the Americans were prostrated by the heat, owing, it was thought, to their head-dress not being sufficient protection from the powerful sun, but even the natives of India suffered considerably.

The Japanese were again in front, and on nearing Ho-hsi-wu found the place occupied by the enemy. The Chinese were quickly driven out and pursued as far as Ma-tou, the troops occupying Mu-chang for the

News from the legations.

March to Ho-hsi-wu.

night. Near Ho-hsi-wu a squadron of the 1st Bengal Lancers came in contact with a force of about 300 Chinese cavalry. Owing to the high crops, cavalry action was difficult, but about forty Chinese were killed, our own troops having only two men wounded.

The British column did not reach Ho-hsi-wu till late in the afternoon, and bivouacked on the right bank of the river, just south of the village. After their experience on the 9th it was decided that the infantry should not march the following day until the evening. The cavalry and artillery, however, went on at 10-30 A.M., but, taking the wrong road, got into deep sand and lost several horses from exhaustion.

During the 10th, most of the junks arrived and the sappers were busy constructing a post, as it had been decided to leave a guard at this point. About 4-30 P.M. the infantry started, but it was still so hot that a long halt was made after the first mile.

Two companies of French troops, with a battery of light guns, had rejoined the force at Ho-hsi-wu, in order to participate in the entry into Peking.

Ma-tou was reached about 2-30 A.M. on the 11th. Later in the morning the Japanese advanced to Chang-chia-wan, followed by the Russians. On nearing that place their advance guard was fired on by the Chinese, and after a smart fight, which lasted about an hour, the enemy were driven out of their position, leaving about forty dead on the field. The Japanese then pressed forward and were again fired at from the village of Kao-chia-chuang, which they captured after a slight resistance, and advanced to another village about a mile further on, when they found themselves within 3,000 yards of the walled city of Tung-chou. Chinese troops were visible on and in front of the walls, and a Japanese battery came into action and shelled the town for a short time, without drawing any reply.

The British marched at 5-30 P.M., preceded by the Americans. The march was an easy one and Chang-chai-wan was reached before midnight. The place is low-lying and marshy and the water supply was bad.

On the morning of the 12th August the Japanese moved forward in the early morning, on the south-east and south-west gates of Tung-chou, and blew them in; but, on entering, it was found that the whole of the Chinese troops had retired towards Peking during the night.

Tung-chou occupied.

The Japanese occupied the town. The British took up their quarters on the river bank to the south-east, where is the landing-place for the junks. The Russians and Americans bivouacked near the south-west gate.

In the afternoon a conference of the British, American, Russian, and Japanese generals was held, at which it was decided that the troops should halt at Tung-chou on the 13th, while reconnaissances were made to examine the country towards Peking. On the 14th the combined force was to move forward to a position outside the walls of Peking, ready to assault the city on the morning of the 15th August. The British, American, and Japanese generals were anxious to attack on the 14th, but, in deference to the wishes of General Liniévitch, who expressed his inability to move earlier, the attack was postponed to the 15th.

The forward movement on the city was to be made in the following order. The Japanese to march along the paved road from Tung-chou towards the Chih-ho mên, or eastern gate of the

Arrangements for the attack on Peking.

Tartar City; the Russians by roads north of the Japanese on the Tung-chih mên, or north gate, on the eastern side of the Tartar City; the Americans by the road along the south bank of the canal from Tung-chou to Peking, on the Tung-pien-mên, or north-east gate of the Chinese City; and the British by roads further to the south on the left of the Americans, on the Sha-huo mên, or east gate of the Chinese City.

Reconnoitring parties moved forward on the morning of the 13th. The British detachment, consisting of the 1st Bengal Lancers, and 7th Rajputs, advanced to the village of Pan-pu-tien-erh, about three miles from the Sha-huo mên, and occupied a walled enclosure round a temple. The Americans were near the British on their right, and the Japanese were at Ting-fu village on the paved road. Their cavalry reconnoitred towards Peking, where they reported that there was little sign of activity on the walls.

During the night of the 13th-14th heavy firing was heard in the direction of Peking, and this was supposed to be an attack by the Chinese, either on some of the allied outposts, or upon the legations.

It was subsequently discovered that the Russians had passed the Japanese in the darkness, and had attacked the Tung-pien mên, the gate allotted to the Americans. They apparently succeeded in getting on to the wall of the Chinese City, in the neighbourhood of the gate, without any opposition, but had failed in their further advance along the foot of the south wall of the Tartar City, and, meeting with a heavy fire from the Tartar wall, had had to retire and seek shelter in the suburbs.

The British troops at Tung-chou, hearing the heavy firing in front, fell in about 2 A.M. and marched towards Peking. Soon after 6 A.M. the Japanese advanced troops, at the urgent appeal of the Russians for support, attacked the Chih-ho mên, near which place their main body arrived about 9 A.M., and, as the gate was very strongly held, the Japanese commander decided to bombard it and the Tung-chih mên, before attempting to storm them. Accordingly fifty-four guns were brought up into position, and opened fire on the two gates and the wall between them.

About 2 P.M. another attempt was made to blow in the Chih-ho mên, but the party was driven back, and it was then decided to wait till dusk before making any further attempt, when a simultaneous assault was to be made on both the Tung-chih mên and Chih-ho mên. With this object in view the 21st Infantry Regiment and a company of Engineers moved off from the rendezvous of the Japanese main body, to the east of Chih-ho mên, and marched towards the Tung-chih mên.

While these events were happening on the right, the British cavalry had left their bivouac in the early morning and reconnoitred towards the Sha-huo mên, but were stopped by rifle fire from the crops. They then moved to their right and got in touch with the Americans on the canal.


About 7 A.M. the main body of the United States troops began to come up, and about 8 A.M. the British, who had had furthest to march, also arrived. After a rest the American and British columns moved slowly forward towards their respective gates, meeting with little opposition. On arrival at the Tung-pien

mên about 12-30 P.M., the Americans found the Russian column taking cover in the houses outside the city. Bringing up their artillery they soon succeeded in breaking in the gate and entered the Chinese City, about the same time as the British arrived at the Sha-huo mên. The latter gate, being found practically undefended, was quickly broken open and the troops streamed into the town.

The British column marched steadily west, meeting with very little opposition, until it arrived at the cross roads about half a mile south of the Ha-ta mên of the Tartar City, where a short halt was made to enable the straggling and exhausted column to close up. A good deal of firing could be heard in the north-east corner of the Chinese City, where the Americans were evidently engaged. The 1st Bengal Lancers and 24th Punjab Infantry were now ordered to march straight to the Temple of Heaven, in the surrounding parks of which General Gaselee intended to quarter the bulk of the British troops. At the same time a portion of the 7th Bengal Infantry was detached towards the Ha-ta mên, to cover the right flank of the column in its advance, and to get in touch, if possible, with the Americans. The remainder of the troops continued their advance westwards towards the middle of the Chinese City.

Through the Legation Quarter runs a broad water channel, which in time of heavy rain carries off the surplus water from the Tartar City, through an opening in the Tartar City wall called the sluice gate. It was known from Sir Claude MacDonald's cypher message that the portion of the city wall, on both sides of the sluice gate, was in possession of the legation troops at the time when the message was despatched, and it was expected that if they were still holding out, a comparatively easy entrance could be effected into the legations through this gate. Great anxiety was, however, felt as to the fate of the defenders, for it was now guessed that much of the heavy firing heard during the previous night must have been directed against the legations, presumably in a last attempt by the Chinese to overwhelm them before help arrived. Of the result of this attack nothing was known.

On reaching a point about due south of the sluice gate, General Gaselee, with some of his staff officers and about seventy men of the 1st Sikhs and 7th Bengal Infantry, turned north and marched through



RELIEF OF THE LEGATIONS
14th August 1900.

- REFERENCES**
- British —————→
 - Americans - - - - -→
 - Russians + + + + +→
 - Japanese→

I. B. Topo. Dy. No 8,076
Rtd. C. J. A. June 1909.

Scale 3 inches = 1 mile.
500 1000 1500 2000 2500 Yards

No. 4.877-I., 1909.

the narrow lanes, until the edge of the moat outside the Tartar City wall was reached. From this point the British, American, and Russian flags could be seen floating on the wall about 200 yards to the west. A signalman then appeared near the foot of the American flag, and sent the message "Come up Sluice Street by the water," and on moving towards him the troops soon caught sight of the arch of the sluice gate, under the part of the wall on which he was standing.

Doubling across the moat, under an ill-aimed fusillade, the party was soon under cover in the sluice ditch.

Relief of the Legations.

Further progress was barred by two strong gratings of upright timbers, but a few of the bars were quickly displaced, and about 2-40 P.M. the first of the relieving force found themselves passing through the British and Russian legations amid cheering crowds of European and Chinese refugees.

Preparations were at once made to drive off the Chinese, who still kept up a heavy fire on the legations. A party of the 1st Sikhs escort, moved out through the defences on the western face of the British Legation, to drive the enemy out of the houses on that side, while the detachment of the 7th Bengal Infantry, which had also entered the Tartar City by the sluice gate, relieved the legation troops on duty on the defences.

Meanwhile the main column, consisting of the 12th Battery, R.F.A., the Maxim detachments, the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, and the 1st Sikhs, had continued its advance on the Ch'ien mên, or great central gate in the south wall of the Tartar City. This they were preparing to assault when a small body of American marines, belonging to the legation Guard, advanced along the wall and seized the main guard-house over the gate. At the same time our troops got in by the gate below, and two of the Maxims came into action. The Chinese made a plucky charge, but were repulsed and driven out of the houses between the Ch'ien mên and the Legation Quarter, suffering heavily in their retirement. Eventually two guns of the 12th Battery, R.F.A., and the 1st Sikhs marched into the British Legation and the rest of the main column retired to the Temple of Heaven, where they took up their quarters for the night.

On nearing the Temple of Heaven it was seen that the Yung-ting mên, or southern gate of the Chinese City, was still held by the

enemy's troops. These were promptly driven out with considerable loss, and the gate was seized and occupied by a British detachment.

About 4-30 P.M. General Chaffee arrived at the legations by the sluice gate, and the Ch'ien mên was occupied by the United States troops. The Russian detachments, found by the Americans at the Tung-pien mên, entered the Chinese City with them, and, moving west, followed the British troops into the Tartar City by the Ch'ien mên. The main body of the Russians also entered the Chinese City by the Tung-pien mên, and General Liniévitch arrived at the legations about 6 P.M. by the sluice gate. The troops with him moved east to the Ha-ta mên, and opened it for the entrance of their main body, who afterwards occupied the south-east quarter of the Tartar City. Major-General Fukushima with a battalion of Japanese infantry also reached the Japanese Legation in the evening by the same route.

The Japanese, however, had not abandoned their attack on the eastern gates of the Tartar City, and about 9 P.M., the outer gate of the Tung-chih mên was blown in, and very shortly afterwards the inner gate was also destroyed. The infantry at once occupied the wall and guard-houses, and advanced towards the Chih-ho mên, while a detachment moved north towards the An-ting mên.

In the meantime the outer gate of the Chih-ho mên had also been assaulted and blown in about 9-40 P.M., and ten minutes later the inner gate was similarly entered, and the infantry stormed the wall and advanced along it north and south, two battalions eventually marching along the wall to the Legation Quarter.

These various assaults had entailed heavy fighting, and the Japanese casualties throughout the day amounted to one officer and thirty-three men killed and seven officers and 123 men wounded. The Russians lost fairly heavily in their unsuccessful attack on the Tung-pien mên, but the remainder of the Allies had very few casualties. The British casualties amounted to one man died, three wounded, one missing.

It was impossible to get any reliable information at this time about the disposition of the Chinese forces, but it was generally supposed that the Court and high officials had left Peking some

time before, on receiving news of the advance of the relieving columns. As a matter of fact the Emperor and Empress Dowager were still in the Forbidden City, and did not leave till the morning of the 15th August, but this was not known till some days later. No doubt the defeat of the Chinese troops had been kept secret, and their Majesties imagined themselves perfectly safe within the massive walls of the capital, which, had they been defended by resolute troops, might have set the small force of the allies at defiance, unprovided as it was with heavy guns.

On the 15th the allies were busily engaged in clearing the city of Chinese troops, who still occupied many parts of it in considerable force. The British cleared the houses near the legations and also a large part of the Chinese city. The engineers blew a hole in the wall of the Imperial City, to the north of the British legation, just west of the sluice channel, and the south-east part of the Imperial City was cleared and occupied by the Royal Welsh Fusiliers. This hole was afterwards enlarged into a gateway to admit carts, and was known as "The hole in the wall"; and eventually General Gaselee established his head-quarters in this part of the town.

The 42nd Regiment of Japanese Infantry advanced early in the morning west from the Chih-ho mên, and broke in the Tung-an mên, or eastern gate of the Imperial City, meeting with considerable opposition from a large body of Chinese troops. The 21st Regiment had also succeeded in capturing the Ti-an mên, or north gate of the Imperial City, and had inflicted heavy loss on the Chinese. They had further cleared the whole of the north-east part of the Tartar City, and before evening had seized the An-ting mên and Te-sheng mên, the two great gates in the north city wall. Their casualties during the day were seventeen killed and eighty-eight wounded.

The Americans captured the great gates leading north from the Ch'ien mên to the Forbidden City. These had to be assaulted in succession and, as they were stubbornly defended, the attacking troops had several of their number killed and wounded.

The Russians cleared the south-east part of the Tartar City.

The French had bivouacked on the canal for the night, and did not enter Peking till the morning of the 15th, when they bombarded the Forbidden City from the wall near the sluice gate.

On the morning of the 15th, a conference of the general officers was held, and preliminary dispositions were arranged for the occupation of the city by the allied troops; and for the relief of the Pei-t'ang Cathedral, which was still being besieged by the Chinese.

On the morning of the 16th a column, under the command of Major-General Frey, commanding the French troops, started to relieve the Pei-t'ang. It was composed of the French troops,

reinforced by detachments, of about 400 men each, from the British and Russian con-

tingents, while the Japanese co-operated from the north, moving round from that side of the Imperial City. Leaving the Ch'ien mên, the southern column marched west against the Shün-chih mên, or western gate, in the south wall of the Tartar City, which was still occupied by Chinese troops. The gate was bombarded by a 12-pr. of the Hong-Kong Artillery, posted on the Ch'ien mên, and by the French guns at close quarters, whereupon the garrison at once fled. The gate was then occupied by the French, and was afterwards held by a guard of British troops.

The column next turned north and marched up the main road from the Shun-chih mên till it arrived opposite the Hsi-an mên, or west gate of the Imperial City. This gate had already been forced by the Japanese, who were engaged with the enemy occupying two strong barricades constructed across the road facing the gate, and also the houses on each side of the road. After some sharp fighting the barricades were captured, and the enemy were driven out of the houses, many of which were set on fire. The relief of the Pei-t'ang, which lies inside the Imperial City to the north-east of and close to the Hsi-an mên, was thus effected.

The troops continued to fight their way east till they arrived at the marble bridge across the imperial lakes. Crossing this they occupied the Empress Dowager's temple at the east end, and then moved north and east to the Mei-shan or Coal Hill. The Japanese seized the Hsi-hua mên, or western gate of the Forbidden City, of which they now guarded the north, east, and west gates, while the United States troops held the south gate, but it was decided that for the present no one was to be allowed inside.

After a short rest, a force of French and British troops cleared all the Chinese out of the houses to the east and north-east of the Pei-t'ang, and then returned to the Coal Hill, where the various detachments bivouacked for the night. The French occupied the Hall of Ancestors to the north of Coal Hill, and here General Frey established his head-quarters. The Russians occupied the Winter Palace.

In the fighting the Japanese had one man killed and seven wounded. The French had four men killed and two officers and three men wounded. The British had no casualties, as they formed the reserve, and had taken no active part in the attack on the Hsi-an mên. The Chinese lost very heavily.

To return to the Pei-t'ang. The small garrison had made a gallant defence. It originally consisted of thirty-five French marines, eleven Italian marines, the Roman Catholic priests, and a few native converts, for whom, however, very few rifles were available. Yet this small force had held a perimeter over half-a-mile in length, and had successfully repulsed all the attacks of the Chinese. It had withstood an even longer and fiercer siege than the legations, had been subject to a heavier shell fire, and had been responsible for the safety of about 2,500 nuns and native converts, most of the latter being women and children. Nearly all the brave defenders had been wounded, and several killed, and, with the necessity of defending so long a line, it was inconceivable that the place could have held out. Only the cowardice of the attackers, who could not screw up their courage to rush some point of the defence, had saved the garrison from destruction.

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CHAPTER XXXVII.

PROGRESS OF EVENTS SUBSEQUENT TO THE OCCUPATION OF PEKING.

THE final expulsion of the Chinese troops and Boxers from Peking, as described in Chapter XXXVI, completed the occupation of the capital, and the allied troops began to settle down in their new quarters.

On the morning of the 16th August a convoy was despatched to Tung-chou to bring up rations.

Looting was general throughout the city. General Gaselee had from the first given strict orders against the confiscation of property, but as almost all civilians, both European and Chinese, and also the troops of most of the allied powers, were busily engaged in appropriating large quantities of valuables of all sorts, it was only natural that our own men were greatly disappointed at being debarred from annexing a share. It was evident that their not being allowed to participate would in no way enable the original owners to retain their property, as it would certainly be confiscated by others and merely go to swell their hoards. Most of the houses of the well-to-do in Peking were lying open, with their contents at the mercy of the first comer, their owners having fled, either during the disturbed times of the siege or on the arrival of the relieving troops. General Gaselee accordingly issued an order which, while forbidding promiscuous looting by individuals, allowed the collection of booty by organized parties, from the houses of Chinese known to be hostile to foreigners or connected with the Boxers. These parties were to be under the charge of officers, and all confiscated property was to be deposited in a large building in the Imperial Carriage Park, under the charge of a military guard. The accumulated loot was afterwards sold by auction, the money realised forming a prize fund, for distribution among all the British troops who took part in the relief of the legations.

Soon after the capture of Peking, the city was divided into districts, which were allotted to the various nations for control and

administration, and the troops of any one Power were debarred from going into the parts of the city told off to the charge of another nation, but certain main roads, leading to all parts of the city, were reserved for general use. Steps were also taken to reassure the peaceful Chinese inhabitants and to protect their property.

The rain, which had fortunately held off during the advance of the relieving force from Tientsin, had fallen in considerable quantities during the last few days, and rendered the forwarding of stores from the junks at Tung-chou a matter of great difficulty on account of the state of the roads.

The telegraph line was brought into Peking on the 17th August. The entire line between Peking and Tientsin had been totally destroyed during the anti-foreign insurrection, and therefore a new line had to be constructed. Unfortunately only materials for repair had been sent from India, and the personnel had been calculated on the same basis. An arrangement had therefore to be made with the American Signal Corps, which also was numerically weak, to erect a combined Anglo-American line, and in spite of deficiency of materials, an office was open in the British Legation only three days after the relieving force marched in.

One of the first measures to be undertaken was the reconstruction of the railway from Tientsin to Peking, so as to ensure the troops being properly supplied with necessaries of all kinds, in the event of their having to remain in the capital during the winter. The Russians put forward a claim to the entire control of the railway, but this was opposed by General Gaselee, and the question remained in abeyance.

On the 19th a combined force of British, Americans, Austrians, and Japanese, about 1,000 strong, moved out of Tientsin, under command of Brigadier-General Dorward, and attacked a strong force of Boxers, who had occupied some villages about eight miles to the south-west of the settlements. The enemy were successfully dispersed with the loss of 300 killed and 60 prisoners. The allies had eleven men wounded.

On the morning of the 22nd, contrary to agreement, the Summer Palace was occupied by the Russians, to the exclusion of the other allies, and they remained in possession for about two months. This

Palace, called the Wan-shou-shan had been built by the Empress-Dowager to replace the Yuan-ming-yuan, destroyed by the allies in 1860. It had been finished only a few years before 1900, and in it were collected most of the priceless treasures which her Imperial Majesty had brought together from all parts of the empire, during the preceding forty years.

The same day the 5th Regiment of United States Infantry, with two batteries of American artillery, reached Tientsin, and the following day the 16th Bengal Lancers began to arrive.

While these events were happening the administration of the city was being organized, and there were constant reconnaissances with occasional skirmishes, outside the walls.

On the 25th August the Russians occupied Ma-chia-pu, the terminus of the Tientsin line, which lies about one and a half miles to the south-west of the Yung-ting mên, and close to the north-west cover of the Hunting Park. The British had placed a small detachment there a week before, but it had been withdrawn, owing to a baseless rumour that a large Boxer force was advancing against the place from the south, and it had since remained unoccupied.

The same day a conference of the military commanders was held, and, after much discussion, it was decided that detachments of the allied troops should make a triumphal march through the Forbidden City on the 28th August, the order of march being arranged in accordance with the declared strength of the respective contingents. The Russians were to lead with 800 men, followed in order by the Japanese 800, British 400, Americans 400, French 400, Germans 200, Austrians and Italians.

On the evening of the 27th the great guard-house above the Triumphal march through the Forbidden City. Ch'ien mên accidentally caught fire and was burnt down. The incident was looked upon as a most unlucky omen by the Chinese, as the Ch'ien mên is the principal gate of the Tartar City, and faces the Imperial Palaces in the Forbidden City.

The building was still burning when the contingents of the allied forces paraded in front of the south gate of the Imperial City, for the march through the Forbidden City. Lieutenant-General Liniévitch arrogated to himself the chief position in the ceremonial. Behind him and his staff came the ministers of the

various powers, and then the detachments of Russian, Japanese, British, American, French, German, Austrian, and Italian troops, in the order named. As the head of the column started, the 12th battery, Royal Field Artillery, fired a general salute.

Crossing the next courtyard and passing through another large gate, the troops entered the great court, at the north end of which stands the southern and principal gate of the Forbidden City, through which no foreigner had ever previously passed. The column marched with bands playing, through the gate, and over an artificial moat, spanned by five marble bridges, and across great courts, till it reached the foot of the high marble terrace, which forms the central and highest part of the Forbidden City. After the march through the City the troops returned to quarters.

On the 30th August, to nullify the effects of the Russian action at Ma-chia-pu, a British detachment occupied Feng-tai, the next station to Ma-chia-pu, and the junction of the Lu-han and Tientsin railways. The place had contained large railway workshops, all of which had been destroyed, along with a number of locomotives. The Russians from Ma-chia-pu were busy leveling the line and collecting sleepers and rails from the adjacent fields and villages, where they had been hidden, and the British were soon employed on the same work between Teng-tai and the next station, Huang-tsun.

On the 31st August the British occupied Kung-ch'i-ch'êng, an important strategical point, where the main road from Peking to the south crosses the Hun-ho by the massive stone bridge of Lu-kou-ch'iao. Some 300 yards higher up, the river is spanned by a fine iron girder bridge, over which runs the Lu-han railway.

On the same day the Naval Brigade, and the Marines of the Legation Guard, who had fought so well during the siege, left Peking for Tung-chou, on their way to rejoin the fleet.

On the 1st September the 3rd Bombay Cavalry arrived at Tientsin, and two days later the 34th Pioneers reached the same place.

Everything was now quiet in the capital, and on the 3rd September Prince Ch'ing arrived in Peking, and took up his residence in the Japanese Quarter. He was supposed to be

accredited as a plenipotentiary from the Court, but had no powers to treat with the allies.

On the 5th September "B" Battery, R. H. A., reached Tientsin, and the detachment of mounted Bengal Sappers, attached to the Cavalry Brigade, arrived on the following day.

There were still a good many Boxers and disbanded soldiers scattered about the country, and skirmishes were of constant occurrence between them and the patrols of the allies. On the night of the 6th the enemy attacked the Russian railway camp near Ma-chia-pu, and killed an officer and some men. In consequence the Russians made a raid to the south, along the west wall of the Nan-hai-tze, burnt some villages, and killed a number of Chinese, including some Boxers.

On the 8th September an expedition left Tientsin for Tu-liu, on the Grand Canal, which was reported to be occupied by Boxers. The town was entered without opposition, and, as the enemy had retired from the neighbourhood, the place was burnt, and the troops returned to Tientsin on the 14th September.

On the 11th September a German force of about 800 infantry and 6 guns attacked the walled town of Liang-hsiang-hsien, which stands on the main road to Pao-ting Fu, about eighteen miles south-west of Peking. As they had no cavalry they were accompanied by forty-four sowars of the 1st Bengal Lancers. A Maxim gun, from the British detachment at Kang-ch'i-ch'êng, also joined the force. The German Krupp guns were each drawn by a team of six Chinese mules, and, as the road was very heavy after the late rains, their progress was very slow. To the east of Liang-hsiang-hsien, across the railway, is a prominent pagoda, standing on a small, bare hill. As our cavalry approached the town they found it occupied by large numbers of Boxers, who rushed out to the attack, but, on the guns coming into action at long range, they retired, and began to disperse rapidly in all directions through the high crops. The principal body marched out in regular order by the southern road towards Pao-ting Fu, and got away unharmed, but the cavalry killed about thirty armed Boxers moving off towards the west. After much delay the Germans finally blew in the east gate and entered the town, which they completely burnt, killing many of the inhabitants. The force returned

the same evening to Kung-ch'i-ch'êng, and the following day to Peking.

On the 13th a detachment of British cavalry, with a force of Japanese, occupied Huang-tsun, near the south-west corner of the Nan-hai-tze, after driving out the Boxers, of whom about thirty were killed. The Japanese then began the repair of the railway, working north towards Feng-tai.

On the 14th September a serious explosion occurred at Tung-chou, resulting in twenty-nine deaths among the British troops, including Captain Hill of the Chinese Regiment. The men were employed, at the time of the accident, in removing and destroying Chinese powder from the temple near the junk landing-place, when from some cause, which has not been satisfactorily explained, a large quantity exploded.

On the 16th the Australian Naval Brigade arrived at Tientsin, and on the same day a force, consisting of 800 British and 800 Americans, under command of Brigadier-General Wilson of the United States Army, accompanied by Major-General Barrow, the British Chief of the Staff, moved out by the paved road from the western gate of the Chinese City to Kung-ch'i-ch'êng, where it halted in the evening. It was intended that a converging attack should be made at daybreak the following morning on the temples of Pa-ta-ch'ü in the Western Hills, where a large body of Boxers were reported to have their head-quarters. The British and Americans were to operate from the south and west, the Japanese from the north, and a party of Germans were to move out from Peking and attack the position from the east. The British and American column left Kung-ch'i-ch'êng at 1-30 A.M. on the 17th September, and reached Pei-hsing-an about 5 A.M. From there one body of troops moved by Mo-shih-k'ou on to the ridge west of Pa-ta-ch'ü, while the remainder moved along the foot of the hills. The Japanese were early in position to the north, but the Germans arrived after the affair was over. The Boxers had no warning of our approach, and were cooking their food when the first shots were fired. They rapidly dispersed through the gap left by the non-arrival of the Germans, losing a few of their number in their flight. At the same time a party of British cavalry visited San-chia-tien on the Hun-ho, and destroyed the arsenal there.

A party of Americans had also been out on an expedition to the north-east, from which they returned on the 21st September. They found the country quite quiet, and the people busy with the harvest.

On the 18th September the 20th Punjab Infantry reached Sin-
 Arrival of 3rd Infantry ho, and on the 20th and two following days
 Brigade. the remainder of the 3rd Infantry Brigade
 reached Wei-hai-wei. This brigade had sailed from Calcutta between
 the 13th and 24th August, and had arrived at Hong-Kong in the
 first days of September, where they were detained till the 15th.

On the 20th September the Pei-t'ang forts to the north of
 Capture of Pei-t'ang forts. Tang-ku were captured, and occupied
 by a combined force of Russians, Germans,
 and French.

The Russians, after the capture of the forts, pushed along the railway to Lu-tai in the direction of Tong-shan.

On the 23rd September Major-General Richardson and the staff of the Cavalry Brigade arrived at Peking with the 16th Bengal Lancers.

On the 25th General Gaselee proceeded on a visit to Tientsin. On the same day His Excellency Field Marshal Count von Waldersee arrived at Taku, and reached Tientsin on the 27th, where he was received by guards of honour of all nations.

Meanwhile arrangements were actively proceeding in Peking and elsewhere for the housing and maintenance of the British troops remaining in garrison in North China for the winter.

In view of the large forces which the other Powers proposed
 Troops in North China. to retain in North China, Her Majesty's
 Government decided on the following
 distribution of the British contingent:—

In Chih-li.—1st and 4th Infantry Brigades, Cavalry Brigade, including the Horse Artillery Battery, 12th Field Battery, three companies of Sappers, Jodhpur Lancers, Maler Kotla Sappers, etc.

At Wei-hai-wei.—3rd Infantry Brigade, Hong-Kong Regiment, and heavy guns.

At Shanghai.—2nd Infantry Brigade.

This was practically the actual distribution during the winter, except that some troops, including the 1st Bengal Lancers, and one company of Madras Sappers, were sent to Hong-Kong and Shanghai, and the 3rd Infantry Brigade wintered at Shan-hai-kuan, while the Hong-Kong Regiment were at Tientsin instead of at Wei-hai-wei, which was garrisoned by the 28th Madras Infantry and the 1st Madras Pioneers.

The approximate strength of the allies' contingents which were present in China at the time of Field-Marshal Count von Waldersee's arrival at Taku, at the end of September, was as follows:—

America.

- 4 battalions of Infantry.
- 1½ regiments of Cavalry.
- 1 Field Artillery battery (6 guns).
- 1 company of Engineers.

British.

- ½ battalion of British Infantry.
- ½ battalion of Australian Naval Brigade.
- 18 battalions of Native Infantry from India.
- 16 squadrons of Native Cavalry from India.
- 1 Horse Artillery battery
- 1 Field Artillery battery } 14 field guns.
- 2 Naval 12-pr. guns
- 4 1-pr. Maxim-Nordenfelts.
- 21 Maxim guns.
- 12 siege guns.
- 4 companies of Sappers.

French.

- 11 battalions of Infantry.
- 2 squadrons of Cavalry.
- 6 batteries of Artillery.
- 2 companies of Engineers.

German.

- 10 battalions of Infantry.
- 3 squadrons of Cavalry.
- 7 batteries of Artillery (40 guns).
- 3½ companies technical troop

Italian.

- 2 battalions of Infantry.
- 4 Gardner guns.

Japanese.

- 13 battalions of Infantry.
- 3 squadrons of Cavalry.
- 9 batteries of Artillery (54 guns).
- 1 heavy battery (4 guns).
- 3 companies Pioneers.
- ½ Railway battalion.

Russian.

- 8 battalions of Infantry.
- 3 squadrons of Cavalry.
- 3 batteries of Artillery (22 guns).
- 4 technical companies.

Colonel J. M. Grierson, M.V.O., R.F.A., and Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel C. H. Powell, Indian Staff Corps, were appointed British military representatives on the staff of the Field-Marshal. The French avoided appointing any officer, and the American army was also unrepresented; and it soon became apparent that the Russian officers considered their position ambiguous, as they asserted that the Field-Marshal was not now in command of the Russian troops at all, since that arrangement had only been made with the object of conducting operations for the relief of the legations in Peking, and, as that had already been accomplished, the appointment no longer held good.

The instructions sent to General Gaselee by the Secretary of State for India, regarding the appointment of Count Waldersee as Commander-in-Chief in North China, were as follows:—"Field-Marshal Count von Waldersee, of the German Army, will shortly proceed to North China to assume 'supreme direction' of the military operations to be conducted in the Province of Chih-li. You will, as General Commanding the Forces of a loyal ally, afford him every support in carrying out the operations that he may decide upon. You will foster, by every means in your power, the most friendly relations and feelings of true comradeship between all ranks under your command, and the soldiers of

all the foreign contingents employed in North China. The command of the troops supplied by us will, however, rest always with you, and the superior officers will be under your orders (although their special sphere of action, or the part they are to take in any particular operation, will be decided by Field-Marshal Count von Waldersee), and all orders to the force under your command should be given through you or your Brigadiers. You will have complete control over your own equipment, transport, commissariat, and medical arrangements; and, whilst helping the troops of the allies, when you can afford to do so, without detriment to the interests of your own troops, you must remember that the establishments sent with your force are only calculated to supply its wants."

Immediately on his arrival at Taku the Field-Marshal requested Admiral Seymour to concert measures with Admiral Bendemann for the occupation of Shan-hai-kuan for the use of the allied contingents.

Admiral Seymour suggested that British troops should be landed to carry out the occupation. These troops could be conveniently drawn from the 3rd Brigade, which was quartered at Wei-hai-wei, and, on the arrival of General Gaselee from Peking on the 28th, he was directed by the Field-Marshal to make such arrangements as he considered suitable for the despatch of troops to Shan-hai-kuan.

He immediately ordered Major-General Reid to proceed from Wei-hai-wei, with the 4th Punjab Infantry and 6th Bengal Infantry, and to occupy Shan-hai-kuan. The 34th Pioneers from Tientsin, the Jodhpur Lancers from Shanghai and Hong-Kong, and the Maler Kotla Sappers from Hong-Kong were also ordered to the same place, while the 4th Brigade at Hong-Kong was ordered up to Tientsin.

On the evening of the 29th September H.M.S. "Pigmy," with Sir Walter Hillier and Lieutenant-Colonel Powell on board, left Taku, and arrived off Shan-hai-kuan the following morning under a flag of truce. The Chinese were summoned to hand over the forts to the allies, and this they at once agreed to do. Sir Walter Hillier and Lieutenant-Colonel Powell then landed a guard of eighteen bluejackets and marines, under Lieutenant Briggs, R.N., and the Pigmy returned to Taku to report. The guard took up its quarter

in the railway station, and found that the line was in good order, and the trains were running daily towards both Tong-shan and Chin-chou.

On the morning of the 1st October the British flag was hoisted on all the forts, and on the powder magazine, and guards were placed where possible. The Union Jack was also hoisted at Ching-wang-tao. The same evening a force of Russians landed at Shan-hai-kuan from Taku, and the following morning the rest of the allies arrived. Later in the day a large force of Russians arrived from Tong-shan by train, and attempted to seize the railway station, but this was not allowed. They, however, laid claim to the whole line, and to the entire management of it.

On the 2nd the French landed at Ching-wang-tao, and marched on Tang-ho railway station, which they found occupied by Russian troops, but, mistaking them for Boxers, opened fire. The fire was returned, with the result that the French had one officer and two men killed and eight wounded, the Russians losing two men killed and three wounded.

Owing to a breakdown in telegraphic communication with Wei-hai-wei, the bulk of the British infantry did not reach Shan-hai-kuan till the evening of the 2nd October.

The Field Marshal now issued orders that the fortifications and railway station were to be occupied by the allies in common.

By an army order of the 19th October the German, Austrian, Italian, and Japanese troops in the neighbourhood of Shan-hai-kuan, were placed under the orders of Major-General Reid. This tended to bring about a better state of affairs, as much lawlessness had previously prevailed among the troops, and the surrounding country was being pillaged by Chinese banditti.

After the dispersal of the Chinese forces in the neighbourhood of Peking, by far the greater part of them retired to the south-west, which was also the direction from which any reinforcements of fresh troops might be expected to arrive, and it was reported that a considerable force, said to be under the command of Tung-fu Hsiang, had its headquarters at Pao-ting Fu, while every town and village south of the Hun-ho was occupied by bands of Boxers and Imperial soldiers.

It was evident that before anything more could be done with regard to settling the country, all armed bodies within a wide radius of Peking must be broken up and dispersed, and the first step to be taken in this direction appeared to be the occupation of Pao-ting Fu, the head-quarters of the Chinese forces. There were other reasons why an early visit to this particular city appeared to be desirable. It is the provincial capital of the Chih-li province, and there, under the fostering care of its officials, the Boxer movement first declared itself in open attacks upon foreigners. As early as the month of May several British and American missionaries had been murdered by the populace just outside the walls of the city, and it was reported that three or four Europeans were still prisoners in the hands of the officials.

On the 28th September, 1900, General Gaselee called upon the Field-Marshal at Tientsin, and it was arranged that two columns should move out from Peking and Tientsin, with the object of making a combined attack on Pao-ting Fu. At first it was intended that this force should consist of British, German, and Italian troops only.

The Americans, Japanese, and Russians did not wish to participate in the operations, and the French troops were not under Count Waldersee's orders. The British were prepared to start at once, but the German arrangements were as yet incomplete. They were deficient of transport, and much of their clothing and supplies was still on board their ships. There seemed therefore to be every prospect of a long delay, when the news got about that the French were preparing to undertake a similar expedition to the same place with their own troops. This accelerated the German preparations, and it was arranged between the Field-Marshal and General Voyron, commanding the French forces, that the latter should combine with the two columns, which Count Waldersee proposed to despatch from Peking and Tientsin, in carrying out a general advance on Pao-ting Fu. It was further arranged that the command of the Tientsin column should be given to Major-General Bailloud of the French Army, while the column from Peking would be under General Gaselee, who would assume command of both columns on their junction in the neighbourhood of Pao-ting Fu.

Preparations now went rapidly forward, and the two columns started from Peking and Tientsin respectively on the 12th October. The Peking column numbered about 3,500 men, and consisted of:—

British.—Three squadrons 16th Bengal Lancers, four guns 12th battery, R. F. A., a half company of Madras Sappers and Miners, and 600 native infantry from the 1st Sikhs, 24th Punjab Infantry, and 26th Bombay Infantry; all under command of Major-General Richardson.

French.—Two battalions of marine infantry.

German and Italian.—Six guns, two battalions of German infantry, and one battalion of Italian infantry; all under command of Colonel von Normann.

The Tientsin column was numerically stronger, and consisted of:—

British.—“B” Battery, R. H. A., two squadrons 3rd Bombay Cavalry, and one troop 1st Bengal Lancers; one company Victoria Naval Brigade, with two Maxims and one 12-pr. naval gun, six companies 20th Punjab Infantry, four companies Hong-Kong Regiment, two companies 1st Madras Pioneers, and half a company Bombay Sappers and Miners; all under command of Major-General Lorne Campbell.

French.—Two battalions of infantry, one squadron of cavalry, with some guns and engineers.

German and Italian.—Four guns, one troop of cavalry, and two battalions of German infantry. One Italian battery, three companies of Bersaglieri, and a pioneer detachment; all under command of Major General von Kettler.

The Peking column marched by the direct road to Pao-ting Fu, the various contingents taking it in turn each day to lead the march. The Tientsin column marched by three roads, the French and German-Italian detachments to the north of the Pao-ting Fu river, and the British contingent following a road to the south. The river was utilised for the transport of supplies.

No opposition was encountered, as the Chinese took care to keep out of the way of the advancing columns. There are eight regular stages between Peking and Pao-ting Fu, but as the march had to be accomplished in seven days, it entailed a slight alteration in the

halting-places. However, there was nowhere any difficulty on this account, as the country passed through is a rich one. The necessary supplies were everywhere obtainable, and water was fairly plentiful.

Pao-ting Fu was reached on the 19th October. Throughout the march the British pitched their camp at each halting-place, while the other troops were billeted in the villages and towns.

The column from Tientsin arrived within a day's march of Pao-ting Fu on the 17th, and halted for a day. The British contingent of this column was, however, delayed, as the route it had followed to the south of the river proved much longer and more difficult than was expected, and, in consequence, it did not reach Pao-ting Fu till the 21st October.

A small French column of about 1,000 men had preceded the main column from Tientsin, and had arrived at Pao-ting Fu some days in advance of the rest of the allied force. They had occupied all the gates of the city, but were said to have been ordered by their General to remain outside, until the main columns arrived. They had also seized the railway, which was in working order from about six miles north of Pao-ting Fu as far south as Ting-chou, and when the Peking column arrived they were already busy repairing it.

On nearing the city the column was met by the Fen-tai, the chief magistrate of Pao-ting Fu, and a number of other officials. General Gaselee decided that the troops should remain outside for the night, and that the formal entry should be made next day, when the question of the occupation of the town and the portions to be allotted to each contingent would be decided.

Accordingly, on the morning of the 20th October, the General and his staff, accompanied by the other commanders with their staff and mounted escorts, rode all through the city, which is divided into four quarters by main streets running north and south and east and west. Immediately after visiting the town a conference of the commanders was held, when it was decided that the British should occupy and police the north-west quarter of the city, the French should take charge of the south-west quarter, the Germans of the north-east quarter, and the Italians of the south-east quarter.

The commanders of the other three nations decided to march their troops into the city, and quarter them in the houses, but the British contingent remained outside, encamped to the north of the town. General Gaselee, however, removed his head-quarters into the north-west section allotted to the British, and a strong force of police, under an officer, also took up their quarters in this district, while a strong British guard held the North Gate.

Cavalry reconnoitring parties were sent out into the hills to the west and north-west of Pao-ting Fu, where Boxers were reported to be collected in considerable numbers, and these had one or two small skirmishes with the enemy.

Immediately after the arrival of the columns at Pao-ting Fu, grave suspicion fell upon the local officials of complicity with the Boxers in the murders of the British and American Missionaries, which had been committed at the outbreak of the recent troubles. To enquire into these charges General Gaselee appointed an International Commission, with General Bailloud as President.

Several officials were taken into custody on suspicion, and the cases were all tried before the International Commission, with the result that T'ing-yung, the Fen-tai; Kuei-hêng, the Tartar governor, commanding the Manchu garrison; and Wang-chan-kuei, a colonel commanding the provincial troops, to whom the missionaries had in vain applied for protection from the Boxers, were sentenced to be beheaded. These sentences were duly carried out on the 6th November, outside the south-east corner of the city wall, at the spot where the missionaries had been murdered three months before.

In addition to these executions, several Boxers implicated in the murders of the missionaries were captured, tried, and shot; and, as a punishment to the town itself, the city temple, dedicated to the tutelary deities, and also the temple in which the Boxers practised their rights, and in which the missionaries had been confined while awaiting death, were blown up and totally destroyed by fire. The south-east corner of the city wall, outside which the missionaries had been murdered, was also razed to the ground, and a heavy fine was imposed on the town.

The punishment of Pao-ting Fu having been effected, General Gaselee determined to withdraw his troops, as did the commander

of the Italian contingent, but the Germans and French decided to retain garrisons at this point during the winter. The troops from Peking were to return, on a broad front, by three roads, different from that taken on the march south, and the British column from Tientsin was also to return by a slightly different road from the one it had used in its advance on Pao-ting Fu, with the object of visiting certain Boxer villages.

The first column to start was a battalion of German infantry, which would march *viâ* Yi-chou and the foot of the western hills to Peking. With it were some of the 16th Bengal Lancers, the detachment of mounted Sappers, and three companies of Italian infantry, all under command of Colonel von Normann. They left Pao-ting Fu on the 23rd October, and, after visiting the Imperial tombs at Yi-chou, moved west into the hills, and encountered a considerable force of Chinese troops near the Great Wall, which they dispersed with heavy loss. They afterwards continued their march on Peking, which was reached without further incident.

On the 27th October the British column for Tientsin started and reached the latter place on the 6th November, having visited and punished several Boxer villages, collected a large number of mules and cattle, and captured and destroyed a large amount of arms and ammunition, and a quantity of gunpowder loaded upon junks.

On the following day the British column took a road which was well to the east of the main road, and which led through Yung-ch'ing-hsien and Lang-fang. General Gaslee started the same day direct for Peking, where he arrived on the 1st November.

The Italian Column, consisting of a battery of artillery and three companies of Bersaglieri, together with a battalion of German infantry and a few German cavalry, all under the command of Colonel Garioni, started on the 29th October, by a road passing through Ku-an-hsien, and running at some distance to the east of the direct road to Peking.

The British column, consisting of all the remainder of the
 Yung-ching hsien visited. British troops, commanded by Major-General Richardson, reached Yung-ch'ing-hsien on the 31st October, and here a halt was made for a day, to

enquire into the murder of two British missionaries, Messrs. Norman and Robinson, in the beginning of June.

General Richardson imposed a fine of 40,000 *taels* on the town, and, in addition, ordered the total destruction of the town temple, and also of another temple, commonly used by the Boxers; and of the north gate of the town, near which Mr. Robinson had been murdered. The villages of Wu-chia-ying, and Ta-cheh-hsiang, where a chapel had been destroyed and several Chinese Christians murdered, were also completely burnt down.

Near Lang-fang certain Boxer villages were also burnt, before the force continued its march to Peking, which was reached on the 6th November, on which day the German column from Yichou arrived at the capital, the Italian column having come in the day before.

With the return of the allied troops from Pao-ting Fu active Termination of active operations. military operations in North China practically ceased. It had been conclusively proved that there was no Chinese force in the field, which had the least wish to oppose our troops, and the Boxer bands had all been dispersed and scattered, and were being hunted down by the Imperial soldiery. The Russian and Japanese Governments were even withdrawing their troops from Chih-li, and were preparing to reduce their garrisons, before the intense cold of winter set in.

The widespread upheaval in the north had naturally caused Unrest in Central and South China. great excitement throughout the empire, and the wildest reports as to the doings of the Boxers, and their victories over the "foreign devils," were everywhere in circulation. In view of the universal distrust and hatred of foreigners throughout China, it was felt that the disturbances would almost certainly spread to the Yang-tse valley, and probably to Canton and the West River as well, the provinces of Kuang-si and Kuang-tung in the south being notoriously turbulent, and always ripe for rebellion. Hu-nan and Kuang-si to the south of the Yang-tse are also notably anti-foreign provinces, and might be expected to give trouble.


To protect British interests on the Yang-tse, H.M.S. *Hermion* and *Linnet* were ordered, on the 15th June, to proceed to Nanking and Hankow, respectively, and to convey to Liu K'un-yi

PEKING

14th, 15th, and 16th August 1900.

Scale 3 inches 2 miles.

1000 500 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 Yards



and Chang Chih-tung, the Viceroy at these places, assurances of the assistance of the British Government in maintaining peace in their jurisdictions.

On the 24th June the British consuls at Canton, Chung-king, and Ningpo all applied for gunboats, to protect British life and property at those treaty ports, but as no vessels were then available they were informed that gunboats could not be sent, but that in case of danger all Europeans must withdraw for safety to Hong-Kong or Shanghai. These places were never seriously threatened.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

EVENTS FROM 1901 TO THE CONCLUSION OF THE CAMPAIGN.

ON the 1st January, 1901, the strength of the combatants, troops of the allied forces in Chih-li was approximately as follows:—

| <i>In and around Peking.</i> | | | |
|------------------------------|----|----|---|
| British | .. | .. | Cavalry .. 4 squadrons. |
| | | | Artillery .. 6 guns. |
| | | | Infantry .. 4 battalions and 2 companies. |
| | | | Engineers .. 1 company and details. |
| French | .. | .. | Artillery .. 24 guns. |
| | | | Infantry .. 5 battalions. |
| Germans | .. | .. | Cavalry .. 2 squadrons. |
| | | | Artillery .. 3 guns. |
| | | | Infantry .. 6 battalions and 3 companies. |
| Italians | .. | .. | Artillery .. 6 guns. |
| | | | Infantry .. 1 battalion and 3 companies. |
| Japanese | .. | .. | Cavalry .. 2 squadrons. |
| | | | Artillery .. 12 guns. |
| | | | Infantry .. 3 battalions. |
| Russians | .. | .. | Cavalry .. 1 squadron. |
| | | | Artillery .. 2 guns. |
| | | | Infantry .. 2 companies. |
| United States | .. | .. | Cavalry .. 1 squadron. |
| | | | Artillery .. 6 guns. |
| | | | Infantry .. 2 battalions and 2 companies. |

In and around Tientsin.

| | | | |
|---------|----|----|---|
| British | .. | .. | Cavalry .. 4 squadrons. |
| | | | Artillery .. 6 guns and 2 pompoms. |
| | | | Infantry .. 6 battalions and 2 companies. |
| | | | Engineers .. 1 company. |
| French | .. | .. | Cavalry .. 1 squadron. |
| | | | Artillery .. 12 guns. |
| | | | Infantry .. 4 battalions. |

| | | | | | |
|---------------|----|----|-----------|----|---------------|
| Germans | .. | .. | Cavalry | .. | 1 squadron. |
| | | | Artillery | .. | 18 guns. |
| | | | Infantry | .. | 4 battalions. |
| Russians | .. | .. | Infantry | .. | 3 companies. |
| United States | | .. | Infantry | .. | 2 companies. |

At Tang-ku.

| | | | | | |
|---------------|----|----|-----------|----|---------------|
| Germans | .. | .. | Artillery | .. | 8 guns. |
| Italians | .. | .. | Infantry | .. | 1 company. |
| Japanese | .. | .. | Cavalry | .. | 1 troop. |
| | | | Artillery | .. | 6 guns. |
| | | | Infantry | .. | 2 battalions. |
| Russians | .. | .. | Infantry | .. | 3 companies. |
| United States | .. | .. | Infantry | .. | 2 companies. |

On Railway line to Shan-hai-kuan.

| | | | | | |
|----------|----|----|----------|----|---------------|
| Russians | .. | .. | Infantry | .. | 2 battalions. |
|----------|----|----|----------|----|---------------|

At and around Shan-hai-kuan.

| | | | | | |
|----------|----|----|-----------|----|------------------------------|
| British | .. | .. | Cavalry | .. | 4 squadrons. |
| | | | Artillery | .. | 2 pompoms. |
| | | | Infantry | .. | 3 battalions. |
| | | | Engineers | .. | 1 company. |
| French | .. | .. | Infantry | .. | 1 battalion. |
| Germans | .. | .. | Infantry | .. | 2 companies. |
| Japanese | .. | .. | Cavalry | .. | 1 troop. |
| | | | Infantry | .. | 1 battalion. |
| Russians | .. | .. | Cavalry | .. | 2 squadrons. |
| | | | Artillery | .. | 8 guns. |
| | | | Infantry | .. | 1 battalion and 3 companies. |

At Pao-ting Fu.

| | | | | | |
|---------|----|----|-----------|----|---------------|
| French | .. | .. | Cavalry | .. | 1 squadron. |
| | | | Artillery | .. | 18 guns. |
| | | | Infantry | .. | 3 battalions. |
| Germans | .. | .. | Cavalry | .. | 1 squadron. |
| | | | Artillery | .. | 18 guns. |
| | | | Infantry | .. | 4 battalions. |

The actual strength of the British contingent of the China Expeditionary Force on this date was :—

| | | | | |
|---------|----|----|----|--------|
| British | .. | .. | .. | 2,129 |
| Native | .. | .. | .. | 16,100 |

Total .. 18,229 officers and men.

Everything was now very quiet in the Chih-li province, and General Gaselee was instructed to arrange the withdrawal of Australian contingent. or the return of the Australian naval contingent before the end of March. He represented that, when withdrawn as directed, their place should be taken by a British battalion, as white troops were most desirable for police duties and employment on the railway, as guards, ticket-collectors, etc., where they would be dealing with the troops of foreign contingents. Orders were consequently issued, towards the end of February, for the despatch of half a battalion of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers from Hong-Kong to North China, to relieve the Australian contingent; they arrived at Tientsin on the 23rd March and at Peking on the 25th; the Australians at the latter place leaving the following day for Tientsin, *en route* to Australia.

All this time negotiations for peace had been dragging slowly along, and there seemed to be no prospect of any definite result being reached. With a view to waking up the Chinese authorities, Count Waldersee determined to show them that, if it became necessary, he was prepared to resume active operations, and to compel the acceptance of the terms demanded by the allied powers. He therefore issued an army order on the 15th February, in which he stated that, as the season of the year would shortly be favourable for the movement of troops and the resumption of hostilities, all commanders should take steps to render their contingents thoroughly ready for mobilization at short notice, in case it might be found necessary to undertake fresh military operations. All troops were directed to be prepared to move by the end of the month, and to be provided with such transport as would be suitable for a campaign in mountainous country.

This clearly pointed to the possibility of an expedition being sent into the Shan-si province, and as such it was undoubtedly regarded by the Chinese plenipotentiaries, who immediately wired to the Court at Hsi-an Fu, urging the acceptance of the demands of the foreign ministers, with regard to the punishments of the high officials implicated in the Boxer troubles and in the attacks upon the legations in Peking. The result was a reply from the Court, accepting the terms in full, and the publication of a satisfactory

edict, specifying the penalties to be inflicted on the persons whose names were included in the list presented by the foreign plenipotentiaries. In consequence of this action on the part of the Chinese, the expedition was postponed, and eventually abandoned.

The railway was now working well, and trains were running punctually.

Towards the end of March the Field-Marshal suggested that the negotiations for peace should be pushed forward with all speed, to allow of the reduction of the allied forces in Chih-li. He pointed out that troops with nothing to do were apt to cause trouble, that the hot weather with its attendant ill-health was approaching, and that the monsoon season would add to the difficulties of transporting troops by sea.

The approximate strength of troops in the various allied contingents on the 1st April 1901 was as follows:—

| | | |
|----------------------------------|---|------------------|
| Strength of Allies on 1st April. | Strength of contingents on the 1st April 1901 | was as follows:— |
| Germans | 21,295 | |
| British | 18,181 | |
| French | 15,670 | |
| Japanese | 6,408 | |
| Russians | 2,900 | |
| Italians | 2,155 | |
| Americans | 1,750 | |
| Austrians | 300 | |
| | <hr/> | |
| | Total .. | 68,659 |
| | | <hr/> |

At a conference of general officers, held at Peking on the 6th April, the Field-Marshal's proposition was accepted, that the following fortifications, which by their nature and position might interfere with free communication between Peking and the sea, should be razed:—

1. The Military Camp at south exit from Yang-tsun, if not required for the accommodation of the garrison to be left there.

2. The Military Magazine of Hsi-ku.

3. The Yellow Fort.

4. The Black Fort (citadel).

5. The East Arsenal.

6. The two camps at Chü-liang-ch'eng.

} Tientsin.

7. The four camps at Sin-ho.

8. All the fortifications at Taku, *viz.*, on the right bank of the Pei-ho, the coast battery with the camp attached to it, and the South Fort of Taku with its camp; and on the left bank, the North-West and North Forts.

9. All the fortifications at Pei-t'ang, *viz.*, the South Fort, the Central and North Forts, the two earthworks to the north of these, and the camps between the line of forts and the railway.

10. All the camps at Lu-tai, within a distance of 2,000 metres from the railway embankment.

11. The camps between Tang-ho and Shan-hai-kuan within a distance of 2,000 metres of the railway.

12. All the forts at Shan-hai-kuan, except those required for the accommodation of the international garrison to be left at Shan-hai-kuan, which might be temporarily retained.

The West Arsenal at Tientsin, which is of no military importance, was not to be razed; and the high mud wall, which lies in the Russian concession, was to be placed at the disposal of the Russian authorities.

The strength of the garrison to be permanently left in Chih-li, for guarding the line of communication between Peking and the sea, was fixed as follows, exclusive of the guards of the legations in Peking:—

Tientsin to be held by 2,000 men, with a further force of 1,500 men at Shan-hai-kuan and Ching-wang-tao, while the following nine posts along the railway were to be occupied by garrisons of about 250 or 300 men each:—Huang-tsun, Lang-fang, Yang-tsun Chün-liang-ch'eng, Tang-ku, Lu-tai, Tong-shan, Lan-chou, and Ch'ang-li; making a total of about 6,000 men.

It was further decided that these posts should be held as follows:—The Italians should furnish the guard at Huang-tsun, the Germans those at Lang-fang and Yang-tsun; the French those at Chün-liang-ch'eng and Tang'ku, the British those at Lu-tai and Tong-shan, and the Japanese those at Lan-chou and Ch'ang-li, while, as long as the railway remained under British military administration, that nation should maintain a small guard at each station for police purposes, and no other nation should interfere with the railway stations or their policing. All five nations were to furnish approximately equal proportions of the garrisons at Tientsin and

Shan-hai-kuan ; and, for the present, until the Chinese Government was fully re-established in power, an additional force of 4,000 men would be maintained at Tientsin, to be furnished in equal proportions by France, Germany, Great Britain, and Japan, with a smaller contingent of Italians.

The appointment of a Commander-in-Chief for the whole of the international guards was suggested, but considered impracticable.

The strength of the Legation guards was fixed at about 2,000 men, made up as follows :—

| | | | | | | |
|-----------------|----|----|----|----|----|----------|
| America | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 150 men. |
| Germany | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 300 „ |
| France | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 300 „ |
| Great Britain | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 250 „ |
| Japan | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 300 „ |
| Italy | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 200 „ |
| Austria-Hungary | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 200 „ |
| Russia | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 300 „ |

On the 11th April orders were issued for the 4th Brigade of the 4th Infantry Brigade British Contingent, China Expeditionary Force, to be broken up. The brigade staff and Ulwar and Bikanir regiments were to return to India as soon as transports could be provided, and the 28th and 31st Madras Infantry were to be transferred to the lines of communication. The 1st Bengal Lancers at Hong-Kong, the 14th Sikhs and four sections of “pompoms,” at Shanghai, were ordered up to Tientsin. On the following day orders were issued for the move of No. 3 Company, Madras Sappers and Miners, from Shanghai, and a wing of the 1st Madras Pioneers from Tientsin for duty at Wei-hai-wei.

On the 20th April a party of the 4th Punjab Infantry, under Skirmish with Chinese Major Browning, when reconnoitring to the brigands near Tai-tou-ying. north of Fu-ning-hsien came in contact with a force of Chinese brigands near the town of Tai-tou-ying. The enemy was strongly posted, under cover, in a village near the town, and Major Browning determined to attempt to dislodge them. This, however, he failed to do, and in the fighting that ensued he and one sepoy were killed, Lieutenant Stirling* and

* Lieutenant Stirling, who was awarded the D. S. O. for his gallantry on this occasion, was killed in an action with raiders near Bannu in March 1910.

six men were wounded, and the column had to retreat on Fu-ning. Reinforcements, consisting of the rest of the 4th Punjab Infantry, under Colonel Radford, 100 men of the 6th Jats, a squadron of the Jodhpur Lancers, and a detachment of 200 Japanese, were at once despatched from Shan-hai-kuan. This force, which was subsequently joined by a company of French Zouaves, advanced on Tai-tou-ying on the 22nd, and captured it after some resistance, inflicting severe loss on the Chinese, who were driven beyond the Great Wall.

The question of the reduction of the whole allied force in North China was now assuming definite shape. On the 2nd May orders were issued for the return to India of No. 3 Company, Southern Division, Royal Garrison Artillery, the 1st Bengal Lancers, 1st Madras Pioneers, 28th Madras Infantry, and No. 3 Company, Madras Sappers and Miners. At the same time No. 15 Company, Western Division, Royal Garrison Artillery, and the 4th Balloon Section, Royal Engineers, were warned to be in readiness to embark for England.

On the 20th May General Gaselee received sanction from the British Government for the further reduction of the British force in Chih-li, by the return to India of the 1st Infantry Brigade, "B" Battery, Royal Horse Artillery, and the Jodhpur Lancers. These reductions were to be carried out *pari passu* with those of other contingents.

On the 25th May General Gaselee was directed to take measures at once to reduce the British forces in China to the strength proposed for the transition period, and to forward suggestions for the reduction of the garrisons of Hong-Kong and Shanghai.

General Gaselee then suggested the following as the British garrison to be left in North China during the ensuing winter :—

Legation Guard—Peking.

2 companies, Royal Welsh Fusiliers.

Detachment No. 2 company, Southern Division, R.G.A.

2 Naval 12-pr. Q. F. guns.

2 siege trains, 6-inch howitzers from Hong-Kong, and maxims.

Tientsin to Shan-hai-kuan.

3 sections of pompoms.
 2 companies, Royal Welsh Fusiliers.
 14th Sikhs.
 1st Battalion, 4th Gurkha Rifles.
 31st Madras Infantry.
 Hong-Kong Regiment.
 Half a British Field Hospital.
 2 Native Field Hospitals.

Shanghai.

Detachment of pompoms.
 2nd Bengal Infantry.
 30th Bombay Infantry.
 1 section of a British Field Hospital.
 2 sections of a Native Field Hospital.

The whole force to be commanded by Major-General Creagh, v.c., with his head-quarters at Tientsin, and a full staff.

On the 1st June the Field-Marshal announced that he had received orders from the German Emperor for the breaking up of the Army Headquarters, and their return to Europe. In consequence, Count Waldersee, with most of his staff, left Peking on the morning of the 3rd June.

A recrudescence of the Boxer movement, which took place towards the end of May, in the districts lying to the south of Pao-ting Fu and east of Cheng-ting Fu, was easily suppressed. A French column consisting of about 1,500 French troops, under General Bailloud, moved out from Pao-ting Fu, and, in conjunction with a force of Chinese regulars under General Lu, attacked the Boxers and completely dispersed them. At the same time German columns, in the hills to the west of Pao-ting Fu, encountered several bands of Boxers, probably fugitives from the fights with the French troops. These the Germans scattered, inflicting heavy loss. Quiet having thus been completely restored, the outlay detachments of French and German troops were gradually withdrawn to Pao-ting Fu and Peking.

Everything was now quiet in Chih-li except for the presence of large bands of armed banditti in the mountains to the north-west of Shan-hai-kuan, who threatened to give trouble by invading

the villages on the plains, but the Chinese Government was doing its best to make headway against these brigands with Imperial troops, and, meanwhile, the withdrawal of the allied contingents from North China was proceeding rapidly.

As the China Expeditionary Force might now be considered to have broken up, General Gaselee handed over command of the British troops in North China to Major-General Creagh, v.c., on the 21st July, and two days later left Chih-li for England.

At the end of July the attitude of Li Hung-chang became so obstructive and insolent, that the British Minister requested General Creagh to occupy the Summer Palace, with a view to bringing pressure to bear on Li, and the 12th Battery, Royal Field Artillery, and two companies of the 7th Bengal Infantry were accordingly quartered there for a short time.

At this time the Home Government suggested that the garrison of Shanghai might be further reduced to one battalion of infantry. The 2nd Bengal Infantry Regiment was accordingly sent to Hong-Kong from Shanghai in the beginning of September.

Towards the end of August the British Minister reported that he considered that the British troops in Chih-li were too few for the work they had to perform. At this time the strength of the other foreign contingents remaining in Chih-li were estimated as follows:—

Strength of troops remain-
ing in Chih-li.

| | | | | | | |
|-----------|----|----|----|----|----|-------|
| Germans | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 3,690 |
| French | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 3,860 |
| Russians | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1,900 |
| Italians | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1,170 |
| Americans | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 300 |
| Japanese | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 3,660 |

Total .. 14,580

Against these the strength of the British force would be about 3,450 men, when the reduction was completed, but, from having to guard the long line of railway, very few troops were available for other duties, and the British garrisons at Tientsin and Shan-hai-kuan were unduly weak, especially in view of possible trouble with armed robbers in the neighbourhood of Shan-hai-kuan, and of the report that the Russians intended to have a considerably

larger garrison in that place than they had at first stated. In consequence Sir Ernest Satow, after consulting General Creagh, strongly advised the retention in Chih-li of the 12th Battery, Royal Field Artillery, the 3rd Regiment, Bombay Cavalry, and the 4th Punjab Infantry, until the spring of 1902, in addition to the troops already arranged for. To this suggestion the Home Government agreed, but afterwards ordered the artillery and cavalry to be sent back to India, while the retention of the extra infantry battalion for the winter was sanctioned.

With the embarkation of the 3rd Bombay Cavalry and the 12th Field Battery, at the end of October and beginning of November, the reduction of the British contingent was finally completed.

END OF VOLUME VI.

PROVINCE OF INDIA
HEADQUARTERS G. O. S.
AUG. 1911